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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyses the discursive struggle in the New Caledonian media over the 
question of independence during the period of most acute conflict during the 1980s.  
It seeks to demonstrate that the discursive struggle was central to the political 
struggle, particularly in its emphasis on the development of discourses on identity 
which authorised particular forms of political engagement.  Colonial discourses in 
New Caledonia provided a well tested armory of identifications of the territory’s 
indigenous people which were mobilised in the anti-independence media, 
particularly the territory’s monopoly daily newspaper Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes.  
The thesis attempts to demonstrate how these identifications connoted, in effect, 
the non-existence of Kanaks through a denial of a ‘Kanak’ identity:  Melanesians 
who identified themselves as Kanaks and took a pro-independence stance were not 
recognised within the colonial identity constructions of ‘Caledonian’ and 
‘Melanesian’, and their claims to constitute a ‘people’ were vociferously denied.  
They existed within colonial discourses as a human absence, and were therefore 
considered to have no rightful claim on Caledonian political life.  In the face of such 
identifications, the pro-independence movement articulated in its media notions of 
‘Kanakness’ and the ‘Kanak people’ which sought to hyper-valorise their identity as 
human and rightful.   
 
It is argued that an analysis of media discourses requires consideration of the type 
of institutional constraints operating within the media institutions from within which 
these discourses emerge.  The thesis therefore analyses the major constraints 
operating within Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes and the two major pro-independence 
media organisations, ‘Kanaky’s first newspaper’ Bwenando and ‘Kanaky’s first radio 
station’ Radio Djiido. 
 
As an overarching concern, the thesis attempts to work through and apply different 
theoretical approaches relevant to the analysis of media reporting in situations of 
heightened political contestation, negotiating through aspects of neo-Marxist and 
post-structuralist approaches.  It assesses the relevance of the notion of ‘ideological 
effect’ as an analytical tool in assessing the effects of power produced by particular 
discourse, concluding that some theoretical notion concerned with elucidating the 
differential effects of power is required.   
 v
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
During much of the 1980s, New Caledonia was embroiled in political turmoil over 
the question of independence.  The increasing forcefulness of the political demands 
of pro-independence groups, in coalition after late 1984 as the Front de Libération 
National Kanak et Socialist (FLNKS - Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front), 
was met with a concerted response from opponents of independence.  The ensuing 
turmoil precipitated a polarisation of the territory’s population over the issue of its 
political future.  To the extent that there had come to be some commonality of 
experience between the primarily European community which opposed 
independence and the primarily Melanesian community which advocated it, as a 
result of decades of difficult but necessary co-existence1, these faded into 
insignificance in the face of the seeming enormity of the political divide that was 
developing.  In late 1984, an event occurred which symbolised this rupture.  A group 
of Kanaks2, most of whom were returning from a political meeting in the east coast 
town of Hienghène, were ambushed and slaughtered by a group of mixed-race 
settlers who considered themselves European.  After the event, there was general 
concurrence among the families of the dead, as well as among the assassins, that 
the victims and their killers had been, prior to the escalation of the Kanak political 
insurrection, friends.  That friendship could so readily turn to the will to violent 
annihilation must call into question the qualities and characteristics of that initial 
friendship.  But, equally, it attests to the ascendancy of a political culture grounded 
in the will to assert difference rather than explore commonality between the 
opposed political groups, if only as a means to authorise the many acts of political 
aggression initiated by both groups, of which the Hienghène massacre was amongst 
the worst.   
 
The level of political agitation in the territory over the issue of independence was 
such that most aspects of people’s lives were affected.  People therefore had an 
                                                          
1 Barbançon has written of a mimesis between the European and Melanesian communities in New 
Caledonia which, he argues, was disrupted by the massive influx of immigrants into the territory in the 
1960s and 1970s.  He has written:  ‘Between Kanaks and Caledonians, relations haven’t always been 
as severed or as simplistic as today.  History has of course known from the outset confrontations and 
fights...But History is also made of reunions, marriages, festivities.  If the differences are flagrant in 
reality, a number of similarities exist.  Even if these similarities aren’t apparent for a superficial or 
passing observer, they are nonetheless profound’ (1992:22). 
2 I use the term ‘Kanak’ when I am referring to pro-independence Melanesians, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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 immediate experiential basis for the opinions which they formed.  But these in turn 
were strongly influenced by, what Said has termed, the ‘communities of 
interpretation’ to which these people belonged (Said, 1981:41).  They brought with 
them a set of understandings which directed their reading of events - 
understandings which were expressive of their socio-cultural location in New 
Caledonian society and their personal histories, and which were in turn expressed 
through discourse.3  Also making sense of the often chaotic and tumultuous political 
events and developments during this period were the territory’s media.  Different 
sense was, of course, made by the different media, depending on whether these 
media opposed or supported independence, or, in a couple of rare instances, 
attempted to tread a middle line.  The narratives which these media developed 
sought to authorise certain readings and delegitimise others.  Indeed, a reading of 
the territory’s press over this decade makes it difficult to escape the conclusion that 
the force of the media’s political engagement served to deepen the political divide. 
 
In a world deemed post-colonial by many, the political crisis in New Caledonia can 
be read as either anachronistic or a testimony to the peremptory nature of such a 
description.4  For those engaging in the political struggle in New Caledonia, there 
was certainly nothing anachronistic about their situation, as colonialism in modern 
guise remained the structuring principle around which most aspects of people’s lives 
were organised.  This is not to argue that the emphasis within post-colonial writing 
on colonialism as a vision whose full realisation was always marred by the actuality 
of complex and difficult engagements is not of relevance to New Caledonia.  There, 
the project of colonialism was as much muddied by the complications of 
                                                          
3 In the thesis I follow Stuart Hall’s definition of discourse as ‘sets of ready-made and preconstituted 
“experiencings” displayed and arranged through language’ (Hall cited in Purvis and Hunt, 1993:485).  
This definition is further discussed in chapter 2. 
4 Anne McClintoch is critical of the application of the seemingly totalising term ‘post-colonialism’ to an 
analysis of the complexity of the changing world order.  She writes:  ‘My misgivings...are not about the 
theoretical substance of ‘post-colonial theory’, much of which I greatly admire.  Rather, I wish to 
question the orientation of the emerging discipline and its concomitant theories and curricula changes, 
around a singular, monolithic term, organised around a binary axis of time rather than power, and 
which, in its premature celebration of the pastness of colonialism, runs the risk of obscuring the 
continuities and discontinuities of colonial and imperial power’ (1994:294).  Vijay Mishra and Bob 
Hodge, in their discussion of one of the seminal post-colonial theory texts, The Empire Writes Back 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 1989), argue that what emerges in this book, which focuses primarily on 
post-colonial literature, ‘is the fact that we are really talking about not one “post-colonialism” but many 
postcolonialisms.  When we drop the hyphen, and effectively use “postcolonialism” as an always 
present tendency in any literature of subjugation marked by a systematic process of cultural 
combination through the imposition of imperial structures of power, we can begin to see those aspects 
of the argument of [The Empire Writes Back] which could be profitably extended.  This form of 
“postcolonialism” is not “post-” something or other but is already implicit in the discourses of 
colonialism themselves’ (1994:284).    
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 engagement as it was elsewhere.  However, post-colonialism’s concern to render 
more nuanced an understanding of the experiences of colonialism has led to an 
emphasis on research into arenas of political and cultural mediation and negotiation 
in formerly colonised territories and the emergence and significance of hybrid forms, 
and a lessening of the emphasis on consideration of the continuing existence of 
colonial divides.  The research emphasis therefore seems to have shifted away from 
consideration of issues of political crisis.   
 
Within media studies, the decisive influence of theoretical perspectives developed in 
industrialised Western societies has had a similar bearing on the orientation of 
research.  The heavy emphasis in most of this work on the analysis of the media’s 
functioning in sustaining the hegemonic nature of social formations raises questions 
regarding its relevance to the analysis of a political context in which broad societal 
hegemony did not exist.  The incorporation in media studies of concerns and 
concepts developed within post-structuralism has been highly fruitful in adding new 
dimensions to the analysis of the processes of social reproduction but, once again, 
an emphasis on the functioning of the media in situations of political struggle is not 
particularly prevalent in this work.  Very largely, therefore, contemporary theoretical 
orientations appear to have bypassed the New Caledonian ‘anachronism’.  How, 
therefore, do we study today the media’s functioning in situations of acute political 
contestation?  One theoretical concept, which was central to such concerns in the 
past, was that of ideology.  The media were conceived of as sites of ideological 
struggle between contending political forces.  But the notion of ideology, in 
particular, has fallen into theoretical disrepute.  In the face, therefore, of the 
rejection within much contemporary theory of concepts which might have been used 
in the past to facilitate media analysis, what is left?  Alternatively, is there relevance 
in the new concepts developed within post-structuralism, and indeed post-
colonialism, despite their different emphases?  The thesis begins with an 
exploration of what I believe to be some of the more intractable dilemmas, and 
opportunities, raised by contemporary theoretical developments for an analysis of 
the engagement of the media in the political struggle over independence in New 
Caledonia.   
 
The choice of New Caledonia as a case study on the functioning of the media in a 
situation of political crisis is, I believe, propitious, for at least two important reasons.  
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 There are practical advantages in studying New Caledonia from Australia.  The 
territory’s proximity to Australia has resulted in the development of good collections 
of material on New Caledonia in Australian libraries.  These include some 
newspaper collections.5  Moreover, there is expertise on New Caledonia within the 
Australian research community.  In addition, the relatively small size of the territory’s 
media meant that I was able to at least sight, if not delve into more fully, almost all 
copies of all publications produced in the territory during the 1980s, as well as a 
significant sampling of prior publications, and to gather material on all the audio-
visual media.  I was therefore able to get an appreciation for the totality of the 
media’s discursive terrain and to view the manner in which pro- and anti-
independence media discourses developed within and against each other.  What 
was happening in the media was a struggle over representation - a struggle over the 
right to render meaningful the myriad of events which were deemed significant to 
the political future of the territory.  In engaging in this struggle the media was not 
merely reflecting or expressing differing views already developed within the 
opposed political communities, but was rather, as this thesis seeks to demonstrate, 
centrally implicated in their production. 
 
The theoretical trajectory 
 
When I conceived of this thesis, I was particularly taken by the seeming relevance 
of Gramsci’s ideas on ideological hegemony to an analysis of the role which the 
media appeared to be playing in New Caledonia in the political struggle around 
independence.6  Gramsci’s argument that political struggles were first and foremost 
ideological struggles seemed to offer a plausible explanation for why political 
groupings in the territory were so interested in using the existing media, or in 
establishing their own media, to propagate their views.  For Gramsci, the objective 
of political groups was to forge a functioning consensus around their own positions 
(or indeed preserve their pre-existing consensus in the face of contestation), the 
                                                          
5 The New Caledonian daily newspaper, Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, which began publication in 
1971 and continues to the present, is available at the National Library of Australia.  Microfilms of the 
complete collection of another daily newspaper, La France Australe, which began publication in 1889 
and continued until 1979, are available at the Menzies Library at the Australian National University.  
The complete collection of the pro-independence publication, Bwenando, is also available on microfilm 
from the Menzies Library. 
6 For a discussion of Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony and consciousness, see Joseph Femia, 1981:23-
130.  See also Christine Buci-Glucksmann, 1982:116-126. 
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 attainment of this political consensus being described by Gramsci as a situation of 
‘ideological hegemony’.   
 
Because of the seeming relevance of Gramsci’s ideas to my reading of the media in 
New Caledonia, I had intended to reserve a large place in my thesis for the concept 
of ideology and to describe the struggle which I observed within and between the 
media as an ‘ideological struggle’.  I wanted to argue, in keeping with Gramsci, that 
the analysis of this ‘ideological struggle’ was critical to the analysis of the political 
struggle in general.  This argument was born out of my concern at the time that not 
enough attention was being directed within mainstream political science to the 
importance of ideology in political analysis. 
 
Some time later, after having done the bulk of my empirical work, I returned to my 
reading on theory and began to read work in cultural studies influenced by post-
structuralism.  I discovered that this literature had abandoned the concept of 
ideology, considering it antithetical to its major concerns.  Foucault appeared to 
summarise the main lines of this post-structuralist critique.  For Foucault, the 
concept of ideology was difficult to sustain on three grounds:  firstly, it presupposed 
the existence of a ‘true’ discourse against which other discourses could be 
assessed as ideological; secondly, ideology was epistemologically grounded in a 
theory of economic determinism; and, finally, the concept of ideology presupposed 
some notion of a unified subject (1984:60).  All of these presumptions were major 
areas of critique and exploration within post-structuralism. 
 
In the face of such a critique, I sought out more contemporary writing on ideology to 
see how theorists had responded and found that, essentially, the responses 
diverged down two separate tracks.  One response acknowledged the insights of 
post-structuralism and discarded the term as epistemologically flawed.  This was the 
finding of Michèle Barrett in her book The Politics of Truth:  From Marx to Foucault  
(1991).  Having begun researching the book with the objective of defending 
ideology, she ended up writing a book which argued that the concept of ideology 
should be discarded in favour of what she described as the more analytically 
coherent term ‘discourse’.  The other response was to stick doggedly to the term, 
but to shift it to an ‘effect’ of discourse so that one now talked about ‘ideological 
effects’.  This shift appeared to provide a means of distinguishing between the terms 
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 ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’, terms which had become increasingly blurred in a lot of 
cultural studies work. 
 
In essence, this literature argued that a discourse became ideological when it could 
be shown that it sustained relations of domination.  While I had little problem with 
this argument, I was left with the question of what to call discourse which 
undermines these relations of domination.  The literature seemed to suggest that 
such discourse was non-ideological, a position which I considered dangerously 
close to the suggestion that it constituted the truth  and one which I found difficult to 
sustain when I tried to apply it to my reading of the New Caledonian media. 
 
While I might readily be persuaded that the racist discourses of anti-independence 
groups, in their attempts to sustain the unequal power relations engendered by the 
experiences of colonialism in New Caledonia, were ideological, it would be difficult 
to consider the discourses of pro-independence groups as non-ideological, even if I 
agreed that their essential aim was to undermine domination.  The heavy 
mobilisation in these discourses of Marxist tropes and their grounding in structuralist 
global analysis suggests that it would be dangerous to argue that they were non-
ideological, particularly given the contemporary criticism of structuralist models, 
both theoretically and politically.  One conclusion was that both pro- and anti-
independence discourses might be described as ideological and that ideological 
discourse might better be conceived of as discourse used to either sustain or 
undermine dominative relations of power.  Ideological discourse would be, in other 
words, discourse which is linked to shifts in power.  
 
The post-structuralist retort to this position was inescapable.  A central argument 
within post-structuralism is that discourse is the means through which power is 
projected.  Discourse is power within this conceptualisation.7  This view on the 
relationship between discourse and power renders problematic the definition of 
ideological discourse given above, for under it, all discourse becomes ideological.  
Ideology thus becomes meaningless, or at least worthless as a separate tool of 
                                                          
7 Foucault wrote, for example, of the relationship between different discursive formations or 
knowledges, and power:  ‘We should admit...that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that 
there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any 
knowledge that does not at the same time pre-suppose and constitute power relations’ (Foucault, cited 
in Patton, 1987:232). 
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 analysis.  Why not throw it away, as does Barrett, and use the term discourse 
instead?   
 
By doing so I could avoid having to differentiate between pro- and anti-
independence discourse, simply describing each as versions, mobilised in pursuit of 
the perceived interests of those articulating them in the power struggle.  It meant 
that I didn’t have to engage in discussion of the relative truthfulness of the various 
versions.  As I said at the conclusion of a seminar where I presented my material on 
the political discourses in the New Caledonian daily, Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, 
the question within post-structuralism was not ‘how could the newspaper have been 
so wrong?’ in its reporting, but rather ‘what relations of power are sustained by its 
version of the “true”?’.  This question presupposed that I have some means for 
describing the relations of power in New Caledonian society in order to discuss how 
discourse relates to them.   
 
However, there are difficulties in the manner in which power is conceptualised within 
post-structuralism.  The Marxist and neo-Marxist conceptualisation of power views it 
as being possessed by classes, groups and institutions.  It is, as Wetherell and 
Potter put it, personalised.  The post-structuralist conception of power, on the other 
hands, as expressed, for example, in the work of Foucault, views power as 
dislocated.  It is not personally or collectively possessed (Wetherell & Potter, 
1991:79-85).  Foucault develops his view of power by contrasting it with what he 
terms the sovereign or judicial conception of power implicit in much Marxist and 
neo-Marxist writing.  The presumption behind this notion of power, he argues, is that 
it is repressive, but for Foucault:   
 
 the notion of repression is quite inadequate for capturing what is precisely 
the productive aspects of power.  In defining the effects of power as 
repression, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power, one 
identifies power with a law which says no, power is taken above all as 
carrying the force of a prohibition.  Now I believe that this is a wholly 
negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power...If power were never 
anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really 
think one would be brought to obey it?  What makes power hold good, what 
makes it accepted, is simply that it doesn’t weigh on us as a force that says 
no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse.  It needs to be considered as a productive 
network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a 
negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault, cited in Wetherell 
& Potter, 1992:83). 
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Wetherell and Potter join with other Marxist critics in arguing that this 
conceptualisation of power, which views it as a type of directionless network running 
through society, loses sight of the continuing existence of power inequities.  As Said 
writes of Foucault’s conceptualisation: 
 
 power can be made analogous neither to a spider’s web without the spider 
nor to a smoothly functioning flow diagram; a great deal of power remains in 
such coarse items as the relationship and tensions between rulers and ruled, 
wealth and privilege, monopolies of coercion, and the central state 
apparatus.  In understandably wishing to avoid the crude notion that power is 
unmediated domination, Foucault more or less eliminates the central 
dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society, despite the 
apparently perfected methods of ‘technotronic’ control and seemingly 
nonideological efficiency that seem to govern everything (1984:221) 
 
Perhaps another way of conceptualising power within post-structuralism would be to 
view power as a discourse.  My reading of New Caledonian media texts confirmed 
that there were competing discourses on the nature of power relations in the 
territory.  Anti-independence groups argued that power resided in a handful of 
Kanak terrorists manipulated by international socialism while pro-independence 
groups argued that it was vested in a local bourgeois elite with links to international 
capital and the French state.  Although one analysis might seem slightly more 
plausible than the other, to try to cut a line through these versions and come up with 
a more ‘objective’ view on power would seem antithetical to the post-structuralist 
method. 
 
Having reached the conclusion that both theoretical orientations had their limitations 
in explaining the New Caledonian situation, I resolved to draw on the most useful 
perspectives offered by each while acknowledging, but not attempting to reconcile, 
their differences.  What follows, therefore, is a discussion of the key theoretical 
perspectives I have applied in my analysis of the New Caledonian media. 
 
Theoretical perspectives 
 
Relations of power in New Caledonia are complex and contested.  However, I 
believe it is possible to talk about a certain directionality of dominative power which 
colonialism has entrained.  Such a view on power enables consideration of the 
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 potential implications of particular discourses; to assess, in other words, the 
potential ideological effects of particular discourses by looking at the extent to which 
they are likely to either sustain or undermine relations of domination.   
 
Why retain a place for such a concept of ideological effect in my thesis?  Essentially 
I do so because I want to be able to differentiate between the effects of power of 
different discourses.  I find it difficult to argue against the statement that all 
discourse produces effects of power.  The experiences of colonialism have touched 
almost every aspect (if not every aspect) of life in New Caledonia and relations of 
power in most contexts have been irrevocably changed as a consequence.  It is 
therefore possible to argue that all discourse in New Caledonia could be analysed 
for its ideological effects.  For example, it would be possible, and indeed 
fascinating, to study the manner in which gender power relations have altered 
through the experience of colonialism and how these changes are expressed in 
discourse. Even more seemingly benign discourses, such as those of greeting in 
public spaces (Comment allez-vous?; Ça va?; handshakes; kisses et cetera) could 
be analysed for the manner in which they engage with colonial power relations.   
 
But it seems to me that the potential ideological effects of some of these discourses 
are greater than others.  For example, the implications for power relations of a white 
man in a formal context greeting a Melanesian whom he does not know with 
‘Comment allez-vous?’, a standard greeting, are a bit more difficult to tease out than 
when the greeting is ‘Comment va-tu?’, an expression used in situations of 
informality, or when greeting children or subordinates.  By treating all these 
discourses as just discourse and not attempting to distinguish between them, we 
are, in a sense, invalidating the analytical usefulness of the term itself, just as those 
who argue against the term ‘ideology’ argue that it is analytically useless because it 
is undifferentiated.  
 
I also think that there is another order of effect, and that relates not only to the effect 
on individuals but also to the potential collective effects of certain discourses.  This 
potential is powerfully effectuated in most contemporary societies by the media 
which disperses discourses simultaneously throughout the communities of readers, 
listeners and viewers engaging with these media.  I believe that discourses 
articulated within the media do engage forcefully with relations of power, and that a 
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 similar belief on the part of the parties to the struggle has precipitated their efforts to 
mobilise the media in order to either maintain or shift these power relations. In 
arguing that the media is powerful, I am not suggesting that the effects of media 
discourses are necessarily predictable or easy to gauge, nor am I suggesting that 
the media acts alone in effecting influence.  I hope that the following chapters will 
amply demonstrate that my understanding of the media situates the various 
institutions which it comprises within a complex social and historical context.  I also 
hope that in my discussion of the ideological effects of discourse it will be clear that 
I posit these as potential or likely effects based on my analysis of the socio-
historical context in which they emerge and the relationship of these discourses to 
other discourses which appear to be more dominant or less dominant in New 
Caledonian society.  The arguments which I advance in this regard are based on my 
considered reflection and not on a presumption that I can state with certainty what 
the effects of discourse are.   
 
As a result of all these deliberations, I have chosen to reserve a place for the notion 
of ideology in my thesis, but one which is much more modest and more tentative 
than that originally conceived.  I discuss ideological effect when it seems to me that 
a strong argument can be made that a particular discourse is likely to have 
impacted significantly on relations of power and domination.  In doing so, however, I 
remain influenced by aspects of the post-structuralism.  Firstly, the post-structuralist 
critique of grand teleological theory has left me far less certain that the impact of 
colonialism in New Caledonian society could be described in any simple terms.  For 
this reason, throughout this thesis I try to avoid talking about ‘colonialism’ and 
instead refer to ‘the experiences of colonialism’ as a means to highlight that these 
experiences were diverse and the product of contestation and negotiation, albeit 
from within a new context of relations of force.  Secondly, my difficulty in accepting 
that a differentiation could be made between anti-independence discourse and pro-
independence discourse, based on the former being considered ‘ideological’ and 
the latter ‘non-ideological’, derives from my scepticism that the truth claims of one 
form of discourse are more self-evident than the other.  This scepticism has been 
fostered by my reading of Foucault, but its foundations were already there in my 
reading of Gramsci’s writing on ‘common sense’ and its subsequent exploration in 
cultural studies.  Finally, my interest in the relevance of post-structuralist notions of 
‘the subject’ and the processes of ‘subjectification’ to the political struggle in New 
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 Caledonia will be reflected throughout the central chapters of this thesis.8  In my 
reading of the New Caledonian press it became increasingly apparent to me that a 
central aspect of the struggle over independence was a struggle over identity, with 
the concern being to stake a claim over who could be considered rightful 
participants in the political process and who therefore could rightfully participate in 
determining the future of the territory.  The experiences of colonialism were highly 
influential in foregrounding identity and the subject in the political struggle.  Not only 
did colonialism engender new subjects and establish the institutional bases of new 
processes of identification, it also sought to eradicate, or at least fundamentally 
alter, the old.  The insecurity of identity within the colonial context made the very 
issue of identity central to the political struggle.  The result was a struggle over 
identity, a struggle over the meaning which could be legitimately derived from being 
‘Caledonian’, ‘loyalist’, ‘Melanesian’ or ‘Kanak’. 
 
This insecurity of identity is evident in the overtness with which identity comes to be 
asserted in periods of acute political tension.  This was particularly evident in letters 
to the editor published in Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes during the mid-1980s.  
These evince a near obsession with the assertion of identity, as the signature to 
letters in one edition illustrates.  These were signed:  ‘An FLNKS kanak activist’; ‘A 
French Australian/Caledonian and proud of all that’; ‘A Caledonian who holds on to 
staying that way, hoping that in the last instance she can become an American 
citizen rather than finding herself under the Soviet yoke through the intermediary of 
Gaddafi, long live France and long live Reagan’; ‘A Wallisian proud to be so’; 
‘Broussards (Bushmen)-settlers, but real ones’, and finally: 
 
 At 18 years of age, a victim of socialism 
                                                          
8 A key argument within post-structuralism is that identity is constructed through discourse and is 
fragmented:  that is, each individual is the site of multiple identities or subjectivities, each of which is 
constituted in discourse.  Perhaps Foucault’s most powerful discussion of power relates to its effect in 
constituting individuals as subjects.  In ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault describes this form of power 
which ‘applies itself to immediate everyday life [and] which categorises the individual, marks him by 
his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must 
recognise and which others have to recognise in him.  It is a form of power which makes individuals 
subjects.  There are two meanings of the word subject:  subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.  Both meanings suggest 
a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to’ (1982:212).  Foucault is interested in the 
various ‘modes of objectification of the subject’ (Rabinow, 1991:7).  One of the key modes he 
describes is that of ‘dividing practices’.  These are practices through which populations become 
objectified, divided up, categorised and named:  ‘In this process of social objectification and 
categorisation, human beings are given both a social and a personal identity’ (ibid:8).  My discussion 
of the subject in the thesis draws on this view of the subject as constituted through discourse and 
through ‘dividing practices’ initiated through discourse. 
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  A former prisoner of war 
 A veteran of Indochina 
 A proud Frenchman since 1922 
 An anti-indépendantiste 
 An anti-communist and anti-socialist 
 A proud French Caledonian (Les Nouvelles, 12/2/85) 
 
Clearly, identity had become vital to the political struggle over independence. 
 
The struggle over identity was closely linked to the issue of power.  Not only was it 
played out through the affirmation of particular identity formations, but it also 
involved discourses which sought to delegitimate or denigrate the Other.  Bourdieu 
argues that such struggles over identity constitute the essence of political action 
which: 
 
 aims to make or unmake groups - and, by the same token, the collective 
actions they can undertake to transform the social world in accordance with 
their interests - by producing, reproducing or destroying the representations 
that make groups visible for themselves and for others (1991:127). 
 
To the extent to which these discourses on identity impacted on relations of power 
and domination, they might, I argue, be described as ideological.  Indeed, perhaps 
one of the primary means through which ideological discourse operates is through 
the construction and reconstruction of subjects with the implications which these 
formations hold for our construction of the Other. 
 
Contested identity 
 
The 1992 edition of a history textbook, prepared by the New Caledonian Society of 
Historical Studies (Société d’Etudes Historiques de Nouvelle-Calédonie) and 
intended for use in high schools in the territory, includes a brief section on ‘the 
inhabitants of New Caledonia’ who are categorised as:  1. Autochthones; 2. 
Europeans; 3. Polynesians; 4. Indonesians; 5. Vietnamese; 6. Others (New 
Caledonian Society of Historical Studies, 1992:121-2).  These categories are mostly 
congruent with those employed in the territory’s census, except that the textbook 
amalgamates the territory’s Wallisian and Tahitian inhabitants under the heading 
‘Polynesians’ and includes ni-Vanuatu residents under ‘Others’.9  A further and quite 
                                                          
9 The 1989 census divided the population into the following ‘ethnic groups’ (the relative sizes of each 
group in percentages, as determined by the 1989 census, is in brackets):  Europeans (33.6%), 
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 striking difference is the use of the seemingly antiquated term ‘Autochthones’ 
instead of the census category ‘Melanesians’, although ‘Melanesian’ is used once in 
the accompanying text.  Pro-independence leader, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, once 
commented that this awkward term began to be used following the granting of voting 
rights to Melanesians.  It corresponded with the creation of a new identification for 
Melanesians as political subjects whose allegiance was now coveted, and was 
meant as a more neutral designation in comparison with the prior terms of ‘Kanak’ 
and ‘indigène’.  For Tjibaou:  ‘We became “authocthones” in 1951 when there was a 
need to gather people together, nobody was quite sure what to call them’ 
(Bwenando, 29/9/87).  The ostensibly more neutral connotation of the term 
‘Autochthones’ may explain its mobilisation in the textbook.  But this seeming will to 
neutrality is betrayed by the texts accompanying each category.  Here we are 
presented with a stark evolutionist taxonomy which structures each category of 
inhabitant within a strict hierarchy of difference.  For example, we read under the 
heading ‘Autochthones’: 
 
 About 73,000 today (49 % of the total population), an increase, but after what 
an evolution!  Epidemics made this number decrease to 17,000 as recently 
as 1925; certain thought the population was about to become extinct.  New 
hygiene, the efforts of the Administration and the Missions, the creation of 
medical services in the bush, have reestablished the balance.  Melanesians 
are more and more integrated in modern life while staying very attached to 
their custom and to their tribes (Société d’Etudes Historiques de Nouvelle-
Calédonie, 1992:121).         
 
One striking feature of this description is the manner in which ‘Autochthones’ are 
objectified as inert and passive, prey to the calamity of ‘epidemics’, whose origins 
are notably omitted in the text, and saved by colonial beneficence, thanks to which 
they have been able to ‘evolve’.  This ‘evolution’ is linked to the notion of 
‘integration’ into ‘modern life’, a state of existence which is presented as 
uncontentious and, indeed, universal.  For the ‘Autochthon’, therefore, their will and 
ability to accede to ‘modern life’ is a product of colonisation, without which they 
would have not only slumbered in their original state but perhaps ceased to exist.  
Other categories of inhabitants fare much better when assessed against their own 
abilities to accede to ‘modern life’.  ‘Polynesians’ are described as ‘a sought-after 
workforce’ who ‘adapt easily to industrial life’ while Vietnamese are described as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Indonesians (3.2%), Melanesians (44.8%), Ni-Vanuatu (1%), Tahitians (2.9%), Vietnamese (1.5%), 
Wallisians (8.6%), Other asiatics (0.4%); Others and non-declared (4%)  (INSEE, 1989). 
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 ‘very evolved’, many having ‘turned towards trades and commerce’.  The 
‘Indonesians’ are ‘at every evolutionary stage, from the old person in a turban to the 
modern young girl’.  Of the major groups, only ‘Europeans’ escape reference to their 
standing in this evolutionary hierarchy, although the text suggests that the growth in 
the ‘European’ population corresponded with a growth in economic activity in the 
territory (ibid).  This lack of reference to the evolutionary stage of ‘Europeans’ 
attests, of course, to their existence at the pinnacle of this discourse’s evolutionary, 
developmentalist hierarchy, and therefore their standing as the benchmark against 
which all other categories are to be assessed.   
 
We might find it scandalous that a contemporary history textbook intended for wide 
use in secondary institutions in the territory still draws on nineteenth century 
evolutionist taxonomies to delineate between racial groups.  The racism implicit in 
the construction of such a hierarchical taxonomy appears stark, primarily because 
the tropes which it employs are so antiquated and so seemingly ignorant of more 
contemporary, and more discursively sophisticated, forms of racism.  In this 
starkness, however, the notion of identity as discursively constructed becomes 
apparent in a way which is not always the case when analysing new forms of racist 
discourse which resonate more closely with contemporary tropes.  In these highly 
synoptic paragraphs on the ‘inhabitants of the territory’ we have, out of the myriad of 
possibilities of explication, an ordered creation. These identities are not presented 
as chaotic expressions of difference, but rather specific entities whose differences 
are ordered around a cohering principle, that of the evolutionary, developmentalist 
discourse referred to above.  Students are encouraged to ‘learn’ from the narratives 
on identity constructed in this text, and in doing so they learn not only about others 
but also about themselves.  Indeed, this example illustrates how, through discourse, 
identity becomes relational.  Students learn about themselves in relation to others.  
In the textbook, these others are presented explicitly to the students in a manner 
which encourages immediate comparison.  In the media texts considered in this 
thesis, the comparison is most often implicit in the discourses on identity which they 
develop.  The anti-independence media’s persistent denigration of pro-
independence Kanaks carried with it an implicit valorisation of those, primarily 
Europeans, who opposed them, just as the Kanak denigration of settlers, the 
‘Caldoches’, implied a valorisation of Kanak identity and culture. 
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 It is this notion of the interconnectedness of discourses on identity which I seek to 
stress in this thesis.  Nicholas Thomas insists that ‘self-representation never takes 
place in isolation ... it is frequently oppositional or reactive’ (Thomas, 1994:213).   
We might assume that in situations of acute political struggle, the reactive character 
of identity constructions would be particularly evident as political groups seek to 
assert their legitimacy in the face of contestation from opponents. This appears to 
have been the case during the period of most acute political struggle in New 
Caledonia during the 1980s.  The claim to political legitimacy was contested 
differently in the pro- and anti-independence media.  Within the main anti-
independence publication, the daily Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, considerable 
discursive effort was vested in constructing the identity of the ‘true Caledonian’ in 
response to the articulation of a discourse of ‘the people’ within the pro-
independence movement.  This discourse of ‘the people’ drew on internationalist 
notions of ‘the people’ as the original inhabitants of a territory.  ‘The people’ was a 
historically constituted entity which was geographically grounded in its place of 
origin, the ‘imaginative geography’ (Said, 1978) which the pro-independence 
movement came to term, after late 1984, ‘Kanaky’.  The discourse of ‘the people’ 
acquired significant political legitimacy through its articulation in United Nations 
documents which proclaimed the rights of ‘the people’, thus historically and 
geographically constituted, to self-determination.  The anti-independence media 
vociferously contested this assertion of ‘peoplehood’ by Kanaks, refuting their claim 
to be the original occupants of the territory and their cultural and racial coherence.  
The extremist right-wing publication Corail claimed that Kanaks were merely ‘those 
who had eaten their predecessors and captured their women’ (Corail, 22/1/82).  But 
the refuting of Kanak claims to ‘peoplehood’ was also forged through the articulation 
of an alternative identity, the ‘true Caledonian’, which matched that of ‘the people’ in 
its exclusionary implications.  The ‘true Caledonian’ was a subjectivity but, like ‘the 
people’, it had its grounding in an imaginative geography designated as ‘la 
Calédonie profonde’ or sometimes the ‘true Caledonia’.  This was a place of 
unfettered natural and sociological harmony and serenity.  Within it, there was no 
place for those who, like Kanaks, sought to disrupt this perfect order.  Kanaks were 
not ‘true Caledonians’ just as they could not, within anti-independence discourse, 
constitute a ‘people’ or reside in the ‘true Caledonia’.  They constituted, in a very 
powerful sense, a human absence in anti-independence discourses of identity.     
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 The Kanak assertion of ‘peoplehood’ was itself a response to the denial of national 
identity which was inherent to the colonial project10 in New Caledonia as elsewhere. 
The claim to constitute a people was not just a claim to an identity; it was a claim to 
a privileged identity which conferred on those thus constituted special rights. The 
centrality of the struggle over identity in the broader political struggle was evident in 
the demands within the nascent pro-independence movement for a recognition of 
‘Kanak’ identity.  Until the early 1970s, ‘Kanak’ was used as a term of denigration; 
its appropriation by young activist Melanesians at this time appears to have drawn 
its inspiration from the corresponding appropriation of ‘négre’ by African activists 
within the Négritude movement in Paris some time earlier.    There was a need to 
give historical, cultural and experiential substance to the Kanak identity which had 
been gutted of affirmative meaning through the functioning of a type of ‘Manichean 
allegory’ (JanMohamed, 1985) through which the mere reference to the term 
‘Kanak’ signified a range of negative and damning connotations.  The quest to 
assert an identity remained a dominant theme in the pro-independence media 
throughout the 1980s.  It is evident not only in the content of the publications and 
radio programs - for example, the prevalence of historical contextualisation and the 
frequent use of personal testimonies  - but also in certain stylistic features, such as 
the use of narrative to heighten the effect of an omnipresence of ‘Kanak eyes’, 
observing and recording the actions of their political enemies.  But, beyond these 
discursive and stylistic features, the will to create a Kanak media was itself a 
powerful claim to existence in the face of the relative absence of Kanak voices in 
the territory’s major media.   The Kanak media was, therefore, in its existence, its 
                                                          
10 My use here of the term ‘project’ draws on Thomas’s discussion of the notion of colonialism as a 
‘project’.  Viewing colonialism thus, he argues, assists in avoiding ‘any polarisation of material and 
ideal aspects of colonial (and anti-colonial) endeavours.  A project is neither a strictly discursive entity 
nor an exclusively practical one:  because it is a willed creation of historically situated actors it also 
has roots and ramifications which were not or are not apparent to those involved.  And a project is not 
narrowly instrumental:  the actors no doubt have intentions, aims and aspirations, but these 
presuppose a particular imagination of the social situation, with its history and projected future, and a 
diagnosis of what is lacking, that can be rectified by intervention, by conservation, by bullets or by 
welfare.  This imagination exists in relation to something to be acted upon - an indigenous population, 
a subordinate class, a topographic space - and in tension with competing colonial projects, yet is also 
a self-fashioning exercise, that makes the maker as much as it does the made.  And projects are of 
course often projected rather than realised; because of their confrontations with indigenous interests, 
alternate civilising missions and their internal inconsistencies, colonial interventions are frequently 
deflected, or enacted farcically and incompletely’ (1994:106).  Thomas notes that an emphasis on 
colonial discourse theory can have the result, in analyses of colonialism, of effacing the agency of 
colonial actors, just as an emphasis on colonial agents can result in an inadequate consideration of 
the significance of the discursive context in which they operate.  Viewing colonialism as a ‘project’, he 
argues, can help to reconcile the place of discourse and agency in analyses of colonialism (ibid:105).  
This will to reconcile discourse and agency is also a central concern in this thesis and has resulted in 
my drawing on some of the theoretical concepts developed by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, 
and is reflected in my emphasis on discursive strategy which is discussed later in this introduction.  
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 styles and its discourses, moulded by the drive to prove Kanak existence, and to 
prove a type of existence which found expression in its different stylistic and 
discursive orientations. 
 
Thomas has argued that, while it is important to acknowledge that the affirmation of 
identity is central to the pursuit of nationalist objectives: 
 
 ... it also seems crucial to recognise political contest within a national (or 
tribal) population, contest that is manifest not only in the process of selecting 
aspects of past heritage or present custom that are to be privileged in the 
construction of ethnic identity, but also in radical rejections of what is local 
and traditional (1994:214). 
 
While Thomas is primarily interested here in considering objectifications of identity 
in traditions and customs, his more general attention to the existence of divergences 
and contests over identity within nationalist movements in the Pacific is evident in 
the expressions of identity in the Kanak media.  In some instances, the assertion of 
existence found expression in essentialist notions of a Kanak past which authorised 
the people’s claim to the right to self-determination, while in others the past offered 
only a foundational basis for the development of an identity which was being forged 
in the process of political struggle.11  These conflicting articulations frequently co-
resided in pro-independence publications, suggesting a certain instability in 
articulations of Kanak identity.  This instability reflected political differences within 
the movement between those who sought a more exclusionary independence for 
Kanaks, in which Kanaky would be an independent nation structured around Kanak 
institutions, and those favouring a more inclusive, transcultural view of 
independence in which all those who sought to reside in an independent Kanaky 
would acquire ‘Kanak’ nationality.  But the frequency of the shifts within publications 
between these articulations and permutations of them suggests that something 
more than political difference was generating this instability; it suggests that 
strategic considerations were frequently a primary factor in particular mobilisations 
and their permutations.  This emphasis on the strategic use of discourse implies 
that the ‘instability’ in discourses on Kanak identity may, in effect, be highly 
                                                          
11 These articulations resulted in different attitudes towards culture and tradition.   Within the former, 
culture and tradition authorised ‘Kanak’ identity while in the latter their significance receded in the face 
of the exigencies of the political struggle through which identity was being forged.  This ambivalence 
towards tradition is particularly evident among those groups within the pro-independence movement 
most influenced by Marxist discourse, in particular the Parti de Liberation Kanak (PALIKA), for which 
‘Kanak’ identity derives very largely from the structural position of ‘Kanaks’ as the oppressed within 
the capitalist system and links ‘Kanak’ identity with the identity of the proletariat in general. 
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 advantageous in allowing for a variety of strategic interventions in a discursive field 
in which meaning was continuously shifting under the weight of challenge.  
 
Discourse and strategy 
 
Contending articulations of identity also existed within anti-independence 
discourses.  The reader of Les Nouvelles was required, for example, to negotiate an 
array of articulations of Caledonian and Melanesian identity, many of which were 
mobilised concurrently and some of which were oppositional.  For example, 
‘Caledonian’ signified being non-Melanesian in many instances, but articulations of 
‘Caledonian’ as Melanesian also appeared in Les Nouvelles.  In instances, these 
differences may have resulted from the mobilisation of more antiquated discourses 
on identity, such as appears to have been the case in the use of ‘Autochthon’ 
referred to above, and the use of ‘Caledonian’ as Melanesian, which dates from the 
earliest period of colonisation.12  But even in such instances, there are strategic 
reasons why archaic forms are revitalised.  The incidence of concurrent articulations 
along with the frequency of discursive shifts in identity constructions are so 
prevalent, particularly in anti-independence discourse, that some understanding of 
the functioning of discourse which goes beyond the seemingly monolithic and static 
connotations encompassed in such notions as ‘colonial’ or indeed ‘anti-colonial’ 
discourse seems particularly warranted.  Articulations of identity changed 
constantly, and these changes were effected, it appears, for rhetorical ends, 
because it was perceived, for example, that previous constructions had been 
effectively appropriated by political opponents, or that challenges to these 
constructions had been rhetorically decisive, or that certain constructions had 
crumbled under the weight of their own contradictions.  This discursive jostling 
evident in the New Caledonian press suggests the need for an understanding of the 
strategic functioning of discourse, and this is a central focus in Pierre Bourdieu’s 
work on language and power. 
 
The pursuit of an understanding of the strategic functioning of discourse is fraught 
with difficulty, primarily because the notion of strategy implies an agent intentionally 
advancing its interests through the pursuit of strategies.  The notion of strategy 
                                                          
12 For example, ‘Anthropology has showed how the New Caledonian, in his physical structure, his 
skeleton and his muscles, has details which remind us of those of the Neanderthal man...’ (Leenhardt, 
cited in Bensa, 1988:188). 
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 therefore appears at odds with the post-structuralist mistrust of the existence of a 
primordial individual subject or agent and its repudiation of the concept of 
intentionality.  Nonetheless, I believe it is possible to talk, as Bourdieu does, of 
strategy and interests without presuming that these derive from an essentialised 
subject.  We can accept that the individual is the intersection of a collection of 
competing subjectivities constructed through discourse.  Associated with these 
subject positions are differing intentions.  Just as the subjects are historically 
constituted, so too are the intentions which they pursue and the strategies which 
they devise to advance these intentions.  A person calling herself ‘Caledonian’, 
‘Melanesian’ and ‘woman’ strategically uses discourse in the pursuit of her 
perceived interests under each of these subjectivities, but this does not imply that 
these interests transcend the constructed nature of these categories. 
 
The work of Bourdieu is very much structured around the language of interests and 
strategy (Bourdieu, 1977).  The individual for Bourdieu is always strategically 
engaged in optimising her capital in the range of fields in which she operates.  
Bourdieu designates a range of fields - the economic, political and cultural fields for 
example - with varying degrees of interchangeability between the types of capital 
which can be exchanged within these fields.  Bourdieu’s theories are particularly 
relevant to this thesis because of the importance he places on language in this 
process of strategically operating in the various fields.  There is a certain hyper-
functionalism in Bourdieu’s ontology which I find worrisome.  The notion that we 
operate invariably to optimise our capital in all the fields in which we operate seems 
too constraining an explanation for the diversity of human behaviour.13  
Nonetheless, the image of strategic discursive jostling which his theory of practice 
suggests seems to fit with the type of discursive behaviour evidenced in the New 
Caledonian press, particularly Les Nouvelles. 
 
One particularly poignant illustration of the strategic mobilisation of identity was the 
emergence in 1986 of a discourse on métissage (inter-racial union).  This discourse 
emerged in association with the dismissal of charges against the seven settlers 
accused of perpetrating the Hienghène massacre.  The settlers considered 
themselves ‘European’ despite most being descendant from interracial unions 
between white settlers and Melanesian women, which was evident in their skin tone 
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 and other physical characteristics.   Their palpable métissage was seized upon by 
the anti-independence media, their defence lawyers and the settlers themselves as 
proof that the massacre had not been born of racial hatred but was rather a 
desperate act performed in response to the extremist political terror waged by 
FLNKS activists in the Hienghène valley where the settlers resided.  In advancing 
the identity of these settlers as ‘métis’ to vindicate their brutal act, a discourse on 
métissage was elaborated which integrally linked this identity to la Calédonie 
profonde.  The physical harmony of this imagining was matched by a sociological 
equilibrium exemplified in métissage.  The organicism of this blending of nature and 
society expressed in la Calédonie profonde was a powerful image which enabled 
this imaginative geography to be equated with ‘the Good’ while the Manichean 
depiction of those who sought to disrupt this harmony portrayed them as bad and 
evil.   It therefore lent authorisation to an act of brutality which horrified even many 
who opposed independence.  The pro-independence movement also sought an 
understanding of the massacre in the identity of the settler métis.  For the 
prosecution lawyers, the massacre was an act of allegiance to the ‘European’ 
identity by settlers whose notions of selfhood had been rendered particularly fragile 
by the heightened insurrectionary activity.  Their physical characteristics as métis 
and their demonstrable cultural hybridity rendered their claim to be ‘European’ 
contestable by those less touched by Melanesian racial or cultural influence.  The 
massacre was, they argued, a desperate attempt to prove their Europeanness and 
reject their Melanesianness, which had become a difficult legacy in the very tense 
political context.  The prosecution therefore sought in its arguments to give concrete 
expression to the polysemous nature of identity and the potential which multiple 
identification entrains for immersion in painful contradictions, exacerbated for the 
settler métis in New Caledonia by the Kanak insurrection. 
 
Dilemmatic discourse 
 
A focus on colonial or anti-colonial discourse is instructive in pointing to the 
commonality of symbolic and linguistic borrowings across these discourses, but it 
can be detrimental in masking the tensions and contradictions which exist within 
and between them.  Colonial or anti-colonial discourses are, in effect, discursive 
networks made up, as de Bolla argues, ‘of a number of discrete discourses which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
13 This issue is discussed in a published conversation between Pierre Bourdieu and Terry Eagleton 
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 interact, sometimes without hostility, at other times with considerable violence, with 
each other’ (de Bolla cited in Thomas, 1994:50).  There is a need to point to the 
heterogeneity of colonial discourse when considering its strategic functioning, 
because the tensions and contradictions within this network point to the possibility 
of discursive openings which can be seized upon and exploited by political 
opponents.  Discursive heterogeneity is an inevitable aspect of colonialism because 
of the diversity of experiences encompassed within the new relationships of power 
brought about by colonial conquest, which implies that openings for contestation 
and subversion are also inherent in the colonial project.  But, rather than merely 
viewing these tensions and contradictions as inevitable by-products of the 
experiences of colonialism, it is also possible to view them as rhetorically efficacious 
in allowing for a degree of argumentative flexibility not otherwise available to 
strategic actors operating within a monolithic discursive network.  There is rhetorical 
benefit, for example, in having ‘Caledonian’ mean European in some or most 
contexts, Melanesian in others, and in also allowing for an inclusive categorisation 
of ‘Caledonian’ which applies to all inhabitants of the territory in yet another context.  
This flexibility relates not only to ostensibly contradictory constructions of identity 
but also to other colonial discourses which are in tension or contradiction.  Because 
I wish to stress not only the perils but also the rhetorical benefits of discursive 
contradictions, I use the term ‘dilemmatic’ discourse rather than ‘contradictory’ 
discourse.  The term ‘contradiction’ within Marxist political discourse, for example, 
invokes a teleology which suggests that our aim is to resolve these contradictions in 
order to reach higher modes of understanding.  I have enormous sympathy for the 
position that we should aim to develop what Gramsci termed ‘good sense’, a critical 
understanding which seeks as far as possible to resolve contradictions, and I hope 
that this thesis reflects this quest.  However, it is also clear to me that, in the way 
we talk and write, particularly in situations of contestation, we mobilise and develop 
discourses in ways which do not seek to be reconciled.  We tend to apportion 
particular discourses to particular subjects and bunch discourses together to avoid 
obvious clashes, all the while attempting to enhance our linguistic intervention in the 
fields in which we are operating.  In the various permutations on Kanak identity 
articulated within pro-independence publications we can see the shifts between 
inclusive and exclusive representations as often corresponding with different 
strategic considerations, just as different articulations of ‘the people’ within anti-
                                                                                                                                                                          
(1994:270-1). 
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 independence publications were mobilised on the basis of their perceived rhetorical 
efficacy.  The rhetorical efficacy of cordoning off dilemmatic discourse is also 
evident in other anti-independence discourses.  In Les Nouvelles and other anti-
independence publications, a discourse on the necessity for continued affiliation 
with France co-resided with a discourse which expressed hostility towards France 
for decades of political and economic neglect of the territory.  In my reading of the 
daily newspaper, there was very little attempt to reconcile these two discourses  
Rather, they were mobilised separately, the discourse of affiliation occurring most 
frequently in response to the pro-independence discourse on Kanak independence 
and the discourse on abandon being articulated when the objective was criticism of 
the French Socialist government’s response to the Kanak insurgency.     
 
In this thesis, I have avoided attempting to reconcile dilemmatic discourses, despite 
the more than occasional temptation to stitch together a coherent narrative out of 
the dilemmas I perceived.  The temptation to sort through the tensions in order to 
explain what, for example, the pro-independence movement ‘really’ meant by Kanak 
independence, in the face of the at times perplexing array of articulations, would 
undermine my concern to stress the significance of discursive dilemmas.  The 
differing articulations point not only to the existence of different imaginings of Kanak 
independence, with at times considerable tension between them; they also point to 
openings for contestation by political opponents.  But, most importantly, readers 
drawing on the media to make sense of the political turmoil around them had to 
contend with these discursive dilemmas; they did not have a higher authority 
making sense of the dilemmas for them.  Indeed, for many, the media was itself this 
higher authority which created meaning around events through its work in 
categorising, ordering and framing.   
 
Exposing dilemmatic discourse rather than attempting to reconcile it is central to this 
thesis because my concern is to glean what media audiences understood of the 
political situation through their reading of the territory’s media.14  Their 
                                                          
14 I have chosen to not include consideration of the metropolitan French press in this study.  There 
was, firstly, a need to limit the empirical scope of the thesis.  Including metropolitan French 
publications would have required a lesser consideration of local publications.  Secondly, the influence 
of the daily French press on the political situation in the territory was scant because of the very small 
numbers of daily newspapers flown into the territory (they arrive three days later anyway).   Only a 
handful of copies of Le Figaro, France Soir, Le Monde and Liberation are ordered for the complete 
territory.  Several of these go to consulates and only a couple to news stands.  Some daily 
publications, for example Le Monde, Le Figaro and Liberation, are available for public reading at the 
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 understanding was not forged solely through engagement with media discourses.  
As historically and socially located actors they were bearers of discourse and 
derived meaning through their engagement with a range of institutions, not only the 
media.  But the significance of the media in describing and explaining events should 
not be underestimated.  Indeed, Stuart Hall has argued that it is the media, par 
excellence, which performs this function in modern times (1985:67).  Clearly, as I 
have argued, a further study could ascertain the complexity of interpretations which 
historically and socially located actors derive from engagement with media 
discourses in all their heterogeneity.  But this does not negate my belief that certain 
plausible readings can nonetheless be advanced, and that their identification is 
greatly assisted by a focus on discourse as a dynamic phenomenon.  In the counter-
discourses developed within the pro- and anti-independence media, we can often 
glean central readings of the discourses being countered.  For example, one 
persistent reading of the discourse of la Calédonie profonde in the pro-
independence press, articulated particularly in relation to the Hienghène massacre, 
was that Kanaks were considered by Europeans as an animal-like sub-species.  
The acquittal of the settler métis was taken by the pro-independence press as a 
signal that the hunting of Kanaks was now officially sanctioned.  Perhaps this was a 
polemical response which bore an uncertain relationship to the more nuanced 
readings by those less politically engaged.  But there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that similar readings were shared, and authorised events which contributed 
to the political crisis in the territory.  Similarly, within the anti-independence 
movement, the large participation of  protesters in a succession of demonstrations 
organised by political groups ranging from conservative to extremist suggested that 
the interpretation within the anti-independence press that the discourse of Kanak 
independence was racist was shared by many.  In the speeches of politicians and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Bernheim Library.  Les Nouvelles would frequently republish articles from the metropolitan press.  
However, these mostly did not relate to political issues.  In addition, Les Nouvelles would sometimes 
critique articles written in the metropolitan press, such as its criticism of Le Monde’s articles which 
ostensibly revealed that two of the Kanak hostage takers in the Ouvéa incident had been murdered 
after their capture.   In contrast, there is an avid readership for weekly magazines.  For example, 
during the 1980s, between 2,600 and 2,800 copies of Paris Match were imported weekly, 1,200 of Le 
Point, 600 - 700 of L’Express and under 500 copies of Le Figaro magazine.  These were the 
metropolitan magazines which were most frequently read in the territory during this period (interview, 
Marie-Claire Viratelle, Nouvelles Messageries Calédoniennes de Presse, 23/4/94).  All are 
conservative publications whose articles were almost invariably opposed to the independence 
struggle.  As an extreme example, Roger Holeindre wrote on New Caledonia for Paris Match in the 
early to mid-1980s.  He was later elected to the French parliament as a National Front Deputy.  These 
weekly publications contributed significantly to the discursive struggle, but almost always in support of 
local anti-independence discourses.  It should be remembered therefore, in my discussion of the local 
anti-independence media in the territory, that the discursive positions which they developed were 
reinforced by the popularity of a weekly metropolitan press in the territory.   
 23
 others addressing these gatherings, such readings were advanced and greeted with 
apparent enthusiasm by the crowds.  There were, in other words, many indications 
that the types of readings of events articulated within the contending media in the 
territory were seized upon, if not already shared, by readers empathetic to the 
political orientations of the different publications.  A focus on oppositional discourse 
therefore provides insights into the more publicly dominant readings of discourse 
which, through their expression in the media, come to be shared by many political 
partisans. 
 
Discourse and institutions 
 
When assessing the political functioning of the media, one fruitful line of enquiry has 
been to explore the instrumentalist links between the media and political and 
economic interests.  The presumption behind this research orientation is that 
structures of ownership and control influence discursive output.  A further line of 
enquiry has been to consider the professional and social practices within media 
institutions from which media products emerge.  The quest is to explain how socially 
and historically located agents (journalists and other media workers) work towards 
producing a particular range of delimited meanings (Hall, 1985:68).  What is 
required, therefore, is an understanding of the politico-economic location of media 
institutions, and of the professional and social practices within these institutions 
through which discourse is produced.  Here, Bourdieu’s work is once again relevant.  
He is interested in explaining the complex and dynamic interrelationships between 
institutional mechanisms, social practices, and the actions of wilful human agents in 
order to explain social reproduction.  His theory of practice seeks, in other words, to 
analyse how relatively predictable outcomes emerge from complex institutional and 
social settings.  To this end, Bourdieu is adamant that the analysis of discourse 
necessitates attention to the institutional mechanisms which delimit these 
discourses, warning that:  ‘Any analysis of ideologies, in the narrow sense of 
“legitimating discourses”, which fails to include an analysis of the corresponding 
institutional mechanisms is liable to be no more than a contribution to the efficacy of 
those ideologies’ (Bourdieu, 1977:184).    
 
John B. Thompson’s work on television broadcasting in Britain is perhaps the most 
relevant example of the application of the type of institutional analysis urged by 
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 Bourdieu.  In his book Ideology and Modern Culture (1990), Thompson outlines his 
approach to the analysis of mass communication which he terms, following Ricouer, 
‘depth hermeneutics’.  The depth hermeneutic approach involves three phases, the 
first of which is an analysis of the socio-historic and institutional context of the 
production and reception of media discourse.  This is followed by the second phase, 
discourse analysis, and then the third, interpretation.  Investigation into the socio-
historical and institutional contexts requires consideration of such features as the 
institutional organisation of producers and of transmission networks; patterns of 
ownership and control; the techniques and technologies employed in production and 
transmission; the routine and practical procedures followed by television personnel; 
and the aims of producers and programmers (Thompson, 1988:374).  This kind of 
research, he argues: 
 
 ...would help to illuminate the rules, procedures and assumptions implicit in 
the production process, including assumptions about the audience and its 
needs, interests and abilities.  These rules, procedures and assumptions are 
part of the social conditions and codes which media personnel draw upon 
and implement in producing particular programmes (ibid:375). 
 
Thompson’s discussion of the need to consider socio-historical and institutional 
factors is apt, but the question of how one goes about undertaking this research is 
problematic.  Thompson argues that empirical, including documentary, research and 
other more contextual, interpretive approaches are appropriate.  Indeed, his 
examination of British television contains considerable empirical detail deriving from 
documentary research, questionnaires and interviews.  In his blending of empirical 
research and interpretive analysis, Thompson’s methodology echoes that of 
Bourdieu, and he, like Bourdieu, tends to bracket off questioning of the authority of 
the empirical research upon which his interpretation is significantly based.   
 
The central problem is:  how is one to conceive of and study media institutions?  
From one perspective they can be read as sites of practical engagement, a view 
which opens them up to empirical techniques of observation and recording.  But, 
from another perspective, media institutions are themselves, as Laclau and Mouffe 
say of institutions more generally, discursive articulations (1985:107).  Within this 
view, the practice of practical engagement in media institutions is a product of the 
discursive constraints operating within institutions, with constraints being 
understood in the Foucauldian sense as both inhibiting and enabling.  Kanak 
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 journalists, for example, were required to negotiate through a range of discursive 
pressures which had to do not only with the bearing of notions of professionalism, 
objectivity, truth and professional comportment on their work, but also with such 
notions as political militancy, ‘Kanakness’, and a critique of truth.  As the chapter on 
the Kanak media illustrates, Kanak journalists negotiated strategically and 
dilemmatically through these discursive pressures.  Within the Kanak media as 
elsewhere, these discursive constraints promoted certain types of behaviour and the 
production of certain types of products, and de-emphasised others.  What becomes 
interesting therefore is not so much a description of these behaviours and products, 
but rather a consideration of the constraints - the discourses in other words - from 
within which they arise.   
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 Institutions and the double imperative 
 
The dilemmas which arise from these different perspectives on institutions are very 
relevant to the consideration of media institutions in this thesis.  It seems to me that 
the post-structuralist concern to analyse discourse, when put to the task of 
institutional analysis, is most readily turned towards deconstruction - pulling apart 
the discursive constructions of institutions which other people have developed.  But, 
in the case of New Caledonia, very little has been written on the contemporary 
media, and it is essentially I whom am constructing these institutions for the readers 
of this thesis.  The problem thus becomes how to pursue an approach which 
emphasises deconstruction when the task at hand requires construction. 
 
Following Derrida, David Campbell has advocated a process of critique which 
resists bipolar demarcations, such as that suggested by the notions of 
deconstruction versus construction, describing this mode of analysis as the ‘double 
imperative’.  This double imperative: 
 
 resists in its operation the reduction of our thought and action to the 
positions of either/or, for/against, by foregrounding the necessary 
interdependence of (supposed) opposites upon one another, and the traces 
of each that marks the other (1995:20).   
 
Campbell’s urging of such a mode of critique is evocative of Stuart Hall’s advocacy 
of a mode of discourse analysis that moves between deconstruction and 
reconstruction.15  Although Campbell and Hall are not directly concerned with 
institutions, their advocacy of this double movement has relevance, I believe, to the 
analysis of institutions.  In constructing it is important to be constantly vigilant of the 
possibilities of deconstruction, of critiquing that which is presented as construction.  
Moreover, it is important that the manner in which institutions are constructed for 
readers highlights these constructions as provisional, pointing to them as arguable 
constructions which result from considerable reflection, but never as reified ‘truth’.   
 
Although very little in-depth work has been published on the media in New 
Caledonia, most books on New Caledonian politics contain references to some 
media, and I draw on this material to varying degrees in my construction of the 
                                                          
15 See Wetherell and Potter for a discussion of Hall’s advocacy of this approach (1992:86-87). 
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 territory’s media institutions.16  I have attempted to do so in a spirit akin to that 
which underpins the notion of the ‘double imperative’, to deploy what Said has 
described as a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (1994:308) in my selection of material.  
What results is a provisional construction which I present to others (as indeed to 
myself) as a possible site for deconstruction.  However, this material forms only a 
small portion of that which I used in this thesis. Most of my understanding of the 
territory’s media came to me through the stories told to me by people who were 
working inside and outside the media, and through my reading of the media itself.  
In most instances, therefore, I did not have ‘authoritative’ documentation to refer to, 
merely the self-interested accounts of others.  This reliance on these stories made 
me very much aware that my understanding of the territory’s media was being 
developed through discourse.  This is not to argue, of course, that ‘authoritative’ 
accounts are outside of discourse but rather to point out that, in the forcefulness of 
their arguments, an awareness of the provisional, discursive nature of such 
accounts is sometimes lost.   
 
My task therefore became that of analysing these discourses for what they told me 
about the types of constraints operating within media institutions.  For example, in 
my discussions on the Kanak media with supporters and opponents, I was 
frequently told that newspapers were not a Kanak ‘thing’.  This was a discourse on 
the oral nature of Kanak society and culture which seemed to be mobilised to 
demonstrate that Kanaks were not culturally equipped to engage in the production 
of written media.  In the thesis I try to demonstrate the power of this discourse in 
structuring the style and content of most Kanak media.  The seeming obsession 
within some Kanak media with ‘professionalism’ is, I believe, rendered far more 
understandable through an awareness of this discursive constraint.  In addition, I 
was very grateful to have an opportunity to spend time with journalists working at 
Les Nouvelles and to work with journalists at the Kanak radio station, Radio Djiido.  
This experience was invaluable in exposing me to the discourses which journalists 
themselves mobilised about their work and which told me something of the nature of 
the discursive constraints within which they operated.   
                                                          
16 Four monographs have been written on the New Caledonian media and there is an entry on the 
media in the New Caledonian encyclopedia (Godard:242-257).  The texts are: Georges Coquilhat’s 
work on the nineteenth century press in New Caledonia (1987); Ismet Kurtovich’s thesis on the 
reporting on the N’Goye affair in Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes (1980) and his content analysis 
comparing 1967 and 1977 editions of La France Australe; and, Michael Spencer’s chapter on media 
reporting in France and New Caledonia on the political events in the territory during the mid-1980s 
(1988).     
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This access to Les Nouvelles and Radio Djiido was exceptional.  Aside from the 
assistance given to me by these two organisations, I had great difficulty in being 
able to meet with people working in other media institutions, despite having 
approached each organisation for assistance.  People refused to meet with me or 
failed to turn up at agreed meeting times, or in a vaguer sense became inaccessible 
(for example, they were never in their offices when I rang and their staff were 
unaware of their whereabouts).  Through my persistent and failed attempts to 
contact many people I became aware that the frustrations of my fieldwork were 
perhaps expressive of a much broader phenomenon in New Caledonian society - 
the will to control discourse.  In a very modest way, my experiences seemed to 
illustrate that discourse was perceived by these people as powerful, so powerful, in 
fact, that its control through the ultimate strategy of silence was considered 
warranted by those I sought to approach.  This heightened concern with discourse 
was probably accentuated by the tense political circumstances existing in the 
territory during my first period of fieldwork in 1989, but my difficulties in meeting with 
people continued during my second period of fieldwork in 1994.  Indeed, as the first 
chapter seeks to illustrate, recognition of a relationship between the control of 
discourse and political power has been a feature of colonialist relations in New 
Caledonia since annexation, expressed particularly through the strategies of 
political and economic interests to control the colony’s media. 
 
The purpose and structure of the thesis 
 
I am concerned in the thesis with the dynamic and strategic functioning of media 
discourses relevant to the independence struggle during its, to date, most acute 
phase.  One of my major interests is the manner in which media discourses 
permutated as a result of discursive contestation from oppositional media and their 
client groups.  The central part of the thesis is therefore organised around 
discussion of the main political groupings of media during the period from the early 
1980s to the signing of the Matignon and Oudinot accords in 1988, which resulted in 
the worst of the hostilities ceasing.  Prior to this, in chapters 1 and 2, I attempt to 
contextualise this discussion both historically and theoretically.  Chapter 1 provides 
a historical overview of the media’s engagement with politics since annexation, 
concluding with a discussion of the political functioning of the major media 
institutions in the territory during the 1980s.  Chapter 2 elaborates on some of the 
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 theoretical issues raised in the introduction and concludes with a discussion of 
conceptual and methodological issues in discourse analysis.  These chapters pave 
the way for the more detailed discussion of media institutions and discourses during 
the period under consideration.  Chapters 3 to 5 discuss the anti-independence 
media.  Chapter 3 analyses institutional practices in Les Nouvelles and considers 
how the paper’s resolute opposition to independence is expressed both stylistically 
and discursively, while chapter 4 analyses more closely the shifting discourses of 
identity in Les Nouvelles.  Chapter 5 discusses the construction in more extremist 
anti-independence publications of a ‘loyalist’ identity and considers how this identity 
is given substance through the discourses articulated in these publications.  The 
thesis then considers the anti-independence media, beginning with a discussion in 
chapter 6 of the main anti-independence media institutions and the discourses 
around independence which they develop, and a more detailed consideration in 
chapter 7 of the shifting notions of identity within these media.  Chapter 8 concludes 
the analysis of media institutions in the territory by exploring institutional practices 
and the shifting nature of political influence in state broadcasting during the 1980s.  
The final chapter analyses the manner in which different media reported on a series 
of incidents and events related to the Hienghène massacre, with a view to 
highlighting the contested nature of media constructions and the significance of 
struggles over identity to the broader political struggle over independence.      
 
In general, the major contentions of the thesis are that: 
 
• the structure of the New Caledonian media in the 1980s remained heavily 
influenced by the relations of power which had developed through the 
experiences of colonialism;  
 
• the New Caledonian media did not merely reflect the political crisis occurring 
within New Caledonian society but were centrally implicated in the production of 
this crisis; and, 
 
• the discursive struggle over identity was integral to the political struggle over 
independence through the authorisation which it gave to particular identity 
formations and therefore to particular forms of engagement in the political 
struggle. 
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 It is my hope that the material presented in this thesis underscores the centrality of 
discursive struggle to political struggle, a point argued in much contemporary 
cultural theory, and one which is increasingly informing other areas of enquiry.  
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 CHAPTER ONE - MEDIA AND POLITICS IN NEW CALEDONIA 
 
In 1989 I travelled with two Les Nouvelles journalists on an assignment to a coastal 
area north of Noumea.  The journalists had been sent to interview an oyster farmer 
about his recently established operation.  One of the journalists was a young 
metropolitan French woman who was working for the paper on exchange for a short 
period.  At the conclusion of the interview and inspection of the facilities, the oyster 
farmer asked the journalist how much he owed her.  She assured him that the 
service was free.  Later she commented to me that she had been very surprised to 
encounter this question frequently while working in the territory. 
 
It is tempting to read this vignette as expressive of the legacy of colonial relations in 
New Caledonia.  The metropolitan journalist's presence in the territory, working on 
the daily French language newspaper, was a product of colonialism enabled by the 
imposition of French political, economic and cultural practices on the indigenous 
inhabitants and the emergence of new institutions, among them a French language 
press.  But, in it, we can also glimpse some of the differences and distances which 
separate France from her colony, themselves deriving from the different relations of 
power established and perpetuated in the territory by the colonial power.  The 
crudeness of the oyster farmer's question was suggestive of a context in which the 
media - an institution considered in France, as in most liberal democratic societies, 
to be characteristic of a functional civil society - was itself subject to relations of 
power which bore little resemblance to those implicit in the discourse of the media 
as the fourth estate, which presents the media as engaging in public debate from a 
vantage point untainted by undue economic or political influence.  Indeed, the type 
of modus operandi suggested by the oyster farmer's question presents the media as 
almost indistinguishable from other colonial institutions which have developed within 
a context of power presided over by the colonial administration and maintained by a 
class of comprador politico-economic elite.1  Within this discourse, the mass 
audience media is, as one pro-independence publication put it, embroiled in 
'colonial tutelage' (Combat Ouvrier, 1/5/94). 
                                                          
1 The oyster farmer's question was congruent with comments which I had heard repeatedly from 
business people in Noumea on the power of an economic elite in the territory to determine the fate of 
their businesses.  Several people recounted that in order to operate successfully they were required to 
make payments to certain businessmen or to comply with certain proscriptions on their operations 
determined by these businessmen.  Others described how businesses had failed because they had 
fallen foul of these business interests. 
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Just as the discourse of the media as the fourth estate shifts attention from the 
complexities and complicities of the media's engagement with political and 
economic interests, so too the discourse of the media as a colonial institution tends 
to obscure the complexities of the media's engagement with, and attempted 
disengagement from, colonial authority.  In contemporary times, the territory’s state 
radio and television service provides probably the clearest example of engagement, 
while the emergence of a pro-independence media attests to the concertedness of 
attempts to disengage.  Between these exists, within and between media 
institutions, a complexity of mediations.  But colonialism nonetheless constituted the 
politico-economic and cultural context within which the institution of the media per 
se emerged within the territory, and the territory's media, whether apologetic or 
oppositional, bear the mark of this difficult engagement.     
 
The media and politics in the early colony 
 
The relationship between the exercise of political power and the control of discourse 
was expressed in the early colony in both the proliferation of a lively press and in 
administrative attempts to control it.   The emergence of this press in the nineteenth 
century attested to the will of early settlers to create local institutions which gave 
voice to their interests in the face of a powerful colonial administration. The 
vituperation with which the early press criticised the administration suggests that the 
absence of democratic institutions in the early colony was experienced sorely by 
many settlers.  Prior to the promulgation in 1881 of metropolitan press laws which 
granted considerable press freedom, the colony's newspapers were subject to a 
variety of means of administrative control, including the requirement of an 
authorisation to publish, the submission of newspapers to the administration prior to 
publication enabling the censorship of articles ‘that tended to inflame the passions 
born of all kinds of controversy relating to the authority’s acts’ (Bulletin Officiel de la 
Marine, 1876:370 cited in Coquilhat, 1987:51), and the suspension of newspapers 
after repeated warnings (Coquilhat, 1987:51-7).  Indeed, Coquilhat writes of this 
period that ‘the New Caledonian press existed without there being any other law 
than that of the goodwill of the governor’ (Coquilhat, 1987:51).  The suspension, 
however, of some publications after censorship suggests that there were either 
problems in the censorship process or difficulties in bringing to bear the full force of 
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 censorship in a colony where the administration sought to foster the longer term 
compliance of 'free settlers' to colonial rule (ibid:29-33).2  The publication of 
clandestine pamphlets also meant that there was a section of the media which 
escaped official censorship (ibid:52).3    
 
The 1881 metropolitan press laws, which resulted from a lengthy struggle over 
press freedom in France, were introduced in New Caledonia without the consent of 
the then governor.4  These laws essentially removed official censorship and the 
possibilities of suspension, exposing media proprietors instead to legal sanctions for 
defamation and other transgressions (ibid:56).5  This new legislative context 
precipitated new strategies of administrative control which relied increasingly on the 
not inconsiderable economic leverage available to the administration to effect a 
more compliant press. One means was the granting of contracts for the publication 
of official documentation.   Coquilhat writes that the transfer of this contract resulted 
in the demise of at least one prominent publication (ibid:93).   
 
But, increasingly, there emerged a new phenomenon in media control which was to 
mark the industry in New Caledonia well into the twentieth century.  This was the 
intervention of business and industrial capital in the colony's newspaper industry, 
and the collusion of these business interests with the administration in effecting 
                                                          
2 One publication which was suspended following censorship was Les Petites Affiches.  During the 
second half of 1876 and throughout 1877 the paper was published with, at times, blanked out 
columns.  The paper was subsequently suspended for a month in November 1877 over an article 
critical of the Banque de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, and received a subsequent suspension for two 
months (Coquilhat, 1987:29-32).  In order to secure the continued publication of a newspaper, the 
owner, Joseph Bouillaud, changed the paper's name to La Nouvelle-Calédonie, which became 
increasingly strident in its attacks against the administration and the clergy and in its advocacy of 
republican ideals.  In particular, in 1879 La Nouvelle-Calédonie campaigned for the establishment of 
democratic institutions and the appointment of a civil governor, a delegate, a general council and an 
elected municipal council for Noumea.  This was established later in that year (Coquilhat, 1987:29-33). 
3 In 1879 Paul Locamus published illegally La Reforme.  La Reforme followed on from Locamus' prior 
publications, Le Courier Illustré and La Revue Illustré de la Nouvelle-Calédonie.  La Revue contained 
articles which were critical of, amongst others, the missionaries and the penitentiary administration 
(Coquilhat, 1987:39-41).  Locamus had successful defamation suits brought against him for having, 
according to O'Reilly, ‘ridicule[d] all that [was] most respected in the colony, governor, military 
command, priests, sailors and magistrates’ (O'Reilly, 1955:306). 
4 Coquilhat writes that the governor Courbet's opposition was based on his conviction that the colony 
was not yet ready to benefit from such press liberalism.  This argument was congruent with that of the 
Minister of the Navy and Colonies Jauréguiberry who wrote in a report to the President that the press 
had been irresponsible in working 'almost solely to frustrate the local authorities through the 
bureaucrats...and to inflame the European population against the indigènes at the moment when they 
were revolting.  In addition, a secret collaboration had occurred between individuals deprived of their 
civic rights because of unlawful actions’ (Report dated 30 June 1880, cited in Coquilhat, 1987:53). 
5 The legislation allowed for court-ordered seizures of publications on the grounds that they contain 
'provocation to commit criminal acts, acts of rebellion, "outrages to proper morals", or exposure of 
private lives' (Freiberg, 1981:163). 
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 ownership changes.  Coquilhat writes that in 1884 the first civil governor in the 
colony, Pallu de La Barrière, sought the assistance of two local businesses to buy 
shares in the printery of one critical publication, La Néo-Calédonien, in order to 
quash the paper's repeated criticism of the clergy and himself (ibid:62-5).  The 
editor of this publication, Julien Bernier, who left following these changes, wrote that 
the newspaper now belonged: 
 
 to an element that no longer allows it to continue its former politics:  the 
enemy has entered the camp ... the independent organ ... has become 
enslaved by a clique ... and this revolution condemns it to be fatally clerical.  
To be convinced one has only to look at the following names:  Messrs 
Casadebaig, Pelletier, Servet, Blanc and Blanchot, who are all more or less 
confirmed in clericalism; and Messrs Dubuisson, Pelatan, Imhaus, Alcide, 
Desmazures, Cudenet and Morgan, who are all associated with the Nickel. 
(cited in O'Reilly, 1955:304). 
 
Bernier's comment suggests that, in the face of a burgeoning critical press which 
railed against the colonial politico-economic elite, and whose competence in this 
regard was strengthened by the participation of communards liberated from 
confinement on the Isle of Pines,6 the administration could increasingly rely on the 
assistance of commercial interests in its will to intervene in the production of media 
discourse.  Perhaps the most concerted response from industrial capital to the 
escalating critique mounted against it was the creation in 1889, largely by the nickel 
mining company Le Société Le Nickel (SLN), of La France Australe, described by its 
adversaries as 'a vast enterprise defending the privileges of the “big companies”; 
that is, the Nickel society and its satellites’  (Le Colon, 3 August 1889, cited in 
Coquilhat, 1987:81).  Although the France Australe claimed that it would minimise 
its engagement in political debate, the paper quickly engaged vociferously in the 
debates on church and state, republicanism and the monarchy, demonstrating in the 
process that its loyalty to particular governors could waver.  Initially a strong 
supporter of Governor Feuillet, the paper subsequently became critical of his 
policies (ibid:107-111).   
 
Elsewhere in the world, a similar demise in a radical polemical press was being 
brought about through the involvement of industrial capital in the newspaper 
industry.  These changes were driven by technological advances in printing and the 
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 concurrent expansion of consumer markets.  From this economic imperative 
emerged a new type of press - coined the 'penny press' because of the cheapness 
of the publications and their reliance on advertising for revenue - and a new style of 
journalistic writing aimed at maximising market share through an avoidance of 
polemics and a shift towards 'objectivity' (Curran, 1983).  The transition from the 
polemical to the 'objective' in journalism was more decisive in the Anglo-Saxon 
world than it was in France where a culture of journalism emerged which sought to 
retain some vestiges of polemical journalism through the creation of mass 
circulation party political publications.   
 
The France Australe appeared to emulate aspects of the penny press in its 
publication of classifieds and advertisements on the front page and in its cost of 
only five centimes, but the rationale behind these stylistic and financial choices 
appears to have differed considerably from those driving such changes elsewhere 
(France Australe, 26/8/89).  The absence of a sizeable mass market in New 
Caledonia meant that there was no imperative to achieve economies of scale 
through the adoption of modern printing technology, and no move to such 
technology took place until well into the post-war period.  Pacific Islands Monthly 
editor R. R. Robinson expressed considerable amazement at discovering during a 
trip to New Caledonia in the 1950s that the France Australe was still being hand 
typeset (PIM, December 1954).  Rather, the SLN's will to become involved in the 
colony's media through the creation of the France Australe appears to have been 
precipitated by its perceived need to influence a discursive context which was 
becoming highly volatile and, among certain groups, hostile to the increasingly 
entrenched influence of a newly emergent comprador class.    
 
The continuation of a polemical style of journalism in New Caledonia well after the 
demise of such a style of journalism elsewhere in the mass circulation press 
probably owes much to the absence of technological imperatives to change.  But it 
also attests to the different political and economic characteristics of a colony in 
which the potential for the arbitrary exercise of power was forever present and not 
infrequently realised.  Given the entrenchment of a politico-economic elite in the 
twentieth century and the tardy and uncertain introduction of structures of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6For example, Eugène Mourot had been a journalist in France before being deported in 1872.  O'Reilly 
commented that he was 'the most famous journalist' in the colony who 'fiercely defends his ideas.  The 
mission, J. Bernier, the administration are his bêtes noires’ (O'Reilly, 1980:189). 
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 democratic governance7, it is perhaps little wonder that journalism in New Caledonia 
failed to make the types of stylistic and conceptual transitions effected in France 
and even more starkly elsewhere.     
 
In the early twentieth century, several republican newspapers were published which 
were either closely affiliated to political groupings or were party publications.8  But 
the party political press could not survive the economic and political exigencies of 
the Depression and war years, and during this period there remained only the bi-
weekly Le Bulletin du Commerce, founded in 1899 by Henri Legras, and the daily 
France Australe.  In the post-war period a populist polemical press re-emerged, 
most notably with the commencement in 1947 of Pierre-Hubert Jeason's roneotyped 
Le Calédonien, described by O'Reilly as a 'Fighting paper, full of local polemics and 
proletarian demands’ (O'Reilly, 1955:319).  But the period from 1933 onwards, when 
the France Australe became the monopoly mass circulation daily publication, 
witnessed the emergence of a new form of journalistic practice which continued into 
the 1960s and in some instances beyond.  The France Australe had triumphed over 
its adversaries due largely to its considerable financial backing from the SLN and, in 
the twentieth century, the large trading company Ballande.  During the war years the 
newspaper's content was heavily regulated by the administration, although there 
appears to have been no suggestion that the paper did not comply willingly with 
wartime censorship.9  However, in the post-war period the publication responded 
                                                          
7 Melanesians were granted French citizenship in 1946 and the Régime d’Indigénat, which had 
severely proscribed Melanesian civil rights and freedom of activity and movement, was abolished.  In 
1956, New Caledonia was granted considerable political autonomy through the application of the loi 
cadre (framework law) in the colony.  This granted local elected representatives significant control 
over key areas of government.  A conservative backlash from the territory’s politico-economic elite, 
and the moving of nuclear testing to the Pacific, resulted in the responsibilities granted under the loi 
cadre being annulled and the enactment of a new statute in 1963 which resulted in the local 
government resuming its role as essentially a consultative body (Henningham, 1992:49-56; Spencer, 
Ward and Connell, 1988:10).    
8 For example, in 1906 the Comité Républicain de la Nouvelle-Calédonie began publishing Le 
Républicain.  The newspaper sought to perform the function of a 'mainstream' daily, providing extracts 
from French newspapers, local and metropolitan news, shipping news etc, but O'Reilly writes that 'its 
activity is essentially political:  electoral propaganda, the fight against “reactionary forces”, anti-clerical 
and pro-Masonic’ (O'Reilly, 1955:315).  Between 1909 and 1911 a weekly publication appeared, La 
République néo-calédonienne, which claimed to be the 'organ of the Caledonian youth and workers' 
(O'Reilly, 1955:316).  Between 1923 and 1933, the Républicains Democrates published the daily La 
Democrate de la Nouvelle-Calédonie et dépendences.  It contained frequent articles from metropolitan 
left newspapers and campaigned against certain commercial interests, particularly Ballande, the SLN 
and the Banque de l'Indochine (O'Reilly 1955:317). 
9 Brou writes that the first article to be censored in the press was in the Bulletin du Commerce on 18 
October 1939 (1976:64).  Censorship ended on 1 September 1945 (Bordier, 1987:84).  From 1942, 
the France Australe was reduced to half a page, but began publishing a full page on 1 January 1946 
and two pages (i.e. four pages of text) on 20 May 1946 (Bordier, 1987:60).  In April 1948 there was a 
paper crisis and the France Australe appeared again on only half a page until August (Bordier, 
1990:41).   
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 very little to the discursive freedoms available to it.  There appears to have been 
considerable congruence between the discursive objectives of the owners of the 
France Australe and those of the administration during this period.  The 
administration's desire to control media discourse was embraced by the France 
Australe which by the 1960s had become, according to the Mémorial Calédonien, 'a 
bit in the image of a closed society and finally quite lacking in curiosity.  Everything 
that could trouble such a society is carefully avoided and particular care is taken not 
to stir up any large political or social question’  (Godard, vol. 7, 246). During this 
period at least, it appeared that the power of financial capital had succeeded quite 
spectacularly in controlling the discursive sphere in a manner which was probably 
only coveted by the administration, caught as it was within the vortex of 
contradictory tendencies, between the will to control discourse and the need to 
foster compliance amongst settlers with the colonial system through allowing the 
emergence of some vestiges of a functioning public sphere.  Commercial interests 
had supplanted the administration as the shapers of public discourse in those areas 
of the media vulnerable to commercial pressure.  With the eventual introduction of 
modern printing technologies in the 1970s and 1980s, the greater cost of publication 
rendered newspapers more prone to the types of financial pressures which 
influential commercial interests could wield, and it increasingly became economic 
factors which regulated industry participation.  These economic factors were not, of 
course, unrelated to colonialism, as certain industries prospered in large part 
because they were shielded from competition by the colonial administration.  As 
Myriam Dornoy has argued: ‘A small number of people dominate the economy and 
intermarriage has consolidated the unity of the “fifty families”.  Their staunchly 
conservative outlook is mainly explained by the determination to retain privileges 
and fortunes acquired in the process of colonisation’ (1984:60). 
 
The 'unspoken' in the mass circulation media 
 
Throughout the many years during which the France Australe was the monopoly 
daily publication, those in New Caledonia who relied on the daily press for 
information about political events were particularly impoverished.  At a time when 
radio, and later television, access was limited and programming heavily controlled 
by the state, we might assume that the dearth of coverage of local events in the 
France Australe was sorely felt by the community.  Several weekly publications 
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 provided some critique of administration policies and business activities, and these 
were widely read.10  The immediate success of Les Nouvelles, which was 
established in 1971 in competition with the France Australe, and which gave 
emphasis to local events and issues, attested to a pervasive desire to have greater 
informational access.  But the question remains as to how a society which had an 
initial history of a lively daily press could tolerate the informational vacuum created 
by the editorial policies of the France Australe. 
 
Barbançon's discussion of a culture of the 'unspoken' in New Caledonian society 
may provide some insight into the editorial policies of the France Australe during its 
period of monopoly publication (Barbançon, 1992).   Barbançon describes 'the 
unspoken' in New Caledonian society as ‘a real institution, an unavoidable constant’ 
(ibid:9).  This constant is, he argues, pervasive: 
 
 All New Caledonia has always functioned like that.  Since forever, this 
predisposition of the mind to hide painful past moments has reigned in this 
country, and those who dare lift the dark veil thrown on the memories are 
sacrilegious (ibid). 
 
Barbançon finds evidence for the ‘unspoken’ in his encounters with Kanaks and 
non-Kanaks whose 'approach to the past leads them to the same conclusion’ (ibid), 
and also in his own reticence in writing about his country, New Caledonia.   But the 
‘unspoken’ described by Barbançon can also be seen in a journalistic culture which 
was most acutely manifest in the France Australe during the 1950s and 1960s, but 
which recurred during the 1980s in state broadcasting and Les Nouvelles, 
particularly after the newspaper changed ownership in 1987.  This culture is 
expressive of colonial relations, as is the culture of polemicism.  But in the culture of 
'the unspoken' we have a particularly acute expression of the power of discourse 
and its potential ideological effects.  'The unspoken' points to the failure of 
hegemony in colonial society, the corollary of this failure being the need to engage 
in the most extreme strategy of discursive control - silence.  Within this precarious 
discursive context there emerged in the 1970s new publications which sought to 
give expression to the rights of Melanesians to  self-affirmation and independence.  
Indeed, it might be said that up until this time, and with a few notable exceptions, 
                                                          
10 There were during this period several weekly or periodical publications.  These included:  Le 
Calédonien, L'Avenir Calédonien, the weekly Le Journal Calédonien and La Voix du Cagou, as well as 
the bi-weekly Le Bulletin du Commerce.  Several of these publications engaged in critical reflection on 
the administration and certain commercial and industrial interests, and were widely read.     
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 sympathetic discussion of Melanesian demands for political and economic rights 
constituted one of the greatest 'unspokens' in the colony's media.11   
 
                                                          
11 In 1927 and 1928, the Bulletin du Commerce, which was widely read by settlers in the interior, 
began publishing articles written by Pierre Bergés which were sympathetic towards Melanesians.  
Bergés was a rich planter-rancher from La Foa and for many years its Mayor, and later worked with 
Maurice Lenormand in the Union Calédonien (Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut Kanak 
d’Histoire Moderne: 54-5).  In 1937, the paper broached the question of indigenous political rights with 
the question:  ‘will the indigènes have their political rights?’.   The response was, ‘warning, it’s 
premature’ (ibid:59).  Brou’s comment in footnote eight suggests that discussion of Melanesian 
political rights featured in Jeanson’s Le Calédonien.  In addition, the Union Calédonien began 
publishing in 1954 L’Avenir Calédonien which discussed indigenous issues, although at this stage, 
L’Avenir was more concerned with a populist leftist critique of capital and demands for greater political 
autonomy in the territory.  Also, since 1893 religious bi-lingual publications (French and indigenous 
language) had been published, initially in the Loyalty islands and later in Houailou (O’Reilly, 1955:311 
& 316).  See also footnote on page 192. 
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 The nascent pro-independence media 
 
To argue that a polemical style of journalism persisted in New Caledonia is not, of 
course, to specify the nature of this polemic, except to point to the general tendency 
towards a populist discourse against the power exercised by the administration and 
dominant commercial and industrial interests.  It also tells us little of the political 
objectives pursued by the various media.  Populist discourse can, after all, be 
mobilised towards quite antithetical political ends as the contemporary advocacy by 
ultra-conservative groups of citizen initiated referenda suggests.  In the post-war 
period, the emergence of the Union Calédonien (UC) in 1951, initially as a 
movement and later as a party, and its immediate and subsequent electoral 
success, attested to the growing strength of populist sentiment in the colony which, 
through the UC, was channelled into demands for greater political autonomy.12   The 
UC publication L’Avenir Calédonien gave voice to these demands and was joined 
for a brief period between 1973 and 1975 by the weekly La Voix du Cagou.13  
L’Avenir Calédonien also gave some prominence to demands for Melanesian 
‘advancement’, particularly after the election in 1964 of the first Melanesian Senator 
Roch Pidjot, but the UC’s quest to broaden its electoral support within the European 
community led the issues of Melanesian disadvantage and indigenous rights to be 
generally subsumed within a more populist appeal to the rights of the disadvantaged 
in general, no matter what their racial origin.14 
 
The first publications to foreground Melanesian political demands were news sheets 
produced by Melanesian political movements which sought to advance indigenous 
rights and assert and explore Melanesian identity  These groups appropriated the 
hitherto derogatory term of ‘Canaque’ or ‘Kanak’, to affirm this identity.   In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the Foulards Rouge produced the roneotyped Le Reveil 
Canaque, the title of which was then used by the Union Multiraciale de Nouvelle-
                                                          
12 Henningham writes:  ‘The UC burst onto the political scene in the elections, in July 1951, for New 
Caledonia’s deputy to the French Parliament.  The European community had failed to appreciate the 
implications of the enfranchisement of the great majority of the Melanesians.  Many European electors 
did not bother to vote.  Moreover, the conservative vote was split when two right-wing candidates ran.  
Only Maurice Lenormand, who was drafted at a late hour as the UC’s candidate, paid attention to 
Melanesian interests in his election promises’ (Henningham, 1992:50). 
13 Alain Bernut began publishing La Voix du Cagou in 1967 following the purchase of his prior 
publication, Le Journal Calédonien by Henri Lafleur.  An article in the Pacific Islands Monthly 
comments that La Voix du Cagou was the organ of Bernut’s party in the Territorial Assembly, the 
Popular Caledonian Movement, and began publication upon Bernut’s election in July 1967 (PIM, 
October 1975:28).  The Mémorial Calédonien comments that the newspaper ‘equally played the role of 
a safety valve for those who were hooked on systematic criticism’ (Godard, vol. 7, 251). 
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 Calédonie in 1972, under the editorship of a young Caledonian doctor, Jean-Paul 
Caillard (Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut Kanak D’Histoire Moderne:81).  
In addition, several political news sheets in indigenous languages (it was and 
remains illegal to produce an indigenous language publication without an 
accompanying French translation) were distributed.15  Caillard subsequently 
published in 1975 Les Calédoniens, a leftist newspaper which supported Kanak 
protest and independence and which gave prominence to sympathetic discussions 
of Melanesian culture and disadvantage.  Financial pressures led to the paper’s 
closure in 1976.  An article in PIM cited the paper’s claim that its printers had been 
subject to ‘the worst pressure from their advertising clients as well as from our 
gubernatorial super-prefect’, adding that ‘needless to say the paper carried no 
advertising.  This kind of outspoken comment doesn’t attract them’ (PIM, October 
1975).  Such commercial pressure would be again used, most visibly, over a decade 
later in ensuring the closure of Le Journal de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, popularly know 
as the ‘Journal Bleu’.16  Other pro-independence groups moved to create their own 
publications.  In 1975 a breakaway group from the Union Multiraciale de Nouvelle-
Calédonie, the Union Progressiste Multiraciale, began publishing L’Avant Garde.  In 
1976 the newly formed Parti de Libération Kanak (PALIKA) began publishing Le 
Kanak, and the title Le Reveil Kanak (note:  no longer ‘Canaque’)17 was resumed in 
the news sheet of the Liberation Kanak Socialist (LKS) party which broke away from 
the PALIKA in 1981. 
 
The media and the issue of independence in the 1980s 
 
The emergence of formal demands for independence from 1975 met with concerted 
opposition from the daily newspapers, Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes and the France 
Australe.  The latter’s opposition was more muted, perhaps because its editors were 
seeking, at this time quite desperately, to enhance the paper’s dwindling market 
share and believed that this could be achieved through some product differentiation.  
But it may also have been that the organisation, not long awoken from its 
‘unspoken’ slumber, was professionally ill-equipped to match its competitor’s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
14 For a discussion of the UC’s origins and early policies see Henningham, 1992:48-61. 
15 Jean-Pierre Deteix cites Titiquadji from Maré and Andimado of the Groupe 68 political movement 
(interview 12/5/94). 
16 The newspaper was coined the ‘Journal Bleu’ because of its incorporation of blue in its mast in 
contrast to Les Nouvelles’ use of red. 
17 For a discussion of the evolution of the term ‘Canaque’ see chapter 6. 
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 populist polemic which presented demands for independence as racist and 
ideologically inspired by outside agitators.  The closure of the France Australe in 
1979 left Les Nouvelles as the monopoly mass circulation publication in the territory.  
Its resolute stance against independence and its denigration of pro-independence 
Kanaks was to become increasingly aggressive as the following decade progressed. 
 
Prior to the election of Socialist President François Mitterrand in 1981, the territory’s 
state radio and television services manifest a similarly resolute opposition to 
independence, achieved largely through the denial of access to radio and television 
to Kanak or European pro-independence politicians.  State control over 
broadcasting in New Caledonia in the post-war period had fostered a highly racist 
professional culture in the organisation which resulted in journalists readily 
embracing the directive that they not interview Kanaks.  In addition, in 1980 a 
weekly publication entitled Corail appeared which increasingly came to manifest 
extremist opposition to pro-independence politicians, mobilising neo-fascist 
discourse, some of which was read by pro-independence groups as inciting violence 
against pro-independence politicians and resulting in the assassination in 
September 1981 of UC Secretary General Pierre Declercq.  Corail was established 
by Daniel Tardieu, who had arrived in the territory after the Second World War and 
was reputed to have been a Nazi collaborator.18  Tardieu’s departure from the 
territory in 1981 resulted in Gérard Lacourrège assuming editorial control of the 
publication.  Lacourrège, a former paratrooper in north Africa, had similarly arrived 
in the territory after the war and engaged in a range of journalistic activities.19  
                                                          
18 Tardieu had arrived in New Caledonia in 1946, married a local woman, Pauline Poulain, and bought 
a local printery, the Imprimeries Réunies de Nouméa, renaming it the Imprimerie Nouvelle.  Tardieu’s 
parents had owned a printery in central France, explaining perhaps the direction in which he 
channelled his professional energies after arriving in New Caledonia, but there was nonetheless 
considerable speculation as to the reasons for his arrival in the first place.  One former conservative 
politician described it as an arrival ‘from nowhere’ which had generated considerable suspicion in the 
Noumea business community at the time.  Certainly, suspicion dogged Tardieu’s lengthy involvement 
in the territory’s printing and media activities.  Allegations shortly after his arrival that he had been 
involved in pro-Vichy activities and the rounding up of Jews in France were revived with his 
involvement in the establishment of Corail. These allegations became more public following the 
publication in the Union Calédonienne weekly, L’Avenir Calédonien, of an article published in the 
French Socialist Party weekly, L’Unité, in which Tardieu was described as a former member of the 
Collaboration group and one of the leaders of the Clermont-Ferraud militia, allegations which were 
strenuously denied in Corail (L’Avenir Calédonien, 22/4/82; Corail, 30/4/82). 
19 Gerard Lacourrège was among those Algerian-born ‘Pieds Noirs’ who arrived in the territory in the 
early 1960s following France’s withdrawal from Algeria (Bobin, 1991).  Bobin suggests that Lacourrège 
was one of the ‘hardline extremists amongst the Pieds Noirs and the Metropolitans (notably the retired 
army officers)’ who ‘played a decisive role in the anti-independence offensive of the 1980s’ (ibid).  
Tardieu and Lacourrège had worked together on the weekly Journal Calédonien, owned by Tardieu, 
which appeared in 1964.  Tardieu argues that the decision to publish Corail was largely at the behest 
of Lacourrège who deemed it important that a publication express a range of views which he 
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 Under Lacourrège, the extremist tone of the publication mounted, and its affiliation 
to extremist political groups became clear with the publication, shortly before its 
closure, of advertising for the newly created New Caledonian National Front 
[FN(NC)].  The magazine was forced to close following a succession of successful 
defamation suits against it, largely from pro-independence politicians and activists.  
A few months later, in January 1985, a new extreme-right publication Combat 
Calédonien appeared under the editorship of a metropolitan French journalist and 
novelist Alain Camille writing under the pen name of ADG, who had worked for the 
right-wing metropolitan newspaper Minute and who had arrived in the territory in 
1982.20  Camille was a member of the FN(NC) committee although he argued that 
Combat Calédonien was not a party publication but rather reflected the views of a 
much broader section of the anti-independence community.  In December 1985 
Combat was similarly forced to close under the weight of successful defamation 
suits.   
 
The press legislation of 1881 had provided the legislative framework within which 
the pro-independence movement and others could apply some economic leverage 
to achieve changes to the media industry, and this leverage was used effectively, 
particularly in securing the rapid demise of Combat Calédonien.  Anti-independence 
groups also had recourse to such legislative intervention and brought defamation 
                                                                                                                                                                          
considered inadequately represented in the existing media (Corail, 15/5/80).  In interview, Tardieu 
distances himself from involvement in the publication and cites his departure from the territory for 
Tahiti in early 1982 following which Lacourrège replaced him as Director of the publication.  Tardieu’s 
wish to distance himself from the early publication, and his decision to leave the territory, may have 
related to accusations that the paper had been implicated in the assassination of UC Secretary 
General Pierre Declercq in September 1981.  European supporters of independence in the territory, 
among them Pierre Declercq, were a major target of Corail.  One article described Declercq and two 
other Europeans, UC militant Jean-Pierre Deteix and Parti Socialist Calédonien politician Jacques 
Violette, as ‘European renegades recently arrived in the country to create confusion in the mind and in 
politics’, and elsewhere as ‘criminals ... who have created here anti-White racism’ (Corail, 5/11/81) 
while another referred generally to the ‘a pile of impassioned radicals, most recently arrived from 
metropolitan France, therefore irresponsible’ (Corail, 15/1/81 & 26/2/81).  Declercq in particular was a 
target in the months prior to his assassination.  An article published two months before he was killed 
mocked his concern with the extent to which settlers were armed and the activities of the army in the 
bush, and concluded ominously:  ‘If the [armed settlers] are so numerous and so trigger-happy, how is 
it that Declercq is still alive?’ (Corail, 23/7/81).  In the face of Corail’s comments on Declercq and his 
subsequent assassination, Tardieu and his publication were accused of fascism and inciting violence 
(Corail, 2/10/81).  Corail claimed that one pro-independence publication commented that 
demonstrators at a rally had called for the banning of Corail and the arrest of Tardieu (cited in Corail, 
16/10/81).  Corail replied with a long article in which it sought to refute these claims admitting that:  
‘Certainly, the sentence that implicates us could appear today sadly premonitory’, but adds that:  ‘We 
read it personally as an established fact of the Caledonian reality on 23 July 1981:  THE FREE 
CIRCULATION OF MEN AND IDEAS’ (Corail, 2/10/81).  In the face of these, and no doubt other 
subsequent pressures, Tardieu may have decided it a propitious time to leave the territory. 
20 Camille came to New Caledonia for a seven month period in 1982-3 to write a novel on the territory.  
During this period he wrote a weekly column for Corail.  He returned to the territory less than two 
years’ later and commenced Combat Calédonien. 
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 suits against the pro-independence media (Hnalaïne Uregei interview, 10/5/94).21  In 
general, however, the anti-independence media was more financially resilient than 
its pro-independence counterpart, in large part because of its ability to attract 
advertising revenue.  Corail published advertising from its inception and its 
advertisers included some large commercial businesses in the territory.22  Combat 
Calédonien began publishing advertisements only seven months into its existence 
following the payment of 500,000 CFP in damages and interest for what it decried 
somewhat facetiously was only the printing of ‘an error in the first name of a public 
servant’ (Combat Calédonien, 5/7/85).  ADG wrote that advertising had become a 
financial necessity; however, his preference had been that the magazine not carry 
advertisements to ensure its complete independence (ibid).  However, the evidence 
that Combat and Corail could carry advertisements at all indicates that there was 
general support for the existence of these publications by commercial interests.  
Such support was never forthcoming to even mildly leftist publications.         
 
The existence during the 1980s of an array of pro-independence party newspapers 
and news sheets provided some discursive counterpoint to the forceful public 
presence of anti-independence discourse, but most of these publications were very 
circumscribed in their circulation, being read primarily by party adherents.  In July 
                                                          
21 Corail’s relentless personal crusades against European independence supporters and others were 
its ultimate downfall.  By October 1983, Corail reported that it had paid more than 3 million CFP in 
damages resulting from defamation suits brought against it, and Lacourrège had already been 
condemned to 15 days in prison for defamation against Deteix (Corail, 14/10/83).  Announcing the 
paper’s closure, Lacourrège claimed he had made 221 appearances before the courts, had been 
convicted on almost every charge possible under the press law, and had paid more than six million 
CFP in damages, interest and legal costs, describing himself as ‘the most condemned journalist in 
France’ (Corail, 29/6/84).  Corail’s far-right successor, Combat Calédonien, also bore the brunt of 
judicial action, but did so much earlier into its existence.  Shortly after it commenced, ADG decried the 
level of police and judicial intervention in the operation of the paper (Combat Calédonien, 29/3/85).  A 
week later, he advised his readership that ‘THE SCANDAL CONTINUES’ and outlined more fully the 
nature of this intervention:  ‘Still more searches, an incessant volley of summonses, of questioning, of 
police pestering, to which, by the way, I have decided to no longer respond other than in writing, here 
or in Minute, which still welcomes me and gratefully so’ (Combat, 3/4/85).  Combat’s vituperation 
against Edgard Pisani, described on one occasion as ‘Edgard-the-bad’ and as ‘Pisani pox’ on one 
front cover, precipitated the police and judicial crackdown on the paper (Combat, 8/3/85 & 10/5/85).  
Pisani himself brought defamation charges against Combat Calédonien following the publication of an 
open letter to Pisani written by ADG (Combat Calédonien, 12/7/85 & 9/8/85).  Moreover, he threatened 
legislation to control the press as part of the legislative package being developed to enable the 
establishment of the Fabius regions (the division of the territory into political regions under the Fabius 
statute) in late 1985.  Camille’s departure from the territory in late 1985 and the consequent closure of 
the publication in its then form averted any need which may have been felt in the administration to 
legislatively intervene. 
22 For example, Corail carried advertisements for local shops, car dealers, construction companies, 
restaurants, cigarette companies and travel agencies.  The volume of advertising appears to have 
dropped off somewhat as the magazine’s militancy escalated.  Combat Calédonien carried advertising 
for several of the businesses or companies that had advertised in Corail; for example, Sitec, 
Groupement Berton and Le Saint Hubert. 
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 1980 a group of pro-independence Europeans and Kanaks began publishing a 
monthly pro-independence newspaper, La Tribune du Pacifique, which sought to 
address itself more broadly across the political groupings within the then pro-
independence umbrella organisation, the Front Indépendantiste (FI).  Financial 
pressures resulted in the paper’s closure in July 1981. 23  Another pro-independence 
publication, La Nouvelle Presse, appeared briefly in August and September 1981, 
produced by pro-independence activists and ex-workers from a recently defunct 
daily, La Presse Calédonienne.  La Presse had been created as a centrist 
publication in competition with Les Nouvelles by members of the centrist political 
party the Fédération Pour une Nouvelle Société Calédonienne (FNSC), and was 
first published on 27 May 1980.  La Presse sought to position itself as a mainstream 
daily publication covering the full range of news and entertainment topics available 
in Les Nouvelles.  However, in its news coverage it clearly favoured the 
presentation of centrist political views, evident, for example, in its sympathetic 
treatment of the Dijoud plan for land redistribution, in the prominence which it 
afforded the views of centrist local politicians such as New Caledonian Senator 
Lionel Cherrier and FNSC Territorial Counsellors Jean-Pierre Aifa and Gaston 
Morlet, and in its muted support for Giscard d’Estaing in the 1981 Presidential 
elections.24  The scantness of advertising in the newspaper resulted in severe 
financial problems which secured the closure of the paper on, or shortly after, 30 
June 1981, the date of the last edition of the paper held in the archives of the 
Bernheim Library in Noumea.25  The deteriorating finances of the paper had resulted 
in workers not being paid for some time, and several of these workers occupied the 
workplace to protest over the moneys owing them.  These workers were joined by 
two European pro-independence activists, Marc Coulon and Jean-Lois Dion, in the 
publication of La Nouvelle Presse (Coulon interview, 18/4/94).26   Another European 
activist, Christian Nègre, later joined Coulon and Dion in the two edition publication 
of L’Evenement, published with the agreement of the FI immediately following the 
political realignment which resulted in the FI assuming government in July 1982.  
                                                          
23 Copies of the July 1980 - July 1981 editions of La Tribune are held in Bernheim Library.  The last 
edition refers to an ‘Extraordinary General Meeting on Saturday 1 August at the offices of the 
newspaper’.  Presumably the decision was taken at this meeting to cease publication. 
24 This support positioned La Presse among the more conservative elements within the FNSC, and 
may have resulted in political turmoil within the publication, alluded to in Corail , where it is stated that 
a M. Tillon assumed control from the hitherto director M. Guaitella (11/6/81).  For an example of its 
muted support for d’Estaing, see La Presse, 11/5/81. 
25 There is, however, no reference in this edition to the imminent closure of the paper. 
26 I was unable to find any copies of La Nouvelle Presse in the newspaper archives of the Bernheim 
Library or the Territorial Archives of New Caledonia. 
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 Coulon argues that the purpose of L’Evenement was to showcase the new 
government, its members and its proposed program (ibid).27     
 
There was one other attempt in 1981 to establish a competitor to Les Nouvelles, 
initiated, curiously, by one of the owners of Les Nouvelles, Roger Brissaud, 
purportedly after a disagreement between Brissaud and his partner Jean-Paul 
Leyraud over Brissaud’s desire to publish Les Nouvelles in colour.  Brissaud used a 
Les Nouvelles journalist, Jean Noel Feraud, as publication editor for Nouméa 
Journal, but poor advertising and sales revenue led to the paper’s very rapid closure 
only a month after its commencement.28  By the period, therefore, of most acute 
insurrectionary activity in the territory in late 1984 and throughout much of 1985, 
media discourse in the territory’s mass circulation press was very much dominated 
by anti-independence sentiments.  All attempts to mount publications which 
countered or even tempered the virulence of Les Nouvelles, Corail, and later 
Combat Calédonien’s opposition to independence had failed.   
  
The commitment given by the new French Socialist government in 1981 that state 
broadcasting in the territory would allow access to pro-independence voices had 
resulted in a considerable change in radio and television news in the territory in 
allowing the views of pro-independence politicians to be heard.  This change was 
persistently decried by Corail and Combat Calédonien in most editions of these 
publications.29  But the weight of conservatism in the state broadcasting 
                                                          
27 Coulon commented that the paper was called L’Evenement because the assumption of government 
by the pro-independence movement after the FNSC, which held the balance of power in the Territorial 
Assembly, withdrew its support for the RPCR and instead formed an alliance with the FI, was ‘an 
event, a sacred event even’ (interview, 18/4/94). 
28 Copies of Nouméa Journal for January 1981 are held in the Territorial Archives.  Corail considered 
the newspaper to be left-wing, remarking on its closure that ‘Certainly, the independence and leftist 
circles in the territory will have lost a friend, but that’s all, and that’s very little’ (Corail, 5/3/81). 
29 RFO (called prior to 1983 FR3) was the primary target of Corail and Combat Calédonien’s media 
criticism.  Corail followed quite closely the changes in organisational structure and personnel at FR3 in 
both Noumea and Paris following the election of Mitterrand as President in 1981.  Initially, Corail 
deplored the ‘nothingness of the TV and radio programs that, since 10 May, the French have had to 
suffer’ and criticised the promotion of two Melanesians, ‘Walles Cotra’ and ‘Joseph Chayet’ (sic), to 
more senior reporting positions, arguing that they were not adequately skilled (Corail, 12/3/82).  But 
increasingly, criticism hinged on what was considered to be the disproportional representation of 
socio-communist and pro-independence opinion on state broadcasting.  One writer, Michel Perrin, 
described FR3 as a distorting mirror, ‘not gleaming with objectivity’ (Corail, 22/10/82).  ‘Walles Cotra’ 
was described as an ‘pro-independence lackey’ and Corail deplored the appointment of what it 
described as a ‘new communist management’ at RFO Paris (Corail, 18/1/83).  The change in name to 
Radio France Outre-mer (RFO) in January 1983 resulted in one writer, RPCR politician George Faure, 
coining the name ‘Radio France Occupée par les socialococos’ for the service, which was described 
shortly after as a ‘Marxist service’ (Corail, 4/2/83 & 18/3/83).  Michel Perrin decried the lack of air-time 
given to the views of the ‘two thirds of the population who wish to remain French’ and described RFO 
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 organisation was difficult to shift and the pro-independence movement remained 
dissatisfied with the coverage afforded pro-independence political demands on 
Radio France Outre-mer (RFO) services, choosing by late 1984 to boycott RFO in 
keeping with its decision to withdraw from the territory’s institutions, setting up 
instead parallel institutions and declaring the establishment, in December 1984, of a 
provisional government of Kanaky.30 
 
The lack of tolerance among anti-independence political groups of RFO’s airing of 
pro-independence discourse precipitated a move by the dominant conservative 
political party in the territory, the Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la 
République (RPCR), to take over a radio station, Radio Rhythme Bleu (RRB), in 
order to give full vent to the views of the party’s main political exponents, primarily 
New Caledonian Deputy and RPCR President Jacques Lafleur and Melanesian 
RPCR Senator Dick Ukeiwé.31  The establishment of RRB testifies to the extent to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
as an ‘gross propaganda instrument at the service of a racist, xenophobic ideology devoid of 
credibility’, coining a new name for the service, ‘Radio Fortement Orientée’ (Corail, 29/4/83). 
30 In the thick of the insurrection, blockades had been established by pro- and anti- independence 
activists throughout the territory making circulation almost impossible.  Many telephone lines were cut 
rendering the work of journalists and communication between groups of FLNKS activists very difficult.  
Perhaps ironically, the FLNKS was reliant during this period on state radio for news of the progress of 
the agitation of activist groups throughout the territory, as it was during the Ouvéa crisis in April and 
May 1988. 
31 Radio Rhythme Bleu began broadcasting in January 1982 as a ‘free radio’ service in the wake of the 
proliferation of such radio services in France following Mitterrand’s election as President.  Its 
beginnings were somewhat episodic with periods of test broadcasting being followed by periods of 
shut-down due to financial and managerial difficulties.  In 1985, the station’s equipment was bought by 
a new association with very close political links with the RPCR, its director being Christian Prost. The 
programming of the station changed from a sole emphasis on music and leisure programming to the 
inclusion of more extensive news and information services.  Prost hired several journalists from Radio 
Alouette in Brittany which was linked to the Republican Party and the UDF, amongst them Elizabeth 
Nouar, a long-time acquaintance, who progressively took over from Prost as station manager after her 
arrival in February 1985 (L’Hebdo, 18/8/88).  Nouar argues that the prior incarnation of RRB was very 
unsuccessful because it primarily played music at a time of political unrest when people wanted 
information about the unfolding political events (interview, 23/10/89).  Under the new management 
structure, news bulletins and other information programs such as commentaries and interviews were 
included in the programming.  As a mark of their political orientation, these new services were met 
with acclaim by Combat Calédonien (Combat Calédonien, 8/3/85).  Much of the programming on RRB 
was oriented towards the encouragement of a mass audience.  The result was that little distinguished 
RRB’s entertainment programs from those offered by state-run radio RFO or, indeed, the commercial 
radio service in the territory NRJ.  In its news services, too, RRB emulated much of the stylistic 
features of its initially sole competitor, RFO, scheduling several news bulletins throughout the day with 
main bulletins of 15 - 20 minutes duration in the early morning, at lunchtime and in the late afternoon.  
Nouar commented that journalists at RRB had the ‘professional concern to separate facts from 
commentary’, but RRB provoked the ire of the pro-independence movement not only for its 
commentary, but also for its choice of ‘facts’, the order in which these were presented in the news, and 
the types of discourses mobilised in their presentation.  Although it was not possible to get access to 
archival tapes, RRB’s mandate to express the views of the RPCR’s leadership suggests that the 
discourses which it mobilised were very close to those of RPCR politicians in Les Nouvelles and of the 
paper itself after 1985. Indeed, the independence movement made little differentiation between the 
discourses developed across the loyalist media and Les Nouvelles.  Bwenando described the 
‘Nouvelles Coloniales’ and RRB as the ‘rubbish press [sic]’ and decried what they described as their 
systematic inciting of violence against the independence movement (Bwenando, 12/11/85). Nouar 
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 which conservative political groups, and in particular the RPCR, viewed the control 
of mass audience media as crucial to the maintenance of their political and 
economic dominance.  When RRB began broadcasting in early 1985 there was 
hardly a torrent, and perhaps not even a trickle, of sympathy for the pro-
independence movement in the mass audience media.  But the discursive openings 
created by RFO’s editorial policies under the Socialist administration seem to have 
been considered by Lafleur and other conservatives as highly seditious, meriting a 
concerted counter-response.32  This was initiated by the creation of RRB, and 
continued through the RPCR’s role in securing in January 1987 a change in 
ownership of Les Nouvelles which ensured that the paper was more consistently 
sympathetic to RPCR and metropolitan RPR politics, and the subsequent creation in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
commented that one of the first concerns of the news service in 1985 was to ‘give voice to all those 
who lived and suffered the évenements’, adding that ‘one shouldn’t get used to lawlessness, one 
should denounce it, and we did all we could in that regard’ (Les Nouvelles Hebdo, 18/8/88).  Those 
‘suffering the events’ were, of course, those who opposed independence and who were presented 
within this discourse as victims of violent, senseless aggression.  One incident which demonstrated 
the extent to which RRB would step out of its ‘mainstream’ guise and actively engage in mobilising 
loyalist protest was the station’s rebroadcasting of an RPCR call to gather in the central Noumean 
Place des Cocotiers on 8 May 1985 (Les Nouvelles, 9/5/85).  The gathering was urged as a show of 
force in support of loyalists who had attacked an illegal pro-independence demonstration and forced 
demonstrators back to the UC’s headquarters in a Noumea suburb near the town centre.  Riot police 
managed to keep the loyalists from taking the headquarters by force, but in the incident one Kanak 
was killed and several other Kanaks and loyalists were injured (Connell, 1987:352).  Following this 
violence, Bwenando decried the RPCR’s role in ‘organising and leading, through RRB, many Kanak 
chases as well as murders and attempted murders like on 8 May’ (Bwenando, 31/10/85).  RRB was 
used extensively by the RPCR leadership to campaign for RPCR politicians in the various electoral 
contests which occurred after 1985 and in rallying participation in the RPCR demonstrations organised 
during this period.  Lafleur and RPCR politicians accorded privileged access for interviews to RRB.  
For example, in the lead-up to the March 1986 national elections, the RPCR organised a press 
conference for Lafleur at RRB to which some other media (but not Bwenando or Radio Djiido) were 
invited. 
32 Dissatisfaction within the RPCR over the coverage given to the communiques of pro-independence 
groups by Les Nouvelles and FR3, and the at times critical reporting of the RPCR in Les Nouvelles, 
had been mounting prior to 1984.  RPCR politician, Georges Faure, articulated much of this 
dissatisfaction in an article published in Corail in early 1983.  Faure argued that, in comparison with 
the space given to independence groups, the RPCR was virtually ignored in Les Nouvelles (Corail, 
4/2/83).  He then anticipated the type of response that Les Nouvelles’ journalists would give to such 
an assertion:  ‘To that, Les Nouvelles could respond that we make less noise...that they hear from us 
less...that we (ultimately) haven’t got anything to say...and that they have to please their clients:  the 
important policies of the RPCR don’t sell...except exceptionally...perhaps their journalists don’t 
appreciate the RPCR...that’s their right...it’s a matter of obedience...’ (Corail, 4/2/83).  Faure’s 
comments were not particularly novel.  Les Nouvelles had commented on several occasions on the 
RPCR’s seeming inability to mount an effective political response and had characterised Lafleur as 
politically ineffectual in being unable to cut a policy line in the face of the different political tendencies 
within the RPCR, particularly over the issues of the departmentalisation of the territory and land reform 
(see for example, Les Nouvelles, 5, 7 & 11/6/82).  Communiques from the RPCR were certainly less 
prolific than those from political groupings to its left and right, reflecting the party’s difficulty in 
developing a consensual position.  However, those characteristics for which Les Nouvelles criticised 
the RPCR were probably its major strength.  As McCallum (1992) has observed, the party operated 
best as a party of reaction to the policies advanced by others and, in particular, the pro-independence 
movement .  The party’s seeming inability or unwillingness to cut a proactive policy line could be 
equally expressed as an ability to affirm the validity of the various constituent groupings within the 
party and to therefore provide cohesion.  Within this party context, and within the territory’s political 
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 early 1988 of an RPCR weekly Les Nouvelles Hebdo.33 This response followed the 
return to power in 1986 of a conservative government in France which resulted in 
RFO once again opposing consistently and strenuously the pro-independence 
movement.  By 1988, the prevalence of anti-independence discourse in the 
territory’s mass audience media had reached unprecedented proportions and the 
FLNKS was once again boycotting this media.  This time, however, the pro-
independence movement had recourse to its own media:  the initially weekly and 
later bi-monthly publication Bwenando, which had commenced in July 1985, and the 
FLNKS radio station, Radio Djiido.34 
 
Kanak media 
 
The perceived futility within the pro-independence movement of attempting to use 
the anti-independence media to give exposure to its demands and arguments had 
                                                                                                                                                                          
context which may have rendered perilous the public airing of internal tension and dissent, it is 
perhaps of little surprise that a party had not attempted earlier to establish its own media. 
33 The RPCR, which had for long objected to the coverage afforded the independence movement by 
Les Nouvelles, moved to investigate the means whereby a competitor to Les Nouvelles could be 
established.  Following Chirac’s election as Prime Minister, Lafleur approached his long time political 
ally and then Prime Minister to request that he urge Robert Hersant to investigate the possibility of 
establishing this competitor.  Hersant sent his assistant, Henri Morny, to visit the Territory.  Morny’s 
assessment was that the market could not sustain a competitor and he instead was able to persuade 
Leyraud to sell Les Nouvelles.  It appears that the RPCR expected to enter into the arrangement with 
Hersant as a co-proprietor of Les Nouvelles (a 60 per cent Hersant, 40 per cent Lafleur/Prost split was 
rumoured).  In January and February of 1987, Christian Prost, elected RPCR member to the Territorial 
Congress and Director of the RPCR radio station, Radio Rhythme Bleu (RRB), spoke to journalists at 
Les Nouvelles about the future editorial direction of the newspaper in a manner suggesting he was 
about to take control.  Early in March, Prost is alleged to have announced to the staff at RRB that he 
was about to assume directorship of Les Nouvelles.  For some reason, however, the deal between 
Hersant and the RPCR fell through.  It was suggested by some journalists that this simply resulted 
from the RPCR not paying up in time - an excuse which allowed Hersant to assume full proprietorship 
of this very lucrative newspaper.  In response to the subsequent RPCR outrage at being excluded 
from ownership of the paper, a deal was struck whereby Les Nouvelles would assist the RPCR to 
publish a weekly newspaper, Les Nouvelles Hebdo, under the directorship of Prost.  Assistance came 
in the form of an agreement to distribute L’Hebdo inside the Thursday edition of Les Nouvelles.  
Despite this co-publication, L’Hebdo was to be editorially independent from Les Nouvelles, an 
independence which Morny argued in late 1989 was evident in a clear difference in tone in the two 
publications.  L’Hebdo was, he commented, ‘far more marked, far more political, far more militant.  
There are a certain number of things in it that I wouldn’t publish’ (interview, 2/11/89).  Despite the 
possibility that L’Hebdo would at times pursue a different editorial orientation, Morny commented that 
he agreed to assist the newspaper ‘because effectively they expressed a sensibility that wasn’t exactly 
ours but was still, it must be said, in the camp of those who hope that Caledonia stays French.  What 
came to be described as the ‘forced sale’ of L’Hebdo in Thursday’s Les Nouvelles generated 
considerable opposition.  In L’Hebdo’s first edition it was signalled that the sale price of Thursday’s 
paper would remain at 100 CFP for the first three months and subsequently increase to 170 CFP, 
which resulted in complaints from at least one consumer organisation in the territory (L’Hebdo, 
18/2/88).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that there was also considerable public opposition to this 
arrangement.  L’Hebdo’s criticism of the politics and strategies of all non-RPCR political groupings in 
the territory, including the more extreme right, probably contributed to this hostility. 
34  Pro-independence political groups continued distributing their publications throughout the 1980s, 
although they tended not to appear during times of acute political crisis probably because those 
producing them were involved in other forms of activism.  
 50
 resulted, as we have seen, in a strategy of withdrawal.  This strategy was 
comprehensible in the light of the political engagement of the existing mass 
circulation media.  But there was recognition within the movement that such a 
strategy could only be provisional and that, politically, the movement could not 
persist in vacating the media terrain, a view espoused by the Parti Socialiste - 
Nouvelle-Calédonie as early as 1982: 
 
 It’s cunning to think that you can suppress colonialism and promote 
socialism without the participation, or at least the support, of the PEOPLE, 
AND THIS REQUIRES MASTERY OVER THE MEANS OF MASS 
COMMUNICATION, LET’S SEIZE IT! (Corail, 26/2/82)35        
 
Despite the urgency suggested in this exhortation, it was only after the escalation of 
conflict in late 1984 and early 1985 that the FLNKS moved urgently to establish a 
Kanak newspaper and radio station (Hnalaïne Uregei, interview, 10/5/94).  
Bwenando was first published on 11 July 1985 and Djiido began broadcasting a few 
months later on 25 September 1985, a day replete with bitter symbolism for the pro-
independence movement, the anniversary of the annexation of New Caledonia by 
France.  Both media were greeted with considerable enthusiasm by sympathetic 
readers and listeners whose comments, published in Bwenando, often suggested a 
type of cathartic engagement.  As one Bwenando reader commented:  ‘You are 
wonderful, you bring me something very important that I’ve been waiting for a long 
time.  You are the light of the past, present and future.  You are the sun that warms 
up the heart of my people, who have suffered for so long, been mistreated, 
exploited colonised.  In everybody’s eyes, you are the truth’ (2/1/86).  In addition, 
Djiido’s extensive use of Afro-American inspired music was very popular among 
young Kanaks.  Bwenando and Djiido ran into financial difficulties early in their 
operation, and the response of the FLNKS to these problems illustrated some of the 
apparent paradoxes in the pro-independence movement’s attitude towards the 
creation and sustenance of its own media.  Bwenando and Djiido formed part of the 
FLNKS’s move to create parallel institutions in the educational, cultural and 
informational spheres.  Their sub-titles, ‘Kanaky’s first newspaper’ and ‘Kanaky’s 
first radio’ suggested that the fate of these media was integrally bound to that of 
‘Kanaky’.  Notwithstanding this, the FLNKS provided little financial backing for either 
                                                          
35 Drawing ostensibly pro-independence quotes from an extreme-right publication is perilous.  
However, this quote is akin to views which I encountered frequently among pro-independence activists 
interested in the media.   
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 service, resulting in Bwenando ceasing to appear after July 1989 and Djiido’s resort 
to advertising in 1989 in order to secure its financial viability.  Many within the 
FLNKS argue that the lack of financial support, for Bwenando in particular, related 
to political tensions within the FLNKS and the disapprobation of conservatives within 
the movement over Bwenando’s leftist discourse and its airing of tensions within the 
FLNKS in its editorial comments and readers’ letters.  This view suggests that the 
FLNKS’s engagement with its own media demonstrated that the will to control the 
production of discourse was not confined to anti-independence politics.   
 
Djiido’s resort to seeking advertising in 1989, and its modest success in doing so, 
was expressive of both the different political context in the territory after the signing 
of the Matignon and Oudinot accords and the programming policy pursued by 
Djiido’s management, which stressed ‘professionalism’ over activism, with the result 
that most of Djiido’s programming differed little from that of its competitors.   
 
Mass circulation press and state and commercial intervention 
 
Prior to 1988, as I have argued, the lack of commercial support for publications 
which were not resolutely opposed to independence had been highly effective in 
securing the preponderance of anti-independence discourse in the territory’s 
commercial media.  Probably the starkest illustration of the success of this means of 
control can be seen in the closure in May 1986, after only three months publication, 
of the ‘Journal Bleu’.   
 
Bwenando described the ‘Journal Bleu’ as the property of ‘Ravel’ and ‘Fabius’, Bill 
Ravel being a New Caledonian industrialist with extensive interests in transport, and 
Laurent Fabius, the then French Socialist Prime Minister.  Frédéric Bobin, a young 
metropolitan journalist who had been working in New Caledonia had been hired in 
late 1985 by the ‘Journal Bleu’s’ editor, Jean-Paul Besset, to recruit an editorial 
team for the paper.  According to Bobin, the French Socialist government had 
become increasingly concerned with the political reporting in Les Nouvelles, and 
had been urging the establishment of a competitor.  Besset had worked for Prime 
Minister Fabius in his press office, and was liaising with a local businessman, Jean-
François Bijon, whose task it was to gather financial backers for the publication.  
Ravel’s financial involvement in the paper is unclear.  Bobin says that, following 
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 Bijon’s failure to secure additional finance, a loan from the Socialist government 
enabled the paper to commence.  Despite this political connection, the paper was to 
be, according to Besset, unbiased and informative:   
 
 We are starting a daily because there isn’t one here.  Democracy, especially 
with the problems which the Territory is experiencing, cannot function without 
information...Les Nouvelles is a journal of opinion which interprets events in 
a grossly partial manner.  In fact, Les Nouvelles is violently opposed to the 
FLNKS and even on occasion comes out against the RPCR, which it 
accuses of taking too soft a line.  It prefers parties of the extreme right, such 
as the Front Calédonien (Canberra Kanaky Bulletin, 12/85 - 3/86:12). 
 
For Bobin, the objective of the editorial team was to produce a popular newspaper 
which would not be considered ‘indépendantiste’ but which gave particular focus to 
the regions and to issues of Kanak development, an objective expressed in the 
content of the newspaper and reflected in Bwenando’s description of the paper as 
‘excellent’ (11/4/86).  A month into publication, a front page editorial, attributed to 
Bijon, reported on what was described as the paper’s positive impact but made 
reference to an ‘advertising boycott’, ostensibly evident in the fact that few 
advertisers have been able to show their support for the new daily’.  The editorial 
continued: 
 
 Yet our distribution is important [the editorial cited 5,300 copies sold daily] 
and the buying power of our readers is high.  In addition, it is in the interests 
of the major advertisers to encourage press pluralism that creates price 
competition and favours and encourages quality advertising.  While waiting 
for a change in attitude, those who are loyal to us have already realised 
returns from publicity in our columns. 
 
The editorial concluded by assuring readers that the paper was not ‘a simple 
electoral instrument’ and would continue despite the conservative victory in the 
French parliamentary elections which had just taken place (Journal Bleu, 19/3/86).   
 
The advertising ‘boycott’ escalated, with the result that the last weeks’ editions 
contained almost no advertisements.  In the final editorial, Bijon wished the 
readership ‘Au revoir!’ and avowed in a self-deprecating manner that: 
 
 The failure of the paper is...a personal failure that I have to assume alone.  
Because of the  meagre financial resources I was able to assemble at the 
beginning, I knew that economic strangulation had to happen sooner or later.  
But my hope was to be able to convince enough advertisers, financiers, 
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 politicians, bankers, that the Journal, once created, didn’t have to die.  
Obviously I wasn’t convincing enough. (Journal Bleu, 28/5/86). 
 
Despite Bijon assuming culpability for the newspaper’s failure, the more endemic 
causes were readily suggested in his farewell.  The near total absence of 
commercial support for the publication might be seen to be attributable to, not so 
much a lack of persuasiveness on Bijon’s part as the superior persuasiveness of 
members of the territory’s politico-economic elite whose extensive and interwoven 
financial and commercial interests in the territory enabled the exertion of 
considerable pressure on business to comply with their will to ensure the 
newspaper’s demise.   
 
The example of the ‘Journal Bleu’ demonstrated one of the means through which 
the state could attempt to intervene in the discursive terrain, in a legislative context 
which mostly precluded direct political intervention.  It also demonstrated the 
tensions between the territory’s comprador class and the French state under 
Socialist government.  The manner in which Les Nouvelles changed ownership 
shortly afterwards suggests that the election of a conservative government had 
precipitated a significant reconciliation.  Les Nouvelles’ new publications director, 
Henri Morny, commented that the French media entrepreneur Robert Hersant had 
been invited by Jacques Lafleur, through the intermediary of the then Prime Minister 
Jacques Chirac, to investigate the possibility of establishing a competitor to Les 
Nouvelles (Morny interview, 2/11/89).  In the event, Hersant bought Les Nouvelles.  
The import of Lafleur’s ‘invitation’ is rendered particularly significant by reference to 
the fate of the ‘Journal Bleu’.  The ‘invitation’ signified consent, without which it was 
very unlikely that a competitor would ever succeed. 
 
The response of the French government to the Ouvéa crisis demonstrated that the 
French state was not legislatively powerless to intervene to control the media.  The 
declaration of a ‘state of emergency’ on Ouvéa, after gendarmes were seized as 
hostages by Kanaks, enabled the military to prohibit the presence of journalists on 
the islands.36  In addition, regular press conferences at the High Commission were 
                                                          
36 Freiberg writes that:  ‘the French state explicitly reserves unto itself the right of defining “exceptional 
states of affairs”, during which press freedoms can be suspended.  During a legally declared state of 
war or emergency, all freedom of the press recognised by common law is suspended, and the 
executive branch and especially the military authorities have full authority to forbid publication, censor 
content, and seize publications.  The law calls for a return to normal press law at the end of the 
exceptional state’ (Freiberg, 1981:163). 
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 cancelled with journalists being told, according to Les Nouvelles, that they would be 
convoked when the High Commissioner ‘feels the need’ (Les Nouvelles, 3/5/88).  
During the crisis, therefore, the only information available derived from the 
administration and military, and initially from Radio Djiido which was in contact with 
the pro-independence radio station on the island of Lifou, Radio Kenu, until this 
station was seized by the military and its equipment smashed (Les Nouvelles, 
3/5/88).  The National Press Federation conveyed to the French government its 
concern at the ‘difficulties encountered by journalists in the exercise of their 
functions on the island of Ouvéa in New Caledonia’ and demanded ‘that public 
authorities do what is necessary to protect in every circumstance the right of the 
public to information’ (Les Nouvelles, 29/4/88).  The Minister for Overseas 
Departments and Territories, Bernard Pons, appeared unmoved, responding that:  
‘When the lives of these gendarmes are no longer in jeopardy, the press will be able 
to do its work’ (Les Nouvelles, 26/4/88).  Pons’s suggestion here that the media 
blackout was somehow anomalous should be met with some caution for, as 
Freiberg has argued, the significance of such periods of acute media control is 
greatly heightened by the broad political significance of the events to which they 
relate ‘because it is precisely during crises that freedom of the press becomes 
meaningful’.  He continues: ‘If, during moments of uncertainty and heightened 
conflict, differing opinions ... cannot be expressed, then the formal freedom of the 
press during uneventful times means considerably less’ (Freiberg, 1981:180).  
 
A transformation occurred in the territory’s media following the signing of the 
Matignon and Oudinot accords.  Media which had hitherto spared almost no 
opportunity to excoriate political opponents began mobilising discourses which were 
notable for their moderation of tone.37  After the national referendum on the accords 
in November 1988 and throughout 1989, criticism of the accords, or the main 
signatories to the accords (the Socialist government, the FLNKS and the RPCR), 
was almost non-existent in most of the territory’s mass audience media.  It 
appeared that the culture of the ‘unspoken’ manifest itself in this silence, attesting to 
the fragility of the political settlement arrived at in the accords, and to the efficacy 
with which the state and commercial interests could influence decisively the public 
discursive terrain.  
                                                          
37 This change was particularly noticeable in Les Nouvelles’  treatment of FLNKS leader, Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou.  See Les Nouvelles, 1/7/88. 
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 CHAPTER TWO - IDEOLOGY AND DISCOURSE 
 
The struggle over media control in New Caledonia suggests that political groups 
were aware of the power of media discourse to bear significantly on their political 
objectives.  The view that media discourse is an active agent in producing political 
and social outcomes has been most fully developed in what has come to be termed, 
in mass communication research, the critical paradigm.  Considerable theoretical 
and methodological shifts have occurred within this research orientation deriving 
largely from the influence of contemporary French critical theory in cultural studies 
research in the mid to late 1980s.  Perhaps one of the biggest shifts has been in the 
rejection of ‘ideology’ and the favouring of ‘discourse’ as the organising concept 
around which media critique has been engaged.  Ideology’s chequered career within 
cultural studies is reflective of the shift from neo-Marxist cultural theory to post-
structuralist and postmodern theoretical perspectives.  Under this influence, the 
term ‘ideology’ was, as Zizek writes, ‘in considerable disrepute’ (1994: cover).  
However, Zizek notes that there has been a sudden revival in grappling with the 
question of ideology and exploring its continuing relevance within social and cultural 
theory and political practice.  In a sense, this revival constitutes a new ‘rediscovery 
of ideology’, almost 20 years after Stuart Hall proclaimed the original ‘rediscovery’ in 
what he considered in the late 1970s to be the ashes of pluralist-behaviourist media 
research (Hall, 1985).     
 
The vicissitudes of ideology 
 
In an influential article published in 1985, Stuart Hall argued that the efficacy of 
critiques of the work of earlier ‘end of ideology’ theorists had led to a ‘rediscovery of 
ideology’.  Within mass communication research, these theories had underpinned 
what had been termed a ‘pluralist paradigm’ which viewed the media as reflective or 
expressive of a broad, pre-existing societal consensus fashioned out of the 
cohesive workings of democratic institutions.  Hall argued that the emergence of 
social protest movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and the consistency of their 
marginalisation in the media, focused attention on the media’s role in forging, rather 
than merely reflecting, consensus accounts of the world and, in the process, 
delegitimating alternative accounts as ‘deviant’.  This insight infused, he argued, the 
critical paradigm, and attention turned to the media’s role in fashioning consensus; 
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 in ‘winning ... a universal validity and legitimacy for accounts of the world which are 
partial and particular, and [in] grounding ... these particular constructions in the 
taken-for grantedness of “the real”’.  This process was indeed, he argued, ‘the 
characteristic and defining mechanism of “the ideological”’ (Hall, 1985:65).  
 
Hall’s ‘rediscovery’ was, however, short-lived.  By the mid-1980s, ideology had 
become, according to some, ‘the central problem of English Marxism since the 
seventies’ (Higgins, 1986:113).  Ideology was therefore once again under siege, this 
time from theorists generally acknowledged to be working within the critical tradition.  
Foucault’s critique of the concept of ideology points to the main lines of criticism: 
  
 The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of for three 
reasons.  The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition 
to something else which is supposed to count as truth...The second 
drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to 
something of the order of the subject.  Third, ideology stands in a secondary 
position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its 
material, economic determinant, etc.  For these three reasons, I think that 
this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection (1991:60). 1 
 
Michèle Barrett argues that Foucault’s critique of ideology is here as elsewhere an 
implicit critique of Marxism (Barrett, 1991:vii).  Certainly, Foucault’s concern with 
ideology relates to central tendencies within Marxist theory.  His reference to 
ideology standing in opposition to the truth refers to an understanding within 
Marxism of ideology as a distorted view of objective reality, which is understood to 
be the material basis of society.  Similarly, his reference to ideology occupying a 
secondary position relates to an economistic notion within Marxism that the 
superstructural realm is determined by the economic base of society almost as an 
after-the-event phenomenon.  Within this view, change occurs through the working 
out of the forces of production, and ideology therefore has no efficacy of its own; it 
is a passive, reflective phenomenon.   Finally, Foucault’s reference to ideology 
referring to ‘something of the order of the subject’ alludes to the relatively 
unproblematised notion of subjectivity within Marxist writing, the subject being 
                                                          
1 It is important to note that Foucault’s critique is of a particular form of Marxism - termed ‘orthodox’ or 
‘vulgar’ Marxism by some - which owes as much to the ossification of Marxism under the influence of 
Soviet dogma as to the writings of Marx himself.  See for example, Milner, 1993:23-32.  Larrain (1979) 
has convincingly demonstrated that Marx viewed the relationship of ideology to the economy as 
considerably more nuanced than represented under this schema.   
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 conceived of in this work in class terms and coming to an awareness of his or her 
essentialised subjectivity through class struggle.2 
 
Foucault’s summary critique neatly points to some of the major limitations of 
orthodox Marxist analysis for cultural studies.  Many who have attempted to go 
beyond these limitations to develop a fuller appreciation of the dialectical 
relationship between the material basis of society and the realm of culture and 
ideology have drawn on Gramsci’s writings, and in particular his notion of 
ideological or cultural hegemony, to circumvent the types of problems raised by 
Foucault.3  One tendency among these theorists has been to abandon the use of 
the term ‘ideology’.   Barrett, for example, after exploring the development in Marxist 
theory of such issues as the existence of objective reality, subjectivity and 
determinism, through analysing the work of Gramsci, Althusser and Laclau and 
Mouffe, concludes by advising against the use of ‘ideology’ as an analytical term, 
arguing that it is:  ‘Better, perhaps, that we oblige ourselves to think with new and 
                                                          
2 Elsewhere, Foucault has written on this subject:  ‘As regards Marxism, I’m not one of those who try 
to elicit the effects of power at the level of ideology.  Indeed I wonder whether, before one poses the 
question of ideology, it wouldn’t be more materialist to study first the question of the body and the 
effects of power on it.  Because what troubles me with these analyses which prioritise ideology is that 
there is always presupposed a human subject on the lines of the model provided by classical 
philosophy, endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize upon’ (Foucault, cited 
in Purvis and Hunt, 1993:488). 
3 Such theorists include Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Raymond Williams (1977).  
See also the work of the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies under Stuart Hall.  In particular, Stuart 
Hall and Tony Jefferson (eds) (1982) Resistance through Rituals:  Youth sub-cultures in post-war 
Britain.  Milner (1993) has argued of Raymond Williams’s work that there is an incompatibility in 
Williams’ earlier work between his concern with the notion of culture as a shared phenomenon and the 
notion of culture as irredeemably marked by class.  He says that Williams provisionally resolved this 
contradiction through his discovery of the work of Gramsci and, in particular, Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony.  In hegemony he considered that he had found a means to resolve the ostensible 
contradictions he perceived between the notion of a shared culture and that of the class basis of 
particular cultural forms.  Williams argued:  ‘“Hegemony” goes beyond “culture”...in its insistence on 
relating the “whole social process” to specific distributions of power and influence...Gramsci therefore 
introduces the necessary recognition of dominance and subordination in what has still, however, to be 
recognised as a whole process.  It is in just this recognition of the wholeness of the process that the 
concept of “hegemony” goes beyond “ideology”.  What is decisive is not only the conscious system of 
ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as practically organised by specific dominant 
meanings and values...It sees the relations of domination and subordination, in their forms as practical 
consciousness, as in effect a saturation of the whole process of living - not only of political and 
economic activity, nor only of manifest social activity, but of the whole subsistence of lived identities 
and relationships, to such a depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a 
specific economic, political and cultural system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple 
experience and common sense.  Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of “ideology”, 
nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as “manipulation” or “indoctrination”.  It is a 
whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of our living - our senses and assignments 
of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world.  It is a lived system of meanings and 
values - constitutive and constituting - which as they are experienced as practices appear as 
reciprocally confirming.  It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of 
absolute because experienced reality beyond society to move, in most areas of their lives.  It is, that is 
to say, in the strongest sense a “culture”, but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived 
dominance and subordination of particular classes’  (Williams, cited in Milner, 1993:55-6).  
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 more precise concepts rather than mobilising the dubious resonances of the old’ 
(1991:168).  Barrett prefers to work within a Foucauldian framework which favours 
the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘power’ over ‘ideology’ (ibid).  Richard Johnson expresses 
similar concern with the term, choosing instead to privilege the notions of ‘culture’, 
‘consciousness’ and ‘subjectivity’, and using ‘“ideology” or better “ideological” 
sparingly, always adjectivally and at the end of an argument, not at the beginning!’ 
(1986, footnote 9:308-9).  
 
There are, however, those who continue to wave the flag for ideology while 
acknowledging its difficulties.  The development of the notion of ideology which they 
attempt responds to some of the critiques from within post-structuralism and 
postmodernism.  This response has been mounted by those who adhere to what 
has been termed the ‘critical view of ideology’ and those who follow the ‘sociological 
view’.  Although the epistemological bases of each of these views differs 
considerably, their responses have been similar. 
 
The critical view of ideology 
 
Foucault’s comment that ideology ‘always stands in virtual opposition to something 
which is supposed to count as truth’ refers to the view of ideology which has been 
termed the critical, negative or epistemological view (Larrain, 1979; Thompson, 
1984; Purvis and Hunt, 1993; Barrett, 1991).  It is argued that this is the view most 
closely tied to key passages in Marx’s writing.  Ideology is portrayed as a necessary 
deception or mystification - a ‘false consciousness’ - through which a person’s 
understanding of social reality is distorted (Larrain, 1979:14).  Barrett argues that it 
is also an ‘epistemological’ usage of the term in that the distorted view is presumed 
to be distinguishable from an accurate view which is objective knowledge or science 
(1991:19), a view espoused most forcefully by Althusser for whom ideology stood in 
opposition to science (Larrain, 1979:196).4 
 
                                                          
4 Barrett mocks Althusser’s claim that scientific knowledge can be gleaned from ideology through a 
method which he terms ‘theoretical practice’, which Barrett describes as a pretentious way of saying 
sitting thinking (Barrett, 1991:36).  For Althusser, Marxism, as a theoretical schema resulting from 
considerable theoretical practice, is accorded scientific status and socialism is considered a scientific 
concept.  Larrain argues that Althusser considered that Marxist science has two characteristic 
methodological features:  ‘the reduction of the phenomenon to the essence; and the consideration of 
that essence as a totality in which the “internal connections” of all phenomena are linked’ (Larrain, 
1979:196). 
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 The validity of claiming a rigid juxtaposition between ideology and science - which in 
Althusser’s conception is the juxtaposition of distorted, ideological understandings 
and undistorted, accurate knowledge, or, in short, truth - has been convincingly 
refuted, not only from within postmodernism but also from those theorists who 
continue to see some validity in working within the critical conceptualisation of 
ideology.  Postmodernism refutes the existence of totalising theories and the notion 
of human rationality which presupposes the existence of a fixed subject.  It therefore 
rejects the claim to truth which is itself a totalising concept grounded in the 
presumption that it is attainable through reason.  Faced with such challenges, many 
former Althusserians have moved to a more relativist or conventionalist position 
which acknowledges the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of attaining objective 
knowledge (Barrett, 1991:39-41).  This move was encouraged by what has been 
termed the ‘linguistic turn in modern social theory’ (Purvis and Hunt, 1993:474) 
which, through structuralism and later post-structuralism, came to consider the 
means through which language and discourse not only conveyed but also 
constituted social experience.5   Purvis and Hunt argue that most writers who claim 
a place for a critical conceptualisation of ideology have moved to a position of ‘soft 
realism’.  It is soft ‘in that it readily accepts the typical postmodernist claim that 
knowledge claims can never be verified and that there is no vantage point external 
to discourse from which truth-claims can be validated’.  On the other hand, it is 
realist in the insistence ‘that there is a non-discursive realm that can be known even 
though that knowledge can never be more than fallible, always liable to be displaced 
by some “better” account’ (1993:476-7).    
 
Barrett has described John B. Thompson as ‘the most sophisticated contemporary 
exponent of the critical theory tradition as it applies to ideology’ (Barrett, 1991, 
footnote 15:185).  Thompson positions his work as ‘a plea for, as well as a 
reformulation and a defence of, a critical conception of ideology’ (Thompson, 
                                                          
5 The emphasis on language and discourse derived from a confluence of theoretical influences during 
the 1950s and 1960s which came to be known of as ‘structuralism’ and which was best exemplified by 
the structural anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss, the revival of Sassurean semiology led most 
prominently during this period by Roland Barthes, Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and 
Althusser’s structural Marxism (Milner, 1993:72-5).  The linguistic, or more specifically discursive, turn 
in the social sciences was further consolidated with the rise during the late 1960s and early 1970s of a 
body of work designated as post-structuralist which, while acknowledging the significance of language 
and discourse in social being, took exception to structuralism’s claims to scientificity.  Milner 
distinguishes three types of post-structuralism:  literary deconstruction exemplified in the work of 
Jacques Derrida, Foucault’s middle-period writing on knowledge-power relations and semiotic 
reconstructions of Freudian psychoanalysis initiated by Jacques Lacan.  Each form took exception to 
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 1984:4).  He argues that only the critical view of ideology is capable of addressing 
the issues which emerge from contemporary analyses of the functioning of language 
in the social world, for these point to the multifarious ways in which language 
intersects with the nourishment, preservation and enrichment of power (ibid:2).  It is, 
he argues, only the critical view of ideology which preserves the ‘connection 
between the concept of ideology and the critique of domination, a connection which 
was certainly part (if not all) of Marx’s conception of ideology’ (ibid:76).  The 
centrality of this concern with domination is reflected in his definition of ideology as 
‘the ways in which meaning (or signification) serves to sustain relations of 
domination’ (ibid:4).   
 
Thompson’s claim that only the critical conception preserves the link with 
domination refers to the view within Marxism that ideology is essentially a ruling 
class phenomenon; that is, that it is the propagation of ideas which serve to sustain 
class inequality.  Thompson recognises the capital-wage labour relationship as the 
fundamental axis along which ‘systematically asymmetrical relations’ are secured in 
capitalist societies (ibid:13).  However, he also accepts the existence of other 
relations of domination between nation states and ethnic groupings, and in relation 
to gender, which are not reducible to class dimensions (ibid:130).6   This broader 
view of relations of domination leads Thompson to argue that ‘ideology is essentially 
linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power’ (ibid:4), rather 
than to a more dedicated Marxist definition of the sustenance of class relations.   
 
Thompson addresses the difficult epistemological issues raised by the critical view 
of ideology and, in particular, the underlying presumption raised by his definition of 
a form of meaning or signification which is non-ideological - which does not sustain 
asymmetrical relations of power - and which is therefore, within his own 
conceptualisation, true.  He draws on Habermas’s work on ideal speech situations 
to discuss the types of formal discursive conditions under which not only the truth 
but also the justice of a statement might be ascertained.  He concludes that, under 
idealised conditions in which systematically asymmetrical relations were temporarily 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the structuralist notion that meaning could be pinned down.  Indeed, in the extreme Derridean case, it 
was argued that there was no reality outside of discourse (ibid:73-4). 
6 Thompson comments that Giddens makes this point forcefully in A Contemporary Critique of 
Historical Materialism. (Thompson, 1984, footnote 86:319).  It is also a central point made by Laclau 
and Mouffe whose work is considered by some as pointing to the limitations of Marxist analysis and 
representing perhaps the most significant rupture with Marxism (Barrett, 1991:61-80). 
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 suspended, it might be possible to ascertain the qualities of a statement (ibid:142-
3).  Thompson anticipates the postmodernist retort to his arguments, making an 
impassioned plea for the need to hold on to truth and justice, if only as limiting 
notions, by arguing that:  ‘A limiting notion is not irrelevant for being a limit:  it is a 
goal which can be approximated and which, in the process of approximation, can 
call our attention to certain factors at the expense of others’ (ibid:145).  Thompson 
wants to hold on to the possibility of truth as a guard against what he perceives to 
be a nihilistic relativism in which political action loses its raison d’être because it can 
no longer be guided by a superior logic, a view sustained, he believes, by the 
alternative sociological view of ideology. 
 
The sociological view of ideology 
 
In developing his critical conception of ideology, Thompson rejects those 
conceptions which he terms ‘neutral’, but which others term ‘sociological’ (Barrett, 
1991) or ‘positive’ (Larrain, 1979), which conceive of ideology not as some form of 
mystification tied to dominant interests but as more general systems of thought, 
belief or symbolic practices.  Thompson argues that this conception loses the link 
between ideology and domination: 
 
 No attempt is made, on the basis of this conception, to distinguish between 
the kinds of action or projects which ideology animates; ideology is present 
in every political programme irrespective of whether the programme is 
directed towards the preservation or transformation of the social order 
(ibid:4). 
 
The distinction made by Thompson between the ‘critical’ and ‘neutral’ views of 
ideology had been previously identified by Larrain (1979).  He argued that Lenin, 
Lukács and Gramsci had developed a ‘historicist’ conception of ideology which 
diverged fundamentally from Marx’s critical view.  The historicist view avoids the 
epistemological dilemma associated with the notion of mystification by inescapably 
grounding consciousness in historical processes and thereby refuting the notion that 
there exists an ahistorical truth. (Larrain, 1979:41-4).  It also avoids one of the other 
major problems associated with the idea of mystification.  The idea of ideology as 
mystification renders those who are the recipients of ideology particularly 
powerless.  Mystification tends to connote a wilful manipulation and distortion of 
ideas which are then projected onto passive individuals.  Crude theories of false 
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 consciousness conceive of those perpetuating the mystification as the ruling class 
who, through their ownership of the means of mental production, are able to 
successfully propagate dominant ruling class ideologies and thereby maintain social 
control.  But this notion that we are passive recipients of other people’s ideologies 
has come under considerable criticism.  As Eccleshall (cited in Mansfield, 1984)) 
has commented:  ‘Ordinary people are unlikely to be bewitched by fairytales spun 
out of the fertile imaginations of capitalist hobgoblins’. 
 
The alternative ‘neutral’ or ‘sociological’ view is grounded in a different 
understanding of the relationship between social reality and consciousness which its 
advocates argue is a more correct reading of Marx’s distinction between essence 
and appearance.  Under this view, ideology is not, as the critical perspective would 
have it, ideas which distort the essence (reality).  Rather, it is reality which always 
presents itself in a distorted fashion.  Ideology thus becomes a reflection of reality in 
its phenomenal form, the distortion being in the way reality presents itself rather 
than in merely distorted ideas about reality (Hage, 1989:36-43).  Marx’s notion of 
fetishism is key here.  He argues that the way reality presents itself masks the true 
nature of social relations just as the way a commodity presents itself as a thing to 
which one attaches a value masks the complex relations of production and 
exploitation which underpin its production (ibid).  As Larrain comments: 
 
 Ideology negates the inverted character of social relations; it takes an aspect 
of reality, the appearances, and gives them an autonomy and independence 
which they do not actually have.  In this sense ideology fetishizes the world 
of appearances (1979:58). 
 
The ‘sociological’ view does not, therefore, conceive of people as dupes.  Rather, it 
preserves more fully Giddens’ ‘theorem of “knowledgeability” - that we are all 
purposeful, knowledgeable agents who have reasons for what we do’ while 
recognising that social processes ‘work “behind our backs”, affecting what we do in 
ways of which we are unaware’ (1981:16).  Within the sociological view, people are 
socially and historically located actors who attempt to make sense of their world, but 
are able to do so only partially because of the partiality of the experiences and 
social practices in which they are immersed.  These partial understandings are 
ideological; they have force, however, because they ‘make sense to, and [do] not 
contradict the practical/meaningful world of the subjects who adopt or produce them’ 
(Hage, 1989:43-4).  Sayer’s notion of ‘practical adequacy’ is relevant here.  
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 Persuasive ideological accounts are those, he argues, which are ‘practically 
adequate in the face of the knowing subject’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992:31).     
 
The sociological view therefore locates ideology in specific experiences and 
practices and upholds the notion of people as thinking, wilful subjects who attempt 
to make sense of their world, which always appears to them in distorted ways.  The 
distortion derives from both the inversion which exists in appearances and the 
partiality of the practices in which subjects are engaged.  However, intrinsic to each 
of these distortions is the further ‘complication’ of language, described by Mills as a 
‘sticky-layer’ between the world and ourselves (Mills, cited in Wetherell and Potter, 
1992:62).  It is through language that we attempt to apprehend our material and 
social world and understand our own place in it.  These external and internal 
understandings are structured in language through discourse, defined by Hall as 
‘sets of ready-made and preconstituted “experiencings” displayed and arranged 
through language’ (Hall, cited in Purvis and Hunt, 1993:485).  As Purvis and Hunt 
write: 
 
 What the concept tries to capture is that people live and experience within 
discourse in the sense that discourses impose frameworks which limit what 
can be experienced or the meaning that experience can encompass, and 
thereby influence what can be said and done.  Each discourse allows certain 
things to be said and impedes or prevents other things from being said.  
Discourses thus provide specific and distinguishable mediums through which 
communicative action takes place (ibid). 
 
As discourse is totally constitutive and there is no means of apprehending reality 
except through discourse, it follows that there can be no privileged vantage point 
from which truth can be ascertained; ‘no versionless reality’ (Wetherell and Potter, 
1992:63).  Wetherell and Potter are careful, however, to argue against the view that 
there is nothing outside of discourse.  They cite the example of colonialism which, 
they argue, was not just a discursive phenomenon.  It involved unmistakable 
physical phenomena such as the movement of people and the establishment of 
institutions.  ‘These things are not just words - but they are not separable from 
words either’ (ibid). 
 
The sociological view and journalistic practice 
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 The sociological view has, I believe, considerable relevance to the material being 
studied in this thesis, particularly in understanding the role of journalists in the 
production of politically engaged discourse.  The critical view would tend to view 
journalists as the producers of false consciousness or mystification - the producers, 
in other words, of the ideas which dupe those who engage with them.  It posits 
journalists as either passive scribes in the propagation of the dominant discourse of 
others, or as themselves so duped by this discourse that they reproduce it 
unthinkingly.  While neither explanation is totally fanciful, the sociological view 
achieves, I believe, important shifts in emphasis.   
 
Within the sociological view, journalists can be seen as wilful agents who attempt to 
make sense of the political events surrounding them, but who do so according to the 
partiality of their experiences and practical engagement, and according to their 
discursive legacy.  It is the commonality of their experiences and discursive 
baggage which contributes to the production of delimited discourses, not the 
conjuring of false ideas which emanate from elsewhere.  This view on journalistic 
practice helps to explain how, for example,  journalists at Les Nouvelles could argue 
with conviction that their accounts of the political situation were totally objective.  
These journalists did not feel dictated to by management’s editorial ‘line’.  They 
believed that their work was the product of their own reasoning, but this reasoning 
was, of course, partial.  In the presentation of this reasoning as universal, it could 
be argued that they were engaged in the propagation of ideology.   
 
Discourse and ideology 
 
Despite the benefits in reconciling wilful human practice with the production of 
ideology, problems with the sociological view remain, one of the more significant 
being the difficulty of developing a functional differentiation between the notion of 
ideology which it produces, and discourse.7  Hall’s definition of discourse as 
privileging certain ‘experiencings’ - certain values, beliefs, practices and 
subjectivities over others - is akin to the understanding of ideology developed within 
the sociological view.  Indeed, Purvis and Hunt point to the tendency to a conflation 
of the terms in Stuart Hall’s work (1993:496)  This definitional similarity is 
accentuated when one considers the relationship between power and ideology and 
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 discourse thus defined.  The sociological view sees ideology as the projection of the 
interests of particular groups within which a core set of experiencings are shared, 
and the attempt to present these interests as universal.  Ideology is thus linked to 
power - the power to project certain experiencings over others8 - leading to a 
definition of ideology as the projection of power through discourse.  But if, as the 
post-structuralists would have it, discourse is power, then what is there to 
distinguish between ideology and discourse?9  Doesn’t this render all discourse 
ideological?10   
 
The force of this logic has led, as I have argued, to a conflating of the terms in much 
cultural studies work.  However, there are those who feel frustrated at this state of 
affairs, because of its effect of undermining the possibility of differentiating between 
the effects of power produced by different discourses.  As Richard Johnson has 
commented:  ‘It may be that all our knowledge of the world is ‘ideological’ more or 
less, rendered partial by the operation of interest and power.  But I still want to be 
able to make discriminations between knowledges or forms of subjectivity, and see 
them as more or less ‘ideological’ (Johnson, 1986, footnote 9:308-9). 
 
Discourse versus ideology 
 
Johnson’s use of the adjectival ‘ideological’ points to a prevalent response among 
those seeking to retain a place for ‘ideology’ as distinct from ‘discourse’.  Within this 
work, ideology has been shifted to an effect of discourse, with discourse being the 
medium and ideology the outcome.  This shift has been traversed by proponents of 
ideology in the sociological and critical schools.  Wetherell and Potter, in their 
discussion of racism, argue, for example, that it is very difficult to determine in 
advance whether a discourse is ideological or not from a reading of the discourse 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Such a differentiation exists within the critical view, ideology being that discourse which sustains 
relations of domination. 
8 Here, the difference with the critical view of ideology is that within the critical view ideology is seen 
as the projection through discourse of the power only of dominant groups in society, not the projection 
of power of interests in general, no matter what their location within hierarchies of power.  
9 Foucault has written that discourse ‘is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is 
the power which is to be seized’ (Foucault, cited in Purvis and Hunt, 1993:488). 
10 One important differentiation between the notions of power inherent in the sociological view of 
ideology and discourse theory is that, within the sociological view, power is linked to interests 
whereas, within discourse theory, power is diffuse.  As Purvis and Hunt argue:  ‘Ideology...implies the 
existence of some link between “interests” and “forms of consciousness”...[whereas] the concept of 
“discourse” remains self-consciously neutral or sceptical about whether discourse as a form of 
existence is connected with elements, such as are invoked by notions of interest, that are external to 
the discursive content of lived experience’ (1993:476). 
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 itself.  They use the example of biological essentialism which, while most commonly 
used in support of racist practices, can also be mobilised in support of anti-racist 
practices.  Rather than concentrate on the propositional claims of discourse, 
attention should be turned, they argue, towards the practices which this discourse 
serves to sustain.  Moreover, this shift to the notion of ideology as an effect is, 
according to Wetherell and Potter, congruent with the shift away from the notion of 
ideology as mystification: 
 
 The specification of these [propositional] claims makes sense if ideology is 
defined as false representation, but it seems to us to be largely wasted effort 
and, indeed, given the pace at which racism is currently changing, leads to a 
theory and method which would need constant revising...Given this flexibility 
of the enemy, and the way debates move on, it seems sensible not to 
commit oneself to one exclusive characterisation of racist claims.  There is a 
danger of being silenced when racist discourse continues to oppress but no 
longer meets the main characteristics of social scientific definitions of racism 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992:71-2). 
 
The shift to the notion of ideology as an effect also focuses attention on the 
variability of effects which any discourse may produce.  The notion that ideology 
exists within discourse tended to presuppose that those engaging with ideological 
discourse assumed its ideological underpinning.  This presupposition was inherent, 
as we have seen, in the notion of mystification and false consciousness, whereby 
the dominated classes assumed uncritically ruling class ideology.  The shift to 
ideology as an effect opens up the possibility that discourse may not achieve the 
desired effect; that it may, in other words, be rejected and lead to the development 
of counter-discourses.  It therefore problematises the effects of discourse and 
necessitates an analysis of the reception of discourse before any claim as to the 
ideological effect of discourse can be made. 
 
There is much to commend this shift away from consideration of the propositional 
claims of discourse to the notion of ideology as an effect.  Opposed political groups 
in New Caledonia frequently mobilised similar propositional claims to justify their 
positions, evident in the prevalence of accusations from both groups that the other 
was racist.  Moreover, it was apparent that both pro- and anti-independence groups 
were decidedly unsuccessful in mystifying their political opponents through the 
mobilisation of discourse.  But the view of ideology as an effect entrains 
methodological problems.  One implication of this view within media studies is that 
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 an assessment of the ideological effect of discourse can be made only after detailed 
audience research, undertaken through such established techniques as interviews, 
surveys, group discussions and participant observation.  The benefits of marrying 
audience research with institutional and discourse analysis are evident in David 
Morley’s excellent work on the British current affairs program, Nationwide (1980).  
But in a political context replete with animosity, suspicion, cultural difference and 
closed political structures, such as existed in New Caledonia during the 1980s and 
into the 1990s, the possibility of accessing audiences in the manner required for 
such research was extremely remote.  In addition, as Morley’s two-volume work 
suggests, the additional work required for such audience research, were it possible, 
would probably merit a second thesis.   
 
I believe, however, that a lack of audience research does not necessitate the 
complete abandonment of the notion of ideological effect.  Although it is important to 
recognise heterogeneity in readings of texts, and to be ever mindful of the manner 
in which texts are negotiated, arguments can still be mounted as to the plausibility 
of some readings over others on the basis of knowledge of socio-economic and 
political circumstances (Mills, 1991:54).  Moreover, we are helped in this task by 
considering broad sociological phenomena such as mass protest, the prevalence of 
insurrection or election results.  While these phenomena certainly tell us very little of 
the nuances of individually negotiated meanings, they suggests that readings 
emerged which were, in some sense, broadly consensual, and it is on this basis that 
some comments on the ideological effects of discourse might be possible. 
 
There is, however, another, more fundamental problem with the notion of ideology 
as an effect.  Despite the different epistemologies of the critical and sociological 
views, those who adhere to these views, and who have chosen to move to the 
notion of ideology as an effect, end up with surprisingly similar definitions of the 
ideological.    John B. Thompson’s quest to maintain the critical linkage between 
ideology and domination is reflected in his definition of ideology as ‘meaning which 
serves to establish or sustain relations of domination’.  Proponents of the 
sociological view appear to arrive at a similar point.  Purvis and Hunt write that ‘what 
makes some discourses ideological is their connection with systems of domination’ 
(1993:497), while Wetherell and Potter define racist discourse as ‘discourse (of any 
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 content) which has the effect of establishing, sustaining and reinforcing oppressive 
power relations’ (1992:70). 
 
What is striking in these definitions, as in the works from which they derive, is the 
relative silence regarding the status of discourses which seek to challenge or 
undermine relations of domination.11  Are these ideological?  Thompson 
acknowledges the practical impossibility of attaining truth, and the sociological view 
rejects the notion of  true and false consciousness.  So, if these discourses are not 
ideological and not truth, how are they to be described?  Thompson is the only one 
to attempt such a description, suggesting, almost as an aside, that such discourse 
might be called ‘contestatory symbolic forms’ or ‘incipient forms of the critique of 
ideology’ (1990:68). 
 
This manner of conceiving of oppositional discourse seems grossly inadequate for 
the purpose of this thesis.  It appears to belittle the effects of power produced by 
oppositional discourses and to presuppose their failure in challenging domination.  
A definition which gave credence to the potential power of oppositional discourse 
would view ideological discourse as discourse which serves not only to establish or 
sustain but also to shift or undermine relations of domination.12  This more inclusive 
definition of ideological discourse does, however, bring us back to the issue of 
whether a functional differentiation can be made between ideology and discourse. 
What is the difference between the effect of power of discourse and the effect of 
power of ideological discourse?  Perhaps one response would be to attempt to 
differentiate between power and domination with a view to deeming ideological 
those discourses which sustain or undermine only certain forms of dominative 
                                                          
11 Purvis and Hunt’s definition of ideology as discourses which are connected with systems of 
domination appears somewhat ambiguous.  It could include discourses which seek to undermine 
domination.  However, elsewhere in their article they talk about the ‘directionality of ideology’.  
Drawing on Althusser’s notion of the interpellation or hailing subjects through discourse, they argue 
that their definition of ideology retains and moves into central prominence ‘a key feature of the critical 
thrust of Marx’s account, namely, its focus on the way in which the interpellation of subject positions 
operates systematically to reinforce and reproduce dominant social relations - it is this that we have 
described as the directionality of ideology theory’ (1993:497).  This quote and the examples of 
ideological effect which they use in their article suggests to me that their definition is akin to 
Thompson’s  in confining ideological discourse to discourse which sustains relations of domination. 
12 In advancing a definition of ideology as discourse which served to sustain or undermine relations of 
domination, Thompson would argue that we have lapsed into an inclusive definition of ideology where 
ideology is akin to politics in general and the notion of domination is lost.  But to argue that there are 
various ideological discourses in competition with one another in a social formation is not to deny that 
this formation is structured in dominance (Althusser, 1971), and that there are greater structural 
obstacles to the subversion of some ideological positions than others.  This was, I believe, one of the 
greatest contributions arising from Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’. 
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 power relations, assuming, as Foucault does, that there are other types of relations 
of power (Foucault, 1980:119).13  But, if it is the case that the experiences of 
colonialism have touched most, if not all, aspects of existence in New Caledonia, 
fundamentally altering relations of power by introducing new structures of 
domination, then it might be argued that few relations of power have escaped the 
dominative imperative of colonialism. 
 
My response to these dilemmas is to concede, as Johnson does, that all discourse 
is probably ideological, but to argue nonetheless that the effects of power of certain 
discourses are stronger than those of others (Johnson, 1986, footnote 9:308-9).  
When I discuss media discourses in the thesis, I do so with the understanding that 
these discourses entail effects of power, and tend therefore not to refer to these 
discourses as ideological.  Indeed, it probably goes without saying that those 
discourses which I single out for discussion are chosen for what I believe is their 
salience in the political struggle around independence.  However, it is, I believe, 
useful to retain the notion of ideological effect, if only as a rhetorical means of 
drawing the reader’s attention to the particularly forceful effects which certain 
discourses may entrain.  The Kanak discourse of ‘the people’ and the European 
discourse of ‘la Calédonie profonde’ were, I believe, two particularly powerful 
discourses, and I discuss therefore to the force of their potential ideological effects.  
In general, however, I have tended to base my analysis on the notion of discourse, 
which is itself, of course, far from unproblematic. 
 
Discourse 
 
There are differences in the manner in which discourse is conceived of - and in the 
questions which one asks when analysing discourse - between those working within 
a broadly neo-Marxist framework and those working from a more dedicated 
Foucauldian perspective.  Perhaps the essential difference could be expressed as a 
view of discourse as a product of social forces within the neo-Marxist perspective, 
compared with the more Foucauldian view of discourse as the very producer of 
these social forces.  The former tends to see discourse as expressive of the 
interests of historically constituted agents, and therefore an expression of what is 
already constituted in society, whereas the latter views discourse as the means 
                                                          
13 See also Anthony Giddens discussion of the different forms of power (1981:49-68).   
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 through which agents and groups, and indeed society itself, are constituted 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1992:79-87).   
 
The concern in Foucault’s work with the manner in which discourse constitutes 
subjects and groups through its functioning in categorising, ordering, and naming 
individuals reflects his rejection of the crudeness of notions of subjectivity within 
much Marxist theory.  At one point Foucault even described the aim of his work as 
the creation of a history ‘of the different modes by which, in our culture, human 
beings are made subjects’ (Foucault, 1982:208).    For Foucault, the issue is not the 
projection of power through discourse by pre-existent subjects or the projection of 
power onto pre-existent consciousnesses, but rather the power in discourse to 
create subjects and consciousness (Foucault, 1980:102;118).  Contrary to the 
Marxist account which sees power as vested in groups whose actions are guided, if 
only implicitly, by totalising narratives, Foucault views power as expressed through 
knowledge and as fragmented - dispersed throughout social practices, rituals and 
institutions (Wetherell and Potter, 1992:83-5).    
 
Foucault’s critique of the treatment of subjectivity in Marxism and his own work on 
the subject have been highly influential in the manner in which discourse is 
conceptualised and analysed14, and this influence is reflected in this thesis, 
particularly in those sections where I analyse the shifting subject positions 
constructed through media discourses.  The manner in which social actors were 
named, categorised and ordered in these discourses produced new subjectivities, 
such as ‘Kanak’ and ‘loyalist’, which constituted significant departures from former 
subjectivities and set in train a range of institutional and ritualistic consequences.  
However, these subjectivities did not emerge in a historical or social vacuum.  They 
were expressive of the experiences of colonialism in New Caledonia, just as they 
drew their authority from struggles over decolonisation elsewhere.  These 
experiences were expressed in discourse, with the result that there existed a 
discursive backdrop to the emergence of these new subjectivities.  The ‘Kanak’ and 
‘loyalist’ identities therefore had an experiential and discursive history which is 
important in understanding their intended meanings.  Similarly, the post-war 
discourse of pluri-ethnicity, inscribed in the UC’s slogan ‘Two colours; a single 
                                                          
14 Barrett concurs with Foucault’s view on the poverty of Marxist theorising on subjectivity describing 
this area as ‘a massive lacuna in Marxism, and one which not only has had its effects in terms of a 
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 people’, and enacted through a range of personal and institutional practices such as 
the incorporation of Melanesians into local politics, was itself the product of a 
colonial struggle in which European domination had been secured and European 
systems of representation had been imposed.  Having achieved its prominent 
status, the discourse of pluri-ethnicity was a powerful force in subsequent struggles 
over independence.   
 
This view of discourse as both historically constituted and constitutive suggests a 
mode of discourse analysis which combines neo-Marxist and Foucauldian 
approaches.  Discourse is constituted by agents who are socially, historically and 
discursively located.  However, discourse has an effectiveness of its own which can 
transcend its origins, and this is particularly the case, as Foucault argues, in the 
manner in which discourse constitutes subjects, in the process reconstituting the 
social.  I therefore seek to discuss what discourse is expressive of, as well as what 
it expresses, pointing to the many instances in which the intentionality behind 
discourse is not reflected in the readings which emerge.15 
 
Interpretive repertoires 
 
Wetherell and Potter argue that Foucault’s treatment of discourse tends to de-
emphasise discourse as social practice favouring instead a view of discourses as:  
 
 potential causal agents in their own right, with the process of interest being 
the work of one (abstract) discourse on another (abstract) discourse, or the 
propositions or ‘statements’ of that discourse working smoothly and 
automatically to produce objects and subjects (Wetherell and Potter, 
1992:90). 
 
This thesis, like Wetherell and Potter’s work, is very much concerned with the 
instantiated use of discourse in social practice, and this is one of the reasons why, 
following Wetherell and Potter, I have preferred in some instances to use the term 
‘interpretive repertoire’ rather than ‘discourse’.  By interpretive repertoires, Wetherell 
                                                                                                                                                                          
crude understanding of political agency and consciousness but has stood in the way of a broader 
consideration of experience, identity, sexuality, affect and so on’ (1991:110).  
15 This view on discourse as constituted and constitutive is advanced by Wetherell and Potter who 
draw on the work of Stuart Hall to argue the need ‘to combine, alternate and intertwine genealogical 
and ideological modes of analysis...We see, therefore, discourse analysis as necessarily involving a 
double movement.  A satisfactory account of a piece of discursive material must, in our view, move 
backwards and forwards between what could be described as the “established” and “constitutive” 
aspects of discourse’ (1992:86). 
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 and Potter mean ‘broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of 
speech often assembled around metaphors or vivid images.  In more structuralist 
language we can talk of these things as systems of signification’ (ibid).  For 
Wetherell and Potter, talking about interpretive repertoires focuses attention on the 
content of discourse in a way that the term ‘discourse’ tends not to, particularly 
within the Foucauldian usage.  The notion of interpretive repertoires draws attention 
to the interpretive resources - the terms, descriptions, images and arguments - 
available to the enunciator in the mobilisation of discourse. These resources 
constitute, as Wetherell and Potter put it, ‘an available choreography of interpretive 
moves - like the moves of an ice dancer, say - from which particular ones can be 
selected in a way that fits most effectively in the context’ (ibid:92). 
 
My inclination to use, in instances, the notions of interpretive repertoires and 
resources rather than discourses derives from my engagement with political 
discourses in New Caledonia.  In discussions with residents in the territory, I was 
struck by the similarity of the terms, concepts, metaphors and examples used in the 
mobilisation of discourse. The frequency with which I heard from anti-independence 
advocates, for example, such statements as ‘Kanaks are savages’, ‘New Caledonia 
would be nothing without France’, ‘if it weren’t for the French, Kanaks would be 
tearing each other apart; look at their disagreements about land’, ‘if you give 
Kanaks something they destroy it’ et cetera, suggested to me the existence of a 
reservoir of statements, metaphors and examples from which combinations were 
chosen according to the context and flow of conversation.  These statements were 
presented as self-validating cliches (ibid:91) whose power was enhanced by their 
pervasive mobilisation.    
 
These perceptions of New Caledonian political discourse interested me in Wetherell 
and Potter’s notions of interpretive repertoires and resources.  I found the focus in 
these terms on the content of discourse useful when undertaking my analysis 
because they made me think about why certain mobilisations appeared to be 
particularly persuasive.  My attention was drawn to those interpretive resources 
which appear to have attained the status of common sense, so that their 
mobilisation was considered to render a discourse beyond contention. I came to see 
discourse as a type of bricolage and to view the rhetorical efficacy of certain 
discourses as the result of a particularly propitious assemblage of resources.  
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 Moreover, my concern with dilemmatic discourse was aided by this focus on the 
existence of a range of interpretive resources from which combinations were 
selected.  The mobilisation of certain combinations over others in particular 
rhetorical contexts pointed to the dilemmas inherent in other combinations.  The 
notion of interpretive repertoires therefore focuses attention on discourse as 
strategic and dynamic, emerging and changing within a context of contestation. 
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 CHAPTER THREE - LES NOUVELLES CALEDONIENNES 
 
Journalists at Les Nouvelles operated within a variety of constraints which shaped 
the production of the newspaper’s text.  These constraints were textual, political, 
economic and personal (Mills, 1991:68).  They derived from the structures of 
ownership and control of the newspaper, institutional and professional practices 
which gave rise to regularities in the types of stories covered and their stylistic 
presentation, and the notions of professionalism and news values held by 
journalists.  The production of Les Nouvelles was also constrained by the personal 
dispositions of journalists, where these dispositions are understood not as innate or 
arbitrary but rather, as Bourdieu (1977) argues, the product of complex economic 
and social influences.1  Journalists were also bearers of discourses which pre-
existed them, and the meanings which they ascribed to events were guided by 
these discourses.  They were not free agents in the development of meanings, but 
rather, as Foucault has argued of the role of authors in general, they constituted the 
‘principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning’ (Foucault, 1991b:118).2  The 
discursive legacy which journalists brought to their work served, in other words, to 
delimit the media discourses which they mobilised.        
 
Sarah Mills has argued that:  ‘Each colonial relation develops narrative and 
descriptive techniques particular to its setting and history, which draw on a range of 
discursive practices’ (1991:87).  Journalists at Les Nouvelles had available to them 
a range of colonial discourses which were more or less expressive of the 
particularity of the experiences of colonialism in New Caledonia and they negotiated 
between these discourses in their production of media texts.  Sometimes these 
discourses were in tension:  for example, journalists at Les Nouvelles vested 
considerable effort in opposing independence through the mobilisation of discourses 
which were unequivocally colonial, but they also mobilised discourses which sought 
to distance New Caledonia from its colonial relationship with France.  The existence 
                                                          
1 Bourdieu (1977) argues that the decisive period of influence in the development of dispositions is 
early childhood during which time the family and schooling are the key influences in determining the 
manner in which individuals subsequently engage in the variety of fields in which they operate.  His 
notion of dispositions therefore suggests that journalists brought to their work a set of socially 
constructed orientations which bore on their production of media texts.  
2 Foucault continues:  ’the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; the 
author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one 
limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free 
manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction (Foucault, 1991b:119).  
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 of these competing discourses points to the heterogeneous nature of colonial 
discourse and its dilemmatic qualities, the existence of which provided openings to 
political opponents for contestation and subversion.3 
   
The origins of Les Nouvelles 
 
Throughout most of the 1980s, Les Nouvelles was the monopoly daily newspaper in 
New Caledonia.  It carried news and extensive commentary on the unfolding 
political crisis around independence and played a central role in opposing the 
escalating push for independence.  Its circulation during this period, usually around 
15,000 but rising to over 20,000 at the height of the insurrection (Godard:253; 
Ventrillon interview, 12/12/90), meant that it reached most European households in 
Noumea and the interior of the main island (Ventrillon interview, 12/12/90).  The 
extent of the paper’s Melanesian readership over the period is unknown, as 
management claims that no audience survey has ever been undertaken.  It is 
generally believed, however, that the Melanesian readership was small, but 
proportionally larger in Noumea than the interior. 
 
Les Nouvelles was established in 1971 by Roger Brissaud and Jean-Paul Leyraud.  
Brissaud was a French journalist who had worked at Radio Saigon and Radio Tahiti 
prior to creating the Tahitian newspaper, Les Nouvelles, in 1961 (Presence, no. 14-
5, 4/89 & 1/90).  A young New Caledonian journalist, Edouard Ventrillon, who had 
worked briefly for the France Australe, joined Les Nouvelles in Tahiti.  It was 
essentially here that Ventrillon received his training, and his skills were recognised 
by Brissaud who appointed Ventrillon as Chief Editor in the late 1960s.  Brissaud 
sought to establish business activities in New Caledonia and was introduced to 
Jean-Paul Leyraud, who came from a very influential family (members of this family 
had been the local directors of a very powerful trading group in the pre-war period, 
the Société Havraise Calédonienne [O’Reilly, 1980:242) and who himself had 
                                                          
3 One of the distinguishing features of Les Nouvelles was the frequency of its verbatim publication of 
communiques from political groups, particularly anti-independence groups but also pro-independence 
groups.  This practice raises the question of the extent to which I can describe these texts as forming 
part of Les Nouvelles’ discourses surrounding the issue of independence.  It is my contention that 
these texts ‘change’ as a result of their publication in Les Nouvelles.  Indeed, the newspaper might be 
conceived of as performing the function of Bourdieu’s ‘auctor’.  Bourdieu writes of the ‘auctor’:  ‘Even 
when he merely states with authority what is already the case, even when he contents himself with 
asserting what is, the auctor produces a change in what is:  by virtue of the fact that he states things 
with authority, that is, in front of and in the name of everyone, publicly and officially, he saves them 
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 extensive business interests in the territory, including a printing firm.  At the time of 
the establishment of Les Nouvelles, speculation was rife within the Noumea political 
community as to the actual source of the considerable sum of money required to 
establish the paper.  Rumour had it that this was ‘Paris money’ which had come to 
New Caledonia via Brissaud in Tahiti.  This was fuelled by further rumours over the 
soundness of Leyraud’s financial position.4   
  
Les Nouvelles was set up in competition with the aging and ossified France Australe 
which had held, as we have seen, a monopoly over the distribution of daily written 
news for several decades and was widely regarded as the de facto organ of the 
territory’s nickel giant, the Société le Nickel (SLN).  With its contemporary format 
and hitherto unprecedented breadth of local coverage, Les Nouvelles quickly 
attracted readers from the France Australe.  Advertisers followed, attracted by cut 
price advertising rates.  Despite moves by the France Australe to update its format 
and to increase its local coverage, the paper remained a financial drain on the SLN 
and was closed in 1979. 
 
Brissaud had appointed Ventrillon as chief editor of his New Caledonian newspaper, 
and Ventrillon appears to have played a very large part in successfully positioning 
Les Nouvelles in the market.  The business relationship between Brissaud and 
Leyraud was problematic from the outset.  Several interviewees commented that the 
equal partnership which they had created left open the question of who was really in 
charge, suggesting that the directions of both partners were at times conflicting.  
The strong alliance between Ventrillon and Brissaud, described by one 
commentator as quasi-familial, appears to have side-lined Leyraud into 
administrative functions, primarily the paper’s distribution and printing.  The conflict 
came to a head, as we have seen, over the issue of publishing the paper in colour, 
and resulted in Brissaud publishing the Noumea Journal in competition with Les 
                                                                                                                                                                          
from their arbitrary nature, he sanctions them, sanctifies them, consecrates them, making them worthy 
of existing in conformity with the nature of things, and thus “natural”’ (Bourdieu, 1991:222). 
4 The importance of rumour in the New Caledonian political context owes much to the closed nature of 
political structures in the territory.  The lack of structures of democratic governance in the 
colony/territory during most of the post-war period fostered extensive speculation within the Noumea 
based political community on political and economic relationships and developments (as well as many 
other topics).  The rumour of ‘Paris money’ entering the territory to undermine the France Australe 
itself had colonial connotations in its reinforcing of the notion that all things which occurred in the 
territory did so at the behest of ‘Paris’.  The importance of rumour to New Caledonian politics was 
officialised with the commencement in 1985 of an irregular column in Les Nouvelles entitled 
‘Caledonian Rumours’.  Les Nouvelles said that the title was taken from the suggestion of the press 
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 Nouvelles, while remaining managing director of Les Nouvelles. It is alleged that 
Leyraud accused Brissaud of acting improperly and assumed control of Les 
Nouvelles from 1981.  Brissaud's primary involvement from that time onwards 
appears to have been that of writing the daily satirical column ‘Le Billet de L'Affreux 
Jojo’.5 
 
Ventrillon’s involvement was also crucial to the paper’s success because he 
personified a set of dispositions which derived from the bourgeois social class in 
which he grew up and which some would describe as ‘typically Caledonian’ or 
‘Caldoche’.  Bobin (1991) argues that the Caldoche identity is strongly individualistic 
and populist.  Ventrillon was both:  he had a strong personality and a strong sense 
of mistrust of authority.  In interview, these characteristics are apparent.  He imparts 
his opinions liberally, is extremely harsh in his criticisms and very bold in the topics 
he broaches.  Shortly after the paper opened, Roland Chartier, a journalist trained in 
France who had migrated to New Caledonia in the late 1960s, joined Ventrillon as 
assistant chief editor at the paper.  Chartier could almost be describing Ventrillon 
when he wrote in Les Nouvelles of Caledonians’ ‘way of plain speaking and of 
ferociously defending their liberties by drawing on lived experience’ (Chartier, Les 
Nouvelles, 6/3/80).  Ventrillon’s editorials were direct, forcefully opinionated and 
frequently adopted a tone of moral outrage.  On the day prior to the March 1973 
legislative elections, a front page editorial (concluding on the back page) signed 
Edouard Ventrillon began: 
 
 Tomorrow, Sunday 4 March, the first round of the 1973 legislative elections 
will take place.  In metropolitan France, as in Caledonia, the stakes are high.  
On the one hand, the socio-communist threat, on the other that of autonomy, 
accompanied by the threat, proffered by Maurice Lenormand, from the 
Melanesian Liberation Front.  A common thread, in metropolitan France as in 
Caledonia; the risk of adventure, ruin and totalitarianism. 
 
The editorial sketches out an interpretive repertoire which, in many respects, 
established the terrain on which the paper’s opposition to independence was later 
articulated.  Ventrillon continued: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
service of the High Commission that Les Nouvelles be renamed ‘Les Rumeurs Calédoniennes’ (Les 
Nouvelles, 19/1/85). 
5 The material which I present in this paragraph was conveyed to me by several interviewees who 
claimed to have information on the events to which I refer.  All wished to remain confidential and their 
names are therefore withheld from the text.  Much of the material I gathered on Les Nouvelles came 
from journalists and other commentators who wished to remain anonymous.  This material is therefore 
not referenced.   
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 And, if Lenormand were sincere and honest, he could only admit that a 
majority, that the majority of this territory chooses its future with France and 
not with those who never brought anything else to the country but hatred, 
compromises, mates and even racism. 
 A racism that shamelessly tries to make the Melanesian ethnic group revolt 
against ethnic Europeans (Les Nouvelles, 3/3/73).  
 
Ventrillon claims that his editorial policy was to 'talk about everything, to say 
everything' (interview, 26/4/94).  Certainly, in comparison with the silence of the 
France Australe on most local affairs, Les Nouvelles did open up aspects of life in 
Noumea to the scrutiny of the daily press.  The comparison was most stark during a 
two-month strike by workers at the SLN only a couple of months after Les Nouvelles 
began.  The France Australe made no mention of the strike whereas Les Nouvelles 
brought daily news on its progress (ibid).  This situation was particularly illustrative 
of the difficulty of sustaining a strictly instrumentalist view of the relationship 
between the media and business - one which posits a direct relationship between 
media discourses and the interests of those who own and control the media.  In this 
instance, the SLN, as owner of the France Australe, chose to channel its information 
on the strike to Ventrillon at Les Nouvelles rather than have it published in its own 
paper because, as the then publicity manager for the SLN, Remy Le Goff, 
commented, 'nobody would believe us if we published it in the France Australe' (Le 
Goff interview, 22/4/94).6 
 
Ventrillon’s claim that Les Nouvelles would ‘say everything’ could be interpreted, in 
part, as a claim that the paper would speak the truth.  For Ventrillon, this ‘truth’ was 
readily available in a realm of objective reality which was accessibly by journalists 
who had only to observe and transcribe their observations in the newspaper.  ‘Truth’ 
was, in other words, phenomenologically attainable.  This notion of ‘truth’, prevalent 
within journalism, masks the complex processes through which those things which 
constitute ‘everything’ come to be singled out as worthy objects of description and 
then described.  It masks, in other words, the notion that ‘everything’ is, in effect, a 
construct which is both identified and transcribed through discourse.  As such, 
‘everything’ becomes a version, as pro-independence activists, highly critical of the 
paper’s reporting on Melanesian and independence issues, were wont to point out:    
                                                          
6 Le Goff claims that he was later given instructions from the management of the SLN to surreptitiously 
ensure the demise of the France Australe.  Ventrillon disputes this arguing that the SLN made several 
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 Do you remember the KAMOUDA, N’GOYE, DAYE, KUTU matters...each 
time the Kanak is humiliated, pointed at, insulted, his claims belittled, his 
words ignored or deformed.  Each time the murderers were looked upon with 
understanding, supported, pardoned.  That was their principle, and they 
called that above all else, ‘information on everything and for everyone’ 
(L’Avenir Calédonien, no. 998, July 1989, emphasis in original).7  
 
Local news coverage in Les Nouvelles 
 
The claim to ‘say everything’ was therefore a claim to establish a new ‘regime of 
truth’ (Foucault, 1991:74) in the territory.  In effect, the ‘everything’ on which the 
paper reported related primarily to events taking place within the Noumea 
community and, during periods of relative political calm, concentrated on accident, 
crime, judicial and ‘human interest’ stories.  The emphasis given in Les Nouvelles to 
reporting on local events was, nonetheless, somewhat revolutionary.  As Ismet 
Kurtovich showed in his content analysis of editions of the France Australe 
published in 1967, reporting on local affairs occupied only one per cent of news 
space whereas 32 per cent of available news space was devoted to reporting on 
international affairs (thesis, undated, title not available).8  Les Nouvelles reversed 
this imbalance:  it privileged local news at the expense of international news, and 
particularly news on politics in France.9  The small amount of international news in 
the paper tended to cover ‘soft’ topics such as the life of the famous, the marvels of 
technological development and crime stories, a development which Kurtovich 
(speaking of the France Australe which had made a similar trajectory in its reporting 
on international news in the effort to compete with Les Nouvelles) described as 
dangerous and ‘caught up in the mesh of simplicity’ (undated thesis:E5).  Articles 
from Les Nouvelles' correspondents in Paris were episodic and most frequently 
related to New Caledonian issues; for example, debates in the National Assembly or 
                                                                                                                                                                          
attempts during the 1970s to reinvigorate the paper, even opening an afternoon paper, Noumea Soir.  
The paper's demise was, he argued, the result of effective competition from Les Nouvelles. 
7 The pro-independence and extreme-right press in the territory frequently used emphasis in its text 
through capitalisation, bolding and underlining.  Unless otherwise stated, the emphasis in quotations is 
in the original.   
8 This privileging of international news reflected the SLN’s orientation towards export markets 
compared with Les Nouvelles’ greater orientation towards servicing the needs of local commercial 
capital.   
9 A small amount of international news was contained in most editions under a variety of different 
banners.  Wire service news briefs were frequently printed on the back page under the banner ‘24 
Hours’.  In addition, articles from such conservative metropolitan publications as France Soir, Le 
Figaro and Paris-Match were sometimes reprinted under the banners ‘A glance at the news’ and 
‘Across the press’, but their episodic nature tended to suggest that they were as much ‘fillers’ as there 
to broaden the informational base of the paper. 
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 Senate on New Caledonia or the visit of New Caledonian delegations to France.10  
Ironically, during the 1970s, ‘L'Affreux Jojo’ contained the most sustained 
commentary on French politics, privileging populist analyses of the machinations of 
the French political elite and criticism of left politics.   
 
Kurtovich writes of the France Australe during the 1960s that the avoidance of local 
news and the privileging of international news corresponds with an important 
psychological trait of colonialism, 'the mistrust of oneself and its corollary, the 
valorisation of the exterior, in order to reassure and impress the colonised’ 
(1991:192).  Franz Fanon and Paulo Freire describe similar psychological traits and, 
in particular, the colonial bourgeoisie’s mimicry of the intellectual and cultural 
models of the colonial power (Fanon, 1967, Freire, 1982).  If these are familiar 
characteristics of colonialism, what then can we say of the fetishism of locality 
characteristic of Les Nouvelles?  Does it constitute a denial of the colonial? 
 
It could be argued that the fetishism of locality merely constituted a more efficient 
means of propagating colonial discourse.  The application of colonial interpretive 
repertoires to local issues could be seen as a means of facilitating the appropriation 
of these repertoires, thereby enhancing a process of self-colonisation.  The part 
played by the settler population in perpetuating the conditions of their colonial 
existence was argued often enough by pro-independence activists during the 1980s, 
and there is indeed merit in this argument.  While the mobilisation of racist 
discourses in France Australe’s reporting on ‘Third World’ issues perpetuated 
colonial discourse, the mobilisation of similar racist discourses in Les Nouvelles 
towards the indigenous Melanesian population also perpetuated colonial discourse, 
but did so in a manner which was no less pernicious and certainly far more 
accessible.  But to argue that the fetishism of locality in Les Nouvelles merely 
constituted a new way of perpetuating colonial discourse would be to miss the new 
discursive elements which arise as the result of this different focus.  The emphasis 
on local events enabled the articulation of local discourses which had developed as 
a result of the particularities of the colonial experience in New Caledonia.  One of 
the more dominant of these expressed hostility towards France for what was 
perceived to be decades of neglect interspersed with instances of incompetent and 
uncaring intervention in local politics.  The emphasis on local news therefore 
                                                          
10 Major metropolitan news stories would sometimes feature in Les Nouvelles; for example, the death 
 82
 resulted in discursive ambiguities and openings in the discourses surrounding 
independence, and these were exploited to varying degrees by pro-independence 
activists during the 1980s.  Realisation of the dangers inherent in this ambiguity 
were perhaps a significant reason behind the paper's shift back to a reinclusion of 
news from France after its purchase by the Hersant group in early 1987. 
 
Journalistic practice and politics at Les Nouvelles 
 
Initially, the team at Les Nouvelles was very small, comprising three or four 
journalists, including Ventrillon and Chartier.  During the 1970s the team gradually 
expanded to include, in 1975, six journalists working to Ventrillon and Chartier and, 
in 1980, 10.  During the 1980s, aside from Ventrillon, only one journalist at Les 
Nouvelles, Henri Le Pot, was born in New Caledonia.  Le Pot undertook studies in 
journalism in France prior to returning to New Caledonia to begin work at Les 
Nouvelles in the mid-1970s (Henri Le Pot interview, 26/4/94).  The remaining men 
had migrated to New Caledonia, primarily during the 1960s and early 1970s.  Most 
were untrained, but three at least, René Sintes, Marcel Lepecheoux and Jean-Noel 
Feraud, had received some basic training, having worked for the France Australe.   
 
Ventrillon argues that a strongly established professional hierarchy did not exist at 
the paper and that its success was largely the result of effective teamwork, a view 
shared by Chartier (Ventrillon interview, 26/4/94; Chartier interview, 21/4/94).  
Certainly, the nostalgia evident in the comments of all the journalists with whom I 
spoke suggests that the editorial structures of Les Nouvelles during this period 
differed significantly from those established after the change in ownership.  There 
does appear to have been significant involvement of journalists in decisions 
concerning the editorial direction of the paper.  The day would begin with an 
editorial meeting during which journalists nominated, or were nominated, to follow 
stories. Ventrillon claims that they were nominated on the basis of competence or 
interest (interview, 26/4/94).  Journalists would write their stories and these would 
then be submitted to either Ventrillon or Chartier for sub-editing.  Ventrillon says 
that he only ever changed articles where they were unclear, incorrect or defamatory 
(ibid).  Any proposed changes would be discussed with the journalist who would 
either accept the changes as written or rewrite the sections in question.   A  further 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of Georges Pompidou (Les Nouvelles, 4/4/74), but these were very infrequent. 
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 meeting would take place at the close of the day during which the team would 
discuss their work, decide on what would be incorporated in the paper and discuss 
the main headlines.  Ventrillon, Chartier and others stressed that this was a 
collective task whereby journalists suggested possibilities and collective decisions 
were made.  Editorials written by Ventrillon and Chartier would also be discussed at 
the meeting and occasionally the team would collectively write an editorial (ibid; Le 
Pot interview, 26/4/94).  Initially, editorials written by Ventrillon and Chartier were 
published unsigned, or signed collectively as 'Les Nouvelles'.  However, as the 
political climate became more volatile, several journalists objected to the collective 
attribution of certain editorials written by either Ventrillon or Chartier, and requested 
that these articles be attributed to their authors (Le Pot interview, 26/4/94).  One 
suspects that work with Les Nouvelles was somewhat less harmonious than the 
recollections of the journalists would suggest.  One journalist described Ventrillon as 
a 'grand abuser'.  Chartier commented that, while he and Ventrillon got along well 
together and had a great deal of respect for one another, they often had animated 
arguments over issues (Chartier interview, 21/4/94).  He argued that they were 
complementary in many respects, and cited the manner in which they handled staff, 
suggesting that Chartier may have had to smooth over ruffles generated by 
Ventrillon's quick temper and tongue.  All this suggests that the evening meetings 
may have been less consultative and more coercive than the journalists’ 
recollections would suggest.  Certainly, the journalists’ recollections are relational:  
they have been structured in the context of their feelings of alienation and 
disenfranchisement following the paper’s change in ownership in 1987.   
 
The practice of attribution is helpful in providing an insight into the limits of consent 
within the journalistic team.11  But, in effect, very few attributed editorials appeared 
and in some instances where they did it is difficult to ascertain why they were the 
subject of dissent, as they seem unremarkable in relation to other editorials.  One of 
the first instances of attribution was the forceful editorial on the March 1973 
legislative elections referred to above, in which Ventrillon cautioned against a vote 
                                                          
11 I use the term ‘consent’ rather than ‘consensus’ because ‘consent’ tends to connote agreement to 
proceed in a certain proposed manner rather than collective agreement with the views expressed.  We 
could imagine the scenario at the evening meetings in which individual journalists may not 
wholeheartedly agree with the views expressed but nonetheless consent to their publication, perhaps 
because they may have felt intimidated by Ventrillon’s position and his forceful personality.  One 
questions, however, whether such a person could have sustained a long period of involvement in the 
cut and thrust of the paper.  Ventrillon appears to be someone who never shied away from conflict and 
who even enjoyed it.  
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 for the UC autonomist candidate, Roch Pidjot.  It is perhaps not surprising that this 
may have been an issue which divided the journalistic team.  These elections took 
place two years prior to the first official demand for independence and, although the 
argument had been well advanced that a vote for autonomy was tantamount to 
abandonment to the inevitability of independence, the discourse around autonomy 
was not yet, and indeed never fully became, closed around this reading.  At the time 
of Ventrillon’s editorial, there was still considerable support for autonomy from within 
the European population.   As the Union Progressiste Multiraciale argued in a 
communique, extracts of which were published in Les Nouvelles:  'There are 
conservative autonomists just as there are conservative anti-autonomists' (4/2/75).12  
Many Europeans who supported autonomy and were members of the UC, 
abandoned this position, and their membership, once the UC declared its support 
for independence in 1977 (Henningham, 1992:68).  The dissent within the 
journalistic team may have indicated that some support for autonomy existed there.  
Alternatively, in a more liberal-democratic tradition, journalists may merely have 
taken exception to Ventrillon’s uncompromising condemnation of all those who 
dared to support autonomist views.   
 
A further example of attribution was the practice, engaged in at least twice, of 
printing side-by-side editorials attributed one to Ventrillon and the other to Chartier, 
presenting different views on the same topic.  Ventrillon and Chartier’s editorial 
styles were very different and increasingly their political views on independence 
diverged.  Chartier’s style was less direct and his language more sophisticated, 
reflecting his middle-class metropolitan French background, in comparison to 
Ventrillon’s frequent resort to idiom and cliche.  By the mid-1980s, Chartier’s 
political views had shifted towards support for independence whereas Ventrillon’s 
had remained stridently opposed to independence.  Following the presentation of 
the ‘Pisani plan’ for the political future of the territory, developed by the then high 
commissioner and special envoy, Edgard Pisani, and outlined in a television 
address on 8 January 1985, Ventrillon and Chartier both wrote separate 
commentaries on the plan, with Ventrillon commenting that the proposals were 
bizarre and disappointing and Chartier expressing qualified support for the 
                                                          
12 For the UPM, 'political progress entails managing one’s affairs, with the common good in mind and 
within the legal framework of the French Republic’ (Les Nouvelles, 4/2/75). 
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 proposals as a ‘first step’ (9/1/85).13  Finally, René Sintes, acknowledged by his 
peers as being one of the more liberal journalists working at the paper, wrote an 
editorial on the Kanak insurrection of late 1984 and early 1985 in which he 
commented that some people were coming around to support independence as a 
way to achieve peace and outlined possibilities for a negotiated settlement 
(24/11/84).  He received death threats following the publication of the article (Helen 
Fraser interview, 14/12/90). 
 
There were, however, nuances in articles on political issues which were not 
attributed.  This was particularly the case in the early 1980s and, while we may 
suspect Chartier’s involvement in a considerable number of these, we cannot be 
certain that he was their author.  In many respects, these nuances reflected 
tensions within the anti-independence RPCR, between those who sought greater 
autonomy from France and those who sought greater integration with France 
through the departmentalisation of the territory.  Many of these tensions became 
crystallised around the issue of land reform, proposed in a plan by the conservative 
Minister for the DOM-TOM, Paul Dijoud, in 1979 (Ward, 1982:32-49, Ovington, 
1988:106-124).   
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the Les Nouvelles’ team supported the 
amended land reform legislation which came before the Territorial Assembly in May 
1980.  Dijoud’s May visit is described in an editorial as ‘A step towards detente’ 
among European and Melanesian communities in the bush (27/5/80).  The editorial 
argues that Dijoud has a large part to play in mobilising the community around the 
‘widely shared hope that the political divisions can be softened in the interests of 
ensuring a harmonious development for all ethnic groups’ (27/5/80) and calls on 
local politicians to ‘silence their quarrels to enable them to follow the momentum 
heralded by the Minister, not for himself, but for Caledonia’ (27/5/80).  In addition, 
the generous coverage given to FNSC meetings and communiques suggests that 
there may have been some sympathy for more centrist views within the editorial 
team.  Ventrillon himself may have been vacillating during this period.  In an 
editorial attributed to Ventrillon which appeared in early 1982, he responded to the 
call for ‘Caledonian independence’ from a new political grouping, the Parti National 
Calédonien (PNC), in a manner which seemed uncharacteristically moderate.  
                                                          
13 Chartier also wrote an editorial entitled ‘A paradox that can be useful’ which discussed different 
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 Ventrillon argued that the PNC risked gathering together all those ‘who don’t want to 
be chucked out of this country that is theirs, for the exclusive benefit of an ethnic 
group with whom they thought they could get on’ .  He argued that the creation of 
the PNC was an understandable, if misguided, response to Kanak nationalism 
which sought ‘an exclusively Kanak Caledonia with, for non-Kanaks, only the right to 
live under the Kanak yoke’.  The editorial concluded with the rhetorical question:  ‘Is 
it utopian, is it realisable?  The future will tell, but in any case it will be the 
consequence in this country of the socialist government’s policies’ (11/1/82).  
Another indication of some toleration within the editorial team towards some form of 
independence for New Caledonia came just prior to the announcement of the Pisani 
plan in January 1985.  Rumours published in the French weekly Nouvel 
Observateur that Pisani was planning to grant sovereignty to the Kanak people and 
then have France rent back a region which included Noumea on the west coast, 
‘Hong Kong style’, met with a favourable response in the paper (5/1/85).14  Within 
this scenario, Noumea would become a ‘free port’ which, Les Nouvelles described, 
in a slightly tongue in cheek manner, as synonymous with an Eldorado (5/1/85).  On 
the day of Pisani’s address, an editorial commented on these rumours that:  ‘The 
little that we know (but do we really know it) from what he is going to propose seems 
original and even seductive.  But is it really the definitive solution for our problems?’.  
The editorial went on to argue that independence would not necessarily solve the 
ethnic problems in New Caledonia and that independence-in-association would offer 
no guarantee of protection for non-Kanaks, as the experience of Algeria 
demonstrated, but concluded:  ‘So, if ever Mr Pisani’s proposal envisages 
independence, he will have to be very persuasive and convincing and his project will 
also have to be really, very, very original’ (7/1/85).  As mentioned above, Ventrillon 
was ultimately disappointed with the plan.  A considerable escalation of violence in 
the territory followed its release, precipitated by the killing of a young European 
settler, and this irrevocably damaged the possibility of a period of reflective 
consideration of the plan sought by Pisani, and plunged the territory into further 
political crisis.  From this period onwards, perhaps corresponding also with 
Chartier’s voluntary side-lining, the paper’s opposition to independence became 
more unequivocal.  Increasingly, Les Nouvelles depicted the FLNKS insurrection as 
racist and mindless.  The paper argued that loyalist populations have never taught 
                                                                                                                                                                          
reactions within the European community to the Pisani plan (11/1/85). 
14 Earlier, in December 1984, Les Nouvelles had urged the RPCR to meet with Pisani, to try to find 
some common ground over the political future of the territory (17/12/84). 
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 hatred to their children, unlike Kanak indépendantistes (27/4/85).  Commenting on 
two youths detained over the murder of a European school teacher, the paper could 
not contain its condemnation of the pro-independence movement:  ‘These two 
youth, today in prison, are children of the FLNKS.  Hatred and racism have been 
instilled in them.  How could we speak to them of reason?  But, let’s move on’ (ibid).  
Increasingly Les Nouvelles commented on what it perceived to be lassitude and 
disarray within the FLNKS, and added fuel to any existing tensions by arguing that 
the militantism of the movement resulted from the UC having been marginalised by 
the more radical constituent groups (23/3/86).15   The paper welcomed the prospect 
of the election of a conservative government at the 1986 French national elections 
arguing that ‘It will be good when these five years of socialist blows end’, but 
cautioned that this was ‘not reason enough to believe in fairies’ (22/3/86).  
 
If there is any validity in the claims of team involvement in the paper’s editorial 
orientation, then it must be assumed that the team members were active 
participants in the development of this political position.  In a telling comment,  
Ventrillon claimed that he did not have to intervene to change the emphasis in 
articles as ‘the team understood each other.  We tried to be objective, honest’ 
(Ventrillon interview, 26/4/94).  If one of the major reasons behind the success of 
Les Nouvelles was its teamwork, then it would appear that Ventrillon had been 
largely instrumental in this success in his employing people who were predisposed 
towards an antipathy to independence.  But also crucial to the team’s cohesion was 
the development of a shared sense of professional ethics and  a common 
understanding of newsworthiness and news values.  At Les Nouvelles, these were 
largely acquired ‘on the job’, which may explain the somewhat idiosyncratic mix of 
universalistic claims and opinion which characterised the professional discourses of 
journalists at Les Nouvelles. 
 
Professional ethics and news values 
 
The overwhelming majority of journalists working at Les Nouvelles had received 
little or no prior training in journalism and it was therefore the task of Ventrillon, and 
                                                          
15 An article on the FLNKS decision to boycott the 1986 Presidential election  argues that the decision 
was taken against the wishes of Tjibaou and that it demonstrates that Tjibaou is president of the 
FLNKS because he adapts, not because he imposes.  The article concludes by arguing that the 
FLNKS’ candidate, Mitterrand, would lose anyway and that:  ‘Faced with this risk, the “passive boycott” 
is very convenient, isn’t it?’ (17/2/86). 
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 to a lesser extent Chartier, to develop these people professionally.  The manner in 
which they were trained reflected the particularities of journalism in New Caledonia.  
On the one hand, as discussed in chapter one, the historical development of a 
mainstream ‘objective’ media, emerging at the beginning of the century in most 
Western nations due to the changing economics of the industry, had not been 
realised in New Caledonia because of its distinctive economic and political 
circumstances.  The result of this divergence in media development was the 
residual prominence of a polemic press in New Caledonia compared with the turn to 
more ‘objective’ forms of media writing elsewhere.  In addition, the colonial political 
relations in New Caledonia constituted a formidable backdrop to work as a 
journalist.  The traditional hold over information dissemination by the politico-
economic elite in the territory, reflected in the ‘unspoken’ of the France Australe, 
rendered the practicing of any form of investigative journalism, usually considered 
by journalists as important in the pursuit of more objective forms of reporting, 
particularly difficult.16  The paper experienced the brunt of these pressures early in 
the piece.  Journalists recall the actions taken by established economic and political 
interests to sabotage the publication.  Advertisers were allegedly threatened with 
reprisals if they used Les Nouvelles and one journalist commented that contractors 
were paid to sabotage equipment arriving at the docks for the new paper.   
 
These recollections of a new competitor struggling against an established monopoly 
publication supported by powerful economic interests in the territory seem to sit 
uneasily with Dornoy’s comment that Brissaud and Ventrillon ‘basically represented 
the interests of the conservative European population’ and therefore that social 
grouping from within which these powerful economic interests derived (Dornoy, 
1984:234).  If the paper represented conservative colonial interests, why did it 
generate so much opposition from these interests?  To the extent that opposition 
existed, it reflected the obsession with control which more than a century of 
colonialism had engendered in the politico-economic elite.17  As Barbançon 
commented in reference to the current deputy to the national parliament, Jacques 
Lafleur:   
                                                          
16 Freiberg writes that French legislation prohibiting the publication of any judicial, government or 
military information that hasn’t been cleared for publication ‘practically eliminates the legal possibility 
of doing “investigative reporting” in the American style’ (1981:165). 
17 The survival of Les Nouvelles suggests that either the will was not sufficiently strong or the means 
not well enough established by vested politico-economic interests to ensure the demise of the 
newspaper in the manner that was later achieved with other publications, the ‘Journal Bleu’ in 
particular. 
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 The Deputy and his men...inherited their fortune, and if they have prospered 
from it, it is because they find themselves in a colonial situation in which they 
control all the economic, fiscal, political and media power.  Faced with real 
capitalist and liberal competition, they would have been swept away 
(1992:59). 
 
The pressures experienced by journalists in this early period accentuated their 
perception of their role as that of broadening out the informational sphere and 
engaging in objective and unbiased reporting.  A 1974 editorial entitled ‘On 
Freedom of the Press’ articulated a classical republican discourse on press freedom 
arguing that press freedom was ‘indispensable for democracy’ and a ‘corollary and 
expression of liberty’.  In reference, no doubt, to pressures which journalists had 
been experiencing, the editorial referred to those who are ‘too inclined to consider 
journalists as pen pushers’ and argued that ‘too many people consider the press as 
merely a means to privilege their own commercial, political or ideological ambitions’.  
Behind newspapers, the editorial continued, were managers and journalists ‘who try 
and make the truth known, and who express it with as much independence as 
possible’.  The discourse on press freedom did, however, evince a particularly 
French position on the role of opinion in press freedom, arguing that newspapers 
were not only a means of exchange between people but also a ‘reflection of opinion 
and a constitutive element in this opinion’ (26/11/74).  From the outset, therefore, 
journalists at Les Nouvelles understood their professional role as one of marrying 
truth and opinion.  While this core understanding of the truthfulness of opinion 
distinguishes French journalistic practices from those of Anglo-Saxon countries, 
there is little doubt that the manner in which journalists translated this notion of 
professional ethics into practice in New Caledonia resulted in a style of journalism 
which was far more polemical than most offerings in the metropolitan French press.  
The practical implication of this notion of professional ethics was that journalists at 
Les Nouvelles were allowed, and even encouraged, to incorporate ‘opinion’ into 
their articles.  Ventrillon commented that this blending of ‘facts’ and ‘opinion’ 
sometimes caused problems, as some of the less able journalists would present 
‘opinion’ as ‘fact’, a distortion which Ventrillon says he would have to sort out in the 
sub-editing process.  Ventrillon counselled his journalists to establish the ‘‘facts’ first 
and to then write a commentary - don’t mix the two’.  Ventrillon commented that in 
instances where journalists were not present at particular incidents, the paper used 
information received from the administration and the gendarmerie as the ‘facts’.  
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 These, Ventrillon commented, were ‘never particularly contested’ (Ventrillon 
interview, 26/4/94).  During the height of the insurrection in late 1984 and early 
1985, Les Nouvelles usually had a couple of journalists sent from Noumea to cover 
incidents in the interior (one usually covered the east coast and the other the west 
coast of the main island).  Frequently, these journalists were not present at major 
incidents, in part because such incidents were occurring simultaneously throughout 
the countryside, and also because the movement of Les Nouvelles’ journalists was 
frequently restricted by pro-independence activists hostile towards the paper’s 
reporting on the independence issue.18  A few days after the November 1984 
territorial elections, the paper commented that the information it was presenting to 
readers resulted from a compilation of the information sent by journalists and 
information gleaned from phone calls with ‘broussards’, white settlers living in the 
bush (22/11/84).  On at least one occasion, Sintes reported that information 
received by the newspaper had been incorrect, the town hall at Ponérihouen had 
not been ransacked (20/11/84).  This type of follow-up was a rarity, because of the 
magnitude of the insurrection and the credence given to the settlers’ accounts by 
the Les Nouvelles journalists.  Almost no attempt was made to glean information 
from pro-independence groups.  In general, Les Nouvelles’ journalists did not attend 
FLNKS press conferences and they were sometimes restricted in their movements 
by virtue of not being issued with an FLNKS media pass (Franck Magdoeuf 
interview19, 20/4/94).  This lack of information did not, however, stop speculation in 
Les Nouvelles as to the movement’s strategy (see, for example, 12/1/83, 31/7/84, 
17/2/86).  
 
In their production of media texts, journalists at Les Nouvelles were required to 
negotiate through the discursive and practical dilemmas thrown up by their 
ostensible adherence to both the notion of objectivity and that of the presentation of 
                                                          
18 René Sintes primarily covered incidents on the east cost during this period, frequently in the 
company of the Australian journalist Helen Fraser.  Fraser writes that she was able on at least one 
occasion to secure access to particular regions for Sintes by arguing with pro-independence activists 
that they should not engage in the same tactics as the right in restricting access to journalists 
(1990:112).  Fraser’s credibility within the pro-independence movement appears to have facilitated 
Sintes’ access, and his reporting did present a more nuanced appreciation of the unfolding events.  In 
particular, in one article, Sintes pointed to the tactical efficacy of the FLNKS’ strategy of road blocks, 
in that while military efforts were engaged in clearing these road blocks, activists would be 
constructing another one a kilometre down the road (Les Nouvelles, 24/11/84).  This argument 
countered the right’s contention that the FLNKS insurrection could be stopped by greater military 
intervention and that it was only the laxity of the Socialist administration which was allowing the 
insurrection to drag on. 
19 Franck Magdoeuf was the AFP correspondant in Noumea in 1989.  I would like to thank him for all 
his assistance during my second period of fieldwork. 
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 opinion in reporting.  That this task of negotiation was fraught with difficulty is 
evident in Ventrillon’s comment that he was required to ‘correct’ journalists’ copy in 
instances where he believed an inadequate demarcation had been made.  In effect, 
Ventrillon was merely bringing to bear his own dispositions in his sorting out of ‘fact’ 
and ‘opinion’.  Journalists were considerably assisted in marrying the two by the 
prevalence of anti-independence sentiment in Noumea, where they primarily 
worked.  The prevalence of this sentiment constituted a type of ‘structure of feeling’ 
(Raymond Williams, 1977), through which there could emerge an armory of ‘facts’ 
which formed the interpretive resources available in the construction of anti-
independence discourse.  The strength of this ‘structure of feeling’ meant that these 
‘facts’ could assume the taken-for-grantedness of the ‘real’.  Thus, information 
passed on from the military or broussards could assume the status of ‘fact’ because 
it resonated with the prevailing anti-independence sentiment in Noumea. 
 
The notion of ‘facts’ was problematic at another level.  The idea that journalists’ 
immediate engagement with events rendered irrefutable the status of their accounts 
as ‘fact’ also requires challenging.  The trouble with this argument is that so-called 
‘eyewitness’ accounts of a range of incidents consistently diverged.  In some 
instances, such as the violent confrontation between Melanesians and gendarmes 
at Koindé, during which two gendarmes were killed, accounts of the progression of 
events differed.20  We might argue that the versions were reconstructed after the 
event to discredit the other party, and such practices probably took place.21  But the 
problem also arises because individuals, and their collective social groups, read 
events in different ways according, as Bourdieu would argue, to their habitus, but 
also according to their own discursive contexts which structure their readings.  As a 
simple example, a parade of gendarmes is more likely to connote security for white 
settlers and fear for Melanesians.  The responses of each of these groups is 
therefore likely to differ and, in turn, to be interpreted differently by those witnessing 
the scene.  The scene then has to be transcribed, and this occurs, of course, 
through discourse, which objectifies, names, categorises and subjectifies in ways 
which are not neutral.  All this implies that the ‘eyewitness’ account, even when it is 
                                                          
20 See for example Les Nouvelles account on 11/1/83 compared with the account published in L’Avenir 
of 19/1/83. 
21 For example, the FLNKS argued that the settlers accused in the Hienghène massacre had 
fabricated aspects of their evidence, such as the accusation that the Kanaks had torched the house of 
a neighbour (Bwenando, November 1986). 
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 that of a seemingly disinterested observer trained in notions of objective journalism, 
is problematic.   
 
Journalists at Les Nouvelles had recourse to other arguments in their attempts to 
reconcile their claim to objective journalism with their licence to advance opinion.  
The definition of objective journalism which they advanced reflected the colonial 
setting in which most of them had been trained.  Their work was objective, they 
argued, because the paper was independent of any political or economic group.  
One senior journalist described the paper as a 'dinosaur' in that, unlike the 
overwhelming majority of newspapers published elsewhere in the world, it was 
editorially independent of its proprietors and 'owed nothing to anyone' (Le Pot 
interview, 26/4/94).  The relative independence of the editorial team under Ventrillon 
certainly distinguished Les Nouvelles from the France Australe, and we can 
understand how journalists would view the paper’s operation as something of an 
aberration in a colonial setting in which information had been, and was still in many 
respects, tightly controlled.  But Ventrillon’s tight reign over the paper, and the 
apparent concurrence within most of the journalistic team with the editorial 
orientation of the paper, rendered Les Nouvelles nonetheless expressive of the 
habitus which Ventrillon and other journalists personified.  While in the operational 
sense the paper was a relatively free agent, in its discourses it was nonetheless 
expressive of a conservative, populist and racist vision of Caledonia which remained 
resolutely tied to France. 
 
Les Nouvelles and political parties 
 
Ventrillon and other journalists commented that the team was cognisant of the 
paper’s monopoly position and therefore bore the responsibility of giving voice to 
the views of pro-independence groups (Ventrillon interview, 12/12/90).  This they did 
primarily through the publication of communiques from the FLNKS, from constituent 
political groupings within the FLNKS, and other independence groups such as the 
LKS and the OPAO (Parti Fédéral Kanak d’Opao).  Ventrillon and others cite the 
example of Machoro’s visits to the offices of Les Nouvelles to present Ventrillon with 
communiques.  Ventrillon commented that he would read the communiques in 
Machoro’s presence and tell him whether he would publish them, the only reason for 
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 rejection being that they contained defamatory material.  Ventrillon said:  ‘He knew 
I’d publish them.  He also knew I’d do a commentary’ (interview, 26/4/94). 
 
The extent to which the publication of these communiques assisted in the promotion 
of the pro-independence position is questionable.  Their incorporation within a sea 
of antithetical discourses always ran the risk of rendering them as parody.  For 
example, when Tjibaou’s claim that only the Kanak people have the right to self-
determination is placed in the context of a prolonged and relentless discourse which 
positions such claims as racist, it may be argued that its inclusion serves only to 
illustrate the contentions of the latter.  In a type of Marcusean repressive tolerance, 
pluralism serves paradoxically to reinforce dominant interpretive repertoires through 
illustration, but also through their effect in ostensibly underscoring the democratic 
underpinning of media and political systems, and thereby their claim to objectivity 
(Marcuse, 1968). 
 
Journalists also refuted claims that the paper flattered the RPCR and cited 
examples of criticism towards the party and its leader Jacques Lafleur.  The most 
critical commentary was evident following the breakdown in negotiations between 
the RPCR and the FNSC in June 1982 which resulted in the independence 
movement assuming government.  Articles criticised the RPCR and its lack of 
willingness to negotiate with the FNSC and criticised Lafleur for his unwillingness to 
articulate a clear political line (5 & 7/6/82).  Aside from these examples, criticism of 
the RPCR and Lafleur were rare, rendering somewhat exaggerated Ventrillon’s 
claim that:  ‘My position was simple:  I was against independence and therefore 
criticised the indépendantistes.  But one criticises one’s friends even more’ 
(interview, 26/4/94).  An indication that the criticism of the RPCR was somewhat out 
of the ordinary was contained in an editorial which responded to readers’ criticisms 
that the paper ‘had been too severe in its criticism of the RPCR and Jacques Lafleur 
and, by the same token, too kind to the FNSC’.  The editorial stressed that the 
paper was independent of all political pressures and that 'the editorial staff is free to 
make its own decisions and comments either in politics or any other field’, adding 
that 'this is generally done collectively'.  The writers argued that their intention was 
not to 'give a present' to the FNSC and acknowledged the broad representativeness 
of the RPCR and its political importance: 
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 Yes, the RPCR is an important movement, but it is also a grouping of diverse 
tendencies, moreover well representative of Caledonian opinions.  But, in 
tearing itself apart, it is weakening and discrediting itself.  To not say and 
draw attention to this wouldn’t be helpful to it, and wouldn’t be in the 
interests of the population that it represents (11/6/82). 
 
This lack of any direct affiliation with any political grouping or large commercial 
interest appears to have been implicit to journalists’ claims to report objectively.  
Their professional schema seems to have assumed that this lack of political and 
commercial affiliation would almost automatically ensure an objective approach to 
issues.  It is, as I have argued, comprehensible historically as a response to the 
tight control exercised by commercial interests over the output of the France 
Australe and other media.  However, objectivity thus defined, left unchallenged the 
range of practices employed by journalists in their rendering of events.  It shifted 
attention away from the manner in which these institutional and professional 
practices structured the types of discourses which they produced.   
 
Objectivity and narrative in Les Nouvelles 
 
Within the Australian press, objective journalism is thought to be achieved by 
including a range of views on issues within articles.  The journalist becomes, in a 
sense, a mediator between competing ideas which she or he presents to readers in 
a manner which does not attempt reconciliation.  Many critiques have been levelled 
at this understanding of objective journalistic practice.  They range from questioning 
the comprehensiveness of the views presented to epistemological critiques of 
notions of objectivity and truth.22  What is fascinating about this notion of objectivity 
in the context of Les Nouvelles is that it was almost never practised.  I found very 
few examples in the period prior to the Matignon accords where an article on the 
question of independence or related issues was structured around what in Australia 
would be considered a relatively objective presentation of anti- and pro-
independence views.23  Overwhelmingly, articles consisted of a presentation of anti-
independence views, with albeit some acknowledgment at times of variations within 
this general position, but no attempt is made to express pro-independence views as 
legitimate.  This manner of constructing articles privileges a particular style of 
                                                          
22 Many of the relevant issues are discussed in Eldridge, 1993. 
23 Roland Chartier’s articles on the round-table discussions at Nainville-les-Roches contain 
consideration of different political perspectives (Les Nouvelles, July 1983).  Another example is an 
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 writing based on a fairly strict narrative structure.  The narrativity is particularly 
evident in articles which report on physical events:  clashes between gendarmes 
and Melanesians, such as those which occurred at Koindé in January 1983 and the 
particularly violent encounter in Poindimié in 1988 (Les Nouvelles, 23/2/88), anti-
independence demonstrations (for example, 27/2/85), and the recounting of events 
in judicial trials.24   We assume from the discourses in the stories that the narrative 
is constructed out of the accounts of participants and witnesses hostile to Kanak 
political demands.  But what is striking about these narratives is the extent to which 
these different voices are masked in the story by the narrator.  Some of the 
implications of this masking can be seen from a consideration of the following 
example.    
 
The series of violent events described by Les Nouvelles as the ‘Koindé ambush’ 
provides a striking example of this use of narrativity.  The physical clash between 
gendarmes and Melanesians from Koindé had been precipitated by a long dispute 
between the owner of a nearby sawmill and the Koindé tribe over the pollution of 
their water supply by waste emanating from the mill.  After several failed attempts at 
resolution of the problem, Melanesians from Koindé set up barricades to prohibit the 
use of mill equipment, including trucks and bulldozers, bringing the operations of the 
mill to a standstill.    The violence occurred as gendarmes were assisting the mill 
owner, M. Barbou, to reclaim his equipment.  The events as recounted by Les 
Nouvelles continue in the following narrative:   
 
 The forestry and sawmill equipment was loaded, then the convoy started at 
12. 17 pm heading for the valley.  It was when it arrived at the tribe that the 
incident erupted. 
 At this place, the road is very windy and the valley is very deep making it 
impossible to see a long way ahead.  The first gendarme vehicles found 
themselves suddenly blocked by a tree trunk lying across the road.  They 
had to stop and pull over to let the bulldozer pass.  This quickly freed the 
way, but during this time the first attack took place in the form of the throwing 
of stones, burning sticks and other diverse projectiles.  The gendarmes then 
used tear gas and the calm seemed to return.  The first gendarme vehicles 
started going, followed by those of M. Barbou, and it was then that the shots 
rang out.  Several people hidden in the houses or in the bush fired almost at 
the same time.  Buck shots and bullet holes were noted on the vehicles.  M. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
article on the Hienghène massacre published shortly after it occurred which acknowledges that there 
are different versions of the events (Les Nouvelles, 7/12/84). 
24See, for example, Les Nouvelles’ reporting on the trial of two Kanaks accused of having murdered 
Jean-Marie Sagarné.  The paper chose to feature the prosecution’s narrative on events.  Very little 
attention is given to the trial itself (26/3/87). 
 96
 Carnicelli, who was in the first truck next to his brother, who was driving, was 
hit by a projectile coming from behind....(Les Nouvelles, 11/1/83). 
 
The detail and the precision of the chronology are striking in this account.  What is 
equally striking is that at no place in the story or its introduction is the reader given 
an idea of where the information came from.  It could have come from  M. Barbou, 
M. Carnicelli, one or more of the gendarmes, the journalist if she or he was there, or 
some other unnamed participant or witness.  The distance travelled by the convoy 
suggests that the information came from one or more of the participants, but we 
cannot be sure of this.  But, if the story came from more than one witness or 
participant, as is most likely, how does it come to have such comprehensiveness 
and coherence?   
 
Hayden White has written of the means through which texts come to acquire the 
type of cohesion presented in this account.  For White: 
 
 the capacity to envision a set of events as belonging to the same order of 
meaning requires a metaphysical principle by which to translate difference 
into similarity.  In other words, it requires a ‘subject’ common to all the 
referents of the various sentences that register events as having occurred 
(quoted in Mills, 1991:74). 
 
This subject is the narrator who is the principle of unification.  But, in the Koindé 
account, the narrator’s presence is masked.  A space is created for the narrator who 
chooses not to declare his or her presence.  It is thus the reader who is lured into 
this space as the principle of unification of the text.  We, as readers, occupy this 
space because of the appeal of narrativity which we can comprehend, according to 
White,  ‘by recognising the extent to which it makes the real desirable, makes the 
real into an object of desire, and does so by its imposition, upon events that are 
represented as real, of the formal coherency that stories possess’ (White, 1987:21). 
 
In his writing on historical narratives, White compares the narrative form with two 
alternative ways of rendering history, the annal and the chronology.  He argues that 
what prohibited the annalist and the chronologist from writing historical narratives 
was their ‘absence of any consciousness of a social centre’.  White continues:  ‘All 
this suggests to me that Hegel was right when he opined that a genuinely historical 
account had to display not only a certain form, namely the narrative, but also a 
certain content, namely, a politicosocial order’ (White, 1987:11).  This politicosocial 
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 order lends authority to the metaphysical subject created in narrative.  Therefore, 
when we are drawn into the narrative to occupy the position of subject, we become 
authorised, validated and legitimated by this politicosocial order and we, in turn, 
authorise it. Therefore, in filling the space created by the absence of the narrator, if 
even for only the short time it takes to read the text, we collude with the text’s 
politicosocial order.  This collusion is an implicit authorisation of the interpretive 
repertoires from which the text emerges.  The use of narrative in Les Nouvelles is 
therefore a powerful stylistic device in achieving the reader’s identification with the 
discourses presented in the text.   
 
News values and newsworthiness 
 
One commentator argued of Les Nouvelles during the 1970s that management’s 
objective was to  ‘run a high circulation paper that could grab the major advertising 
contracts and thereby choke the other newspapers out of existence and leave the 
political coverage to ORTF TV and radio’.  While political coverage was not left to 
TV and radio, Brissaud, Leyraud and Ventrillon were certainly concerned to ensure 
the commercial viability and later commercial success of the paper.  This concern is 
evident in Ventrillon’s facetious retort to criticism of the paper’s political orientation: 
  
 I make no pretence of producing an intelligent journal...If there are Nouvelles 
in all the garbage buckets of Noumea, I am happy.  The sole interest of a 
journal is to prevent vegetable peelings from sticking to the bottom of 
garbage tins (Canberra Kanaky Bulletin No. 6, December-March 1986). 
 
This commercial focus was apparent in both the style and content of the paper.  Les 
Nouvelles’ style was similar to that of the tabloid press in many countries.  During 
the 1970s, the paper’s emphasis on local news was mostly devoted to accidents, 
particularly car crashes, crime, judicial proceedings and ‘human interest stories’ 
about social events, the life of the famous, et cetera.  Sport also featured 
prominently in the paper, particularly, and not surprisingly, in the Monday editions 
where over a quarter of the paper could be devoted to weekend sport.  As Ventrillon 
commented,  ‘These stories make a paper work’ (interview, 26/4/94).  With the 
escalating political tensions, the paper devoted increasing amounts of space to 
political issues, but it reverted readily to its emphasis on accidents and crime once it 
deemed that the worst of the tensions were on the wane.  
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 Headlines and photos featured prominently in Les Nouvelles.  Indeed, most front 
pages of Les Nouvelles contained only headlines and photos, throwing to the story 
situated later in the paper. This stylistic feature immediately distinguished Les 
Nouvelles from its competitor, the France Australe.  Up until the 1960s, the front 
page of the France Australe was very dense, containing the commencement of 
several articles each headed by a small headline.  For example, the front page of 
the 7 October 1963 edition included the headline and beginning of 15 articles.  It 
was only in the years prior to the commencement of Les Nouvelles that the France 
Australe moved to a front page devoted almost solely to headlines and photos with 
only a small volume of text.  Although the number of headlines was reduced, a 
similar font size used for each headline rendered the page somewhat dense. What 
distinguished Les Nouvelles from the France Australe during the 1970s was the 
dominance of a main headline on its front page, a dominance achieved both by the 
use of font size and strategic positioning on the page.  Most main headings 
occupied between 25 and 50 percent of the available space on the front page 
excluding the mast and advertising space.25  Three to five additional headlines 
appeared on the first page, but these were visually subsidiary and did not, therefore, 
detract from the prominence of the main headline.   
 
Headlines were not only stylistically important in attracting readers’ attention; they 
were also used editorially to direct, in a particularly forceful manner, the reading of 
the article (or articles) to which they referred.  As a collective practice, the headlines 
reveal the extent to which the journalistic team was at least willing to sanction a very 
forceful opposition to independence and Kanak demands.  Ventrillon, however, had 
a particular knack in devising headlines which reflected his populism.  He cites two 
example which he argued have become renowned.  The first, ‘CRACK, BOOM, 
HUE’  referred to the chorus line of a popular French song, and was used on the 
front page to refer to photos of accidents (Figure 3.1).  The second, ‘THE TIME OF 
THE LOPETTES’ used the Caledonian term ‘lopettes’, meaning ‘cowards’, to refer 
                                                          
25 Regularly, a beginning section of ‘L'Affreux Jojo’ was printed on the front page, but sometimes only 
the banner appeared and at other times there was no reference.  The appearance of text on the front 
page did not seem to relate to the significance of the events discussed in the column suggesting that 
L'Affreux Jojo was used as a type of space filler after the mast, headlines, photos, text and 
advertisements had been placed.  Progressively, less and less text appeared on the front page.  
During the 1980s the instances of text on the front page (aside from that of ‘L’Affreux Jojo’) was 
extremely rare.  Its placement suggested that the paper had a particular message to convey to its 
readers and we might assume that most readers, aware of this rarity, would take the time to read what 
appeared.  
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 to what Les Nouvelles considered the French administration’s unwillingness to 
intervene to restore calm to the territory.  
 
Ventrillon’s knack often resulted from his ready resort to slang, argot or idiom in 
headlines.  Bourdieu has argued that the use of these forms is: 
  
 the product of the pursuit of distinction in a dominated market.  It is one of 
the ways in which those individuals - especially men - who are poorly 
endowed with economic and cultural capital are able to distinguish 
themselves from what they regard as weak and effeminate’ (Bourdieu, 
1991:22).   
 
Certainly, Ventrillon’s use of local idiom might be seen as a strategy of 
empowerment in a colonial situation which had rendered New Caledonia a 
dominated market. The mobilisation of the term ‘lopettes’ in the context of a critique 
of the French administration was a strategic attempt to distinguish the paper, and 
readers who identified with this idiom, as strong by contrast with the alleged 
cowardice of the administration. 
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Figure 3.1:  Les Nouvelles, 12/6/84 
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 Apart from populist characteristics, the headlines in Les Nouvelles display other 
distinctive stylistic features.  Frequently the headline comprised a small narrative in 
which a problematic was synoptically established and resolved.  This feature is 
apparent in the headlines surrounding the events leading up to the call for 
independence by the Melanesian politician Yann Céléné Uregei in 1975.  Following 
the refusal of French President Giscard D'Estaing to meet with Uregei’s delegation, 
the headline reads:  'Without waiting for the decisive day of Monday;  THE 
AUTONOMISTS SLAM THE DOOR; They leave the delegation and will return to 
Noumea on Saturday’ (Les Nouvelles, 6/6/75).  The narrative structure of this 
headline is striking.  It renders the series of events referred to in the headline 
cohesive and therefore strongly directs the reading of these events around the 
interpretive repertoire which the headline establishes.  By establishing a narrative 
causality between the events, the context is created where the autonomists can be 
criticised for rupturing this causality.  This rupture of sequence by the group 
connotes petulance, and this connotation is further reinforced by the trope, 
‘slamming the door’.  Following Uregei's call for independence, the headline reads:  
'After the President of the Assembly adopts an anti-French position; DISAGREE M. 
UREGEI!’ (25/6/75).  Once again, a problematic is established and a response 
delivered.  The lack of a subject who ‘disagrees’ provides a discursive space for the 
reader to assume this position and therefore the interpretive repertoire established 
in the headline.   
 
The narrative is enabled by the structuring of headlines around two, but mostly 
three, statements.   For example, the wounding of a girl travelling in a school bus to 
Thio in early 1985 elicited:  People from Saint-Philippo have wounded a 10 year-old 
girl;  AND THAT, IS IT NOT CRIMINAL?; In Thio, the violence has never really 
stopped’ (21/2/85).  Similarly, the front page headline on the day prior to the 1984 
territorial elections, boycotted by the FLNKS, read:  ‘Tomorrow, the territorial 
elections;  GO AND VOTE!; out of duty and to defend liberty (17/11/84).  The May 
1983 visit of French Secretary of State for the DOM-TOM, Georges Lemoine, which 
precipitated pro- and anti-independence demonstrations in Noumea, led to:  
‘LEMOINE FACED WITH THE REALITY; 30,000 PRO-FRENCH, 5,000 
INDEPENDANTISTES’ (19/5/83). 26  And, on the visit of three conservative French 
                                                          
26 The headline was accompanied by a large photo of the ‘pro-French’ rally which accentuated the 
amplitude of the crowd, and a smaller photo of the indépendantiste rally, showing a crowd of people 
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 politicians to New Caledonia prior to the 1986 national elections the headline 
declared:  'Leotard, Chinard et Medecin; SIX MONTHS TO HOLD OUT; appeal to 
the courage of Caledonians and for the arraignment of the government’ (23/8/85).27   
The narrative structure enables a closure in the reading of these headlines around 
the interpretive repertoires which they express.  For example, the headline on 
Lemoine’s visit draws on a discourse which establishes an equivalence between 
numbers and legitimacy, thereby rendering the pro-independence rally not only 
relatively inconsequential but also illegitimate.28 
 
On a few notable occasions, the headlines evinced considerable moderation, such 
as when the pro-independence leader Eloi Machoro was killed by military 
marksmen.  A photo of a dead Machoro being carried from a military helicopter on a 
stretcher was accompanied by the headline ‘THE DEATH OF MACHORO’ (14/1/85).   
The general euphoria among the anti-independence population in Noumea at the 
news of his killing, which could easily have spilled over into acts of aggression, may 
have cautioned Les Nouvelles against a more provocative headline. The paper did 
occasionally caution the loyalist population against engaging in aggressive 
behaviour.29 Alternatively, the paper’s moderation in this instance may have 
reflected an assumption that there was no need to direct the manner in which most 
readers would respond to the news of Machoro’s death.  The moderation in this 
instance contrasts significantly with the paper’s reporting on Machoro during 1984.  
As Secretary General of the UC during this period, Machoro wrote most 
communiques published in Les Nouvelles and was the main speaker at UC and FI 
press conferences.  Les Nouvelles concentrated much of its criticism of the pro-
independence movement on the personality of Machoro.  Following a press 
conference in which Machoro announced that the movement would boycott the 1984 
territorial elections, the paper’s headlines read, ‘MACHORO-THE-THREAT; But how 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sitting in the central park.  The caption commented that a better photo of the indépendantiste rally was 
not possible because trees were in the way. 
27 While the headline appears to have been a paraphrase of comments made by the politicians at a 
rally the evening before, its ambiguous presentation in the headline suggests that it was a position 
also advanced by Les Nouvelles. 
28 Tjibaou anticipated Les Nouvelles’ belittling of the FI rally on the basis of its inferior numbers.  He 
told the rally:  ‘They are perhaps 40,000, you, you are perhaps only 2,000, but you are the people.  
Geneologically, you descend from the trees, the stones, the pines, and the coconut palms.  The 
indigenous legitimacy is inside you, it is in the belly of the Kanak land, it won’t leave the Kanak land’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 19/5/83). 
29 For example, on 22/7/82 an editorial commented:  ‘Since everything is known in Noumea because 
everyone talks, without it being necessary to listen behind doors, the over-excitement is gaining 
ground and becomes a breeding ground for desires suddenly presented as threats.  A bit more 
moderation and cool-headedness would certainly help the Republic and Caledonia’. 
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 far will the UC go to stop the vote?’ (13/9/84).  The hyphens in this headline were 
presumably meant to imply that the threat was both the boycott and Machoro 
himself.  At one point, Machoro protested in a letter to the paper at the personal 
attention directed at him when the positions which he advocated in press 
conferences were arrived at collectively (22/9/84).  In the editorial accompanying 
the headline, Les Nouvelles elaborated on this ‘threat’: 
 
 Eloi Machoro now and then has the knack for saying tough things in an even 
tone.  We can question the significance or the implications of the thinly veiled 
threats pronounced by him at yesterday morning’s press conference.  
Stressing the idea of the active boycott of the elections, he did say in this 
regard that his party had examined all the polling booths, and he did affirm 
on several occasions that the elections wouldn’t take place.  But, on top of 
the physical threat comes the moral threat that any Melanesian who votes 
would be a traitor to the Kanak people.  A curious conception of democracy, 
one could say, but one which is inscribed in the logic of the Kanak 
indépendantistes according to whom reason and truth is theirs only 
(13/9/84).  
 
The editorial concentrated on ‘the threat’ to the elections rather than on Machoro-
as-the-threat.  As with many headlines in the paper, the accompanying editorial was 
less belligerent than its heading. 
 
Photography and politics 
 
Photography was also used strategically in Les Nouvelles to political ends.  Photos 
of Kanak politicians appeared rarely in the paper, whereas anti-independence 
politicians, both European and Melanesian, featured predominantly.  Mug shots of 
detained Melanesians appear more than occasionally, as do photos of Melanesians 
in police detention.  These photos of Kanak ‘criminals’ contrast starkly with 
photographs of anti-independence Melanesians.  These tend to depict Melanesians 
in various joyous, even euphoric, scenes, leading demonstrations, greeting the then 
Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, at the airport, embracing the Minister for the DOM-
TOM, Bernard Pons, and carrying him and his wife on their shoulders et cetera.30 
 
Photography’s illusion of verisimilitude provided a powerful means through which 
the gaze of readers of Les Nouvelles was consistently directed from a partisan 
position.  During the various clashes between Kanaks and the military, the 
                                                          
30 See for example, 18/9/87, 27/2/88 & the November 1987 magazine, ‘La Nouvelle-Calédonie 1987’. 
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 photographer’s position, usually behind the military or at least on the military’s side 
of the clash, meant that the photos showed the backs of some military and the front 
of Kanaks on the other side.31  This positioning of the camera also positions the 
reader both physically and discursively in a partisan position in the text.  A 
discursive space is created for the reader who is drawn into filling this space in the 
reading of the text.  But the reading derived from this positioning is sometimes less 
closed than these examples would suggest.  The famous photo of Machoro poised 
to chop the ballot box in a polling booth provides an example of this (19/11/84) 
(Figure 3.2).  The photo was taken by a woman who worked as a secretary at the 
local town hall in Canala and who was working at the polling booth that day.  She 
was an occasional correspondent for Les Nouvelles.  The photo is taken from the 
position of a polling booth attendant, who we might assume would have been quite 
fearful at being faced by an axe-wielding Machoro.  Indeed, the photo was used in 
media around the world to illustrate, amongst other things, the violence of the 
FLNKS election boycott.  But this immediate reading of fear is belied by the 
expressions on the faces of the other polling attendants appearing in the right of the 
photo.  They look genuinely relaxed, even nonchalant, and certainly unperturbed, 
rendering somewhat ambiguous the reading that can be inferred from this 
photographic text.   
 
Perhaps the best example of the manner in which camera position structures our 
involvement in the text is the photo of Dominique Canon being released from prison 
(24/7/82).  Canon was convicted for the 1981 assassination of the hostile Secretary 
General of the UC, Pierre Declercq.  Canon’s arrest precipitated a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 See, for example, the photos of the ‘Thio picnic’ (18/2/85).  A variation on this positioning of the 
camera appears on the front page of the 27/12/84 edition.  Here, the photographer is behind a line of 
‘loyalists’ who are pushing up against a cordon of military personnel.  The reader is incorporated into 
this text on the side of the loyalists, in keeping with the editorial position generally advanced in the 
paper. 
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3:  Les Nouvelles, 19/11/84 and 24/7/82 
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 response from the anti-independence community and a support committee was 
established to lobby for his release.  This committee received considerable publicity 
from Les Nouvelles, which published, at times daily, news on its progress.  The 
photo depicts a smiling Canon with his arm outstretched towards the camera (Figure 
3.3).  We infer from the photo that he is about to shake someone’s hand, and the 
proximity of his hand to the camera lens suggests that the hand he is about to 
shake is that of the journalist taking the photo.  But, because we are structured into 
the text in the position of the camera, Canon is, in effect, shaking our hand.  He is 
thanking us for our assistance in securing his release from prison.  Willingly or 
otherwise we are structured into this text in a highly involved position.  The positions 
structured for us in the photographic texts in Les Nouvelles are therefore powerful 
attempts to draw us into the unfolding events from a highly politicised perspective 
which, in the case of Les Nouvelles, was increasingly opposed to the prospect of 
independence. 
 
The fait divers and interpretive repertoires in Les Nouvelles 
 
Michael Spencer has argued that the fait divers, which he and others (Freiberg, 
1981:213) translate as the 'human interest story', is the characteristic genre in Les 
Nouvelles, and he views the interpretive repertoires which give rise to this form of 
reporting as inherently conservative.  Within this genre: 
 
 ‘Chance’, ‘fate’, ‘destiny’ (usually malicious) supplant social or historical 
cause-and-effect relationships, while any kind of coherent historical process 
is denied in favour of 'eternity' (eg the eternity of universal emotions such as 
love, hate, jealousy).  The universe presented in the fait divers is 
fragmented, bizarre, unmotivated...things just happen to individuals, and 
there is no room for the play of social or class forces (1988:177). 
 
One is immediately struck by the relevance of Spencer's description of the fait 
divers to the treatment of certain categories of stories in Les Nouvelles, particularly 
crime stories, car crashes, fires and domestic and sexual violence.  Reporting on 
judicial proceedings also tends to favour this interpretive orientation.  The trial of a 
Melanesian accused of having attacked his mother and chopping off her hand in a 
fit of rage precipitates the front page headline:  ‘Flight of madness:  ALL THAT FOR 
A SNAIL IN THE SOUP!; Two years prison for having cut off his mother’s hand’ 
(14/6/84).  Similarly, a violent incident between two Melanesian groups results in the 
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 front page headline:  ‘SEA SNAILS PROVOKE A TRIBAL BRAWL; Two huts burnt, 
a hand cut; five wounded by tamioc and sabre blows (27/2/86).  In both incidents 
the precipitating incident is depicted as trivial and unmotivated and the resulting 
violence excessive and irrational.  The fact that this type of reporting almost always 
involved aggressive acts between Melanesians both derived from and reinforced the 
racist interpretive repertoires of Melanesians as savages (Bensa, 1988).  Indeed, in 
Les Nouvelles, the genre of the fait divers becomes almost a shorthand code for 
underscoring ostensible Melanesian deviance and savagery.  Although most crime 
reporting did not refer to the racial origins of the perpetrators, it was assumed that 
most aggressive acts were perpetrated by Melanesians.  This assumption derives 
from the discourses on Melanesian deviance, but also from the practice of 
specifying that a crime was perpetrated by Europeans on the seemingly rare 
occasions that such crimes were reported on (for example, see 5/6/82).  The 
paper’s emphasis on the fait divers therefore becomes a powerful device in 
propagating racist discourse and undermining the legitimacy of Kanak demands for 
independence.32   
 
Ventrillon readily acknowledges the importance of the fait divers to the paper.  After 
all, he says: ‘Journalism is the fait divers.  Faits divers sell a paper’ (interview, 
26/4/94).33   The view that the fait divers is the natural order of the paper is 
underscored by the manner in which the paper returns to this genre following 
periods of acute political crisis.  Two headlines in particular stand out as illustrative 
of this phenomenon.  In early 1985, following weeks of political crisis in the territory 
and the overwhelming dominance of political stories in the paper, readers awoke to 
the headline:  ‘While diving near the lighthouse;  MAULED BY A SHARK; The ‘tiger’ 
suddenly sprang up from the bottom’ (28/1/85).  Again, following the near political 
paroxysm of the Ouvéa crisis in 1988, once again reflected in extensive and 
                                                          
32 Most of the fait divers in Les Nouvelles were written by Marcel Lepecheoux, who was primarily a 
photographer.   
33 The car crash receives a surfeit of attention.  Indeed, during the 1970s, most editions featured at 
least one car crash story, mostly accompanied by photos (eg. 'Right into the safety rail; The driver is 
only wounded' (5/3/73)). Frequently, the Monday edition would be devoid of any directly political 
stories, perhaps due to the lack of political events on the weekend except when there were political 
conferences, and the skeleton Sunday staff. (See for example, the edition of Monday, 18/12/72.  This 
sixteen page edition contains articles on car accidents, a pop show at the town hall, Father Christmas, 
various accidents and thefts, cinema, radio, television, comics and nine pages of sport.  Sport was a 
mainstay of the paper, the early editions of the paper containing at least two and frequently more 
pages of local and international sport.  See also the edition of Monday 2/9/74 which contained on its 
front page the following headlines:  'Rugby:  The ASLN beaten 19 to 9; 3 000 francs stolen at Ducos; 
Art and Culture - Melanesians at Nouville are introduced to mime; 2,500 hours of work for this $1.78m 
aircraft carrier; Cycling - taking off at 120 km from the finish, Jean-Jacques Bonnard'.) 
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 detailed coverage in the paper, the headline reads;  ‘The installation of an aerial 
mast was defective:  KILLED BY THE TELEVISION; Calixta (3 1/2 years) was 
electrocuted in the rain’ (29/6/88).  In both instances, the political climate in the 
territory remained fluid, rendering somewhat incongruous the appearance of these 
headlines at these times.  But we can speculate as to their likely effects.  Their 
appearance seemed to signify that the political situation was under control.  In the 
first instance, the Pisani plan was all but defeated and, in the second, the political 
response to the Ouvéa crisis appeared to be being channelled effectively towards 
an agreed non-aggression pact.  The headlines signified the return of doxa or, as 
Bourdieu argues, the ‘silence of doxa’ implicit in the strategic triumph of the 
orthodox, anti-independence position (Bourdieu, 1991:131). 
 
The emergence of the fait divers in journalism in France after the Second World 
War corresponded with the rapid modernisation of French society and the rise of a 
consumer culture (Ross, 1995). Consumerism’s elevation of commodities as objects 
of desire, and its eliding of the processes through which these objects come into 
being, had their corollary in the new treatment given to events in the media.  Within 
the genre of the fait divers, events were presented as essentially alien objects of 
pleasurable consumption.  Indeed, this notion of alienness - expressed in the 
tendency to present events as unpredictable and bizarre - is the key to the 
possibility of pleasurable consumption, in that events can be read without a notion 
of personal involvement, and therefore culpability, in their unfolding.  Kristen Ross 
also points to a correspondence between French modernisation and the most rapid 
period of French decolonisation in Asia and Africa, a correspondence which she 
argues was not incidental.  She describes how the techniques of social control 
perfected in the colonies were applied to the task of modernisation in France.  
Drawing on the work of Lefebvre, she argues that the declining French empire 
precipitated a shift from the colonisation of the Third World to the ‘colonisation of 
everyday life’ (Lefebvre cited in Ross, 1995:77), expressed in the rapidity with which 
a consumer culture, modelled on the American experience earlier in the century, 
was orchestrated in France (Ross, 1995:71-122). 
 
The success of Les Nouvelles in the early 1970s attested to the inroads of 
modernisation in New Caledonia, greatly precipitated by the ‘boom’ years of the 
1960s when a heavy international demand for nickel resulted in a massive upturn in 
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 economic activity in the territory, substantial migration and a considerable extension 
of wealth (Barbançon, 1992:33-40).  Les Nouvelles embraced this new culture with 
the paper’s emphasis on the everyday (and ‘everything’) and, above all, its faits 
divers.  In this sense, Ventrillon was right to concede the centrality of the fait divers 
to the success of the newspaper, for the fait divers exemplified these new cultural 
influences.  As a cultural expression, the fait divers was more a way of looking at all 
events than merely a description of certain types of events, a view which calls into 
question the adequacy of its translation as 'human interest story'.  As Ventrillon 
said:  'My style of journalism, it’s to say everything ... It’s not really a question of 
content, it’s a question of form.  There is a way of presenting things’ (interview, 
26/4/94).  Les Nouvelles sometimes took exception to the manner in which pro-
independence activists sought to present events as politically motivated rather than 
as ‘simple’ faits divers.  The paper argued, for example, that the shooting of a youth 
at Tontouta was only a ‘stupid fait divers’ used as a pretext for an independence 
march (23/6/82).  Similarly, another incident was described as a ‘stupid fait divers 
turned into a political event by the distillers of hatred’ (13/5/83). This reference to 
the notion of a ‘stupid’ fait divers is fascinating for its implicit devaluing of the 
general significance of the most prevalent form of journalism employed in the 
newspaper.  But the argument that the events were insignificant was itself highly 
political.  As Freiberg has argued, the presentation of events as faits divers 
obscures consideration of the reasons behind these events, presenting them 
instead as individualistic, ahistorical and episodic, and therefore beyond reason or 
understanding (1984:216-219).  It therefore delegitimates those readings of events, 
prevalent within the pro-independence movement, grounded in structural and 
historical explanations, as indeed it delegitimates the events themselves.   
 
Spencer agrees that the genre of the fait divers not only privileged particular story 
categories (such as crimes and car crashes) but also permeated reporting on 
significant political events.  He argues that the paper is forced by the world-view 
which it adopts to render such events as the assassination of the independence 
leader Eloi Machoro as faits divers.  It tells the reader 'what happened', but 'it never 
attempts to answer the question:  why did it happen?' (1988:189).34  This argument 
requires challenging as the paper does argue explicitly why events occurred.  The 
                                                          
34 Spencer adds, somewhat ironically, that the reason for this focus lies perhaps in the fact that 
everyone already knew why the events had happened.  But, as he notes, there were enough 
competing versions around to require some further investigation or elaboration (1988:189). 
 110
 insurrectional activity waged by the FLNKS during the period from 1984 to 1986 is 
repeatedly blamed on the laxity of the French Socialist government and its high 
commissioners in New Caledonia, Jacques Roynette and Edgard Pisani.  In its 
editorials, letters and articles, the paper gives repeated voice to this argument.  An 
editorial two days after what the paper describes as the ‘Hienghène shooting' 
lamented the killings but commented that:   
 
 In effect, it took a good ten days for the inhabitants of Caledonia, weary of 
these exactions, abandoned to themselves by the inoperative forces of order, 
to come to organise themselves to the point of Hienghène...But, does 
[Tjibaou’s subsequent call for calm] suffice to efface the responsibility of both 
the FLNKS and the state in the flaming of violence that has stopped so 
dramatically? (7/12/84).   
 
Around the same time, the paper published a letter which accused the French 
Socialist government ‘of complicity with the minority, criminal, indépendantiste 
fraction in aiding it, through non-intervention, to accomplish the daily innumerable 
heinous crimes of the last 15 days’ (3/12/84). 
 
Of course, this discourse of wilful abandon falls well short of a comprehensive 
explanation of the insurrectionary activity during late 1984 and 1985.  On the one 
hand, it does little to elucidate the reasons behind the laxity of the Socialist 
government; on the other, it says very little of the reasons behind the FLNKS 
activities reported in the paper.  But, although such explanations were not all 
articulated in any one article, reasons are nonetheless available to the reader in the 
interpretive repertoires sketched on a daily basis in Les Nouvelles:  the Socialist 
government's laxity derives from a collusion between it and the FLNKS, which itself 
stems from the Socialist government's doctrinaire belief that New Caledonia should 
be independent.  Elsewhere it is argued that the more communist elements in the 
Socialist government are seeking an independent New Caledonia as a means to set 
the territory adrift and have it enfeebled so that it can drift into the hands of the 
communists, with Gadaffi at their head (see for example, 27 & 29/9/84; 25/7/87).  
Alternatively, the weakness of the government is viewed as ineptness and 
confusion.  The FLNKS, on the other hand, is presented as a collection of terrorists 
and extremists, who have been indoctrinated by alien doctrines and led by outsiders 
to destabilise the political order. 
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 Dilemmatic discourse 
 
The sheer volume of space devoted to the development and articulation of these 
discourses in Les Nouvelles seemingly renders them all-encompassing and 
inescapable.  But the various interpretive resources drawn on to sustain these 
positions were not always mutually sustaining.  Discursive tensions arose as a 
result of the particularities of the colonial experience in New Caledonia.  The 
discourse of abandon, referred to above, drew on interpretive resources grounded 
in the early experiences of colonialism and in particular the acute disappointment 
experienced by early settlers in the unresponsiveness of the colonial administration 
to their political and economic demands.  The slow pace at which the colony 
developed prior to the Second World War and the growing polarisation in wealth and 
privilege between the ‘economic oligarchy’ and the remainder of the white 
population resulted in sentiments of hostility which had not abated in the post-war 
period (Barbançon, 1992:108-116).35   
 
Those who opposed independence had to contend with this interpretive repertoire.  
Opposition to independence, and its corollary in the articulation of a closer affiliation 
with the mother country, sat uneasily with the colonial experience of difference.  
This difference was signalled discursively in a range of constructs.  Local, and 
indeed metropolitan French, discourses referred to New Caledonia as a ‘country’ as 
frequently as they used the term ‘territory’.  Settlers referred to ‘France’ over there 
and ‘New Caledonia’ here, rather than use the term considered more politically 
‘correct’ within loyalist circles of ‘metropole’.36  The discursive habits of decades 
were hard to shift, primarily because they articulated palpable experiential 
differences.  Discursively, anti-independence politicians and Les Nouvelles might 
have been able to approximate a certain homogeneity in their racist discourses on 
Kanak militantism, but the inevitable moment the issue of the French 
administration’s involvement or culpability in the political situation was raised, the 
discourses became dilemmatic.  A populist hostility towards local politicians added a 
                                                          
35 Jacqueline Sénès has written of the conservatism and anti-authoritarianism of the Caldoches which 
often translates into an animosity towards French bureaucrats.  According to Sénès:  ‘The opinion of 
this little country will be absolutely intractable towards a bureaucrat who is a bit odd or a plan of action 
too authoritarian.  In the 1900 of Governor Feuillet, in the 1940 of the authoritarian Admiral 
d’Argenlieu, in the 1985 of the solitary Edgard Pisani, the Caledonia of the so-called “Caldoches will 
absolutely refuse all orders”’ (Sénès, 1985:165). 
36 I was severely chided by a National Front politician for using the term ‘France’ in my discussions 
and was told that I should be using the term ‘metropole’. 
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 further layer of complication to this discursive labyrinth.   Under the heading, ‘Land 
reform; in spite of the popular condemnation; THE ASSEMBLY SUPPORTED THE 
BILL’, a journalist writing in Les Nouvelles described the scene in the Territorial 
Assembly during the 1980 debate on the land reform Bill.  The journalist commented 
that the indépendantistes were frequently booed during the debate but, at the same 
time, when indépendantiste politicians attacked land reform or the French 
government, they were applauded.  But, the journalist concluded, ‘an even sadder 
sight, [was that the crowd] also insulted the elected representatives’ (3/9/80).  It is 
difficult to read this scene in a manner which reconciles its various components.  
The audience was strategically intervening in the discursive context in a manner 
which engaged with the discourses being articulated at any one time.  Each of their 
interventions, such as the booing of the indépendantistes or the French 
government, or the journalist’s dismay that people in positions of authority were 
being denigrated, was comprehensible historically, but the totality was ultimately 
dilemmatic.   
 
Wetherell and Potter, in their analysis of racist discourse in New Zealand, point to 
the dilemmatic discourses in Pakeha New Zealander talk on race relations.  In 
general, they show that these discursive dilemmas remain unreconciled, or 
inadequately reconciled (1992:198).  The tensions between discourses also remain 
unresolved in Les Nouvelles. The paper argued against independence, against the 
French government, and against local politicians and the local administration, but 
seldom were these discourses articulated concurrently.  Some rhetorical resolution 
of these dilemmas was made possible after the election of Socialist President 
Mitterrand in 1981.  It could then be argued that the political crisis was the result of 
socialism, seen as a perversion of French political life, as an editorial in early 1984 
indicated: 
 
 it is no longer possible to be confident after [the Socialist government’s] 
behaviour.  The credibility of the so-called institutional guarantors has 
dissolved into betrayal and abandon.  The ones who pay the price aren’t the 
political adversaries.  They are the brave people, that anonymously but 
laboriously woven tissue that is the people.  Thank you, Mr Socialists! 
(27/1/84). 
 
Discourses articulating a more general populist contempt for politics also remained 
after Mitterrand’s election.  In a 1983 editorial, Les Nouvelles condemned both 
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 conservative and Socialist politicians and administrators who had been involved 
since the late 1970s in New Caledonian politics:  
 
 From Christian Nucci to Jacques Roynette, as from Dijoud to  Lemoine, even 
forgetting Emmanuelli, the promises, assurances, guarantees, consolations 
have been nothing but deception.  These men have been or are 
representatives of the Republic, of the State, of France.  Their public 
responsibility hasn’t succeeded in dissolving in them the foulness that all 
political action feeds on (23/9/83). 
 
A small number of otherwise conservative members of the New Caledonian political 
elite sought to resolve this contradiction between the discourses on independence 
and French politics by openly advocating independence.  In early 1982, a veteran 
local politician of European descent, Georges Chatenay, announced the formation 
of a new Parti National Calédonien (PNC).  Chatenay’s party advocated a 
‘Caledonian independence’ which he distinguished from the Kanak independence 
demanded by the pro-independence movement.  In a letter to Les Nouvelles, 
Chatenay argued that France had ‘sufficiently proved, across all the successive 
governments of the Republic, that the best ministerial envoys are, mostly, like hell 
paved with good intentions’ and added: 
 
 Independence can only be for everyone, no matter what their label, 
otherwise it would risk appearing racist, vengeful, a source of hatred and 
confrontation, a ferment of division or brutality and injustices, and this, even 
in the clans...Independence, because it is between us and by us 
Caledonians, that the structures, the mentality and the proper means should 
be put in place to make the misunderstandings disappear.  And, because, it 
is precisely here, and not in Paris, that the common and complementary 
values are found.  We have become big enough, Canaques and Caldoches, 
to not be dragged along by anyone else’s analysis of the situation, not in 
relation to the manner in which we should broach the problems that concern 
the country, nor to the modes of progress from now on (Les Nouvelles, 
9/1/82). 
 
In its introduction to Chatenay’s letter, the paper commented that: 
 
 Today, as we are governed by men who seem to be more socialist than 
French, more and more Caledonians are coming to think that it might be 
better to distance oneself from a government that hasn’t obtained a majority 
of the votes in this country (Les Nouvelles, 9/1/82). 
 
To be socialist was therefore, according to Les Nouvelles, to be in some ways ‘un-
French’, the presence of a socialist president and government robbing the country 
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 of its core authenticity.  This comment suggests that France was, for Les Nouvelles, 
a metaphor for a conservative politico-economic program as much as it was an 
object of cultural attachment.  The paper’s support for such a program became 
intertwined with the issue of independence but was never totally subsumed within it, 
as the paper’s equivocal response to Chatenay’s advocacy of a ‘Caledonian 
independence’ indicated. 
 
Evidence that Ventrillon’s ‘Caledonian-ness’ rendered the PNC’s platform alluring to 
him came in a subsequent editorial attributed to him in which he commented on the 
party’s creation and its advocacy of independence. Ventrillon argued that 
Chatenay’s position represented the views of those who ‘have fewer and fewer 
illusions about the Socialist government’s intentions towards us, and who, being 
Caledonian above all else, don’t want to be chucked out of this country that is theirs, 
for the exclusive benefit of an ethnic group with whom they thought they could get 
on’.  It was, he added, comprehensible, and he concluded in an uncharacteristically 
equivocal manner:  ‘Is it utopian, is it realisable?  The future will tell, but in any case 
it will be the consequence of the Socialist government’s policies in this country’ 
(11/1/82).37     
 
The discursive openings created by this dilemmatic co-existence always constituted 
a potential threat to the anti-independence position, even if the escalating political 
tensions in the territory had ensured that Chatenay’s initiative was short-lived.38  
Faced with these discursive openings, the new management, which took over 
                                                          
37 A letter from a broussarde appearing on the same page is published with the explanation that:  ‘If 
we accept to publish the following letter, it is because it summarises perfectly the opinions which have 
been transmitted to us over the weekend either in the form of a few scribbled words or with a 
complicated style compared to this letter which explains more clearly the same opinion.  All this 
indicates that part of the national electorate traditionally pro-France is in the process of swinging and 
ready to attempt an independence adventure rather than to suffer the blunders of the Socialist 
government’. The ‘broussarde’ congratulated the ‘handful of courageous men who did what many men 
and women were hoping and waiting for a long time:  bravo men for having dared to defy all those 
crooks, this rotten administration, this colonial power, and for having created this party for the 
independence of Caledonia.  Hold out a hand to this Canaque who is so close to us, this man with 
whom we have always lived, rubbed shoulders with, that’s where our future is, our happiness with him’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 11/1/82). 
38 Chartier’s coverage of the July 1983 round-table discussions between New Caledonian pro- and 
anti-independence politicians and Secretary of State, Georges Lemoine, at Nainville-les-Roches in 
France provides another instance in which articles highlighted the cultural similarities between 
ostensibly antagonistic political groups in New Caledonia.  But, in general, the discourses on 
independence and French politics co-existed dilemmatically, each relegated to independent 
mobilisation when the circumstances arose.  
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 following the paper’s sale to the Hersant group in January 1987, engaged in new 
strategies to plug these discursive spaces.39 
 
Hersant’s Les Nouvelles 
 
Following the success of the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR) in the 
French legislative elections in 1986 and the election of Jacques Chirac as Prime 
Minister, Jacques Lafleur, who still harboured the desire to have greater control 
over the local informational sphere, approached Chirac to request that the French 
media ‘mogul’ Robert Hersant investigate the possibility of establishing a competitor 
to Les Nouvelles.  When Hersant’s offsider, Henri Morny, visited the territory he was 
instead able to persuade Leyraud to sell the newspaper.40  
 
Under Morny, editorial policies and management structures of Les Nouvelles 
changed dramatically, particularly in the role Morny and his new staff from France, 
and in particular editor-in-chief Henri Perron, played in its editorial direction.  A 
system of strict management control was established.  News-gathering was 
circumscribed by an array of directives which prescribed what journalists could write 
about.  Some journalists claimed that the title page of each edition was faxed to 
Morny in Paris each evening before publication for his scrutiny and approval.  Yet 
Morny stated that his interventions were less frequent: 
 
 I do not intervene editorially on a daily basis, firstly because I am far away 
and also because the editorial section works well and I don’t want to bother 
them.  It does happen that once or twice a month I pick up the phone to say 
that I think that more or less could have been done on a particular subject or 
that it could have been treated differently.  But it is more at the level of 
‘appreciation’ and advice (interview 2/11/89). 
 
                                                          
39 Another way that some tried to resolve the dilemma between abhorrence towards France’s policies 
on New Caledonia and resolute opposition to independence was to advocate becoming a state of the 
United States.  During the mid-1980s a very strong Friends of America movement existed in the 
territory.  The Friends of the United States Association was formed on 19 May 1984.  One of the 
founding members commented that becoming American was ‘irreversible’ because it is the profound 
manifestation of a complete people without distinction on the basis of origin, desperately searching for 
its unity and for secure values that aren’t stolen from under it’ (Les Nouvelles, 9/4/85; see also 
Barbançon, 1992:28).    
40 Ventrillon alleges that Leyraud had mismanaged the paper which was, as a consequence, in 
financial difficulty.  Moreover, he alleges that the paper was considerably in arrears in its tax payments 
and that the deal to sell Les Nouvelles was mediated by the then High Commissioner, Montpezat, in 
exchange for legal clemency (Ventrillon interview, 26/4/94).     
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 Ventrillon gives examples of the types of restrictions which journalists claimed 
prevailed at Les Nouvelles:  on the first two days of his employment under the new 
owner he said he was given two directives not to publish stories, one relating to 
Hersant’s manoeuvring to establish a commercial television channel in France, the 
other concerning a dispute at the local Bernheim Library which later resulted in a 
month-long strike by employees.  On the third day Ventrillon says that he left, and 
others, such as Henri Le Pot, followed suit (Ventrillon interview, 12/12/90; Le Pot 
interview, 26/4/94).  Those who remained expressed considerable hostility 
regarding the constraints on their work. 
 
Editorially, Les Nouvelles aligned itself very closely with the political program of the 
French RPR in the territory, rendering it virtually a public relations organ for the 
Chirac government.  Barbançon commented that from this time onwards Les 
Nouvelles ‘ceased being “Caledonian” and became an instrument of propaganda.  It 
didn’t hide it’ (1992:60).  The relatively frequent visits of the new Minister for 
Overseas Departments and Territories, Bernard Pons, received extensive and 
unequivocally affirmative coverage.  Pons’ first visit after the change in ownership 
set the tone.  The photo accompanying the front page headline, ‘Bernard Pons’ 
week-end’, showed Pons and his wife being carried by a group of Melanesians, and 
was accompanied by the caption:  ‘In Lifou, the Minister of the DOM-TOM was 
carried in triumph before returning to Noumea.  Cries of joy, songs, hugs:  never 
before has a minister received such a warm and friendly good-bye’ (Les Nouvelles, 
9/2/87).41  Pons’ obvious policy of avoiding visits to pro-independence communities 
ensured that the paper had ample opportunity to depict Pons and his wife in a range 
of quasi-intimate poses with Melanesian supporters.42  The paper’s first edition in 
colour appeared for Pons’ subsequent visit to New Caledonia in May 1987, the front 
page colour photo depicting Pons and a group of dignitaries walking across the 
tarmac immediately after his arrival (12/5/87). The symbiosis between the Chirac 
government and Les Nouvelles was symbolically affirmed by Pons becoming the 
paper’s editor-in-chief for a day (7/8/87).43 
                                                          
41 Bwenando claimed that Pons had been carried in triumph ‘by drunkards brought to Ouvéa by [Air 
Caledonia’s] ATR 42!’ (5/1/87), suggesting that the scene had been staged by the administration. 
42 Reporting on Pons’ August visit to Maré included a photo of him sitting on the grass surrounded by 
Melanesian women, two of whom had arms around his shoulders and one of whom was leaning up 
against his legs (6/8/87). 
43 Les Nouvelles described the scene of Pons’ assumption of editorial duties thus:  ‘Very relaxed, [the 
Minister] directed the international press review and distributed the territorial news to “his” journalists 
for a day’ (7/8/87). 
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The paper also sought to develop a new interpretive repertoire for French politics 
and the local French administration.  Editor-in-chief Henri Perron argued in an 
editorial that the time of the missionaries hasn’t passed.  Now it is the: 
 
 secular missionaries who come to bring the good republican word:  senators, 
deputies, the reporter of this or that project, senior public servants who are 
the mouth piece of the state.  They transmit, they translate the intentions of 
the government.  They find the words that appease, words that bring peace, 
hope, liberty (28/3/87). 
 
The rhetorical work in plugging the discursive space left by the tension in local 
discourses was further attempted by a far-right journalist and writer for Hersant’s Le 
Figaro, Thierry Desjardins, in his weekly comment in Les Nouvelles.  For 
Desjardins, the longstanding tensions between France and New Caledonia were 
over.  With the demise of the socialists, ‘happily, the sad page is turned, France has 
become France again, and everyone has rediscovered it’ (5/9/87).44 
 
The paper vested considerable effort in publicising the Chirac government’s 13 
September referendum on independence, boycotted by the FLNKS.45  The 
government’s decision that only those adults resident in the territory for at least 
three years could vote, considered by it a concession to the demands of the pro-
independence movement, resulted in the publication of a series of pro-forma letters 
in the paper which readers could cut out and send to the electoral commission to 
contest their exclusion from the roll (1, 7, 13 & 22/7/87).  Over two weeks prior to 
the vote, the paper began publishing a full-page advertisement, the text of which 
read: 
 
 The 13 September.   
To vote is to take your destiny between your thumb and your index finger.  
 Complementary space offered by Les Nouvelles for great national causes.46   
 
                                                          
44 This new articulation of an authentic France was accompanied by an increase in coverage of news 
of French politics and society in Les Nouvelles. 
45 Early in the piece, Desjardins opined about the difficulty of devising a referendum question 
containing the word ‘independence’ because, he argued, many Caledonians would still equate the 
word with the experience of liberation following the first and second world wars.  Desjardins argues 
that to be precise, the question should go something like this:  ‘Do you want to become independent, 
that is to say, lose forever all liberty and plunge yourself into misery?’ (28/3/87). 
46 The ad was reduced to less than half a page a few days prior to the referendum. 
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 Despite the FLNKS directive that the referendum be boycotted, approximately 59 
per cent of the adult population voted and, of these, 98.3 per cent voted, as Les 
Nouvelles put it, ‘for France’ (Les Nouvelles, 15/9/87).47  The paper argued that this 
result granted the RPCR: 
 
 the right finally to no longer have their determination to construct Caledonia 
contested.  We have lost too much time, we have mobilised too much energy 
in warding off the mischief of the FLNKS and in dismantling the ideological 
mechanisms leading to hatred and violence (14/9/87).48 
 
The paper’s sycophantic behaviour towards the Chirac government was 
accompanied by an unabashed hostility towards the FLNKS.  Its front page 
headlines illustrate the relentlessness with which the paper was used to articulate 
an interpretive repertoire implicitly hostile towards pro-independence activists.  
Some days, almost all news was bad for the FLNKS.  On 29 April 1987, the five 
headlines on the front page read (in what to me appeared like descending order of 
visual importance):  ‘He kills a gendarme; Faced with Canberra, Aborigines stir up 
the threat of independence; The Balny to the help of boat people; Tribal war in 
Papua; France suffers from a fall in the dollar’. There is also an increase in the 
insertion of editorial comment in articles signalled by the acronym ‘NDLR’ (note de 
la rédaction - editorial note). These comments appear most frequently in articles 
about the FLNKS.  For example, the paper’s Paris correspondent, Marie-Laure 
Bernard, commented on aspects of Tjibaou’s discussion with Mitterrand at the 
Elysée that:  ‘Tjibaou lied - his favourite weapon - and in this regard, nothing 
bothers him’ (12/12/87).  Similarly, following the acquittal of the settlers accused in 
the Hienghène trial, a letter from the four prosecution lawyers to the senior legal 
representative in Noumea, complaining about the state of justice in New Caledonia, 
elicited the following response: 
  
 N.D.L.R.  We know the slanted and blind positions of these four lawyers, who 
have never hesitated to present the guilty as victims.  And it is they, who 
know nothing (or rather don’t want to know) about the real situation in New 
Caledonia, who intend to give a lesson to the Noumea judges (8/2/88).    
 
                                                          
47 The headlines on the day following the referendum read:  ‘Participation:  58.99 Per cent; YES TO 
THE FUTURE; taking refuge in abstention, the indépendantistes are clearly in retreat’ (14/9/87). 
48 Four days after the referendum Chirac and Pons flew to New Caledonia in the Concorde for a 
‘lightning visit’.  In his speech of thanks, Jacques Lafleur also referred to France becoming France 
again.  The front page of Les Nouvelles featured a striking picture of the Concorde in flight in blue sky 
(17/9/87). 
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 Comment was also included without the signpost of an NDLR.  For example, in an 
article following the Ouvéa crisis, reporting on FLNKS accusations that the military 
had assassinated at least three of the Kanak hostage takers after they were 
captured, the unnamed journalist commented:  ‘So many gratuitous claims for, after 
all, it is the word of the accomplices of terrorists against that of the GIGN super-
gendarmes’ (13/5/88). 
 
The paper’s shift towards a more homogeneous colonial discourse directed towards 
an embracing of the mother country was enabled by the recruitment of new 
journalists from Hersant’s publications in France.  This new discursive strategy also 
required that the paper cease publishing letters to the editor, for it was probably 
realised that few Caledonians could be as enamoured with French political life as 
the paper’s discourses would suggest.  This strategy of discursive closure 
represented, in some respects, a return to the ‘unspoken’ of a previous era in New 
Caledonia’s media history.49 
                                                          
49 While the hostility of the paper towards pro-independence groups and activists must have been 
gratifying to many of the paper’s readers, and while many were highly supportive of the Chirac 
government’s repressive policies towards the Melanesian population, the lack of articulation of local 
discourses engendered a certain alienation among readers, reflected in an initially small, but 
increasing, demise in circulation (Ventrillon interview, 12/12/90). 
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 CHAPTER FOUR - IDENTITY IN LES NOUVELLES 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the discourses surrounding 
independence in Les Nouvelles were heterogeneous in many instances and that this 
heterogeneity reflected the historical particularities of colonialism in New Caledonia.  
The differences were particularly apparent in discourses concerning the practicality 
of New Caledonian political and administrative relations with France.  These 
articulated a sense that the French government did not understand and did not care 
about the particularities of New Caledonian society and that it was being used as a 
type of social laboratory for French policy.  This perceived lack of care translated 
into a deep sense of abandonment.  These differences provided openings in the 
discursive struggle which were seized upon in differing degrees by political groups.  
The change in ownership in early 1987 signalled a new, more forcefully anti-
independence position in the paper and an attempt, by an editorial team 
increasingly hired in metropolitan France, to stop up these discursive openings. 
 
The paper’s increasing contempt for pro-independence activists was aimed at 
achieving their exclusion from the realm of legitimate political debate.  Indeed, a 
large part of the rhetorical work done in Les Nouvelles was directed towards 
discursively constructing this group in a particularly racist, and therefore pernicious, 
way.  But this effort was not only vested in the construction of the ‘Kanak’ identity.  
Other identities became the focus of discursive struggle in the pages of Les 
Nouvelles.  To be ‘Caledonian’, ‘Melanesian’ or ‘Kanak’ signified in the discourses 
surrounding independence an interestedness in the struggle, but in a place which 
was forever shifting according to the relations of force at the time.  Indeed, the 
fluidity of the subject positions constructed in Les Nouvelles highlights the contested 
nature of identity in New Caledonian society and the centrality of the process of 
subjection to the political struggle.   
 
This fluidity was not simply a problem of disagreement on how best to categorise 
and describe the various agents in the independence struggle.  The process of 
subjection was not simply a process of describing an empirically verifiable reality.  
Rather, as Foucault argues, it is one of the central means through which power is 
exercised and therefore came to be a central focus of the discursive struggle 
(Foucault, 1982).  The discursive struggle over subjectivities was a struggle over 
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 who could act as legitimate participants in determining the territory’s future.  It was, 
in effect, a struggle over who constituted the ‘real Caledonian’, the ‘real Melanesian’ 
and ultimately the ‘people’ whose right it was to participate in the political struggle.  
Increasingly, the debate sought to delimit the ‘real’, the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘true’ 
subject.   
 
These subject positions correlated with a series of geographical entities whose 
existence, place and character were equally contested.  While there might be 
considerable consensus over what constitutes the geographic territory of New 
Caledonia, the place designated as ‘Caledonia’ in discourses in Les Nouvelles 
enjoyed no such consensual meaning. To use Said’s evocative terminology, what 
was being constructed was an ‘imaginative geography’ which, in the face of 
contestation from alternative geographical imaginings, also became channelled 
towards the articulation of a ‘real’, a ‘profound’ and a ‘true’ Caledonia (Said, 1978).  
At stake was the demarcation of a space which could rightfully be claimed by the 
‘true’ subject and from which others should and could be excluded.   
 
Contemporary critical theory research has provided a means for understanding 
subject positions as discursive constructs which are organised into categories such 
as ‘nation’, ‘people’ and ‘ethnicity’.  Foucault, for example, sought to uncover the 
discursive conditions and related institutional practices which made possible the 
development of different understandings of the self.  While his work points to the 
multiple and changeable subject positions constituted through discourse, it is most 
oriented towards epochal shifts in subjectivity.  Foucault is less concerned with the 
instability inherent in discursive formations particularly in periods of acute political 
struggle (Wetherell and Potter, 1992:90).  In these contexts, as Said argues: 
 
 What we are dealing with here are in the very widest sense communities of 
interpretation, many of them at odds with one another, prepared in many 
instances literally to go to war with one another, all of them creating and 
revealing themselves and their interpretations as very central features of 
their existence. (Said, 1981: 41-2). 
 
But even within these communities of interpretation there are at times 
simultaneously contested understandings and articulations of a range of subject 
positions.  In New Caledonia, the attempt to advance a broadly consensual political 
position by those who supported or those who opposed independence resulted in 
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 articulations of subjectivity which were, at times, dilemmatic.  Thus, in the early 
1980s, to be ‘Caledonian’ signified being ‘Melanesian’ to some and ‘non-
Melanesian’ to others in the anti-independence movement.  In many instances, the 
competing articulation of categories and subjectivities by those ostensibly on the 
same side of the political fence appears purposive and might presumably reflect 
their differing appreciations of what was required to optimise their strategic 
positioning in the political field at any point in time. 
 
The ensuing analysis of the discursive construction of subjectivities in Les 
Nouvelles centres on the development of the key categories of ‘the people’, 
‘Caledonian’ and ‘Melanesian’.  However, implicit to this discursive work is the 
construction of not only subject positions but also models of inter-group relations 
and theories of social process and social influence (Wetherell and Potter 1992:149).  
As Wetherell and Potter argue, ‘the discursive act creates groups, interests, 
emotions, similarities and differences, a social landscape, an anthropology, a 
psychology of identity and even a geography’ (ibid:146).  Each subjectivity exists in 
relation to these other constructs, whether articulated or not.  For example, self-
identification occurs not only through discourses about the self but also through 
discourses about the ‘Other’.  Constructs such as ‘the people’ and ‘Caledonian’, as 
well as the imaginative geography of ‘Caledonia’, are therefore forged through the 
construction of this Other.  They become what this Other is not.  Indeed, as Balibar 
argues, it is this very process of differentiation between ‘us’ and the ‘Other’ which 
gives the ‘us’ its cohesion.  Balibar, discussing the construction of the notion of ‘the 
people’ and drawing on the work of the German philosopher Fichte,  puts it in terms 
of the manifest differences of the ‘foreigner’ divided from ‘us’ by ‘external frontiers’.  
In the construction of ‘the people’, ‘external frontiers have to be imagined constantly 
as a projection and protection of an internal collective personality’ (Balibar, 
1991:95).  External frontiers are therefore also ‘internal frontiers’.1  Thus, in 
analysing the discursive means through which subjects are constructed it is 
necessary to move between the construction of different subjectivities in order to 
understand the collective field and the model of inter-group relations being 
developed.  As a starting point, however, I consider the construction of perhaps the 
most contested subjectivity, ‘the people’. 
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 Constructing ‘the people’ 
 
The notion of ‘the people’ came to the fore in New Caledonian politics in 1956 with 
the formal establishment of a political party, the Union Calédonien (UC), which had 
existed since the early 1950s as a political movement and had successfully fielded 
candidates in national and local elections.  The UC adopted the banner ‘Two 
colours, a single people’, a slogan which Barbançon comments corresponded with 
the sociological reality of the country (1992:33).  The movement was certainly 
electorally successful, which suggests that its discourses must have resonated with 
the dispositions of a sizeable number of voters.2  But it is more difficult to assess 
which sociological reality the banner ‘Two colours, a single people’ referred to.  
Firstly, the ‘two colours’, presumably white and black, left a further category which 
the UC acknowledged - that of ‘yellow’ - excluded.3  But the concept of polarisation 
inherent in the expression of ‘two colours’ resonated with the experiences of most 
‘white’ and ‘black’ Caledonians in the pre-war period.  The isolation of Melanesians 
on reserves, the establishment of a separate legal structure to regulate the 
Melanesian population and their almost total lack of any political rights within the 
colonial political system until 1946 (Henningham, 1992:51) had meant that there 
was a distinct politico-legal and experiential basis underlying the concept of ‘two 
colours’, no matter how many colours or shades some may argue existed in 
between.  In the face of this system of demarcation, the notion of ‘one people’ 
appears somewhat troublesome.  What were the conditions of existence which 
allowed it to resonate with such apparent force? 
 
Henningham estimates that, at the time of the formation of the UC, two-thirds of the 
white settler population living on the main island  were living at subsistence level 
(ibid:52).  Their material existence was therefore akin to that of the Melanesian 
populations living on the reserves and there was considerable interaction between 
the populations which had produced, among other things, significant intermarriage.  
The UC sought to unite the interests of these poor white settlers with those of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Ann Stoler applies Balibar’s discussion of Fichte’s notion of ‘interior frontiers’ in her discussion of 
métissage (1995:130).  See also the discussion on métissage in chapter nine of this thesis. 
2 The UC candidate, Maurice Lenormand was elected as New Caledonian deputy in the July 1951 
elections, largely because the conservative vote was split between two candidates.  As Dornoy writes:  
‘63 per cent of the electorate had cast anti-Lenormand votes but the simple majority voting system 
ensured his victory’ (1984:161).  In the 1953 territorial elections the UC gained 15 seats out of 25 
(ibid:164). 
3 White referred to Europeans, black to Melanesians, and yellow to Asian immigrants. 
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 Melanesian population.  Two religious organisations established by the Catholic and 
Protestant missions, with the encouragement of the High Commissioner, had been 
behind the formation of the UC with the aim of encouraging the advancement of the 
Melanesian population and remedying the disadvantages of the poor.  Dornoy and 
others have argued that the French administration initially encouraged the 
movement as a counter against more extremist (i.e. communist) ideas taking hold 
among the disaffected (Henningham, 1992:49; Dornoy, 1984:156;165;  Barbançon, 
1992:33). 
 
‘The people’ was therefore a populist concept of appeal to the disadvantaged, but it 
was very much an entity in the creation.  The UC’s declared aim in the first edition 
of its news sheet, L’Avenir Calédonien, was ‘to build a new Caledonia, freed of the 
economic feudal system by which it is stifled and enslaved; we want to give to all 
Caledonians, white, black or yellow, the possibility of a better life in their small 
country’ (L’Avenir, 11/9/54, cited in Henningham, 1992:50-1).  UC leader, Maurice 
Lenormand, writing in this first edition, described the publication as ‘the paper of the 
Caledonian people ... Made for the defence of the Caledonian people’ and 
concluded that:  ‘The people has to help itself and can only draw strength and 
victory from itself’ (L’Avenir, 11/9/54).  Despite the similarity between this last 
statement and that of independence leaders during the thick of the political struggle 
during the 1980s,4 the referents of this and later statements diverged considerably.  
In 1954, the Other against which ‘the people’ was being defined was the Noumea 
based bourgeoisie, what Lenormand called the ‘economic oligarchy’, and the SLN 
(Henningham, 1992:51).  Towards France, the UC was still unequivocally 
affirmative: 
 
 In fact, our action within the French community is closely linked to the 
destiny of France, to its strength and its weaknesses, to its influence and its 
independence.  That’s why France, with its free and democratic institutions 
and its establishment of fraternity and social justice between all the French, 
is our biggest support (Precis and work of the 1st Congress of the UC 
Movement, Noumea, 12-13/5/56:28). 
 
In its program the UC called for the defence of Melanesian traditions and certain 
aspects of traditional justice, but these defences were seen as a means to ‘insulate 
traditional culture and society from demoralising outside influences, so that 
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 adaptation could proceed constructively and at a steady pace’ (Henningham, 
1992:53-4).  The aim was ‘the fuller integration of Melanesians into New Caledonian 
society, not the assertion of a separate identity’ (ibid).  ‘The people’ was therefore 
being constructed as a populist unity against privilege within the assimilationist 
model of integration into colonial institutions.  The religious backing of the UC and 
the influence of religious discourse suggests a further reason for the resonance of 
the banner, ‘two colours, a single people’.  The banner suggests an acceptance, 
and perhaps even a renunciation, of difference in the interests of acknowledging a 
higher truth - ‘a single people’.  The notion of being equal before God could be 
applied to that of being equal before the ultimate earthly arbiter, the democratic, 
republican system. 
 
This essentially reformist discourse of ‘the people’ contrasted with the emergence 
during the 1960s of a new internationalist discourse which linked the category of 
‘the people’ with discourses of liberation, decolonisation and independence.  The 
popularity in France and elsewhere of such writers as Frantz Fanon and Aimé 
Cesaire meant that the first Melanesian tertiary students were readily exposed to 
these discourses.  The opening sentence of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, 
first published in France in 1961, reads:  ‘National liberation, national renaissance, 
the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth:  whatever may be the 
headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent 
phenomenon’ (1967:27). The headings used to articulate the Kanak struggle from 
the early 1970s onwards were very much those of ‘nationhood’ and ‘the people’.   
 
‘The people’ in this discourse is not a category of the future, something to be forged 
in the process of renouncing past divisions.  It is rather a category of the past, 
grounded in an articulation of ‘the people’ as the ‘original people’, a pre-colonial 
construct imbued with apolitical authenticity.  When used by Kanak activists in New 
Caledonia, the category of ‘the people’ was most often qualified, initially by the 
adjective ‘indigenous’ and later by that of ‘Kanak’, leaving open a discursive space 
for the existence of other ‘people’, a space which the independence movement 
sought to plug as the discursive struggle over key subjectivities heightened during 
the 1980s.  But even though this notion of ‘the people’ claimed historical legitimacy, 
it too was a category in the process of construction, as those hostile to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4 For example:  ‘The Kanak People...needs..to take charge of its destiny and its own affairs’ 
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 independence struggle were wont to point out.  According to a New Caledonian 
National Front (FN(NC)) communique: 
 
 No elder has ever mentioned in oral tradition the ‘Kanak people’.  None of 
them ever talked about the ‘legitimacy of the Kanak people’ and even less 
about the ‘sovereignty of the Kanak people’, and that is for one simple 
reason:  there has never been a Kanak people.  The Melanesian 
populations...established themselves out of tribal conflicts and their own 
needs. 
 The cement called itself progress and fraternity (FN(NC), cited in Les 
Nouvelles, 19/1/85). 
 
The anteriority of the term ‘Kanak people’ may be an issue, but there is little doubt 
that the resonance of this categorisation for Kanaks was grounded in the past.  Part 
of the conditions of existence of this discourse of ‘the people’ might be found in the 
sociological circumstances described above.  The politico-legal systems of 
exclusion in the period prior to the Second World War lent credence to discourse of 
difference. But colonial discourses paved the way for some conception of unity in 
their designation of these peoples as ‘Melanesian’.  In addition, the alienation of 
clans from their land and their cantonment on reserves cut across tribal lines and 
had resulted in people from different tribal groups residing together for almost a 
century (Mathieu, 1989:89-90).  In this sense, colonialism structured a certain type 
of unity out of whatever existed before. The communal nature of traditional Kanak 
society and its emphasis on reciprocity and dialogue are also likely to have 
influenced the adoption of discourses of ‘the people’ whether in their reformist or 
historical forms.  It would appear that many Kanaks interpreted the socialist 
influence behind the historical conceptualisation of ‘the people’ in terms of their 
communal tradition.  Kanak society, they argued, was traditionally ‘socialist’.5  
 
The historical conceptualisation of ‘the people’ derived considerable legitimacy from 
its use in United Nations (UN) documents, in particular, UN resolution 1514 which 
declared the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination. The moves in the 
late 1970s by the independence movement to seek the reinscription of New 
Caledonia on the list of colonial territories subject to UN review coincided with an 
almost wholesale move to articulate their struggle in internationalist terms.6  In 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Bwenando, 31/7/86). 
5 For a discussion of notions of socialism in pro-independence discourse, see chapter 6. 
6 Speaking at a demonstration marking the anniversary of French annexation of the territory on 24 
September 1980, politician and independence activist André Gopéa addressed the demonstration on 
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 1975, Kanak politician Yann Céléné Uregei was the first to officially call for 
independence but he did so on behalf of the ‘Caledonian people’ in their struggle for 
a ‘Caledonian nation’ (Les Nouvelles, 25/6/75).  In 1980, the then secretary general 
of the UC, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, speaking to a bill before the Territorial Assembly 
which, for the first time, recognised clan ownership of land, described the bill as ‘a 
step in the process of restoring to the only legitimate people of the country, the 
indigenous people, the kanak nation’ (Les Nouvelles, 16/5/80, italics added).  It 
appeared that the discursive transition within the independence movement had 
been well and truly effectuated.  ‘The people’ now signified difference.  Until the 
1960s Melanesian difference had been discursively signalled by the use of the term 
of denigration ‘canaque’.  By the early 1980s, independence leaders were arguing 
that the movement had appropriated this term precisely because it signified 
difference and therefore allowed Melanesians to constitute themselves as a 
‘people’.  Being recognised as ‘a people’, they argued, would pressure France into 
decolonising in conformity with the UN charter (Les Nouvelles, 9/12/82).   
 
The ascendancy among pro-independence Melanesians of the conceptualisation of 
‘the people’ as difference, rather than the former notion of ‘the people’ as a pluri-
ethnic unity, is evident in the appearance of banners at pro-independence rallies 
which denounced ‘pluri-ethnic fraternity’ (Les Nouvelles, 25/9/80) and in the 
dropping of the term within the movement.    
 
Challenges to the internationalist notion of ‘the people’  
 
Bourdieu (1977) argues that the structure of any field is characterised by the 
relations of force which exist between agents or groups as a result of the acquisition 
of capital by these groups in the course of previous struggles.  Those who possess 
the greatest capital seek to pursue strategies of conservation or orthodoxy while 
those who possess the least capital pursue strategies of subversion or heterodoxy.  
As Thompson writes of Bourdieu’s theory on linguistic markets:  ‘By bringing what is 
undiscussed into the universe of discourse and hence criticism, heterodoxy impels 
the dominant agents or groups to step out of their silence and to produce a 
defensive discourse of orthodoxy’ (Thompson, 1984:49-50).  By late 1980 the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the international aspects of the struggle and commented that the dossier prepared by the 
Independence Front for submission to the UN Decolonisation Committee was in the process of being 
translated (Les Nouvelles, 25/9/80). 
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 discursive heterodoxy of the independence movement was about to precipitate a 
counter move.  Speaking at the UN, the anti-independence Melanesian politician 
Dick Ukeiwé admitted that one reason for his trip to the UN was to explore what an 
appropriate discursive counter might be.  Ukeiwé commented: 
 
 One mustn’t change the language, but rather find one with an international 
dimension and not only a local or regional one, because New Caledonia is 
also part of the international order.  I have to speak a language that is 
appropriate to the place that New Caledonia should occupy in the 
international rung.  This trip enabled me to better assess and to advance 
suggestions.  But firstly, one must be vigilant and conserve (Les Nouvelles, 
8/12/80). 
 
We might speculate that Ukeiwé’s dispositions as a Melanesian made him more 
sensitive to the lure of the historical discourse of ‘the people’ and that he, therefore, 
sought in his visit a means to appropriate and incorporate aspects of the 
internationalist discourse into the orthodox position.  Certainly, from this time 
onwards, the existing discourses of ‘the people’ began to mutate.  
 
Within the anti-independence movement, the response revolved in part around an 
articulation of ‘the people’ as those who opposed independence and did so most 
vociferously.  In 1982, the Liaison Committee for the Defence of the Institutions, 
formed just prior to the formation of the alliance between the FI and the centrist 
FNSC which was to bring the independence movement into government, published 
a full-page notice in Les Nouvelles which ominously declared that:  ‘the Caledonian 
people is ready to show its determination’ (Les Nouvelles, 8/6/82).  The text sets up 
some equivalences and juxtapositions which assist in deciphering who ‘the people’ 
are.  They exist in juxtaposition to ‘those in administrative and political offices’ who 
are deciding the future of ‘the people’ which, in this context, presumably meant pro-
independence and centrist politicians.  ‘The people’ included ‘Caledonians’ and, 
more specifically, ‘those who work and pay taxes’, the inference being that ‘the 
people’ was primarily white.  As in the UC’s original usage, ‘the people’ in this 
discourse was linked to a political program, but it was no longer that of the assault 
on privilege but rather the opposition to independence.  This articulation was most 
clearly expressed in a full-page RPCR notice published in Les Nouvelles prior to the 
visit of the French Secretary for Overseas Territories, Georges Lemoine, in May 
1983.  Calling for a large show of force at the demonstration planned for the day of 
Lemoine’s arrival, the advertisement stated that the demonstration will show the 
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 government once more ‘the determination of the Caledonian people in their entirety 
to oppose every possibility of independence or separatism’ (Les Nouvelles, 
14/5/83).  These articulations present ‘the people’ as already constituted; a latent 
force about to reveal its existence.  In both instances, ‘the people’ is associated with 
either an impending or planned demonstration and this is an association which is 
not coincidental, for it was in the very act of the demonstration that this new 
articulation of ‘the people’ was being constituted.  Bourdieu describes the ‘dialectic 
of manifestation or demonstration’ as a forceful means through which a hitherto 
subjective group becomes objectified and officialised: 
 
 ...officialisation finds its fulfilment in demonstration, the typically magical 
(which does not mean ineffectual) act through which the practical 
group...makes itself visible and manifest, for other groups and for itself, and 
attests to its existence as a group that is known and recognised, laying a 
claim to institutionalisation (Bourdieu, 1991:224, italics in the original). 
 
Bourdieu’s argument might provide an insight into Les Nouvelles’ obsession with 
publicising the numbers at anti-independence demonstrations and comparing these 
with the much smaller numbers at pro-independence demonstrations.  At one level, 
this was a means to show the majority status of the anti-independence movement 
and therefore its legitimacy within the dominant republican discourse.  However, 
what Les Nouvelles was also doing was officialising this discourse and in so doing 
constituting this version of ‘the people’. 
 
In the face of these increasingly polarised discourses of ‘the people’, the centrist 
FNSC articulated an alternative discourse which presented the existence of two 
‘peoples’, the ‘Canaque people’ and the ‘Caledonian people’ (Les Nouvelles, 
12/1/83).  This discourse suggested a dual historical legitimacy.  That of the 
‘Canaque people’ was perhaps more distant, but the ‘Caledonian people’ also had a 
history which dated from the beginnings of white colonisation.  In the face of the 
seemingly exclusionary discourse of ‘the people’ articulated by the independence 
movement, the issue of the political legitimacy of the settler population, particularly 
those whose ancestors were born in New Caledonia, took on particular saliency at 
round-table discussions which took place in July 1983 between the major political 
groupings in the territory at Nainville-les-Roches in France.  The official 
documentation from the meeting recognised the Kanaks’ ‘innate and active right to 
independence’ but also recognised the rights of settler groups with generational ties 
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 to the territory.  A new articulation of ‘the people’ was sketched in this document, 
the preamble to which stated:  ‘In order to start the process of self-determination, 
we have to draw up a specific, decisive and evolving internal autonomy statute.  But 
the process of self-determination will be the act of the Caledonian people in their 
entirety’ (Les Nouvelles, 11/7/83). 
 
This articulation skilfully attempted a type of rapprochement between the 
internationalist discourse of ‘the people’ and the reformist discourse proposed by 
the UC almost 30 years earlier.  The association of the term ‘self-determination’ with 
that of ‘the people’ evoked the elements of the UN resolution.  The choice of the 
term ‘self-determination’ rather than the hitherto much advocated ‘referendum’ by 
anti-independence groups was crucial to this possibility of rapprochement.  There 
was some ambiguity concerning precisely who this category of ‘the people in their 
entirety’ would include.  The document referred to a new category, ‘victims of 
history’, to describe the white settler population with generational roots in the 
territory, and the documentation suggested that these people should rightfully be 
included in this conceptualisation of ‘the people’.  But no precise demarcation was 
established between ‘victims of history’ and those Caledonians of European 
background who were not ‘victims’.  The ratification of the document by the UC 
representatives at the meeting generated a great deal of opposition within the 
FLNKS (see Henningham, 1992:74) precisely because of the opening it afforded to 
this new conceptualisation of ‘the people’.  The participation of ‘the people’ thus 
articulated in a referendum on independence was likely to lead to defeat for the pro-
independence position.  But the mobilisation of the term ‘self-determination’ and its 
marrying with a more inclusive definition of ‘the people’ was not alien to the 
interpretive repertoires of the UC, as we have seen.  It is in this sense that the text 
of the meeting might be seen to be a very skilful attempt at appropriating the more 
radical internationalist discourse of ‘the people’ to more conservative ends. 
 
Les Nouvelles took offence at this interpretive repertoire linking ‘the people’ with an 
electoral process which drew its interpretive sustenance from the republican ideals 
articulated during the French Revolution.  For Les Nouvelles, the argument that self-
determination would be ‘a matter for the Caledonian people’:  ‘gives us the vague 
impression that we are already considered by the socialists as forming a people, in 
other words, not fully French citizens.  It is a rather unpleasant impression, to tell 
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 the truth’ (Les Nouvelles, 26/11/83).  Here Les Nouvelles points to the ultimate peril 
for the anti-independence movement of contesting the terrain around the discursive 
construct of ‘the people’.  No matter how inclusively or exclusively ‘the people’ was 
articulated in the context of New Caledonian politics, the concept still contained the 
residual signification of an organic entity which was different.  This difference, I 
have argued, reflected the ambivalence of the colonial circumstances of New 
Caledonia and was therefore quite functional politically in the period prior to 
demands for independence.  With the heightened political struggle, the discursive 
accentuation of difference became politically dangerous.  Anti-independence 
leaders abandoned the term.  In 1987, conservative French politician François 
Leotard addressing a rally in Noumea, declared to the crowd that ‘you are the most 
beautiful part of the French people’ (Les Nouvelles, 15/7/87).  The term ‘community’ 
instead came to the fore, most notably in Mitterrand’s one-day visit to the territory in 
January 1985 (see Les Nouvelles, 22/1/85), to which one pro-independence leader 
cited in Les Nouvelles replied: 
 
 the Canaque [sic] people is the indigenous people of this country and 
therefore not a community like the others living in this country.  There are 
communities of diverse ethnic origins, Wallisians, Europeans, Tahitians, and 
there is the Canaque people (Les Nouvelles, 22/1/85).    
 
The abandonment of ‘the people’ to the pro-independence movement allowed anti-
independence politicians to argue with greater rhetorical force that the notion of the 
‘Kanak people’ distinguishable from all other ethnic groups or communities, and with 
a sole right to self-determination, was a racist conceptualisation of what Ukeiwé now 
referred to as the ‘extraordinary human mosaic’ of New Caledonian society (Les 
Nouvelles, 26/1/85).  The evidence of the efficacy of this new discursive approach 
was the attempt within the pro-independence movement to articulate a new, more 
inclusive conceptualisation of the ‘Kanak people’.  In the face of intensifying 
accusations of racism, the moderate political group Liberation Kanak Socialist (LKS) 
sought to give the term a ‘modern meaning’, ‘that of nationality and not ethnic group’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 11/12/86).  The ‘Kanak people’ would be those who agree to live as 
citizens in an independent Kanaky, no matter what their racial origin.  This attempt 
to articulate ‘the people’ as a future category of nationality appears to have lain 
fallow in the face of an ever increasing polarisation.  The rhetorical strategy 
employed by anti-independence politicians shifted from one of attempting to 
appropriate ‘the people’ to one of challenging the historical and racial foundations 
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 upon which the category of the ‘Kanak people’ was based.  A large part of this work 
was done by Henri Perron, Les Nouvelles’ editor-in-chief who took over from 
Ventrillon after the purchase of the paper by the Hersant group.  In an editorial in 
March 1987, Perron questioned the status of Melanesians as the ‘first occupants’ of 
the land, arguing that others had preceded them (‘A Vrai Dire’, 14/3/87; see also 
10/9/87).  In his editorials, Perron sought to reinvigorate the discourse of pluri-
ethnicity as a counter to the claims of the ‘Kanak people’.  There is a stark 
coherence in his writing around the conceptualisation of the ‘Kanak people’ as an 
ethnic group bonded to other ethnic groups by a strong sense of fraternity.  In his 
discussion of a series of weekend sporting events, Perron laments that: 
 
 ...those who cry from the roofs against French Caledonia; those who want 
the world to believe that Whites exploit Melanesians, that the tribes are 
confined to their reserves at gun point...they would have seen a white, black 
and yellow people, their hearts beating as one at the exploits of the heroes 
of the day.  They would have seen a pluri-ethnic or multi-racial crowd play, 
run, dance, sing, share a meal of friendship, commune better in an immense 
leap of joy and fraternity (AVD, 2/5/87). 
 
The metaphor of childhood friendship was also used to connote the depth of 
fraternity and pluri-ethnic tolerance which prevailed in New Caledonia.  A front-page 
photo published in November 1987 showed two small girls, one presumably 
Melanesian and the other blond haired, sharing a bottle of drink with the caption 
‘Childhood fraternity’.  The photo is highly evocative of the 1908 Methodist mission 
postcard, discussed by Thomas (1994:130-1), entitled ‘A Study in Black and White’, 
which depicts a blond girl standing hand-in-hand with two black boys.   The black 
boys are wearing only loin cloths while the girl is dressed in a frock and hat, but all 
are bare footed.  In the Les Nouvelles’ photo, both girls are wearing ‘mission-
dresses’, mostly worn by Melanesian women, which strengthens the connotation 
that contemporary fraternity has reached new heights of hybridity resulting from 
considerable cultural interaction and borrowing, and could no longer be viewed as a 
political phenomenon which imposes dominant social and cultural codes. 
 
The rhetorical strategy of questioning the historical justification for the notion of the 
‘Kanak people’ was accompanied by a strategy of questioning its racial coherence.  
Pons argued that Caledonians ‘form only a single community.  The Kanak people 
don’t exist.  There are only mixed-race’ (cited in Barbançon, 1992:113), adding that:  
‘I am myself mixed-race and proud to be so’ (Les Nouvelles, 7/10/87).  With no 
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 historical or racial legitimacy, the ‘Kanak people’ constituted a non-identity within 
this discourse of ‘pluri-ethnic fraternity’.  In effect, they no longer even constituted 
an ethnic group, for, as Balibar has argued, the presumption of some form of racial 
cohesion is usually required to establish ethnicity (Balibar, 1991:99-100). 
 
 
Being Caledonian in Caledonia 
 
The discursive construct of ‘the people’ in New Caledonia was a subjectivity with 
clear political origins and contemporary political efficacy.  But it was also an 
avoidable subjectivity; those designated as ‘the people’ could be named in other 
terms, probably the most obvious of which was the term ‘Caledonian’.  Being 
‘Caledonian’ was also a political construct, deriving from the events of European 
discovery and colonisation, but its functionality as a general descriptive term for 
those living in New Caledonia rendered it less avoidable. The commonsense 
assumption that the subjectivity of ‘Caledonian’ would be less political and therefore 
less contested than, say, that of ‘the people’ was belied by the media discourses 
surrounding independence in Les Nouvelles.  The discourse of being ‘Caledonian’ 
was a highly contested terrain with discursive strategies similar to those used in 
relation to ‘the people’. The frontiers of inclusion and exclusion shifted according to 
the perceived interests of the various agents articulating the subjectivity and the 
relations of force in the political field at any time.  But, because anti-independence 
groups felt constrained to employ the term, a new logic of representation emerged.  
Once the terrain became muddied by contested representations, discursive energy 
went into articulating a new subjectivity, that of the ‘true Caledonian’.  The 
geographical correlate of this ‘true Caledonian’ was an imaginary space described 
as the ‘true’ or ‘profound’ Caledonia.  Les Nouvelles engaged actively in this 
articulation of the ‘true’ and therefore lent authority to the range of exclusions which 
this articulation implied. 
 
The discourses in Les Nouvelles in the early 1980s suggest that there were at least 
three articulations of ‘Caledonian’ in circulation at the time.  The first, most 
frequently advanced by those of European origin, juxtaposed ‘Caledonian’ with 
‘Melanesian’.  However, a letter published in Les Nouvelles in 1980 from a 
‘Melanesian’ distinguished between ‘Caledonians’ and ‘Europeans’, suggesting that 
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 the term ‘Caledonian’ among certain Melanesians designated the indigenous 
inhabitants of the territory (11/9/80).  A third articulation advanced an inclusive 
definition of ‘Caledonian’ as in ‘All Caledonians, white and black’ (9/1/82), ‘the 
Caledonian population in its entirety’ and ‘half the Caledonians against the other 
half’ (8/6/82).  This articulation was most frequently advanced by anti-independence 
politicians in formal contexts such as communiques and speeches; that is, in 
situations where discourses are most likely to be consciously governed by strategic 
considerations.  It was also frequently advanced by the centrist FNSC which was 
dominated by politicians of European origin.   The prevalence, however, of 
articulations which juxtaposed ‘Caledonian’ with ‘Melanesian’ brings into question 
the extent to which this inclusive definition was in general usage among the 
European population.   
 
The very presence of these competing discourses of ‘Caledonian’ suggests that 
there is no certainty that the term, when used as it frequently was in isolation from 
other subject positions or discursive clues, included Melanesians.  Indeed, the 
manner in which the discourse was most frequently incorporated in the text 
suggested that ‘Caledonian’ equated with being non-Melanesian.  For example, in 
his speech to the large crowd at an anti-independence rally, RPCR Counsellor 
Justin Guillemard commented that a television interview with Tjibaou ‘goes without 
saying, and every Caledonian now knows what’s awaiting them’, and then paid 
homage to ‘the courage and determination of our Melanesian brothers who fight at 
our sides’, concluding with:  ‘Caledonians we were born, Caledonians we are by 
heart or adoption, Caledonians we will stay, Caledonians we will die, so that every 
Caledonian may live in Caledonia’ (Les Nouvelles, 28/6/82).  
 
This discourse is at best ambiguous, but it and many other passages suggest that, 
historically, Melanesians did not rightfully claim a place as ‘Caledonians’ in the 
discourses of Europeans.  This exclusion was increasingly problematic within the 
anti-independence movement as Melanesians became more prominent within it.  
Anti-independence political groups successfully advanced Melanesian candidates 
for election in an attempt to counter accusations that their opposition to 
independence was racist.  They argued repeatedly that the struggle over 
independence was not between black and white but rather between those for and 
against France.  Les Nouvelles assisted the anti-independence movement to 
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 acquire significant symbolic capital from the presence of Melanesians in their ranks 
by photographing Melanesians at the front of rallies, meeting the Minister et cetera 
and by describing their activities in heroic terms.7  This political strategy of 
privileging the position of Melanesians within the anti-independence movement 
necessitated a new articulation of ‘Caledonian’ which incorporated Melanesians.  
Thus, Ukeiwé referred to ‘Caledonians of all origins’ (19/5/83) and others, wishing to 
refer to the white population used ‘European Caledonian’ which suggested the 
category ‘Melanesian Caledonian’ (9/1/85).  But the possibility that pro-
independence activists could be called ‘Melanesian Caledonians’, a possibility 
which was contested by the anti-independence movement, spurred new 
articulations.  The communique of one far-right group referred to ‘French 
Caledonians, victims of their courage’ (22/4/85) which equated ‘Caledonian’ with a 
political position against independence, and Ukeiwé referred to ‘Caledonians in 
favour of France’ (26/1/85).  As the political struggle escalated, local anti-
independence politicians and Les Nouvelles sharpened the focus on this articulation 
by simply referring to ‘Caledonian’ as those against independence.  The Mayor of 
Noumea and former RPCR deputy Roger Laroque declared that the ‘Caledonian 
population is exasperated’ at the state of insurrection in the territory (12/1/85).  
Following the change in ownership at Les Nouvelles, the paper advanced this 
articulation in some key articles.  One senior journalist, Marie-Laure Bernard, wrote 
from Paris on the results of the 1987 referendum on independence:  ‘But yes, do 
Caledonians know what they want?  They proved it again in a dazzling manner in 
front of the world last 13 September.  THEY WANT TO STAY IN THE FRENCH 
UNION’ (23/11/87).  This ‘Caledonian’ identity was therefore expressed through the 
process of lodging a vote ‘for France’. 
 
The ‘true Caledonian’ and the ‘profound Caledonia’ 
 
One of the central and most compelling aspects of Foucault’s work is his detailed 
analysis of the historical, social, economic and ultimately discursive practices 
through which effects of truth are produced.  Foucault is, as Rabinow argues, ‘highly 
suspicious of claims to universal truths’ (1991:4).  According to Foucault: 
 
                                                          
7 For example, a march ostensibly organised by anti-independence Melanesians in May 1983 resulted 
in the following front-page headlines in Les Nouvelles:  ‘Melanesians have responded to the 
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  truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power:  contrary to a myth whose 
history and functions would repay further study, truth isn’t the reward of free 
spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have 
succeeded in liberating themselves.  Truth is a thing of this world:  it is 
produced by multiple forms of constraint.  And it induces regular effects of 
power (Foucault in Wetherell and Potter, 1992:68). 
 
Foucault explores the means through which effects of truth are produced in a range 
of academic and professional discourses and their subsequent implications for the 
manner in which populations and individuals are subjectified.  For Foucault, the 
complex work behind effects of truth is masked by the seeming naturalness of the 
discourse, its taken-for-grantedness.  Although there are fundamental 
epistemological, and consequently methodological, differences between Foucault’s 
work and Gramsci’s, Foucault’s notion of the ‘effects of truth’ and Gramsci’s notions 
of hegemony and common sense relate to similar phenomena.  Under a state of 
hegemony, a seemingly natural but nonetheless constructed common sense 
prevails, but Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is far more open to contestation and is 
therefore far more provisional than Foucault’s effects of truth.8   
 
The political instability in New Caledonia during the 1980s, reflected in the 
discursive struggle over key subjectivities, could be described in Gramscian terms 
as a struggle over ‘ideological hegemony’.  The struggle was to produce an effect of 
truth over who could rightfully constitute ‘the people’, ‘Caledonians’ and 
‘Melanesians’.  The elusiveness of any consensual reading is apparent in the 
material which we have studied.  But the will to lay claim to the ‘true’ was 
nonetheless apparent.  What is interesting is the manner in which anti-
independence politicians and Les Nouvelles, in the face of this crisis of hegemony, 
invested discursive effort in articulating a discourse of the ‘true’.  From October 
1984 onwards, the geographical imaginary of the ‘profound’, the ‘true’ and the ‘real 
Caledonia’ featured in anti-independence discourses and with it the emergence of a 
new subject, the ‘true Caledonian’.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
indépendantistes; DECLARE THEMSELVES FRENCH; they had the courage to descend into the 
streets to say it’ (9/5/83). 
8 It might be argued that Foucault’s effects of truth constitute more enduring discursive phenomena 
whereas Gramsci’s common sense concerns shifts of meaning within a prevailing truth.  For example, 
debates in New Caledonia questioned, as we have seen, who should participate in the political 
process and to a certain extent what this political process should be, but the fundamental ‘truth’ of the 
inevitability of incorporation into a historically constituted world system as an entity which 
corresponded with certain geographical boundaries, and as ‘citizens’, was never challenged. 
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 The discourse of the ‘true Caledonian’ in the ‘true Caledonia’ is much more nuanced 
than that of ‘Caledonian’ in that it does not reduce these categories merely to 
political or ethnic characteristics but rather deals more fully with sociological 
phenomena.  The ‘true Caledonia’ is a type of landscape with a type of people 
which, together, produce a type of political orientation.  The distancing of politics 
from the ‘true’ resonated with earlier interpretive repertoires based on libertarian 
notions of freedom as freedom from the state.  These were expressed, as we have 
seen, in feelings of hostility towards Metropolitan and local politicians and politics.  
But we might speculate that the potential ideological effect of this articulation of the 
‘true’ was to circumvent the feelings of alienation from the political process which 
the escalation of political conflict and the rarefaction of political discourse was 
engendering.  People can identify more readily with people and places than they 
can with political debate.  That these people and places engendered a political 
position was a ‘natural’ outcome of the types of characteristics which they 
displayed.  This discourse of the true, which stressed social dimensions, also 
suggested modes of social interaction.       
 
In September 1987, less than two weeks prior to the 13 September referendum, Les 
Nouvelles published a front-page photo of a New Caledonian landscape (Figure 
4.1).  An accompanying heading read, ‘The Caledonian serenity’ (4/9/87).  It was a 
photo of a stretch of flat land with a mountain rising in the background and in the 
fore-ground a man surrounded by chooks, a deer and a dog.  The caption indicated 
that this photo was taken at the property of the retired couple George Weiss and his 
wife near Koumac towards the centre of the main island of New Caledonia.  It 
commented on the peacefulness and harmony of the scene, which, it suggested, 
reflected ‘la Calédonie profonde’.  Moreover, the caption suggested that stumbling 
on such a serene scene had surprised the photographer.  What does this photo tell 
us of ‘la Calédonie profonde’? 
 
It is firstly a domesticated and a colonial scene.  The land is cleared and the deer, 
which is not a native species but which has been imported since colonisation, 
grazes in its domesticated state.  These marked traces of colonial conquest are 
presented as natural.  Marie-Louise Pratt, in her work on travel writing, discusses 
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Figure 4.1:  Les Nouvelles, 4/9/87 
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 the frequency of the panorama in this genre of writing and suggests that ‘the fantasy 
of dominance ... [is] commonly built into this stance’. (Pratt quoted in Mills, 
1991:78).  Mills comments that this stance ‘recalls Foucault’s work on the 
panopticon’ (Mills, ibid), which Foucault considered the ultimate mechanism of 
control in its ability to allow one person to control the activity and behaviour of 
many.  The ‘fantasy of dominance’ may also be seen to be inscribed in this scene of 
la Calédonie profonde which depicts the type of unfettered harmony which only 
complete domination can engender.  The surprise occurrence of capturing this 
scene, referred to by the caption writer, enhances its naturalness by suggesting that 
it is pervasive.  It is there to be had, but at the same time its pervasiveness is 
insufficiently noticed, precisely because it is so unremarkable, so natural.9  Pratt 
argues that the task of colonial discourse is to: 
 
 incorporate a particular reality into a series of interlocking information orders 
- aesthetic, geographic, mineralogical, botanical, agricultural, economic, 
ecological, ethnographic, and so on.  To the extent that it strives to efface 
itself, the invisible eye/I strives to make these informational orders natural, to 
find them there uncommanded, rather than assert them as the 
products/producers of European knowledges or disciplines (Pratt quoted in 
Mills, 1991:79).  
 
This particular ‘reality’ was also incorporated in the manner in which the inhabitants 
of this ‘profound Caledonia’ are described.  In 1984, an article reported on Minister 
for Overseas Departments and Territories George Lemoine’s visit to a small remote 
farm in the mountains.  An old woman of European descent, whose husband had 
died, lived on the farm with her two sons.  They lived a poor subsistence lifestyle but 
professed to be happy.  Lemoine was quoted as saying that ‘Caledonia, it’s this 
house, this old woman who had two children with a canaque’ (20/10/84).  The 
simplicity and harmony evoked by this description were echoed in the 
accompanying photo.  The family was not only in harmony with their physical 
environment but also with their sociological one, reflected in the fact that the woman 
had had ‘two children with a canaque’.  The dream of ‘pluri-ethnic’ harmony was as 
implicit to this conception of la Calédonie profonde as was the dominance and 
domestication of the land, as is evident in Melanesian Senator Maurice Nénou’s 
profession to be ‘the voice of the true Caledonia, of this pluri-ethnic Caledonia about 
                                                          
9 This notion that the scene is ‘there to be had’ is evocative of the conceptualisation of the fait divers 
in Les Nouvelles.  Like the la Calédonie profonde, the fait divers exists in a realm of objective reality 
which is largely divorced from human engagement in its manufacture. 
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 which some still think that two communities oppose each other’ (16/4/87).  The 
articulation of the ‘true’ as solid, constant, reflective and unemotional recurs in this 
discourse.  Ukeiwé, outlining his plan for the establishment of new political regions 
for the territory in the Territorial Assembly, described his propositions as ‘the echo 
that la Calédonie profonde sends to the incantations of the indépendantistes’ 
(27/3/85).  Henri Perron, writing in his editorial column on Mitterrand’s opposition to 
the Chirac government’s policies towards New Caledonia, commented that ‘the true 
Caledonians showed no emotion, no animosity, no surprise either.  Their opinion on 
the ideological colour of the host of the Elysée was established a long time ago’ 
(21/2/87).  Violence also played no part in this description of the true Caledonia.  
Lafleur described Caledonia as a ‘common good’ and added that ‘we haven’t the 
right, neither this group nor that, to force ourself upon it by violence’ (30/4/88). 
 
As Wetherell and Potter argue, the depiction of society as organic, such as occurs 
in the ‘profound’ or ‘true’ Caledonia, initially appears to present this society as 
curiously weightless and unenergised.  But organic society is given force precisely 
because it signifies normativeness, continuity, stability, cohesion and orderliness.  
They discuss the manner in which these lay articulations of the social and 
processes of social influence correspond with dominant theories in sociology which 
depict society as an organic whole, united around shared values.  The ascription of 
normativeness to this articulation of the social renders this society full of latent 
power.  In their analysis of the discourses of Pakeha New Zealanders’ discourses 
on race relations, Wetherell and Potter argue that through this articulation:  ‘an 
ideological trick is accomplished.  Pakeha New Zealanders become inactive but 
legitimate, their power invisible and normative, while Maori groups become active 
and visibly energetic but, simultaneously, deviant’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1991:159). 
Those groups who disrupt the social order by producing ‘disintegrative tendencies’ 
are considered dysfunctional and the product of inadequate socialisation.  They are 
therefore pathological; they have no rightful role to play in a healthy social or 
psychological order (ibid:158-161). 
 
Adequate socialisation occurs through the process of assimilation which is inherent 
to the notion of pluri-ethnicity.  Any claim to difference or separateness, and any 
rejection of the concept of pluri-ethnicity, earns within this conceptualisation the tag 
of deviancy and pathology.  The ‘true Caledonia’ articulates a powerful schemata 
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 from which all those who profess difference can be excluded.  And, because their 
difference confers not only social but psychological dysfunction, they can in some 
senses be treated as less than human, as the following section seeks to illustrate. 
 
Indépendantistes, Melanesians and Kanaks  
 
The articulation of ‘Caledonians’ as those against independence raises the question 
of how those who were not ‘Caledonians’ were categorised and described.  It is 
interesting to note that the discourses of anti-independence politicians published in 
Les Nouvelles contain few references to pro-independence groups.  The strategies 
of discursive exclusion described above meant that there was little need, and 
therefore little attempt, to officialise the Other.  Where a reference could not be 
avoided, it was usually made to the FLNKS.  The author of the ‘Billet de l’Affreux 
Jojo’ even uses the term ‘an FLNKS’ to describe an unknown pro-independence 
activist rather than the term used more frequently in the paper of ‘indépendantistes’ 
(18/9/85).  One implication of this categorisation was to stress the political nature of 
opposition and therefore to suggest a lack of popular support.  ‘Indépendantistes’ 
suggests a subjectivity whose very existence is viscerally tied to the fight for 
independence.  In contrast, ‘an FLNKS’ expresses a subjectivity moulded by a 
political group rather than a program, and suggests that the deepest conviction of 
those thus designated was towards the party rather than the ideas which the party 
professed to represent. 
 
Anti-independence politicians, and Les Nouvelles, developed a rich vocabulary of 
deviancy to describe these FLNKS activists. In 1988, just prior to the Ouvéa crisis, 
Lafleur posed the rhetorical question, ‘Who’s threatening whom?’, and replied:  ‘It is 
the revolutionaries, the terrorists, the struggle committees who refuse democracy’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 8/4/88).  A few weeks later, National Front leader Roger Holeindre 
declared that the trouble was being caused by ‘a band of mafiosos’ and added in an 
extremely provocative and threatening manner:  ‘what we are going to start is the 
big cleansing.  We’ve got it in for some people, notably the crooks.  We’ve got a 
surprise waiting for them, the chef’s surprise’ (20/4/88). 
 
Articles and editorials written by Les Nouvelles’ journalists often used terminology 
which was potentially less ideologically charged.  The most frequently used 
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 category was that of ‘indépendantistes’, but, as we have seen, the paper was not 
shy in drawing on the vocabulary of deviancy itself.  Prior to 1984, the paper 
occasionally used the term ‘Melanesian’ to signify pro-independence activists, such 
as when it commented that the gendarmes had found the ‘Melanesians’ in Temala 
particularly aggressive (Les Nouvelles, 13/5/83).  This mobilisation of ‘Melanesian’ 
to signify pro-independence activists was to become particularly contentious as the 
political struggle intensified and anti-independence Melanesians mobilised their 
symbolic power in the political field.  A juxtaposition began to be established 
between ‘Melanesians’ and ‘indépendantistes’.  During Georges Lemoine’s April 
1984 visit to the interior of the main island, the front page headlines declared:  ‘He 
wanted to find Melanesians; he found indépendantistes’, in reference to the cool 
reception which Lemoine received in pro-independence tribes (5/4/84).  
Corresponding with this juxtaposition there later emerged a geographical divide 
between what Les Nouvelles described as ‘the “good” and the “bad” side’ of the 
main island (6/5/88).  At times ‘Kanak’ was juxtaposed with ‘Melanesian’, but the 
symbolic capital acquired through the deployment of the term by pro-independence 
activists was apparent in the paper’s general avoidance of it.  Where this was not 
possible, as, for example, when quoting from a pro-independence leader’s 
comments on ‘Kanak independence’ at a press conference, the term was most 
frequently rendered as ‘Canaque’.10  There were even some attempts to appropriate 
‘Canaque’ as an anti-independence subjectivity, perhaps best exemplified in Henri 
Perron’s description of ‘true Canaques’ as those who attended an anti-
independence rally prior to the September 1987 referendum (12/9/87).  ‘Kanaks’ 
were, however, implicitly present in anti-independence media discourse through the 
emergence during the mid-1980s of the term ‘non-Kanak’ to designate the 
immigrant population in the territory (see for example, 7/1/85; 6/10/86).  This was a 
direct borrowing from pro-independence discourse and was probably adopted for its 
descriptive economy.  However, it lent authority to the pro-independence discourse 
on the uniqueness of the Kanak presence which derived from the status of Kanaks 
as prior occupants of the territory, and which conferred on Kanaks special rights.  
The use of ‘non-Kanaks’ therefore constituted a significant opening to pro-
independence discourse and an indication of the efficacy of the movement’s 
discursive strategies.   
                                                          
10 This led to some deft pieces of journalism with the terms ‘Melanesian’, ‘Canaque’ and ‘Kanak’ 
appearing in the same article depending on who and where the original deployment of the term came 
from. 
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The rhetorical strategies used to juxtapose ‘Melanesian’ with ‘indépendantistes’ or 
‘Kanak’ sought to diminish the significance of the latter rather than compromise the 
former.  Lafleur argued that the number of FLNKS activists was in fact very small 
and that the 1984 FLNKS boycott of the territorial elections deterred only 10 per 
cent of the population (20/11/84).  A good indication of the rhetorical borrowings 
between RPCR politicians and journalists at Les Nouvelles was the manner in which 
this argument was subsequently fleshed out in an editorial in which it was argued 
that the FLNKS represented only 12 per cent of the total population, or about 25 per 
cent of the Melanesian population (21/12/84).  Lafleur argued that the worst of the 
problems was the work of no more than 1,200 ‘troublemakers’ (21/11/84) egged on 
by outside ‘agitators and manipulators’ (24/2/88); Europeans ‘of the petty left-wing 
intellectual style dreaming of mythical revolutions’ (19/10/84). The FLNKS was 
presented as duplicitous, incompetent and corrupt.  Writing from Paris on a 
television debate between representatives of the RPCR and the FLNKS, Sylvie 
Collin commented that viewers: 
 
 could appreciate the will to dialogue of one group, the discouraging 
intransigence and evasiveness of the other.  Again and again, the RPCR 
delegates had to intervene in order to re-establish the truth, passed through 
the double canaque and socialist mincer (10/4/87). 
 
The ‘double language’ of FLNKS leaders (3/8/87; 13/5/88)) was contrasted with the 
`simple answers’ from DOM-TOM Minister Bernard Pons  to the ‘simple questions’ 
put to him at a press conference (4/2/87).  The dysfunction of the FLNKS was, 
according to Desjardins, apparent in ‘their incompetence, their nice cars, their 
popular kanaque schools and their economic and social fiascos’ (5/9/87).  In 
contrast to the ‘true face of Caledonia’, which the paper argued was evident at a 
large anti-independence rally (10/9/87), the ‘true face’ of the FLNKS was evident in 
its reprisals against those who voted against independence in the September 1987 
referendum (16/9/87) which included, according to Les Nouvelles, the beating up of 
a handicapped person for having voted in the referendum (25/9/87).    
 
This discourse on the extremism and deviancy of the FLNKS led to the emergence 
of a further juxtaposition which came to the fore at key electoral moments.  This 
contrasted the socially and psychologically dysfunctional ‘Kanak activist’ with the 
reasonable, well-adjusted ‘Melanesian’.  This discourse on the ‘good Melanesian’ is 
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 fascinating in pointing to the limits of Les Nouvelles’ ability to affirm a positive 
Melanesian identity.  Journalists’ construction of such an identity drew on 
interpretive resources which could nonetheless be considered deeply offensive by 
many Melanesians.  Moreover, women figure prominently in this discourse of the 
‘good Melanesian’, in contrast to the dearth of representations of women in the 
political discourses of Les Nouvelles in general.    
  
The good Melanesian 
 
On the day prior to the 1984 territorial election, Les Nouvelles sought to distinguish 
between ‘types’ of Melanesians, certain of which: 
 
 rest attached to peaceful wisdom, others, disturbed by access to the modern 
world, allow themselves to be fascinated by egalitarian myths or Marxist 
claims.  Still others refuse to abandon their right to vote, so preciously 
obtained after the war, and even the women dare interfere, sometimes 
saying that the men would do better to fight against alcoholism than to lose 
themselves in politics (17/11/84). 
 
We can speculate that the strategy behind this more politically inclusive articulation 
of ‘Melanesian’ was to avoid alienation from Melanesian readers who could take 
umbrage at any implication that their political views rendered them in some way 
‘non-Melanesian’.  For most of the following two years, this politically inclusive 
articulation of ‘Melanesian’ was, as we have seen, not encouraged.  Its re-
emergence in 1987 corresponded with the movement towards the September 
referendum on independence and the 1988 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. 
 
In early 1987 anti-independence politicians attempted to establish a distinction 
between ‘extremist’ leaders and those who had followed them during the thick of the 
insurrection in late 1984 and early 1985; a distinction which hinged on the notion of 
these followers as victims.  Pons advised one group of Melanesians from Lifou: 
 
 Don’t allow yourselves to be misled and misused any longer.  If a certain 
number of your brothers, among the most extremist, tried to lead you along a 
dangerous path, it is because they were intoxicated by Europeans who came 
to the Territory, members of the Revolutionary Communist League, animated 
by a Marxist idea, who wanted to impose an implacable dictatorship on your 
Territory...So I am calling you:  in the coming weeks and months before the 
self-determination referendum, go forth, in all the Lifou tribes, preach the 
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 good word, turn towards your brothers and sisters who were abused and say 
to them, you must wake up, open your eyes.  You must come back to ground 
(9/2/87). 
 
The vivid biblical tropes add force to the suggestion in this passage that those who 
had strayed could be redeemed.  Some, however, were beyond redemption.  The 
type of surreal deviancy attributed to these people, and evident in the following 
description of one activist, set them apart from other Melanesians, even those who 
had participated in insurrectionary activities.  It was still possible to redeem these 
latter Melanesians.  Following a violent clash between FLNKS activists and 
gendarmes over the site of a future hospital at Tieti near Poindimié, Les Nouvelles 
commented on those ostensibly responsible: 
 
 But one thing is certain:  we are in the presence of individuals ready for 
anything.  The group seems to be under the authority of Camille Maperi, 34 
years old, a violent individual without scruples, implicated in several cases of 
theft, rape, attacks, as well as in several cases of shooting on the forces of 
order and probably in several other affairs.  This person seems never to 
separate from his weapon, which makes him doubly dangerous.  He showed 
this weekend that he doesn’t hesitate in using it (14/3/88). 
 
Les Nouvelles argued that those whom the FLNKS claimed to represent were fed up 
with such deviancy, a fact demonstrated by the inability of the movement to mobilise 
its supporters.  Referring to one rally the paper argued that:  ‘The movement didn’t 
stir up the expected masses.  Because the masses still have in mind the tragic 
events of 1984-1985 and their share of desolation, misery, suffering and uncertain 
tomorrows’ (24/8/87).11  Among those who did attend demonstrations: 
 
 visibly, their heart wasn’t in it, neither among the speakers nor the others.  
Nobody believed any more.  The grand days of 1984 -1985 had finished 
shining, Pisani was no longer there, the forces of order had reassumed the 
instructions worthy of their function (Les Nouvelles, 18/4/88). 
 
This strategy of distinguishing between activists and less active supporters enabled 
this latter group to be absolved from blame for their past involvements.  Lafleur’s 
comment on the arrest of an alleged European ‘agitator’, Paul Naud, detained in 
relation to the violence at Tieti, exemplified this absolution: 
                                                          
11 It is important to note that these arguments derived a certain rhetorical force from broader political 
developments following the formation of a conservative government in France.  The new government 
withheld funding from the newly created indépendantiste regions and repressive military strategies 
were pursued within Kanak tribes.   
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 It is, for the whole of the Melanesian community, an insult to think that 
Melanesians, by themselves, are responsible for the Tieti incidents.  If we 
had put a stop to the actions of such individuals as Mr Naud, and I could cite 
others, a lot of dramas would have been avoided in New Caledonia 
(27/2/88).12   
 
This depiction of Melanesians as passive followers, easily led astray by ideologically 
driven foreign agitators, was, of course, deeply racist. This Melanesian had neither 
the dignity of the ‘noble savage’ nor the ‘wild man’ (White, 1978).  He, or she, was 
the child of colonialism - dependent, incapable and lost.  This infantilisation of the 
‘good Melanesian’ gave rise to a prevalence of representations of Melanesian 
women and girls in this discourse, a collection of which were published in a special 
supplement to Les Nouvelles in November 1987.  In these photos, Melanesian 
women and girls are depicted in a range of festive scenes associated with anti-
independence demonstrations, the greeting of conservative French politicians at the 
airport or, as mentioned earlier, in a series of quasi-intimate scenes with Minister 
Pons during his visits to anti-independence tribes in the territory.  One photo shows 
Pons seated on the ground surrounded by several Melanesian women, two of whom 
have an arm around Pons’ shoulders while a third is leaning up against his legs.  
The prevalence of representations of women in this discourse suggests that such 
women were considered exemplary ‘good Melanesians’, rendered such by their 
child-like enthusiasm, spontaneity and adoration.  This infantilisation of women 
evokes one of the central tropes of colonial discourse which Thomas argues was 
important to both missionary propaganda and French assimilationist policy, but 
which also had more general application:  the infantilisation of indigenous peoples 
(1994:133-4).  The use of representations of women to mobilise this trope was 
possible because of their general absence in anti-independence media discourses.  
This absence meant that media images of Melanesian women had escaped the 
difficult political contestations which had occurred.  Women could still constitute a 
realm of purity, moderation and bonhomie, and could thus, along with children, 
represent one of the last realms of the ‘good Melanesian’, well reconciled to the 
assimilationist imaginings of the French colonial project.  That such representations 
were used to lure Melanesian votes by presenting what were considered to be 
                                                          
12 Barbançon writes that Naud had the misfortune to be a member of the UC and to be white:  ‘He was 
accused of being a traitor to his race and of having pushed the Kanaks to revolt, because they 
couldn’t admit that the French military had been taken by surprise by young Kanaks.  A White brain 
had necessarily to conceive of this operation’ (1992:78).  
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 positive representations of Melanesians attests to the prevalence of a deeply 
entrenched colonial mentality among journalists at Les Nouvelles.  Not only could 
these images be read as colonising indigenous people, they can also be read as 
colonising women, thereby illustrating the congruence between dominative relations 
of power in two realms - the colonial and the sexual - which might hitherto have 
been considered separate.13     
 
The non-existence of Kanaks 
 
With the appropriation of the category ‘Melanesian’ to the anti-independence 
position, the frontiers of exclusion for those who supported independence were 
pushed to their limits.  Within the discourses in Les Nouvelles, these people were 
neither Caledonian nor Melanesian; they could not rightfully constitute themselves 
as ‘the people’ and had no legitimate place in Caledonia.  This exclusion of Kanaks 
as legitimate human beings constitutes, Alban Bensa argues, a central component 
of racism in New Caledonia and explains the extremist forms which racism has 
taken historically and in recent years.  Bensa has written that, within the French 
empire, the colonial phantasm of  a complete disappearance of the colonised 
people was nowhere better embraced than in New Caledonia, and this, he argues, 
explains the zeal with which the theory of the imminent disappearance of the Kanak 
people was embraced in the territory (1988:190-1).  This theory was: ‘less the 
product of an irrefutable total inquiry than an ideological extrapolation from sparse 
observations, treated as proof of the inescapable disappearance of the “inferior 
races”’ (Bensa, 1988:191).  It was nonetheless, he argues, highly influential, for:  
‘This ideology of the extinction of Melanesians defined the very particular form 
which racism took in this French colony, from 1853 to today:  a racism of 
annihilation that only ever envisaged Kanaks as non-beings’ (1988:191).     
 
Bensa’s argument that anti-Kanak racism in New Caledonia in the 1980s renewed 
the worst of the colonial fantasies of extinction which prevailed in the earliest 
decades of colonisation is borne out in the discourses on Kanak identity in Les 
Nouvelles.  In these discourses Kanaks constituted non-beings in the sense that 
                                                          
13 Thomas has argued of eighteenth century contact between Europeans and indigenous people in the 
Pacific that perceptions of indigenous women often codified more general perceptions of their culture.  
His argument suggests that the representations of women in Les Nouvelles signified a broader view of 
Melanesian culture as still open to the possibility of an assimilationist imagining (Thomas, 1994:101-
2). 
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 their deviance disaffiliated them from any legitimate human subjectivity.  As in the 
earliest times of colonisation, their status as non-beings authorised some of the 
worst acts of aggression against them, as exemplified in the Hienghène massacre.  
But in the 1980s, unlike the nineteenth century, Kanaks were better equipped to 
counter their discursive exclusion in anti-independence discourse. 
 
What are the ideological effects of this strategy of exclusion?14  If ideology is 
understood as the mobilisation of discourse to sustain or undermine relations of 
domination, then the exclusion of those who supported independence from any 
rightful claim to a politically legitimate subjectivity is clearly advantageous to those 
who sought to sustain existing relations of domination.  In disaffiliating the Kanak 
Other, the discourses on subjectivity in Les Nouvelles were constituting those who 
opposed independence in a position of power as the only rightful subjects of the 
true Caledonia. 
                                                          
14 One might ask where the ideological effects of this discourse on the non-existence of Kanaks were 
most felt, given that Les Nouvelles was not widely read within the Kanak community.  The evolving 
interpretive repertoires articulated in Les Nouvelles were sustained by other media and therefore 
formed part of a more general discursive context which would have touched on the lives of many 
Melanesians, particularly those spending some time in Noumea.  Being Melanesian meant negotiating 
through these various discourses on identity and developing one’s understanding of oneself as a 
consequence.  But the greatest ideological effects were probably felt within the European community, 
the most avid readers of Les Nouvelles. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE - EXTREME-RIGHT PUBLICATIONS AND ‘LOYALISM’ 
 
During the 1980s, the independence struggle reached into most aspects of public, 
and one suspects many aspects of private, interaction.  In a sense, it became an 
articulating principle around which many discourses came to be organised.  This is 
evident in the manner in which notions of identity changed.  Whereas ‘Caledonian’ 
had once been an identity with a range of significations, by the mid-1980s, as we 
have seen, it had become in political and media discourse an expression of political 
affiliation to the anti-independence movement.  Increasingly, people saw their 
identity as expressed through their stance on independence.  This notion of 
selfhood was the result of considerable discursive effort, engaged in by the 
territory’s media and political groups, aimed at channelling the readings which 
people had of their political and social environment, and the events around them, 
towards some relevance to the question of independence.  Thus, for example, the 
journalistic genre of the fait divers came to have, as we have seen, considerable 
political significance in ostensibly reinforcing Melanesian deviancy and therefore 
validating the thesis on the deviancy and corruption of the FLNKS.  Perhaps the 
most extreme representation of visceral identification with the anti-independence 
struggle was the practice, which began in the mid-1980s, of painting faces and other 
parts of the body red, white and blue, for anti-independence demonstrations.  This 
practice was officialised with the establishment by the loyalist radio station RRB of a 
competition for the best ‘costume’ at the September 1987 Rally for Freedom (Les 
Nouvelles, 10/9/87).  Displays of the tricolour had been and remained prolific, but 
the practice of bodily adornment signified a new level of identification with the 
struggle over independence. 
 
The rapidity with which the term ‘loyalist’ spread within the anti-independence 
movement and media from the time of its first usage in early 1985 suggests that this 
new identity corresponded well with the type of visceral engagement with the 
independence issue referred to above.  To be ‘loyalist’ exemplified an unwavering 
attachment to France.  It was a selfhood that found its ultimate expression in 
political struggle against independence.  But ultimately it was a relatively narrow 
identity.  The identity of ‘Caledonian’, even at the time when it was most closely 
equated with a stance against independence, always contained the possibility of 
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 other historically produced readings.  The ‘loyalist’ identity on the other hand, newly 
arrived in New Caledonia, seemed to entail far less ambiguity. 
 
In practice, however, the ready usage of the term by the anti-independence media 
meant that ‘loyalism’ tended to be associated with the interpretive repertoires which 
these media articulated and developed.  In their appropriation of the term, each of 
the media gave substance to this new identity so that it came to signify much more 
than a negative reflex to independence. 
 
The emergence of loyalism 
 
The ‘loyalist’ identity was introduced into New Caledonian political discourse during 
the most acute phase of political struggle in early 1985.  The earliest reference I 
found to it was in a Les Nouvelles article which reported on Melanesian RPCR 
Senator Dick Ukeiwé’s address to the French Senate in which he referred to the 
conflict in New Caledonia between ‘loyalists’ and ‘separatists’ (Les Nouvelles, 
26/1/85).  From this time onwards, the frequency of its appearance in Les Nouvelles 
increased until, by 1987, following the change in ownership, it was the term almost 
invariably used to designate those who opposed independence.  
 
However, the most frequent early use of ‘loyalist’ was in the extreme-right 
publication Combat Calédonien under the editorship of the metropolitan journalist 
ADG.  An early edition of Combat refers to ‘loyalists, called “anti-indépendantistes”’, 
signalling its preference for the use of the former term (6/3/85).  The state-owned 
broadcasting service RFO also began using the term in 1986 following the 
conservative victory in the French national elections. Les Nouvelles reported that 
the Chirac government had prohibited RFO’s use of the term ‘anti-indépendantiste’, 
demanding instead that ‘loyalist’ be used (Les Nouvelles, 7/5/87).1  This directive 
also suggests why Les Nouvelles would have used ‘loyalist’ after the 1987 change 
in ownership which resulted, as we have seen, in a very strong relationship between 
the paper’s ownership and management, newly arrived from France, and the Chirac 
government. 
 
                                                          
1 Les Nouvelles reported that this information had been part of Socialist senator Melenchon’s speech 
during the French Senate debate on the 1987 referendum bill.  Pons is reported to have responded 
that the term ‘loyalist’ reflected the reality of the situation in New Caledonia (Les Nouvelles, 7/5/87). 
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 These insights into the introduction of ‘loyalism’ into the New Caledonian media 
suggest that the term was a metropolitan French import used primarily in 
publications directed by metropolitan journalists.  The absence of ‘loyalism’ in the 
territory’s media prior to this period attests to the tensions in the relationship 
between France and the territory which rendered the loyalist signification of servility 
to the French legal and administrative system somewhat jarring. These tensions did 
not hold the same significance for someone like ADG, newly arrived from France.  
They also point to the reasons why Ukeiwé would strategically mobilise this 
classification in his Senate speech in order to reinforce those sentiments that united 
New Caledonia with France rather than those that divided them.  Finally, the 
favouring of the notion of loyalism by the new conservative French government was 
in keeping with its strategy of depicting a more one-dimensional relationship with 
France aimed at closing the discursive openings arising as a result of the tensions 
in discourses on relations with France.  Conservative Minister for Overseas 
Territories Bernard Pons argued that the term ‘loyalist’ reflected the reality of the 
relationship between the two countries (Les Nouvelles, 7/5/87).  It was a ‘reality’, as 
we have seen, which the new conservative government was trying to forge. 
 
Les Nouvelles’ occasional use of the term ‘loyalist’ prior to the change in ownership 
- and particularly prior to the 1986 defeat of the French Socialist government - 
accentuated the dilemmatic nature of the paper’s discourses on relations with 
France.2  That Les Nouvelles mobilised this categorisation at all attests to the 
acuteness of anti-independence sentiment within the journalistic team and a 
perceived prescience of the term in expressing a depth of sentiment which it was 
felt other categorisations, such as ‘anti-indépendantiste’ or ‘French Caledonian’, 
were unable to convey.  The dilemmas were partly solved with the election of a 
conservative government in that it then became easier for conservatives to argue 
the need for the maintenance of a close political relationship with France.   During 
this period, Les Nouvelles reminded its readers that ‘loyalism’ signified the will to 
abide by French law, demonstrating that it was aware of the particular signification 
of ‘loyalism’ which distinguished it from the categories of anti-independence identity 
hitherto used (Les Nouvelles, 30/8/86). However, loyalism continued to sit uneasily 
with the lingering expressions of antagonism - or more precisely during this period, 
                                                          
2 See Les Nouvelles of 11/2/85, 22/2/85, 10/5/85, 3/8/85 and 5/2/86. 
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 caution - towards the French government.  It nonetheless became integrated into 
the dilemmatic interpretive repertoires of Les Nouvelles. 
 
‘Loyalist’ identity and the extreme-right press 
 
Les Nouvelles’ somewhat hesitant adoption of loyalism prior to 1986 contrasted with 
its avid usage in Combat Calédonien; but the differences in usage went beyond the 
frequency of appearance.  The discourses developed within Combat constituted 
loyalism as a very different identity to that articulated in Les Nouvelles.   Combat did 
not introduce these discourses to the territory.  Many had already been mobilised 
and developed in Corail (Figure 5.1), largely through authors writing for both 
publications. 3  Indeed, in many senses, Combat (Figure 5.2) was a discursive 
extension of Corail.  Its loyalism was, in other words, predicated on the discursive 
contributions of its extreme-right predecessor.  For this reason, discussion of the 
development of a ‘loyalist’ identity also requires consideration of discourses in 
Corail.4   
                                                          
3 For example, ADG, Lacourrège, Gilbert Monchanin and Didier Real. 
4 In many respects, Corail and Combat Calédonien might be considered more a continuum than two 
separate publications.  There were certainly differences between the two publications, particularly in 
their stylistic features. Corail maintained more of a pictographic orientation on its colour front page 
with many editions featuring a bare-breasted young woman.  Corail adopted more of a magazine 
format than did Combat Calédonien, even though the first years’ editions of Corail were in tabloid 
form.  The publication included general information such as classifieds, airport arrivals and departures, 
tides, cinema programs, a television guide, a horoscope, and a significant number of advertisements 
from large and small firms.  The publication also contained some magazine style articles on health, 
beauty, fitness et cetera.  Corail therefore sought to position itself as both a ‘journal of opinion’ and as 
a leisure publication and appears to have been successful in reaching quite a sizeable audience 
through this market orientation.  An early edition commented that the level of demand for the paper 
was higher than expected and that the paper stock had been exhausted, necessitating the use of 
different paper.  By September 1983, Corail claimed a weekly circulation of 25,000 copies (Corail, 
16/9/83).  Combat Calédonien was more a political publication which only reluctantly began to include 
a couple of magazine-style features as a means to increase circulation following the payment of some 
fairly hefty defamation damages.  One stylistic feature of the paper which distinguished it from Corail 
was its inclusion of political cartoons.  A section appearing for the first few months, ‘Press 
Review...and Dark Designs’ took a quote, usually from either Les Nouvelles or RFO, but sometimes 
from French publications such as Aspects de la France and Le Figaro, and either depicted or parodied 
it in a manner in keeping with the interpretive repertoires developed in the publication.  For example, a 
quote from RFO stating that ‘Edgard Pisani had the tall grass in Thio slashed so that the unrulely brats 
(sic) can no longer hide to throw stones at cars’  (to which Combat Calédonien added, ‘...and scare 
the gendarmes’) was accompanied by a cartoon showing four Kanak babies playing in the tall grass 
with, respectively, a baton, a stick of dynamite, matches and a Molotov cocktail.  The baby with the 
matches is about to light some spilled petrol and has already lit the wick of the molotov cocktail 
(8/3/85).  The paper also included a cartoon strip, ‘Cause toujours...tu m’interesse’ (a sarcastic 
rendering of ‘Keep talking....I’m interested’), which satirised current political events. The length of 
Combat was a little less than half that of Corail (23 pages compared with 43 pages in the later Corail) 
and its circulation was considerably smaller at around 4,000 copies, reflecting its more dedicated 
political focus.  But, for all these differences, there is a sense in which Combat Calédonien could be 
seen as an extension of Corail, particularly in the interpretive repertoires developed in both 
publications. Their differences were as much a reflection of the evolving political situation as they were 
an indication of any difference in opinion on what an appropriate publication should be. Combat 
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At one level there were similarities in the discourses developed in Combat and 
Corail, and Les Nouvelles.  Corail and Combat grounded much of their rhetoric in 
the type of populist discourse articulated in Les Nouvelles.  They railed against the 
policies of the Socialist government in New Caledonia (see for example, Corail, 
30/7/82), decried the humiliation of gendarmes at the hands of FLNKS militants in 
Thio and elsewhere (Combat Calédonien, 9/8/855), criticised the ineptitude of local 
politicians (Corail, 19/7/82 & 6/8/82), and argued persistently that the FLNKS 
demand for self-determination was racist and would lead to Europeans being thrown 
out of the territory (Corail 26/3/82 & 3/2/84).6  But at another level, their discourses 
were very different.  Even in developing discourses which evoked those of Les 
Nouvelles, there were nuances which indicated the existence of a very different set 
of interpretive resources.  For example, Corail’s editorial on the creation of 
Chatenay’s PNC begins with the observation that the ‘Caledonian political world is 
sliding towards independence’, a point also suggested in Les Nouvelles, but then 
goes on to explain this political turn in New Caledonia as a reaction to the demise of 
France ‘exacerbated by the aims of a guilt-ridden civilisation’: 
 
 In this big game of History’s dupes, the losers are branded.  Locked in a 
despair which the Machiavellian socialist power, marvellously incarnated in 
its local representative, has played a part in anchoring in their hearts, by 
making them doubt the will of France, the castaways of confidence hold on 
to what they consider their last hope.  Rotten, it only sustains them for as 
long as it takes to achieve their fate, which will throw them on the bank 
where the wrecks of all previous disasters came to die (Corail, 5/2/82).   
                                                                                                                                                                          
Calédonien was more strident and aggressive in tone, but so too was the political climate during the 
period of its publication in 1985.  The tolerance of centrist political views in some early articles in 
Corail, evident for example in an interview with the centrist politician and New Caledonian Senator 
Lionel Cherrier published in the magazine’s second edition (3/4/80), gave way to uncompromising 
criticism of attempts to foster a centrist political response later in the year.  Just prior to the political 
realignment which saw the centrist FNSC break its alliance with the RPCR and instead join with the FI, 
Corail opined:  ‘For two years now, week after week, Corail had denounced, proof at the ready, the 
criminal actions of the FNSC.  For two years now, week after week, Corail has denounced the suicidal 
apathy of the Caledonians who consider the political deals, secret or otherwise, of the FNSC with 
fraternal and pluri-ethnic Caledonia’s worst enemies - that is to say the racists of the Independence 
Front - as simple and unimportant ups and downs’ (4/6/82).  A year after the realignment of the FNSC 
with the FI, an article appeared entitled ‘The anniversary of the “grand air” of treason’ which recalled 
Corail’s version of the circumstances of the FNSC-RPCR split (24/6/83).  Less than a year later, a 
series of lengthy and seemingly obsessive articles, entitled ‘The Caledonian sickness’ was published 
over several weeks describing and discussing these same events, but this time in enormous detail 
(Corail, December 1983 - March 1984). 
5 ‘Poor gendarmes, sad alibi of the disorder, abused by a decadent power.  From today, justice is no 
longer in command, it is the brave warriors of socialist and racist Kanaky’ (9/8/85). 
6 As an example of highly personalised reporting, Combat Calédonien published an article which 
questioned who a woman was who frequently appeared at the High Commission, using this as an 
excuse to describe Pisani’s personal history in injurious detail and describe him as ‘Pisani-blue-beard’ 
(Combat Calédonien, 8/3/85). 
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Similarly, an article entitled, ‘There won’t be any place for Caledonians on the 
Caillou7 of independence’ - an unremarkable enough statement in the context of 
New Caledonian anti-independence politics - concludes somewhat more 
distinctively, ‘Everyone should know, thousands of us will be eliminated’ (Corail, 
26/3/82).  The use of such strident tropes is a feature of extreme-right discourse, 
and was one of the characteristics of the interpretive resources employed in Corail 
and Combat Calédonien which distinguished them from Les Nouvelles.   
 
We are given an insight into other distinguishing features of extreme-right press 
discourse through Corail’s reference above to ‘History’.  Much of Les Nouvelles’ 
discourses was rhetorically grounded in a notion of ‘rights’, which was exemplified in 
the stress placed in the paper on the argument that pro-independence demands 
were racist.  For Corail and Combat, on the other hand, the rhetorical grounding of 
their discourse was in the lessons of history:   history became the terrain on which 
these publications developed their interpretive repertoires and through which they 
sought to privilege certain readings of local political events.8  
 
                                                          
7 A local nick-name for New Caledonia is ‘le Caillou’. 
8 The appearance in Corail of historical articles derived in part from Lacourrège’s interest in historical 
research.  Lacourrège published several lengthy historical articles, such as the four part series on the 
history of the press in New Caledonia and a series of articles on the nineteenth century journalist 
Henri Rochefort-Lucay, publisher of La Lanterne, the material for which was gathered from the Paris 
police archives and French period newspapers (see for example, Corail, 16/10/81 & 10/6/83) 
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Figure 5.1:  Corail, 18/3/83 (cover) 
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Figure 5.2:  Combat Calédonien, 26/7/85 (cover) 
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 History and grand narrative in Corail and Combat Calédonien 
 
The historical narrative developed in Corail and Combat  was seldom presented in 
any sustained fashion within individual articles although, as we shall see, there were 
some notable exceptions.  Despite its piecemeal introduction, history is nonetheless 
put to the task of advancing in Corail and Combat a series of discourses on 
modernity, tradition, capitalism and socialism which favour particular readings of 
local political events.  The most sustained articulations of these discourses 
appeared in articles written for Corail and Combat by René Blasco, and in 
contributions to both publications by Gilbert Monchanin who, in an article written 
ostensibly about Tjibaou, provides perhaps the best illustration of the stunning 
historical and geographical sweep of the grand narrative developed in these 
publications.     
 
Monchanin’s article begins by arguing that the media has done much to promote an 
image of Tjibaou as a charismatic and intelligent leader.  However, he reminds his 
readers that Tjibaou has proclaimed himself not only ‘canaque’, but also ‘socialist’, a 
reference which precipitates from Monchanin a sweeping historical overview of what 
he sees as the socialist malaise.  He writes: 
 
 Let’s leave aside the original socialist doctrine:  that which was nationalist, 
individualist, that demanded respect for hierarchies and natural values. 
Obviously, this is no longer at issue, having for a century been expelled to 
History’s oblivion.  The Socialism in question is completely different, 
opposed even.  It is internationalist - worldist we’d say.  It is egalitarian, 
‘massifying’.  It is opposed to everything that has for centuries made the 
greatness of Western civilisations. 
 
This Western civilisation was said to be ‘fashioned by superior beings who climbed 
well above their like’.  For Monchanin, the first of these superior beings was 
‘Cromagnon man’ from whom ‘a universe has been drawn which, rejecting the 
debilitating, annihilating mass, has projected the genius of individuals enthusiastic 
to take on progress’.   
 
Socialism becomes, within this schema, the ‘absolute and caricatured antithesis of 
the Western spirit’: 
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  For risk, enthusiasm, combat, it substitutes aboulic charity - welfare - 
masked by the deceptive term solidarity...Rather than exalting the individual 
always in pursuit of an ever bigger dream, it exalts - pitiful choice - burial in 
this formless, colourless and odourless mass, where all the heads have been 
planed to the height of the lowest head.  The European presence in this 
country should have been the chance for Canaques, if they had been able, to 
emulate and overtake, ON THEIR OWN GROUND, those who have created 
the only planetary civilisation that the world has known (Corail, 20/5/83). 
 
The presentation of a racial hierarchy presided over by European civilisation, and 
the positioning of ‘Canaques’, along with other indigenous peoples, as demonstrably 
incapable of emulating this civilisation and, therefore, inferior, provided a stark 
justification for the maintenance of colonial relations of power in the territory and 
held the potential to produce significant ideological effects.   It also underscored the 
significance of Combat’s privileging of a ‘loyalist’ identity over other ways of 
categorising the anti-independence population; for what was important within this 
narrative - what, in other words, gave continuing justification to the maintenance of 
colonialism in New Caledonia - was not a claim to be ‘Caledonian’ or to constitute a 
‘people’, but to be part of a civilisation.  Loyalism expressed this belonging.   
 
The centrality of this presumption of European racial superiority to the discourses 
developed in Corail and Combat explains another distinguishing feature of these 
publications.  We have seen that much of the struggle over independence in Les 
Nouvelles was expressed in an acute fluidity of identity.  In Corail and Combat, 
there is an almost total disregard for contesting Melanesian identity.  This disregard 
is reflected in their willing use of the term ‘Canaque’, as in the above quote, and 
even ‘Kanak’ when referring to anti-independence Melanesians such as Dick 
Ukeiwé (see, for example, Corail, 5/11/8 & 30/7/82).  Such a use of ‘Kanak’ in Les 
Nouvelles would have been considered highly seditious; its use in Corail was 
unproblematic because ‘History’ had demonstrated that identity was fixed:  
indigenous peoples had, within this interpretive schema, demonstrated themselves 
incapable of attaining the heights of European civilisation, and no change in 
nomenclature would alter this historically verifiable fact.   
 
This view of racial identity as biologically fixed is evident in the choice of the title 
Identity for the National Front’s intellectual magazine in France.  What this title 
signifies is not an exploration of the complexities of identity, but rather a will to 
retain French national identity against the sullying cultural influences of immigrants 
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 in France (Marcus, 1995: 116-7).  In Corail and Combat, it is also evident in the 
parodying of the pro-independence claim to a ‘Kanak’ identity, spelt with a ‘K’.  This 
was achieved through replacing ‘Cs’ with ‘Ks’ in words used either in reference to 
the pro-independence struggle, or used by the pro-independence movement.  Thus, 
Corail referred to the ‘Républik de Kanala de Machoro’ (Machoro was from Canala) 
and to a ‘Konstitution Kanake’ (21/11/81 & 4/2/83), while Combat referred to the 
‘Ekoles populaires kanakes’ (8/3/85).  One reading of this strategy of substitution is 
to underscore the fixity of identity, the argument being that no amount of discursive 
gloss was going to change its basic nature.     
 
Loyalism, international socialism and Melanesian culture 
 
This assertion of racial fixity contradicted the effort rendered in Combat to 
appropriate loyalism to the interpretive repertoires developed in the publication.  
What is surprising about these repertoires is that they often appeared only 
tangentially relevant to the issue of independence.  Indeed, loyalism seemed to 
have more to do with an antipathy towards international socialism than a stance on 
independence. 
 
We are given an insight into the discourse on international socialism by following 
further Monchanin’s comments on Tjibaou’s advocacy of socialism.  Monchanin 
argued that, in this advocacy, Tjibaou was merely responding ‘to a coherent and evil 
will that isn’t his own and of which he probably isn’t even conscious ... It is that of 
those who have doomed the West to destruction’ (20/5/83).  This ‘coherent and evil 
will’ is what Corail and Combat referred to elsewhere as Marxist international 
subversion (Corail, 8/4/83).  It is this subversion, and its expression in demands for 
indigenous rights, not independence, that emerges as the primary referent of these 
publications’ critique.  As Corail noted, ‘to be “indépendantiste” is a right, but 
matching this word, which is respectable in itself in spite of its utopian aspect, with 
the two other adjectives, “kanak” and “socialist”, is to practice both racism and 
political despotism’ (Corail 10/9/82). 
 
This focus on international socialism rendered political events throughout history 
and around the world relevant to the New Caledonian situation, but within these 
publications, and especially in feature articles, there was a relative dearth of 
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 attention to the New Caledonian political situation per se.   Often the relevance was 
only referred to in a general introduction to the article while the article itself made no 
mention of New Caledonia because it had been taken from a French extreme-right 
publication.  For example, one article recalled in considerable detail President De 
Gaulle’s acts in relinquishing Algeria.  Combat’s  introduction commented that the 
anniversary of De Gaulle’s return to power on 13 May 1958 was a fitting time to 
remind younger generations of the acts of this ‘Gaullist impostor’ and reminded 
readers that Pisani himself had once been a Gaullist (Combat, 17/5/85).  The 
relevance of a series of articles published in Combat on the experience of political 
partition in several countries was more obvious, as partition had been mooted as 
one of Pisani’s possible options in his development of a political strategy for the 
future of the territory.  As the introduction to the series commented:  ‘Partition!  Ah, 
the terrible word finally let out.  At “Combat Calédonien”, we’ve been thinking about 
it discreetly for a long time’ (Combat, 24/5/85).  The series began with the 
publication over several weeks of extracts from a book written in 1959 by Gaullist 
Minister Alain Peyrefitte, in which he considered the option of partition for Algeria by 
examining sympathetically the situation in such countries as Cyprus, French 
Canada and Switzerland.9   In one introduction, Combat presented partition as a 
means to both thwart international socialism and save Melanesian society.  It was 
argued that the agents of international socialism - whom the extreme-right describe 
as the ‘Internationalists’ (the French term is ‘mondialistes’) - oppose partition 
because their objective is to impose a ‘planetary unification of the world, the 
disappearance of countries, nations, cultures, the global uniformity of an 
international economy under the pretext of free exchange’ (Combat, 31/5/85).  
Partition, therefore, by thwarting international socialism, would enable Melanesian 
culture to survive.  As one FN politician visiting New Caledonia put it:  ‘if 
Melanesians were to separate from the French flag, it would be the suppression of 
their custom and way of living, for there is no custom in the countries of the 
gulag’ (Combat Calédonien, 12/7/85). René Blasco elaborated on this theme in an 
article on what he termed ‘separate development’ in South Africa which, he argued, 
was not ‘apartheid’.10  ‘Separate development’ was more apt in describing the then 
                                                          
9 The book is called, Faut-il partager l’Algerie? 
10 Combat Calédonien’s introduction to Blasco’s article provided an excellent insight into the breadth of 
the extreme right’s interpretive ambit:  ‘That was expected.  It was enough to pronounce the word 
partition for the cunning echo to respond:  apartheid!...When pacifists start serving Muscovite 
imperialism, when homosexuals say they’re normal, when murderers are no longer sent to the gallows, 
and the destruction of foetuses is planned in the name of life and liberty; when we talk about progress 
in the midst of a totalitarian regression which is devouring our societies and we invent a historical 
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 South African situation, he argued,  ‘in order to highlight their concern;  to ensure 
that all the peoples and races of Southern Africa have access to a development 
which fits properly with their culture - their world vision - and those indescribable 
choices which are forever printed in each according to his or her atavism’ (31/5/85).   
 
This discourse on indigenous culture contrasts starkly with the discourse on ‘pluri-
ethnicity’ developed concertedly in Les Nouvelles.  Within Combat, indigenous 
culture is manifestly inferior and therefore fragile.  Its inadequacy and fragility is 
attested to in the readiness with which elements in Melanesian society have 
capitulated to the doctrine of socialism, rather than emulate European civilisation.  
The optimal response, within this discourse, is to facilitate the Melanesian cultural 
slumber by separating Melanesians from European civilisation and the corrupting 
influences of its socialist ‘has-beens’, geographically if at all possible, and, if not, 
culturally at least.  The notion of cultural borrowing and blending implicit in the 
discourse of ‘pluri-ethnicity’ is anathema to this discourse on Melanesian culture 
and its place within the grand narrative developed in these publications.   
 
The struggle for hegemony in anti-independence publications  
 
The almost obsessive will in Corail and Combat to historically and geographically 
contextualise the political struggle in New Caledonia in order to render it meaningful 
within the context of the grand narrative which they developed evokes Gramsci’s 
writings on the strategy through which political groups defend or contest ideological 
hegemony, the precursor to political hegemony.  Gramsci argued that this strategy 
involved struggles over what he termed ‘common sense’ - the taken-for-granted, but 
yet inherently fragmented and contradictory, understandings we develop of our 
world.  Hegemony is secured through the articulation of understandings which better 
reconcile these contradictions.11 
 
We have seen that there were significant dilemmas in Les Nouvelles’ discourses 
and little attempt at their reconciliation in earlier editions.  In a sense, this lack of 
effort reflected the relatively hegemonic position of the paper’s discourses within the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
equality which is the privileged arm in the dismantling of natural inequalities; in short, who would be 
surprised that, with each word, we finish by saying the contrary of its prime meaning?’ (31/5/85). 
11 For a discussion of Gramsci’s notion of common sense, see Femia, 1981:132-3 and Roger Simon, 
1982:58-64. 
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 anti-independence community.  Les Nouvelles could appeal to this fragmented 
common sense, without needing to demonstrate a superior understanding of local 
political circumstances.  Corail and Combat Calédonien, on the other hand, were 
attempting to challenge this common sense by presenting alternative interpretations 
of these circumstances.  They were attempting, in other words, to wrest anti-
independence hegemony from the more centrist conservative position articulated in 
Les Nouvelles.12  The advancement of their view of loyalism required the 
mobilisation of discourses and rhetorical strategies which could render more 
coherent the fragmented common-sense presented in Les Nouvelles, thus 
precipitating this will to contextualise.  
 
The title of René Blasco’s weekly segment in Combat, ‘Taboo’, points to another 
discursive strategy employed in these publications.  Rather than ignore oppositional 
discourse, Corail and Combat sought to co-opt it to their own interpretive armoury.  
Thus, for example, the claim that Corail was ‘fascist’ precipitated a response which 
outlined five alleged characteristics of fascism and then described how these 
applied to the pro-independence movement (2/10/81).  To the accusation that the 
publication had incited the assassination of Declercq , Corail responded with an 
analysis of the comments made on Declercq in its ten previous editions, finding, not 
surprisingly, that there were no traces of ‘fascism’ or comments which might be read 
as inciting violence (ibid).  Other terms were also turned back on the movement, 
such as when Kanak demands for self-determination were described as ‘Kanak 
apartheid’ (22/1/82).  This strategy of appropriating oppositional terms, metaphors 
and discourses was, of course, aimed at undermining them.  It is completely 
opposed to the strategy of the ‘unspoken’ in the mass audience media which seeks 
to contain the discursive sphere by avoiding reference to oppositional discourse, 
viewing such reference, we might presume, as tantamount to its validation.  But the 
will to broach what others may have considered ‘taboo’ was only partial.  Corail and 
Combat were highly critical of Les Nouvelles’ policy of publishing pro-independence 
communiques.  As Corail commented: 
 
 And that’s enough from you too Leyraud, Ventrillon, d’Andre, Lepot and 
all the other tools of the trade, all ‘born in Noumea’, as you often sign, 
enough of offering, under the facile and hypocritical cover of the ‘right to 
                                                          
12 This is not to say that the views which they expressed were not held by some of Les Nouvelles’ 
loyalist readership.  The white supremacist discourses articulated in Corail and Combat Calédonien 
were certainly close to some of the more racist rhetoric in Les Nouvelles. 
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 information’, your columns - those blessed and impregnable sanctuaries 
where the patent destabilisers of New Caledonia find refuge as soon as 
their coups have been realised.   Are you so naive as to think for a single 
moment that on the big evening when the big prizes are being distributed, 
seats will be kept for you on the stage ‘for services rendered in the past?’ 
(Corail, 21/1/83). 
 
Corail even went so far as to accuse Les Nouvelles of complicity with the pro-
independence movement, arguing that:  ‘At Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, the 
general rule is not to even slightly hurt the indépendantistes’ (Corail, 22/4/83).  
Critique of other anti-independence media was a means not only to demonstrate 
Corail and Combat’s superior commitment to independence, but also to advance 
their own enigmatic narratives on history, as when Corail refuted FR3 radio’s 
comment that ‘South Africa was the only African country still occupied by whites’, 
arguing instead that whites were already in South Africa in 1652, before the blacks 
started to invade the territory.   
 
Anti-independence politics and dilemmatic discourse in extreme-right 
publications 
 
No matter how seemingly totalising were the narratives developed in Corail and 
Combat, significant discursive tensions remained.  These tensions were the product 
of differing sentiments within extreme-right political groups and the more general 
difficulties of mobilising discourses developed in one context - metropolitan France - 
in the very different socio-historical and political setting of New Caledonia.   
 
In contrast to the inherent unity suggested in the category of ‘loyalist’, the 
population who came to describe themselves thus were diverse and far from united 
on key political issues.  As we have seen, a sizeable number of Melanesians 
opposed independence.  In addition, the European ‘loyalist’ population comprised 
several social groups, each with different collective experiences and consequently 
different readings of the socio-political circumstances surrounding them.  Tensions 
existed between those European Caledonians born in the territory, termed 
‘Caldoche’,13 and those who migrated to the territory in the post-war period.  Among 
                                                          
13 The origins of the term ‘Caldoche’ are uncertain and disputed (see for example, McCallum, 1989:4-
5; Barbançon, 1992:17-21), but its popularisation appears largely to have been the result of its use in 
the foreign media during the period 1984-85 as a classification opposed to that of ‘Kanak’ (Barbançon, 
1992:19).  Although the term is becoming more popular in the 1990s among Europeans born in the 
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 the earliest immigrants were the estimated 2,000 Pieds Noirs from North Africa, 
primarily Algeria, who had fled after the withdrawal of France from Algeria.  As 
Bobin writes, these Pieds Noirs ‘arrived in New Caledonia with the firm intention of 
not seeing the Algerian misadventure repeated’ (Bobin, 1991).  Their members were 
among the more uncompromising anti-independence militants and they came to 
occupy important positions in anti-independence political groups.  The Pieds Noirs 
were followed by a large number of migrants from France who came to the territory 
in the 1960s and 1970s, encouraged by the resettlement policies of the French 
government and the economic boom in the territory during the period 1968-72 
(Bobin, 1991; Henningham, 1992:62-3; Barbançon, 1992:33-40).   
 
The tensions between the immigrant and Caldoche communities were exacerbated 
by tensions within both communities.  Immigrants from France were frequently 
contemptuous of a perceived lack of culture and urbanity within the Caldoche 
community.  The contempt was reciprocated, the Caldoches being resentful and 
scornful of the ‘metro’ presumption of superiority (McCallum, 1989:4-7).  In addition, 
economic differences within the Caldoche community were stark and precipitated 
animosity.  The collective habitus of the Caldoche politico-economic elite was far 
removed from that of the poor broussard living a near subsistence lifestyle in the 
bush.  Yet these were precisely the polar extremes of the continuum of social 
groupings within the anti-independence movement.  The Caldoche alliance with the 
post-war immigrant communities to oppose independence meant that the political 
groups which they formed were replete with tensions and divisions which surfaced 
publicly at various moments during the decade. 
 
This alliance was expressed politically with the formation in 1978 of the RPCR.  
Divisions within the anti-independence community precipitated the formation of 
more extreme right-wing political parties and movements:  the Front Calédonien 
(FC) in 1982 and, as we have seen, the FN(NC) in 1984.  Although these smaller 
parties were formed, in part, in response to the perceived inadequacy of the 
RPCR’s response to the escalating push for independence, it is important to note, 
as McCallum does, that many of the more extremist opponents of independence 
were members of the RPCR, not the ostensibly more extreme parties (McCallum, 
1992:54). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
territory, it was rarely used by these people in the late 1980s and was still considered by many to be 
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The relationships between anti-independence political groups were rendered 
somewhat ambiguous by the shifting allegiances of some of their members.  Some 
politicians shifted parties and movements on several occasions during the decade.  
For example, Justin Guillemard, initially an RPCR politician, formed the FC in 1982.  
He left the movement in 1984 and was expelled from the RPCR in 1987 following a 
series of personal attacks against RPCR politicians (ibid:35).  Guillemard then 
joined the FN(NC) and stood at the head of the party’s ticket in the West Region 
during the 1988 regional elections (ibid:44).  An even more extreme case of political 
mobility was that of François Néoéré who stood in 1979 as a pro-independence 
candidate on the FI’s ticket and was, by 1984, the secretary general of the FN(NC).   
 
The existence of tensions within and between anti-independence groups was 
acknowledged in Combat, and ADG argued that his publication should reflect ‘ALL 
opinions on the local Right’ (Combat, 6/9/85).  While, arguably, Corail and Combat 
privileged more extremist opinion, the practice of publishing articles from outside 
contributors resulted in some of the discursive tensions existing within the more 
extremist right-wing community emerging in these publications.  For example, the 
experience of colonialism in the territory was described differently. At one point 
Corail likened new legislation which tightened metropolitan political control in the 
territory to the ‘worst times of colonialism, it’s Paris, and Paris only, that commands’, 
evoking the type of populist, anti-French rhetoric which underpinned early pro-
autonomy discourse (Corail, 19/7/82).  However, only a month later, the ‘fait 
colonial’ (‘colonial fact’) was defended in Corail by RPCR politician George Faure 
who argued that: 
 
 ...there is nothing to condemn the fait colonial; there is every reason to be 
proud of it.  It is the colonial experience that made New Caledonia what it is 
with its public amenities, and a remarkable and unequalled educational, 
sanitary and social system.  It is the colonial experience that liberated 
Melanesians from structural tribal dictatorships (Corail, 26/8/83). 
 
Faure’s defence points to another area of divergence within extreme-right 
discourse.  His positing of colonialism as a liberating force for Melanesians sits 
uneasily with the discourse articulated above on the demonstrable incapacity of 
Melanesians to take advantage of the benefits of European civilisation.  Such 
                                                                                                                                                                          
slightly derogatory. 
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 tensions in discourses on Melanesians were a major source of discursive dilemma 
within these extreme-right publications.  They attested to the difficulties inherent in 
the transposition of extreme-right discourse from a metropolitan context to a colonial 
one.   
 
Mediations in extreme-right discourse 
 
The grand narrative developed in articles by Blasco, Monchanin and elsewhere in 
Corail and Combat, in its discourse on Melanesians, appeared to make little 
concession to the particularities of the New Caledonian anti-independence context.  
There were many respects in which this narrative could be considered unsettling in 
a New Caledonian anti-independence context.  The transposition of the extreme-
right’s anti-immigration rhetoric to the territorial context in which a large portion of 
the anti-independence population could themselves be described as ‘immigrants’ 
was a difficulty which resulted in minimal emphasis being placed on this aspect of 
the extreme-right’s program in their New Caledonian publications.  There were, 
however, some mobilisations of anti-immigration discourse.  Blasco, for example, in 
defending South Africa’s ‘separate development’, launches a tirade against those 
who blame the West for the human tragedy throughout Africa and asserts: 
  
 One day, Europe will be sick of its gloomy Punch and Judy shows. 
 One day, Europe and America will have had enough of being invaded by 
the unkempt crowds that demanded, boastfully, to be their own masters, only 
to invade us today, fleeing their countries. 
 Countries which we made sparkle.  That they destroyed and turned to dust.  
After 40 years of freedom, Africa stinks and runs for refuge in Europe 
(Combat, 23/8/85). 
 
Blasco’s primary referent here is, of course, African immigrants in Europe, but the 
not too fanciful possibility existed that the text could be turned towards another 
referent - immigrants to New Caledonia and, in particular, Pieds Noirs who 
‘demanded, boastfully, to be their own masters, only to invade us today, fleeing their 
country’.  This type of unsettling parallel existed in other extreme-right discourses.  
In discussing the National Front’s program in France, Marcus argues that the party 
‘insists that a plurality of cultures and peoples must be preserved, but clearly not in 
France’.  Its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, recognises cultural difference but argues 
that all peoples’ engagement with the world is best ‘adapted to the geographical 
environment in which they were born, live and die.  They are the products of an 
 169
 historical evolution and, just like individuals, they have a past, they have origins, 
their own characters and a singular destiny’ (Le Pen cited in Marcus, 1995:106).  Le 
Pen therefore argues that ‘there is an intangible relationship between a living 
individual and his land.  Just as an animal feels sheltered in its biological space and 
seeks to mark out its territory, so human beings need a homeland’ (ibid).  The 
transposition of this discourse on culture and place into the New Caledonian context 
renders it distinctly evocative of Kanak claims to land ownership and demands for 
Kanak independence.  As a result, it was unlikely that such a discourse would be 
publicly mobilised in the territory.  But even more seemingly benign utterances, such 
as Le Pen’s comment in Corail that ‘I have ... the right to demand not to be 
suspected and persecuted because I am French and Catholic’, risked appropriation 
by Kanaks who could demand similar rights on the basis of race and belief (Combat, 
21/6/85).   
 
The points of appropriation between extreme-right and pro-independence discourse 
were numerous because of the common grounding of their key interpretive 
repertoires in notions of cultural difference which both the extreme-right and Kanaks 
argued granted them special rights - the one to a French ‘homeland’, the other to a 
Kanak one.  This notion of irrevocable cultural difference contrasts significantly with 
a more mainstream assimilationist discourse on Melanesian culture in the anti-
independence movement, reflected in Faure’s comment above on the benefits 
brought to Melanesians by colonialism, and frequently expressed through notions of 
‘pluri-ethnicity’ and ‘fraternity’.  Perhaps because of the disturbing parallels between 
extreme-right and pro-independence discourses on cultural difference, this 
assimilationist discourse was at times privileged in Corail and Combat.  Its 
mobilisation facilitated the transposition of other aspects of extreme-right discourse 
between the very different socio-historical and cultural settings of metropolitan 
France and New Caledonia. 
 
Negotiating dilemmatic discourse:  the case of François Néoéré 
 
I have already pointed to the tendency within publications to section off dilemmatic 
discourses to particular themes in order to optimise their rhetorical efficacy.  This 
practice was also evident in Corail and Combat.   Any attempt at reconciliation, if it 
occurred, was usually left to the reader.  One wonders how a Melanesian opponent 
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 of independence would negotiate through these discourses on socialism, culture 
and place which, in some of their manifestations, were markedly less than 
complimentary to Melanesians.  The anti-independence movement, including the 
extreme right, sought after all to court Melanesian support in order to augment its 
symbolic capital and enhance its electoral fortunes. How would a person such as 
Néoéré - a Melanesian who had never even visited France prior to 1984 and whose 
extreme-right discourse could therefore be expected to reflect local permutations - 
effect such a negotiation?   
 
We gain some insight into how he did this through articles written by him and 
published in Corail and Combat following his appointment to the position of FN(NC) 
Secretary General in 1984.  What is striking about Néoéré’s discourse is the 
selectiveness of the resources which he uses and the enigmatic manner in which 
these resources are choreographed into interpretive repertoires which tend to 
militate against the worst of the extreme-right’s anti-egalitarianism.  Indeed, in 
Néoéré’s writing, there is a rhetorical stress on egalitarianism which is presented as 
congruent with the political program of the FN.   
 
Néoéré’s emphasis on egalitarianism is achieved through the central place afforded 
a discourse on Christianity, also prevalent in some extreme-right political discourse 
in France, particularly that of Le Pen (Marcus, 1995; D’Appollonia, 1988).  For 
Néoéré, the struggle was not a fight against independence but rather a fight for 
Christianity.  It was a struggle against Marxist materialism and atheism - a ‘fight for 
peace in Jesus Christ’ against Marxism, as he described it (Corail, 11/5/84).  Only 
Jesus Christ, he argued, could ‘unite in LOVE all Caledonians not matter what their 
race, in the shadow of a single flag, that of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’ (Corail, 
11/5/84).   
 
We are given some insight as to why Jesus Christ should want to unite Caledonians 
under the French flag and no other from the discourse on Melanesians which he 
chooses to mobilise.  Instead of a stark discourse on Melanesian cultural ineptitude 
such as that developed by Monchanin and Blasco, Néoéré chose to stress 
Melanesian progress, not stasis, under colonialism.  However, unlike many 
Europeans, he felt the need to qualify this progress.  He anticipated the Kanak retort 
to his argument by acknowledging that ‘some errors and injustices [had been] 
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 committed by some French settlers in New Caledonia’ but recognised that these 
‘would never equal the wealth and benefits, as much spiritual and cultural as 
material, distributed profusely during the past 182 years, to the benefit of 
Melanesians’ (Combat, 22/3/85).   
 
But remaining with France was also, he argued, a duty.  Here, his argument became 
highly enigmatic in his linking of this duty with Christianity and custom.  Custom and 
Christianity were for Néoéré nearly synonymous because:  ‘Custom [too] is the love 
of man, it is the respect of the word of the elders who have given it’ (Combat, 
12/7/85).14  The ‘word of the elders’ to which he is referring here is that which 
supposedly ceded New Caledonia to the French at the beginning of colonisation, a 
‘word’ which the pro-independence movement disputes was ever given.  For Néoéré 
then, only through the struggle against independence could Christianity, and 
therefore custom, be sustained in the territory, and, once sustained, both would bind 
New Caledonia to France.   
 
There is a curious circularity in this argument on the need to fight for France in order 
to be bound to France by custom.  There are also dilemmas produced through his 
highly enigmatic discursive negotiations, in particular, in his advocacy of the 
sustenance of custom while welcoming European cultural influence in Melanesian 
society.  But what is most striking in the interpretive repertoires which he develops 
is the centrality of egalitarian notions to them.  His discourses on Christianity, 
fraternity and custom are rhetorically grounded in notions of equality, yet, in their 
combination, they support an outcome, not to mention a political party, which rejects 
racial and cultural equality. 
 
This apparent disjuncture between discourse and its likely outcomes was also 
noticed by Wetherell and Potter in their analysis of Pakeha New Zealander 
discussion of Maori culture and society.  As they found: 
 
 The majority of Pakeha New Zealanders we interviewed used the resources 
of individual rights, egalitarianism, practical rationality, history as progress 
and so on to argue for outcomes which we would describe, taking up our 
own stance within the argumentative battlefield, as actually ‘illiberal’, as 
designed to maintain unequal power relations and the dominance of a 
                                                          
14 Néoéré’s linking of Christianity with custom was not novel.  Tjibaou had himself commented that:  
‘The oral tradition of our people is much the same as the Bible’s’ (quoted in Chesneaux, 1988:61).   
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 particular group of Pakeha New Zealanders (Wetherell and Potter, 
1992:186).   
 
As they point out, this disjuncture reinforces the view that ideology can be assessed 
only as an effect.  It is the manner in which the interpretive resources are 
assembled, not so much the resources themselves, which set in train certain 
ideological effects (ibid:186).   
 
This is not an argument about the intentions behind Néoéré’s discursive 
constructions.  He may well have believed that only the extreme-right was 
concerned to save Christianity in the territory and therefore ensure the possibility of 
the type of ‘democratic fraternity’ which he advocated, just as he may well have 
believed, as he argued, that the National Front was not racist, a view lent credence 
by his presence at the head of the party during most of 1985.  The ultimate irony, 
however, was Néoéré’s forced resignation towards the end of that year, following 
the circulation among FN(NC) members of a letter from Le Pen urging his 
replacement by a European (Connell, 1987:370).  His ousting was received with 
incomprehension by the new editorial writer at Combat who had taken over from 
ADG upon his return to France.  This writer commented, somewhat politely, that Le 
Pen’s act must have reflected his confusion over the New Caledonian situation 
(Combat, 27/12/85). 
 
Many read Néoéré’s forced resignation as validation of the compulsive racism of the 
National Front.  As one writer to Bwenando commented: 
 
 After having eaten all the grist that came to his mill and having adhered to all 
political parties, Mister ‘chameleon’ NEOERE has not been able to take on 
the white colour necessary for membership of the National Front; hence his 
eviction from the fascist sect.  He didn’t understand that for the Les Pens, 
Chiracs and the like, the aim is to keep Caledonia for France, not necessarily 
with Kanaks (Bwenando, 10/1/86). 
 
There is, of course, much to commend this reading.  But Néoéré’s disfavour could 
also be read as a response to the perceived waywardness of his discourses.   In his 
attempt to articulate a vision which did not relegate Melanesians to a cultural past, 
but which at the same time did not denigrate this cultural past, Christianity, 
egalitarianism and fraternity emerged as his unifying themes.  Perhaps it was 
thought by Le Pen, and no doubt others within the FN(NC), that, in the process, 
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 Néoéré had lost the plot.  Others clearly held this view, although for different 
reasons.  The writer to Bwenando continued: 
 
 So, I suggest that he continue to write a lot of anti- socio-communist and 
anti-Marxist articles.  He has so much talent and we have so little opportunity 
to laugh at funny stories.  Besides, I’m sure it won’t be long, with the divine 
inspiration he has, before he writes that it was a Marxist mole infiltrator of the 
weekly Combat Calédonien who obtained from LE PEN the expulsion of 
NEOERE, the attacker of the ‘red devils’. 
 Really, we are impatient to read you, fake brother NEOERE (ibid). 
 
Others also found his discursive and rhetorical constructions less than convincing.  
The party formed by Néoéré for the 1986 French national elections, Vérité 
Fraternité, Vivre Français, did poorly, winning no more than 2.6 per cent of the vote, 
principally in Noumea and his place of origin, the Isle of Pines (Connell, 1987:370).  
Néoéré, in seeking to render coherent the dilemmas which others had left 
unaddressed, had clearly not found a way through which was convincing to many 
Melanesians or Europeans.   
 
Néoéré’s discourse on Melanesians and his vision of a ‘democratic fraternity’ in 
Caledonia was also antithetical to the vision of loyalism which was projected 
through the grand narrative discussed above, and which was clearly much more in 
keeping with some of the central premises of extreme-right discourse in France.  
This loyalism was the articulation of an identity which was oriented towards an 
affinity with a civilisation, not an emphasis on local political outcomes.  This is 
attested to by the steady demise of references to ‘loyalists’ or ‘loyalism’ in the anti-
independence media, particularly Les Nouvelles, following the ratification of the 
Matignon accords.   The shift in political emphasis in the territory from issues of 
grand principle to negotiated political agreements, brought about by this ratification, 
rendered somewhat anachronistic the claim to a ‘loyalist’ existence, particularly after 
the passing of the initial hostility among a significant proportion of RPCR voters to 
Lafleur’s agreement to the accords.  The new political exigencies required the 
emergence of new subjectivities, along with a renewed contestation over the claims 
to a rightful existence as ‘Caledonian’.  
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 CHAPTER SIX - THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MEDIA 
 
The prevalence of racist discourses on Melanesians in the anti-independence 
media, and the persistent denigration in these media of Kanak political demands, 
provided compelling reasons for the pro-independence movement to investigate the 
establishment of its own media.  Not only could such media provide information and 
cohesion to the movement, it could also assert a Kanak existence in the face of its 
persistent denial in more mainstream anti-independence publications.  That the will 
to assert identity was at the forefront of the push to establish pro-independence 
media is evident in the comment from a prominent pro-independence journalist that 
Radio Djiido was established to ‘allow the Kanak People to reclaim its Word in its 
Country so that its Voice could radiate throughout the whole Territory’ (Waia, 1991).  
This notion that reclaiming the right to speak is implicit in the anti-colonial project 
has been central to post-colonial theory and writing.  As Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 
argue:  ‘The seizing of the means of communication and the liberation of post-
colonial writing by the appropriation of the written word become crucial features of 
the process of self-assertion and of the ability to reconstruct the world as an 
unfolding historical process’ (1989:82).   
 
Adam and Tiffin’s definition of post-colonialism highlights the relevance of this area 
of enquiry to an analysis of the pro-independence media in New Caledonia.   Post-
colonialism can be defined, they argue, as discursive practices involving ‘resistance 
to colonialism, colonialist ideologies, and their contemporary forms and 
subjectificatory legacies’ (cited in Barker et al., 1994:5).  From this definition it is 
clear that many of the central concerns within post-colonialism are highly relevant to 
a consideration of the New Caledonian pro-independence media.  For example, the 
emphasis within post-colonialism on the interplay between colonial and anti-colonial 
discourse is particularly apt in the New Caledonian context.  In its style and content, 
the pro-independence media repeatedly bears the mark of its inevitable 
engagement with colonial discourses.  This engagement is inevitable because, as 
Terdiman argues:  ‘no discourse is ever a monologue; nor could it ever be analysed 
intrinsically ... everything that constitutes it always presupposes a horizon of 
competing, contrary utterances against which it asserts its own energies’ (cited in 
Parry, 1993:172). 
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 The tension between this engagement and the anti-colonial quest for 
disengagement raises the question of the extent to which oppositional movements 
can break out of the constraints imposed upon them by those whose dominance 
they are trying to arrest.  Disengagement from colonial dominance requires active 
opposition to the colonial power, through discursive and extra-discursive 
engagement in the political struggle.  But, as some have argued, fighting against a 
system is, in a sense, validating that system in its position of dominance.  Goldie 
(1995) uses the analogy of a chess game to illustrate this point.  For Goldie:  ‘The 
indigène is a semiotic pawn on a chess board under the control of the white 
signmaker ... the individual signmaker, the individual player, the individual writer, 
can move these pawns only within certain prescribed areas’ (ibid:232).  Moreover, it 
is possible, he argues, to see ‘the play between white and indigène as a replica of 
the black and white squares, with clearly limited oppositional moves’ (ibid:232-3).  
Goldie concludes that in engaging in these moves the players validate the rules of 
the game which is itself that of the coloniser.  This constraint on oppositional moves 
has been described by Said as ‘the partial tragedy of resistance that it must to a 
certain degree work to recover forms already established or at least influenced or 
infiltrated by the culture of empire’ (1994:253). 
 
This constraining of oppositional moves within a system of rules introduced by the 
coloniser can be seen in the pro-independence movement’s use of the French 
language in its media.  Language privileges certain conceptual categorisations, 
subject positions, discourses, and systems of reasoning.  Recognition of such 
constraints has led some opposition movements to use vernacular languages as an 
ultimate strategy of abrogation.1   This option is more feasible in some socio-political 
contexts where a vernacular language is broadly shared and the political obstacles 
to its deployment are not too great.  In New Caledonia, the large number of 
vernacular languages2, the imposition of French as lingua franca and the absence, 
until recent times, of the teaching of vernacular languages in schools, have resulted 
in French becoming the most widely used medium of political, and indeed social, 
exchange between Kanaks.3  In addition, a 1922 law declaring illegal the publication 
                                                          
1 Ashcroft et al. describe abrogation as ‘a refusal of the categories of the imperial culture, its aesthetic, 
its illusory standard of normative or “correct” usage, and its assumption of a traditional fixed meaning 
‘inscribed’ in words (1989:38).  Fabian (1986), in his discussion of the use of Swahili in the Belgian 
Congo, demonstrates how vernacular languages can also be appropriated. 
2 There are currently around 28 vernacular languages spoken in New Caledonia (Connell, 1987:14). 
3 The Ecoles Populaires Kanak was an attempt to rekindle the use of vernacular by teaching in 
vernacular languages.  Although few EPKs remain, the existence did constitute a form of pressure on 
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 of vernacular texts without an accompanying French translation militated against the 
production of vernacular publications, although the pro-independence media did 
defy this law on occasion.4  The pro-independence movement’s use of French 
raises the question of how far it jeopardised its ability to develop a resistance 
culture which was expressive of its claims to difference. 
 
While there are those who would argue that the promotion of difference is 
impossible in such a context (see, for example, Spivak, 1988), a great deal of post-
colonial writing has been concerned to emphasise the ways in which difference still 
emerges, despite the imposition of culturally alien linguistic and discursive forms.  
The emphasis here is on the manner in which oppositional movements selectively 
appropriate aspects of the dominant culture and incorporate these with aspects of 
traditional culture to create hybridised cultural forms.  For Ashcroft et al., post-
colonial writing ‘emphasises how hybridity and the power it releases may well be 
seen to be the characteristic feature and contribution of the post-colonial, allowing a 
means of evading the replication of the binary categories of the past and developing 
new anti-monolithic models of cultural exchange and growth’ (1995:183).  Mary-
Louise Pratt describes as ‘autoethnographic’ those hybridised texts which colonised 
people construct about themselves in response to colonial texts.  They involve, she 
argues: 
 
 ...a selective collaboration with and appropriation of idioms of the metropolis 
or conqueror.  These are merged or infiltrated to varying degrees with 
indigenous idioms to create self-representations intended to intervene in 
metropolitan modes of understanding (1994:28).   
 
This intervention is not possible through the use of vernacular languages.  Although 
French tied the pro-independence movement into Western categorisations and 
privileged the importation of Western modes of reasoning, it made possible tactics 
in the political struggle which would not otherwise have been possible, such as 
attempts to broaden electoral support outside of the Kanak community and to win 
international support.  Chaterjee argues that Indian nationalist discourse was 
different even though it was heavily influenced by Western thought (1986:42).  This 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the educational bureaucracy to introduce some teaching in vernacular languages in the primary school 
system. 
4 La Tribune du Pacifique published a couple of articles in vernacular languages without translations, 
signalling that it was doing so in defiance of the law (see, for example, the editions of July and 
October 1980).  
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 influence was not, she writes, ‘a simple relation of correspondence, even of 
derivation’, because: 
 
 First of all, nationalist thought is selective about what it takes from Western 
rational thought...nationalist texts will question the veracity of colonialist 
knowledge, dispute its arguments, point out contradictions, reject its moral 
claims.  Even when it adopts...the modes of thought characteristic of rational 
knowledge in the post-enlightenment age, it cannot adopt them in their 
entirety, for then it would not constitute itself as a nationalist discourse’ 
(ibid:41). 
 
Others criticise the emphasis within post-colonialism on hybridity on the basis that it 
emphasises mediation over struggle.  Benita Parry (1993) has argued that the 
emphasis tends to obscure the force of the continuing struggle between 
protagonists, and the manner in which this force continues to be exercised through 
colonial institutions.  It either erases ‘the voice of the native’ or limits ‘native 
resistance to the devices circumventing and interrogating colonial authority’, 
resulting in ‘a downgrading of the anti-imperialist texts written by national liberation 
movements; while the notion of epistemic violence and the occluding of reverse 
discourses have obliterated the role of the native as historical subject and 
combatant, possessor of an-other knowledge and producer of alternative traditions’ 
(cited in Loomba, 1994:307).  Ania Loomba (ibid) also makes a plea for a depiction 
of post-colonialism which views hybridity as only one of its characteristic forms, 
recognising that it co-exists with forceful opposition as well as the maintenance of 
aspects of traditional culture. 
 
No matter what the mix of derivative, traditional or hybrid forms incorporated in pro-
independence discourses in New Caledonia, the concerted opposition from anti-
independence activists to the pro-independence media suggested that their 
existence, and the discourses which they produced, were highly unsettling for the 
anti-independence movement.  As Bwenando commented:  ‘If our enemies have 
tried to physically eliminate us, it is because they have understood our importance 
in the struggle’ (31/11/85).  Whether their discourses constituted an optimal blend of 
forms is not the major concern of this and the following chapter.  Indeed, such a 
concern sits uneasily with some of the central premises of this thesis.  At times, the 
obvious borrowings within the pro-independence media of Western cultural forms 
and discourses may have militated against the oppositional efficacy of these media.  
But this was not always the case.  As I sought to demonstrate in chapter 4, anti-
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 independence groups found it difficult to appropriate the pro-independence 
discourse of ‘the people’, ultimately abandoning the quest despite this discourse’s 
origins in French political thought.  This abandoning highlighted the efficacy of this 
discourse for the pro-independence movement and reinforced Said’s apt 
observation that only a ‘confused and limiting notion of priority allows that only the 
original proponents of an idea can understand and use it’ (1994:261).  Moreover, 
traditional discourses also continued to be used within the pro-independence 
movement but not always with the same apparent degree of efficacy, judging by the 
openings which they created for counter-discourses.  Once again, the point here is 
that the efficacy of any discourse emerges largely from its strategic, situated usage 
in practice, and not from an isolated consideration of its inherent form. 
 
Consideration of the strategic use of pro-independence media discourse therefore 
forms a central theme of this chapter, preceded by a discussion of the institutional 
constraints on the production of these discourses.  In the process I draw on 
concepts and debates developed and discussed within post-colonialism, but not 
with a view to assessing the efficacy of pro-independence media discourses outside 
of the context of their located use.   
 
Attitudes to media 
 
The pro-independence movement’s determination in the early 1980s to achieve its 
political aims through a mix of legal and extra-constitutional means precipitated an 
increasingly hostile response from the existing media and threw into sharp relief the 
media’s power  in influencing, in what pro-independence groups considered a 
particularly pernicious way, the discursive terrain.  However, this view of the media’s 
capacity for damage was accompanied by a growing awareness of the benefits 
which the media could bring in advancing the pro-independence struggle.  
Increasingly, the movement looked to foreign media to bring to the attention of an 
international audience their demands and claims of injustice and oppression.  As the 
UC publication L’Avenir commented: 
 
 In 1878 we had no newspapers and no international support.  Today, the 
struggle can be brought to an international level by the media.  It’s 
important...because the mass media has the power to create opinion.  It’s a 
necessity (13/4/85). 
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 Even when the FLNKS was boycotting the local media, it continued to maintain 
relations with the overseas and metropolitan press, prompting Les Nouvelles to 
complain, in late 1984, that it had to learn that the FLNKS had lifted its blockades 
from an AFP release (Les Nouvelles, 23/11/84 & 7/12/84).5 This emphasis on 
encouraging international support led the FLNKS to establish, in 1987, an overseas 
news service, the Agence Kanak Presse, which carried news on the pro-
independence movement to international media and organisations.   
 
These divergent perspectives on the media as enemy and ally were sharply 
illustrated in an event which occurred in late 1987.  An illegal sit-in by FLNKS 
members in the central Place des Cocotiers in Noumea was broken up by police 
using batons.  International television crews filmed the violent dispersal but state-
owned RFO television was not present.  The UC publication, L’Avenir Calédonien, 
commented that the result was that Australian TV viewers got 10 minutes on the 
dispersal while Caldoche viewers got 30 seconds (presumably of read 
commentary).  Of the three minutes shown on French television, L’Avenir added: 
 
 Three minutes of television summed up, before millions of viewers in France 
and the world, the reality of Colonialism in New Caledonia.  The three 
minutes of television on the events of Saturday 22 August in the Place des 
Cocotiers was but a CONCENTRATE OF ALL THE FRENCH 
GOVERNMENT’S ERRORS.  Without the cameramen, on this day, the entire 
world would be immersed in the PONS-LIE (L’Avenir, 28/8/87 & 9/9/87).6    
 
By this stage, the FLNKS had already responded to pressure from within the 
movement to establish its own media.  Bwenando and Radio Djiido began operating 
in 1985 and, in 1986, the FLNKS-controlled regions produced the weekly magazine 
Construire.  In addition, two regional radio stations, Lifou’s Radio Kenu and 
Hienghène’s Radio Maxa Hiehene, were established in 1987.7 
 
                                                          
5 An FLNKS communique was, however, broadcast on RFO (Les Nouvelles, 7/12/84). 
6 Ukeiwé suggested that the sit-in was staged for the media.  He commented that the FLNKS ‘wanted 
to increase public awareness through the media and, more particularly, foreign media, like the 
Australian-New Zealand journalists and also a few metropolitan journalists’ (Les Nouvelles, 28/8/87).  
Les Nouvelles followed with a similar line commenting that the FLNKS ‘was running a veritable media 
campaign essentially oriented towards the Pacific Anglo-Saxon media’ (Les Nouvelles, 31/8/87). 
7 Radio Kenu began operation in May 1987 (L’Avenir, 15/5/87).  Radio Maxa Hiehene opened at the 
end of August 1987.  ‘Maxa’ means ‘raise one’s head’ (L’Avenir, 9/9/87).  In September Maxa’s cable 
was cut, resulting in claims of sabotage from the FLNKS.  Tjibaou denounced the ‘systematic 
interferences with the freedom of expression of the Kanak people’ (Les Nouvelles, 10/9/87).   
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 The financial difficulties faced by all these media resulted in their demise, with the 
exception of Radio Djiido.  I discuss later in this chapter the argument that this 
demise reflected a lack of willingness within the FLNKS to sustain media which 
some in the FLNKS felt could not be adequately controlled.  Here, I wish to consider 
another argument advanced by what appears at first a curious cross-section of the 
New Caledonian political community on why the FLNKS press, in particular, did not 
survive.  This argument suggests that the lack of support for the Kanak press attests 
to a more general cultural malaise.  In its most sympathetic form, the argument is 
that: ‘The press, well, it’s not a Kanak thing’, suggesting that a traditionally oral 
culture evinces great difficulty in surmounting its cultural legacy and in embarking 
on new modes of communication.  The articulation of this discourse by supporters 
and opponents of independence is one of its more intriguing aspects. 
 
The media and Kanak culture 
 
In the introduction to his book, La terre est le sang des morts (1985), anthropologist 
Jean Guiart recounts a story he heard of the appearance of the first Kanak 
publications.  Guiart writes that a small group of Europeans calling themselves 
anarchists offered the use of their roneotype machine to Nidoish Naisseline, a 
young Kanak from Maré in the Loyalty Islands, heir to the Grand Chieftaincy of 
Gwahma, and a founding member of the Foulards Rouges, a movement of young 
Melanesians demanding Melanesian cultural and political rights.  Naisseline used 
the roneotype machine to produce tracts written in the three languages of Maré.  
The tracts were immediately confiscated by the police and Naisseline was 
imprisoned for having published material which the authorities claimed incited 
murder.  Naisseline’s arrest precipitated a large demonstration and what Guiart 
terms, the ‘first riot of modern times in Noumea’.  Guiart claims that the tracts had 
been badly translated (he implies maliciously), and that the offending phrase, ‘la 
terre est le sang des morts’, had been translated into ‘the blood of Whites has to be 
spilt on the land’ rather than what he argues is the correct meaning ‘that the blood 
of the sum of all previous generations was the process through which the soil in 
which the yams were planted was symbolically constituted’ (ibid:9-10).  
 
In reading Guiart’s story, I am reminded of Foucault’s mischievous remark about a 
story he once encountered: that it is so beautiful he fears it might be true 
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 (1972:225).  Certainly, the general outlines of this story are a matter of historical 
record in New Caledonia (Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut Kanak 
d’Histoire Moderne:78).  This record holds that a tract was produced and Naisseline 
arrested, precipitating a large demonstration and riot.  But what is fascinating for the 
purpose of this discussion in Guiart’s story are some of the embellishments and, in 
particular, the description of European anarchists approaching Naisseline with the 
offer of their machine.  Here, it seems to me, we potentially have a very classic 
colonial tale.  What the story enables is a reading of the events of ‘modern times’ - 
the period which Guiart seems to consider commenced with the emergence of 
Kanak political demands - as made possible by Europeans.  It was through 
European instrumentality - in this case through the lending of the roneotype 
machine - that the public articulation of Kanak political demands became possible.  I 
am not arguing that this thesis of European instrumentality is Guiart’s intended 
reading.  But, as a story, it makes for multiple readings, and many opponents of 
independence in New Caledonia, upon reading Guiart’s story, would rue the day 
that those ‘anarchists’ first approached Naisseline to bestow upon him the fruits of 
Western modernity. 
 
This discourse on European instrumentality in the Kanak accession to media (and 
indeed to most other ‘modern’ things) is one with which the pro-independence 
movement has had to contend, and which many Kanaks find deeply offensive.   The 
most common articulation of this discourse by those opposed to independence held 
that the pro-independence media, while ostensibly Kanak, was written by 
Europeans.  In early 1987, Pons declared that ‘an important mass audience media 
outlet is directed by a member of the LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire - 
Communist Revolutionary League)’.  Bwenando retorted that there has only ever 
been one resident member of the LCR in the territory, Jean-Louis Dion, adding that 
he ‘collaborated at Bwenando at the technical level only with no editorial 
responsibility, and that he left the territory a year ago’ (Bwenando, 17/2/87).  Two 
months later, RPCR Counsellor Pierre Maresca made a similar declaration in the 
Congress, arguing that a reading of Bwenando indicated that the articles were 
written by Europeans, not Kanaks.  FLNKS Territorial Counsellor Yéiwéné Yéiwéné 
replied, according to Bwenando, ‘that it wasn’t the fault of Maresca and his like if 
Kanaks had learnt to read and write, and therefore to produce a newspaper’ 
(Bwenando, 7/4/87). 
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There are significant parallels between these discourses on Kanak media and 
earlier discourses which portrayed Melanesians as voiceless.  Conservative 
Caledonian historian Bernard Brou’s description of Jeanson’s leftist newspaper Le 
Calédonien is a classical statement in this regard.  According to Brou, Jeanson:   
 
 called for the ‘honourable’ repatriation of migrant workers (Vietnamese and 
Indonesian) and, with the support of three indigenous grand chiefs, Vincent 
Bouquet from Bourail, Henri Naisseline from Maré, and Pascal Sihaze from 
Lifou, attempted a Melanesian defence that the indigenous people don’t 
express (Brou:14).8 
 
This broader discourse on European instrumentality in the emergence of 
Melanesian consciousness and political demands is brought to bear in the more 
specific discourse on European instrumentality in the Kanak media.   
 
One of the more intriguing aspects of this discourse is its broad political currency.  I 
encountered it in my discussions with several European pro-independence 
supporters, some of whom had worked with Kanaks in pro-independence 
publications, and even in discussions with some Kanaks.  Marc Coulon, who has 
lengthy experience working in pro-independence publications, was one of its 
exponents.  According to Coulon:   
 
 the Kanaks agreed to produce L’Evenement, but didn’t yet have the will 
themselves to produce a newspaper.  That’s certain...because I think that 
they didn’t have the idea, or didn’t feel that they had the means, or it didn’t 
seem a priority...I have to say that it also corresponded with the fact that the 
notion of ‘mediatising’ an idea or words was completely new, in so far as, up 
until now and even still a bit today...the two camps in this country - the two 
politico-ethnic blocks - had their own systems of communication.  There were 
the Whites - the RPCR - with Les Nouvelles and the TV, and then the 
Kanaks with their system of oral communication through meetings - by 
transmitting messages - and that a Kanak newspaper or a pro-Kanak 
newspaper, was a kind of totally unthinkable thing (interview, 18/4/94).   
 
Certainly, European involvement in oppositional publications which sought to 
advance indigenous political rights had been longstanding.  Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries had been involved in producing bilingual publications in indigenous 
                                                          
8 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Histoire du Pays Kanak draws on Brou’s comments in its entry on Le 
Calédonien, but omits reference to Brou’s comment that the indigenous people were not voicing 
political demands at that time (Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut Kanak d’Histoire 
Moderne:66). 
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 languages and French for over 50 years prior to WWII.9  After the war, the various 
political news sheets which appeared were largely the work of European political 
activists.  For example, L’Avenir’s  publication director was UC party leader and 
New Caledonian deputy, Maurice Lenormand.  Lenormand was the major 
contributor to the publication, using it as a vehicle for the propagation of his leftist 
populism through denouncing the economic and political power vested in what he 
termed the ‘trusts’ and calling for greater political autonomy.  From the early 1980s 
the principal contributor to L’Avenir was François Burck, a Caldoche UC activist who 
was to assume the position of secretary general following the killing of Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou in 1989.  Similarly, Jean-Paul Caillard had been prominently involved in 
several publications.   
 
La Tribune du Pacifique seemed to signal a break with the pattern of European 
control of oppositional publications by designating a young Kanak, Henri Bailly, as 
its publication director.  Bailly was a prominent PALIKA member who joined 
Naisseline’s new political grouping, Liberation Kanak Socialist (LKS), when it broke 
away from PALIKA in February 1981 (Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut 
Kanak D’Histoire Moderne:100).  However, the vagueness of La Tribune’s opening 
editorial which commented on the composition of its workers - its statement, for 
example, that the paper was the initiative of ‘a certain number of people, 
indépendantistes and others’, and that ‘most of the journalists at this paper wouldn’t 
be able to write even one line in Lifou, Paici or Wallisian’ - suggests that most of the 
team were Europeans (La Tribune, July 1980).10 
 
However, the record on European involvement in oppositional media is not as clear 
as some suggest.  In PALIKA’s Le Kanak we have at least one example of a 
longstanding publication produced by Kanaks.  Since the party’s inception in 1976, 
                                                          
9 The first bilingual publication was the Catholic Le Messager des Loyalty, written in French and Lifou 
(O’Reilly,1955:311).  In 1910 the Protestant mission in Ro, Maré began publishing Nata me roi (Celui 
qui raconte bien) in the Maré language.  Leenhardt was the first director followed by E. Benignus.  
O’Reilly says that the printing press and characters were reported to have been sent to Houailou in 
late 1914 (ibid:316).  Between 1912 and 1916, the Protestant mission at Houailou published the 
monthly, Virsersi (ka e).  Leenhardt then published Virherhi which printed articles in diverse local 
languages including Hienghène, Koné Nemi and Ponerihouen and continued until 1936 (ibid:316).  
Between 1930 and 1939, the Protestant mission on Maré published La Voix des Isles in the Maré, 
Lifou and Houailou languages (Brou, 1975:53). The title Le Messager was again used as the banner 
for a bilingual publication of the Association des Indigènes Calédoniens et Loyaltiens (AICLF), which 
began in October 1947 and contained articles on issues deemed relevant to the indigenous population 
including education, political rights and alcoholism, and which, importantly, also gave some attention 
to international issues (O’Reilly, 1955:318; Bordier, 1989b:63). 
10 Coulon argues that La Tribune was largely a European publication. 
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 the need was felt to produce a publication which would set out the party’s principles 
and political program as they related not only to political issues at the time, but also 
to less immediately topical issues such as religion, custom, the economy and 
schooling (PALIKA member, Sylvain Pabouty, interview, 18/4/94). 
 
The argument that Kanaks were tardy in their involvement in the press because of 
their lack of cultural affinity with this mode of communication is also challenged by 
the extent of readers’ contributions to Bwenando in the form of articles and letters.  
Bwenando presented itself as the voice of the Kanak people and was confirmed as 
such in many readers’ comments on the publication.  As one reader stated:  ‘I 
congratulate the newspaper, and especially its team who participate in the often 
disquieting publication of our only, unique means of expression’ (6/12/85).  Another 
reader concurred, in more fulsome prose:  ‘every time I finish combing the pages of 
the newspaper, I feel that I have discovered a reality that has often been hidden by 
the imperialist press.  Without a doubt, Bwenando truly remains the newspaper 
which serves the Kanak people’ (12/11/85).  In this affirmation, we are not left with 
the impression that Bwenando was particularly culturally aberrant.  The increasing 
volume of articles and letters from readers printed in Bwenando also seems to belie 
the view that writing was ‘not a Kanak thing’.  In late 1985, Bwenando claimed that 
an average of 13 pages of each 16-page edition was written by readers (12/11/85).  
Letters conveyed news on such topics as FLNKS activities in local areas, local 
military activities, tensions among pro-independence groups in the tribes, alleged 
harassment from anti-independence groups, progress on land claims and options 
for independence.  By 1987, letters from FLNKS prisoners imprisoned in Camp Est 
near Noumea were also printed regularly.   
 
The purpose of this discussion is not to confirm or refute the veracity of the claims 
that the pro-independence media was largely a European construct, or that FLNKS 
equivocation over its media resulted from culturally-based difficulties with this form 
of communication.  Nor is it to delve behind the intentions of one or more of the 
bearers of these discourses.  As Fabian argues:  ‘In interpreting this sort of talk as 
discourse one is less interested in the truth value of specific statements, in the 
question for instance, whether a certain author really expressed his convictions, 
gave an accurate report of facts, and so on.  Instead, one seeks to appreciate the 
documentary value of a ‘style’ by discerning key notions, rules of combining these 
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 and theoretical devices used to build arguments.  In short, one concentrates on 
elements which determined the shape and content of colonial thought irrespective of 
individual intention (1986:79). 
 
In a similar vein, I seek to highlight this dominant theme in the discussion of the 
Kanak media and treat it as discourse; that is, as a version grounded in a particular 
interpretive repertoire enabled by the experiences of colonialism in New Caledonia. 
The discourse on European instrumentality in the Kanak media is grounded in 
antecedent discourses on Kanak quiescence and voicelessness, which were 
themselves enabled by the disruptive impact of colonialism on the indigenous 
peoples.  As a pervasive colonial discourse, it formed the discursive backdrop to 
Kanak efforts to establish their own media.  As I argue below, a great deal of the 
style and content of the Kanak media derives from an engagement with this 
discourse.   
 
Bwenando as an FLNKS emblem 
 
Hnalaïne Uregei was Bwenando’s first editor.  Uregei says that he had been told by 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, at the FLNKS congress where the decision was taken to 
produce a newspaper (Hienghène, 25-6 May 1985), that he would be in charge of its 
production.  Uregei was one of the very few Kanaks who had any experience in the 
print media, having worked briefly on a trade union publication.  According to 
Uregei, the decision to attempt to produce a mass circulation newspaper was 
‘emblematic’ for the FLNKS.  It would show, he argued, that Kanaks were capable of 
producing a ‘real newspaper’ (interview, 10/5/94).  Uregei’s stress on this notion of a 
‘real newspaper’ illustrates the influence of the discourse of European 
instrumentality on the pro-independence movement.  It suggests that Bwenando, at 
its inception at least, was meant to speak as much to others as it was to the 
movement.  For these others it was to demonstrate Kanak intellectual competence 
and organisational abilities.  Above all, it would demonstrate that Kanaks not only 
existed but also had charge of this existence.  In other words, there was a great 
deal riding on the success of Bwenando as an exemplar of the Kanak political 
struggle. 
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 This reference to a ‘real newspaper’ by a politically committed Kanak is, however, 
curious.  After all, ‘real newspapers’ in the New Caledonian context were most 
frequently conservative and commercial publications.  Could the quest to emulate 
certain aspects of such publications be reconciled with the will to use a publication 
to assert the uniqueness of Kanak identity?  How did Uregei, and others involved in 
the publication, negotiate this apparent dilemma? 
 
Bwenando’s pursuit of the status of a ‘real newspaper’ was most apparent in certain 
organisational and stylistic features.  It was also apparent in its journalists’ 
engagement with certain professional discourses.  However, these points of 
rapprochement coexisted with stylistic and discursive features which departed 
significantly from more conventional publications.  The differences became more 
prevalent as the publication proceeded, and as the will to demonstrate Kanak 
capabilities to others faded in the face of an escalation in anti-independence 
militancy encouraged by the election of a conservative French government in 1986.   
 
The objective of publishing a ‘real newspaper’ had certain organisational 
consequences, such as the legal requirement that a non-profit organisation be 
established from which a management committee would be constituted.  The 
Political Bureau of the FLNKS decided to use an already existing structure, Les 
Editions Populaires (EDIPOP), to act as the managing organisation of Bwenando 
and later Djiido.   EDIPOP had been established in the early 1980s by Marc Coulon 
and two other non-Kanak UC members, Jean-Pierre Deteix, who had come to New 
Caledonia from France in the late 1960s to work in Catholic education, and Ismet 
Kurtovich, a Caledonian of European descent.  Its initial purpose was to sell leftist 
books by correspondence, but later it was used as a vehicle to publish several 
monographs on politics in the territory (Deteix interview, 12/5/94).  The Political 
Bureau designated Deteix as the paper’s administrator, but Uregei was given free 
reign over its concept and editorial content.  Deteix says that, at the time, he argued 
that the paper should be modest, with a priority that it be completely autonomous, 
meaning that it should be photocopied, not printed.  Uregei’s view was different; he 
sought a printed publication.  According to Deteix:  ‘in the Kanak mind they thought 
that they had to at least have one publication which has as good as the others.  It’s 
a thing of the past to want to only use stencils’ (12/5/94). 
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 The production of Bwenando was financially constrained from the outset.  Deteix 
was responsible for raising capital for the publication and managed to assemble a 
small amount, primarily from overseas non-government organisations and the 
German Greens, which enabled the purchase of a computer and the hiring of a 
secretary.  Despite these financial constraints, Uregei believed it was imperative 
that the publication appear regularly on a weekly basis.  Indeed, frequency and 
regularity appear to have been key features of Bwenando’s attempts to emulate 
‘real newspapers’.  These features distinguished Bwenando from other pro-
independence publications in that most pro-independence political news sheets 
appeared irregularly.  During periods of intense political crisis, the efforts of activists 
responsible for these publications were often directed elsewhere.  Most were 
unapologetic about these lapses, as Le Kanak’s comment regarding a four-month 
lapse in publication during the turbulent period following the 18 November territorial 
elections indicated: 
 
 Le Kanak is an activist publication and therefore entirely realised by activists.  
During the months following 18 November, we certainly privileged the 
realisation of the FLNKS structures with a stronger mobilisation than 
before...This issue appears because the circumstances permit.  If this is the 
case in the weeks that follow, we will try to continue our work of informing 
(Le Kanak, 9/3/85).   
 
Bwenando first appeared as a 16-page weekly publication on 11 July 1985 and 
maintained this rhythm, apart from a couple of single-week lapses, about which it 
was highly apologetic, until the end of 1987.  This was quite an impressive record, 
as working conditions were ‘prehistoric’, according to Uregei, with the small team 
being required to work lengthy hours to ensure regular publication on a very minimal 
salary.  The Bwenando office did not even have a telephone after November 1985 
(Bwenando, 5/9/86).  Bwenando moved to fortnightly publication at the beginning of 
1987 and continued regular publication until April 1988, after which only five editions 
appeared at irregular intervals. 
 
Apart from regular publication, Bwenando incorporated other newspaper 
conventions (Figure 6.1).  Its pictographic front page emulated, modestly, the style 
of most of the major metropolitan French and local weekly publications available in 
the territory, particularly Combat, which was similarly printed in black and white.  In 
addition, Bwenando incorporated regular sections such as page 3 editorials and 
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 letters to the editor, usually printed on page 2, although the clear political 
engagement of most of its discourse rendered the page 3 editorials barely 
distinguishable from other articles. Bwenando did not seek to emulate other 
publications’ coverage, for example, of entertainment or faits divers, suggesting that 
the publication of a ‘real newspaper’ did not signify the will to engage with a 
readership beyond that of the pro-independence movement and overseas 
sympathisers.  It noted, however, that the paper was read by some in the 
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Figure 6.1:  Bwenando, March-April 1987 (cover) 
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 anti-independence community.  In its creation and certain stylistic features, 
Bwenando’s purpose was to demonstrate Kanak existence and competence to 
these readers; in its discourses, however, the movement spoke, through Bwenando, 
resolutely to itself. 
 
Bwenando sought to expose the political activities, clandestine machinations, and 
allegedly corrupt activities of the right in Noumea and throughout the interior.  It 
reported on the activities of the regions and the struggle committees, the activities, 
decisions and proposals of the Political Bureau of the FLNKS, and the decisions of 
congresses.  It also analysed FLNKS campaigns and set out to rally militants to 
improve their organisational structures and sharpen their militancy.  From the 
outset, therefore, Bwenando conveyed a militancy of tone in keeping with its 
apparent quest to foster the abilities and preparedness of FLNKS militants to 
engage in extra-constitutional action.  It also kept alive the notion of unity of black 
peoples in the anti-imperialist struggle by devoting two or more pages in most 
editions to news of other anti-imperialist struggles elsewhere in the world - 
frequently South Africa, Chad, the Carribean and Central America, and East Timor.  
Bwenando was therefore a major conduit for the importation of an internationalist 
discourse of black and Third World struggle and resistance. 
 
Professional discourses 
 
In parallel with the will of the Bwenando team to produce a ‘real newspaper’ was the 
will to be recognised as ‘real journalists’.  The establishment of an FLNKS 
newspaper resulted in the creation of a new type of activist within the movement - 
the journalist.  There were prior instances where Kanaks had written regularly for 
pro-independence publications, but the decision to publish a regular FLNKS 
newspaper necessitated the full-time dedication of some activists to the task.  
These activists readily assumed the professional appellation of ‘journalist’ and 
sought official recognition for this status through requests to the High Commission 
to be issued with press cards which enabled journalists’ entry into official functions 
and judicial proceedings. Bwenando decried the non-response from the High 
Commission to its requests.  It argued that one implication of what it took to be a 
refusal was that Bwenando journalists could not report on judicial proceedings 
involving Kanaks, unless they managed to get a place in the public gallery, which 
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 was frequently difficult, particularly after the bombing of the Noumea court house in 
1986 and the consequent relocation of trials, either to a court annex or to the 
theatre of the Fédération Ouvrier Laïque (FOL).  Noting that journalists working for 
anti-independence publications had press cards, Bwenando railed:  ‘In New 
Caledonia, only foreigners, faschos and schemers can hold a press card.  
Therefore, at the TRIAL OF THE KANAK PEOPLE, THE KANAK PEOPLE’S 
NEWSPAPER IS BARRED’ (26/6/86).11    
 
The desire to be recognised as journalists resulted in an engagement with some 
professional discourses, but this engagement was always tempered by other 
discursive pressures.  The most notable engagement was with a discourse on truth, 
expressed in comments on the truthfulness of the reporting in Bwenando compared 
with that of other publications, and also in the volume of empirical material used in 
articles to sustain the arguments which they advanced.  This claim to ‘the true’, 
bolstered by the incorporation into articles of extensive supporting evidence, is 
prevalent in the style of journalism that has come to be known as ‘investigative 
journalism’.  This style is particularly apparent in the numerous articles on ‘RPCR 
terrorism’ in the early editions of Bwenando, which appear to have as their primary 
objective the desire to prove that it was the RPCR, not the FLNKS, that was 
terrorist.  This thesis was widely concurred with within the FLNKS.  One therefore 
wonders why it was seen to be necessary to include this volume of supporting 
material.  Perhaps it was intended to inform the movement and overseas readers of 
details of which they were unaware and make known to the RPCR that the 
movement was watching its activities.  However, it might also have been included 
because of the Bwenando journalists’ engagement with received ideas of 
journalistic style and professional practice.  That a discourse on truth was at the 
forefront of this engagement in Bwenando probably attests to its compatibility with 
political engagement.  Bwenando argued that it sought to expose the truth, but it 
gave to this quest a highly political justification in arguing that ‘only the truth is 
revolutionary’ (18/4/86).   The revolutionary power of truth would, it argued, liberate 
the territory: 
 
                                                          
11 By September 1987, Bwenando appears to have received official recognition.  A journalist from 
Bwenando appears to have participated in a Pons ‘meet the press’ televised by RFO (Bwenando, 
11/9/87).  This was just after Alain Le Garrec took over as director at RFO.  See chapter 8, p. 278.  
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  New Caledonia, comfortably stuck in a bog of lies since March 1986 in 
particular, will only survive by letting the truth set it free.  The current regime 
survives only on lies.  Its press, radio, television, inject a daily dose of lies 
into the Caledonians, thereby applying the precepts of Dr GOEBBELS by 
which it is sufficient to tirelessly repeat lies, preferably the most outrageous 
and cynical possible, in order to make an official truth.   
 Volumes could indeed be written to enumerate what Caledonians, 
supposedly ‘informed’ by official television and the main press under the 
orders of LAFLEUR and the local extreme right, haven’t known and will never 
know.  Let’s just ask this one question:  Where and when have the main 
press and official broadcasters ever explained honestly the ideas of 
supporters of Canaque independence? 
 Inexhaustible when it comes to exposing as ‘terrorists’ those who refuse to 
sacrifice themselves to the cult of LAFLEUR and who don’t give in in the face 
of oppression and colonial violence, always ready to make a big noise about 
uncontrollable and tendentious rumours and to pass on cheap police gossip, 
the Territory’s main media have never respected Caledonian opinion to the 
point of really letting the ideas of the independence movement be known 
(7/5/87). 
 
There are inflections in Bwenando’s engagement with truth.  Liberating truth is 
compared with ‘official truth’, which is manufactured by powerful media institutions 
involved in the repetition of lies.  Despite this ‘official truth’ being lies, Bwenando 
repeatedly acknowledges its force and coherence in its references to the existence 
of ‘two logics’, the one belonging to the coloniser and the other to the colonised 
(26/6/86).  This notion of ‘two logics’ is brought to bear particularly in Bwenando’s 
analysis of the differential treatment afforded Kanaks and Europeans by the judicial 
system.  Bwenando considered this to be exemplified in the acquittal of the 
perpetrators of the Hienghène massacre which was followed shortly after by the 
conviction of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and the imprisonment of Yéiwéné Yéiwéné on the 
grounds of inciting violence after they declared that the acquittal meant that Kanaks 
should now arm themselves in self-defence (8/1/88).  The movement within 
Bwenando between the notion of truth as absolute and the more contingent notion 
of the existence of competing realms of truth allowed for the strategic mobilisation of 
inflections in the discourse of truth according to the requirements of different 
discursive contexts. 
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 Financial and political difficulties at Bwenando 
 
The ambitious scope of the project - that is, the desire to produce a weekly 
newspaper with a relatively broad coverage of issues in a context of extremely 
limited financial and material resources - resulted in the paper experiencing severe 
financial difficulties almost from the outset.  Although the paper sold well (3,000 
copies were initially printed and this number increased progressively to 5,000 by 
1987), the proceeds from sales did not always find their way back to Bwenando.  
Distribution was effected through an ‘activist network’ with bundles being picked up 
by activists from the Bwenando office and delivered to other activists in Noumea 
and the interior for further distribution.  Bwenando’s exasperation with this situation 
was expressed in a May 1986 editorial: 
 
 A lot of right-wing people buy and read Bwenando.  They at least, it seems, 
are more serious and pay more regularly than some...FLN activists who 
haven’t sent anything for months, despite the decisions of the AG [General 
Assembly] at Houailou and the motion of the congress at OUNDJO (29/5/86). 
 
Bwenando is referring here to the decision taken at the FLNKS’s congress in 
Oundjo that the newspaper proceed, despite EDIPOP’s argument that the paper 
was in financial trouble and would need to close (Deteix interview, 12/5/94).  
EDIPOP’s recommendation precipitated vigorous and acrimonious debate at the 
congress over Bwenando’s future.  The resolution, which supported not only 
Bwenando but also Radio Djiido and the Popular Kanak Schools, revealed little of 
the acrimony which had preceded its passing:   
 
 The fourth FLNKS Congress affirms that the newspaper BWENANDO, radio 
DJIIDO and the E.P.K. (Kanak Popular Schools), are indispensable 
structures in the Kanak People’s struggle for liberation. 
 The Congress therefore decides that all the structures, all FLNKS 
organisations, should mobilise in order to strengthen their finances and 
operations (FLNKS:  La Charte du FLNKS.  Les Motions de Tous les 
Congrès.  Les Decisions du Gouvernment Provisoire de Kanaky, EDIPOP). 
 
Although financial pressures clearly brought into question the continuing viability of 
Bwenando, political dissent over the editorial orientation of the paper was perhaps 
of equal, if not greater, weight in EDIPOP’s recommendation.  The dominant UC 
leadership in the FLNKS had agreed to the activist initiative to establish Bwenando, 
but from the outset had been uneasy about the concept of an FLNKS publication.  
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 Deteix says that the UC leadership had long before decided against establishing a 
newspaper on the grounds that it would be too costly and too difficult to distribute, 
favouring instead the establishment of a radio station (interview, 12/5/94). 
 
Following the Oundjo congress, management was transferred from the UC-
dominated EDIPOP to a new association, Bwenando, comprising the workers from 
the paper and a member of each constituent FLNKS group designated by the 
FLNKS Political Bureau.  Deteix says that the UC sought to withdraw from its close 
association with the publication but agreed to have a representative on the new 
association which, he argues, never met (ibid).  Instead, a system of collective self-
management appears to have resulted from the new organisational structure.  This 
meant that editorial control remained with the editorial team, moderated only 
marginally, if at all, by the political representatives of the constituent FLNKS groups.  
Jacques Violette, the leader of the Parti Socialiste Kanak (PSK) and a European, 
took over as the head of this team (Uregei had left in late 1985 to become the 
FLNKS’s representative in France).12  The suggestion that the editorial content of 
Bwenando was collectively determined was lent weight by the publishing in 1986 of 
an article which Violette attributed to himself because, he said, he had not 
submitted the text to the editorial committee for its agreement (31/7/86). Uregei 
argues that the new management structure, along with changes in the editorial 
team, did not significantly alter the editorial orientation of the newspaper.  
Bwenando, he argues, ‘never reflected the dominant, hegemonic, consensual 
stream - the right-wing stream - within the FLNKS’ (interview, 10/5/94). 
 
It was the prospect that an FLNKS newspaper might act as a conduit for the 
expression of more marginalised discourses within the FLNKS that had led the UC 
and other more conservative groups in the Front to be concerned about the initial 
structures of editorial control within the paper.  And it appears to have been the 
prevalence of such discourses that precipitated the UC’s unsuccessful move to seek 
the paper’s closure less than a year into its publication.  The prospect that 
Bwenando would chart a more radical, leftist course was signalled in its first edition.  
Uregei referred to the ‘coming revolutionary effervescence’, adding that:  ‘the war, if 
                                                          
12 From this period until 1988, Bwenando designated its publications director as Susanne Ounei and 
its chief editor as Luc Tutugoro.  However, the absence of Ounei from the territory during much of this 
period brings into question the extent to which she contributed in an ongoing fashion to the paper.  
Uregei argues that the team of Bwenando was like a Kanak music group:  the group remains but the 
membership changes completely on a regular basis (interview, 10/5/94). 
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 there is going to be war, is yet to come - as if to imagine that it is still possible to 
contain the violent blast, born on 18 November, within institutional constraints’ 
(11/7/85).  A tendency in Bwenando to lapse into Marxist revolutionary discourse 
must have been unsettling for more conservative members of the movement.  In one 
article, Marxism is touted as the legitimate political philosophy for the FLNKS - a 
view which many in the FLNKS did not share:     
 
 ...in 10 years time a referendum will result in independence and the 
independence project will have become much more radical.  Racist or 
Marxist, not both, for Marxism and racism are fundamentally contradictory, 
contrary to what is claimed by illiterate ‘political scientists’ who haven’t read 
Marx (20/12/85). 
 
The will of more conservative elements to control the publication was pitted against 
the aspirations of Uregei and others for a ‘real newspaper’ which, they argued, 
required that the publication have a significant degree of editorial independence 
from the FLNKS and its constituent groups.  The editorial position of the paper was 
partially clarified following the Oundjo congress.  In an editorial referring to criticism 
within the FLNKS of Bwenando’s publishing of an article critical of the FLNKS move 
to distance itself in its relations with Libya, Bwenando referred to the decision taken 
by the FLNKS Political Bureau after the Oundjo congress that: 
 
 Bwenando would be the FLNKS newspaper but would remain independent, 
provided that it doesn’t depart from the framework of the Charter and 
motions of the congress.  Obviously, the BP [Political Bureau] will maintain 
supervision in order to ensure that the content complies with the defined 
orientations. 
 
Bwenando continued with an interpretation of this mandate:   
 
 To begin with, BWENANDO has a vocation to OBJECTIVELY INFORM and 
maintain debate within the FLNKS.  Our newspaper is that of the FLNKS, 
therefore the newspaper of the people, the rank-and-file. 
 And the rank-and-file should be informed in order that it can engage in 
the debates.  It is therefore reprehensible to lie to the rank-and-file, even by 
omission, by hiding the truth.  Don’t forget that ‘only the truth is 
revolutionary’. 
 Bwenando also has a mission to generally support the diverse FLNKS 
structures and the actions of the Political Bureau in particular (18/4/86). 
 
This interpretation treads, of course, a fine line between pluralistic notions of 
objectivity, revolutionary notions of truth, and service to the FLNKS.  It might be a 
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 succinct statement of position, but it did little to mask the inherent tensions between 
Bwenando’s commitment to be both editorially independent and politically aligned.  
This tension was rendered particularly acute in the volatile political context in the 
territory, which rendered every discursive intervention highly significant.  The 
concerns expressed by conservative (and some less conservative) groups in the 
FLNKS over what they saw as Bwenando’s destabilisation of the movement 
demonstrated that Bwenando’s interpretation of its mandate was not shared by all. 
 
Bwenando’s assertion of its independence from particular positions within the 
FLNKS came early in its publication.  In its first month, an article criticised a UC 
communique which expressed concern at the ‘risk of anarchy’ from the activities of 
FLNKS activists in the east coast town of Thio (8/8/85).  A month later, Bwenando 
acknowledged that it had been criticised for ‘demolishing its partners’, choosing to 
interpret this criticism as referring to its persistent opposition to what it argued were 
the collaborationist policies of the more moderate pro-independence group, the LKS 
(19/9/85).  This was a curious interpretation given that the LKS was not a 
constituent member of the FLNKS.     
 
Bwenando’s retort to these criticisms was that others had accused the publication of 
being too consensus-oriented.  There is much in the publication to support the view 
that Bwenando was an important advocate for many FLNKS decisions.  Much of 
Bwenando was devoted to rallying readers around decisions taken at congresses 
and at meetings of the Political Bureau.13  For example, Bwenando waged 
strenuous campaigns to effect adherence to the electoral boycott of 1986 and the 
referendum boycott of 1987.  It even campaigned for the boycott of the 1988 
presidential elections, despite having previously argued that the FLNKS should 
participate in the poll.  However, Bwenando’s episodic divergences from certain 
decisions, along with its discussion of issues of considerable sensitivity within the 
FLNKS, resulted in a continuation of criticisms that the newspaper was excessively 
divisive.  These came not only from more conservative elements within the Front.  
The FLNKS’s constituent union, the leftist USTKE (Union Syndicale des Travailleurs 
Kanaks et des Exploités -United Union of Kanak and Exploited Workers), had 
strongly supported the continuation of Bwenando and had provided financial 
                                                          
13 Although UC representatives dominated in senior FLNKS positions, all the constituent groups within 
the FLNKS had equal representation on the Political Bureau which, as a result, sometimes adopted a 
more militant stance than that advocated by the more conservative UC leadership. 
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 assistance to ensure this.  However, at one stage, even the USTKE, through 
comments published in Bwenando, was moved to:  ‘deplore that our newspaper, 
supported by the union, plays at this game, and (to) demand that it doesn’t 
contribute to our divisions but rather to our unification’ (18/4/86).  Bwenando’s 
retorts to such criticism were always less than contrite.  In response to the USTKE, 
Bwenando argued that ‘No-one fights more for the unity of the FLNKS and the 
reconciliation of its tendencies than Bwenando’ (ibid).  Elsewhere, Bwenando 
provided a more sustained response: 
 
 As in the past, certain naively reproach Bwenando for having echoed so-
called ‘internal divisions’, for displaying ‘intestinal quarrels’ to the advantage 
of our adversaries. We accept the risk, which is only fictitious.  In reality, 
there are only advantages to prove to those who accuse us of totalitarianism,  
that the debating of ideas and freedom of opinion are in fact the rule within 
the FLNKS.  Since the creation of the FI in 1979, it is in-depth debate which 
has been at the root of our mobilisation.  This debate is at the origin of the 
creation of the FLNKS and the actions taken, which made us progress on the 
difficult road of liberty (7/5/87). 
 
Violette’s management of Bwenando from late 1985 to the paper’s demise in 1989 
might be considered by some to muddy the paper’s claim to Kanak authenticity, and 
was probably behind Maresca’s comments cited above that Bwenando was written 
by Europeans.  But under Violette Bwenando sought to give new meaning to its 
claim to be the voice of the Kanak people by incorporating an even larger volume of 
articles, letters and poems written, it claimed, mostly by Kanaks.  The diversity of 
views expressed in these contributions generated further concern among FLNKS 
conservatives (12/11/85).  Deteix’s assessment that this practice of encouraging 
contributions precipitated Jean-Marie Tjibaou’s subsequent assassination illustrates 
the level of hostility felt by some in the movement towards Bwenando’s editorial 
policies under Violette.  Deteix argues that, under the editorial direction of Hnalaïne 
Uregei: 
 
 Bwenando had a certain editorial quality while being open to events and to 
popular sensitivities.  I think that Hnalaïne knew how to maintain, in spite of 
everything, an editorial standard at the paper...[The new editorial orientation] 
made a bad newspaper because everyone can’t say intelligently just 
anything.  Statistics even show that, by constantly saying just anything, 
people become uninterested, or people think that it is the official word of the 
FLNKS.  And when just anything is expressed, it can’t be the official word of 
the FLNKS because this development culminated in the assassination of 
Jean-Marie.  That is to say, this conception that just anyone, because he is 
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 Kanak, can say officially and publicly just anything, culminates in just 
anything.  And it is this manner of thinking about [the paper’s] operation that 
contributed to the assassination of Jean-Marie.  This happened from the 
moment that the FLNKS didn’t dare confront things and say, ‘No, you can’t 
say that.  Those things can’t be done, can’t be said, you haven’t the right to 
say that (interview, 12/5/94). 
   
Although Bwenando’s demise in was ultimately precipitated by financial crisis, 
animosity towards Bwenando meant that there was little will within the FLNKS 
leadership to assist the newspaper to continue.  The last edition to be published 
was a memorial edition for Jean-Marie Tjibaou in July 1989.  A memorial edition for 
Yéiwéné Yéiwéné was foreshadowed but never appeared.  With the demise of 
Bwenando, the FLNKS no longer had a publication and none has subsequently 
emerged.  For Uregei, the closure of Bwenando underscored the notion that the 
newspaper was emblematic for the FLNKS: 
 
 When I say that Bwenando reflected perfectly the evolution of the Front in its 
different phases, that is to say that, at the beginning, there was enthusiasm - 
a united, revolutionary enthusiasm.  Everyone bought it - no, they didn’t buy 
it - everyone read it. Bwenando was well distributed.  Very quickly, the 
FLNKS fell back in its divisions - structural divisions.  That had repercussions 
on Bwenando.  Very quickly, a part of the FLNKS leadership no longer 
recognised Bwenando or did everything to stop Bwenando from operating.  
As early as 1986, Bwenando had already fallen into a type of ghetto, there 
you are! (interview, 10/5/94). 
 
The experience of Bwenando attests to the centrality of the struggle to control 
discourse to political struggle at all levels, not only between officially recognised 
adversaries but also among ostensible political allies. 
 
Radio Djiido 
 
Radio Djiido’s continuing existence suggests that the station was better able to 
negotiate the difficult financial and political constraints under which it, like 
Bwenando, operated.  That Djiido endures where Bwenando demised suggests not 
only that its finances were better managed but also that its management structures 
and editorial policies were better suited to the exigencies of political power within 
the FLNKS.  In particular, the strength of UC influence within the station’s 
management appears to have ensured that Djiido pursued a more conservative 
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 editorial line and therefore maintained support from more moderate elements within 
the FLNKS and, in particular, its UC-dominated leadership.    
 
Deteix argues that the FI had discussed the establishment of a radio station 
following the legalisation in 1981 of ‘free radio’ services in France.  However, it was, 
he argues, primarily UC members who ‘turned to action’ and committed financial 
resources to ensure the station’s establishment and initial operation.14  A prominent 
UC member who was subsequently appointed as station manager, Octave Togna, 
travelled to France to purchase equipment, with finance from the German Greens, 
some foreign non-government organisations and EDIPOP (Togna interview, 
23/11/89).  The UC formed an association, Unica, to take out a loan to purchase a 
house as premises.  Its location a few hundred metres from the anti-independence 
radio station RRB, in the upper middle-class Noumean suburb of Magenta, was 
illustrative of the major purposes which the UC envisaged for the station.  According 
to Deteix, Djiido was established to ‘affirm a presence, to get whites used to the fact 
that they weren’t the only ones to speak’ (Deteix interview, 12/5/94).  As Togna put 
it, the choice of location was very political:  ‘The voice of the Kanak people should 
make itself heard even where people don’t like it’ (Kanaky, no. 9, September 1987). 
 
This objective immediately distinguished the aims of Djiido from those of Bwenando.  
Although Bwenando was created in part to articulate a Kanak voice to those who 
denied its existence, its voice primarily addressed Kanaks.  Distribution was a 
problem for the publication because the aim was that Bwenando reach Kanaks 
throughout the territory.  Djiido’s signal covering a 50-kilometre radius meant that 
the station could be heard only in greater Noumea, whose population was primarily 
non-Kanak.  Djiido did seek authorisation to extend its signal into the interior early in 
its operation.   Its lack of success in this regard did not, however, jeopardise what 
appears to have been its major objective - to constitute a Kanak presence in 
‘Nouméa la blanche’.15  The centrality of this objective is reflected in Togna’s 
comparison of the efficacy of Djiido and Bwenando:   
 
                                                          
14 Deteix says that Radio Djiido resulted from the initiative of such people as himself, Eloi Machoro, 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, Yéiwéné Yéiwéné, Octave Togna and Léopold Jorédié. 
15 Djiido began being broadcast to 80 per cent of the territory in 1991 through a network put in place 
by the state-run broadcasting transmission company, TDF (Waia interview, 10/5/94).  Prior to this, 
Djiido had made unsuccessful requests to TDF for the extension of its network (Deteix interview, 
12/5/94).  The extension of Djiido and RRB was a commitment made in the Matignon Accords. 
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  Psychologically, local whites think that it is impossible that local Kanaks 
could use radio.  It is unthinkable.  It’s unthinkable that Kanaks could speak 
for themselves and that we could rape whites in their own homes - by that I 
mean penetrate their homes without entering physically.  Bwenando doesn’t 
enter into the homes of Europeans; Djiido does, but they hide to listen to us.  
We are stronger than Bwenando in so far as radio is more able to influence 
European opinion than a newspaper (interview, 23/11/89).  
 
The station was opened on 24 September 1985, the 132nd anniversary of the 
annexation of the territory by France, by New Caledonian Deputy Roch Pidjot and 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou, with an opening Tamla Motown jingle which signalled its 
intended musical orientation towards the black musical genres of reggae, soul, funk 
and disco.  Djiido was the territory’s first 24-hour radio service, a programming 
decision taken as much for security reasons, to ensure a continual presence at the 
site, as a demonstration of the capabilities of its team.  Only 24 hours into its 
operation, a bomb was thrown at the premises but it caused little damage.  The staff 
and premises continued to be subjected to considerable harassment from right-wing 
agitators, resulting in the staff being required to sleep on the premises during 
periods of acute political tension.  Djiido’s news broadcasts were frequently 
jammed.  Bwenando believed that the jamming was emanating from RRB, 
describing it as ‘a violation of OUR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION in Kanak country’ 
(Bwenando, 16/10/85; see also, Bwenando, 10/1/86 and L’Avenir, 25/11/86).16   
 
The objective of using Djiido to demonstrate Kanak abilities to the European 
population of Noumea placed a high premium on the broadcasting of programs 
which complied with dominant notions of media professionalism and program 
structure.  Early efforts were made to secure training courses for those designated 
to work as journalists at the station.  From the beginning of 1986, journalists were 
sent overseas for six-month training programs, primarily to the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation.  One of the first journalists to undergo training in 
Australia was Nicole Waia, who became Djiido’s co-director in 1989.  She argues 
that, while these courses were helpful, Djiido’s journalists learnt most from 
emulating the modes of operating of other journalists working in the territory.  This 
was hardly a mind-set which demonstrated a critical engagement with notions of 
media professionalism.   
                                                          
16 Djiido was also subject to defamation proceedings.  Les Nouvelles Hebdo reported that Djiido was 
found guilty of defamation in December 1987 for having broadcast an interview with Pierre Juquin 
which defamed Serge Vanhale and Bernard Deck (25/2/88). 
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Togna also resolved to emulate much of the programming structure of the other 
radio stations in the territory.  Djiido primarily broadcast music, its political 
programming being mostly restricted to its three daily news bulletins and a couple of 
additional information programs.  Initially, the news bulletins, which then lasted only 
five to seven minutes, were compiled by Deteix and UC politician Léopold Jorédié.  
Bulletins were compiled from news broadcast on RFO, RRB, Radio Australia and 
the Voice of America, and from pro-independence sources who provided information 
by phone (Togna interview, 23/11/89; Deteix interview, 12/5/94).  By 1986, the news 
bulletins lasted at least 15 minutes and more local news was incorporated into the 
bulletins as a result of information relayed to Djiido from local FLNKS struggle 
committees.  Djiido would frequently be informed of activities of the police and the 
military in the interior, and this information would be incorporated into news 
bulletins.  The incorporation of this news was, according to Nicole Waia, a new and 
troublesome development for their opponents: 
 
 Our political adversaries began to understand the extent to which we were 
dangerous for their propaganda.  From then on, they could no longer say 
anything they liked.  Radio Djiido annoyed them, hence their will to sabotage 
it at any cost (Waia, 1991). 
 
In part, the restriction of political information primarily to the news was an 
organisational imperative:  the small news team was already stretched in putting 
together three main daily news bulletins.  However, it was also seen as a legislative 
and political imperative.  Legislatively, Djiido and RRB were required to comply with 
certain standards of objectivity and balance, and the requirement that political 
programming be clearly identifiable from the remainder of the programming.  Djiido 
appears to have followed these dictates more closely than RRB, but both stations 
flouted this legislative requirement at times.  Nicole Waia commented, for example, 
that Djiido publicised the FLNKS call to boycott the French national elections of 
1986 and the 1987 referendum on independence by broadcasting advertisements 
explaining the FLNKS position, ignoring a directive from the High Commissioner that 
the station give air-time to its opponents (Waia interview, 10/5/94).  Djiido did, 
however, give some exposure to anti-independence political discourses.  It did so, 
Waia argued, in order to counter the anti-independence discourse which described 
the Kanak struggle as ‘a racist fight, even a fight for expulsion’ (Waia, 1991).  As 
she commented: 
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 We want Djiido to be the image of a future national radio station or national 
structure when the country is independent.  That is to say that people have 
to be able to express themselves...It is the only way to convince people that 
our struggle isn’t a racist struggle (interview, 10/5/94).  
 
Even during the Ouvéa crisis, Djiido maintained its policy of keeping political 
discourse to the news bulletins, this time for security reasons in order to guard 
against the station being attacked by those Waia described as ‘fascists’.  As she 
commented:  ‘Above all else, we mustn’t excite people here in Noumea because we 
aren’t in a position of strength here.  People have already come here to throw 
grenades and all’ (Waia interview, 10/5/94). 
 
The limiting of political discourses primarily to news bulletins engendered criticism 
from within the FLNKS.  As one writer to Bwenando commented: 
 
 I am waiting for Radio Djiido to become a political radio service for the 
FLNKS on which the political situation in Kanaky would be analysed; where 
one could hear of the history of the Kanak people’s demands- all in all, a 
political education for the Kanak people and those who are colonised and 
exploited in order to reinforce the work of the struggle committees and 
Bwenando, rather than waste time broadcasting music (Bwenando, 27/3/86).  
 
Bwenando responded by defending Djiido, telling such critics that they should rather 
ask themselves what they have done for Djiido (ibid).  Bwenando’s response 
pointed to resource constraints as the major factor behind Djiido’s programming 
orientation.  While these constraints were indeed formidable, they were exacerbated 
by the choice taken by the management at Djiido to comply with conventional 
notions of professionalism and program structure.  Alternatives were possible, but 
not if the objective of the station was to demonstrate Kanak existence and 
competence to ‘Nouméa la blanche’.         
 
Djiido and FLNKS politics 
 
As with Bwenando, Djiido was a structure of the FLNKS but was also guaranteed a 
degree of editorial independence from the FLNKS.  This independence was 
considered crucial if Djiido was to succeed in projecting a professionally credible 
image.  Waia’s interpretation of this relationship is evocative of Bwenando’s, 
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 although it is probably less forceful in the manner in which it asserts Djiido’s 
editorial independence.  Waia argues that: 
 
 Certainly we can’t say anything against the FLNKS...but that doesn’t stop us 
from doing analyses which run counter to them a bit.  When one doesn’t 
agree with the orientation taken by the FLNKS, one doesn’t denounce it but 
rather does an analysis and makes sure that people in the FLNKS listen to it.  
Then that allows a debate to take place. But at no time does the FLNKS 
have a direct hold (Waia, 10/5/94).  
 
Journalists at Djiido were clearly faced with tensions similar to those at Bwenando.  
The different fate of these two FLNKS media suggests, however, that the tensions 
were negotiated differently between the organisations.  A major factor in this 
difference appears to have been the continuing influence of the UC in the 
management of Djiido.  Until his appointment as head of the Agence de 
Dévélopement Culturelle Kanak (ADCK) in late 1989, Togna maintained relatively 
tight editorial control over Djiido’s news and current affairs programming.  Although 
he was not located on the premises during the day (he held a position at the SLN), 
journalists would seek his advice on whether potentially contentious information 
should be broadcast and he would be present most evenings when the nightly news 
bulletin went to air.  Although EDIPOP remained in place as the official 
management structure of the station, its remained so in legal terms only, and was 
not called on to provide management or editorial advice.  In interview, Togna 
stressed his central editorial role:  ‘There are times when you have to say things.  I 
make the choice.  I base the choice on a proper analysis of the political situation.  It 
is never dictated from outside, never, never, never’ (23/1/89). 
 
A hint of Togna’s forceful personality is conveyed in this quote.  It, along with the 
prominence of his position in the UC and the FLNKS in general, probably assisted 
significantly in shielding journalists at Djiido from acute political pressure.  Togna 
says that it was initially very difficult to guard the station’s independence (ibid).  
However, his ‘proper analyses’ of the political situation, which dictated his editorial 
decisions, were no doubt significantly influenced by his closeness to the UC.  His 
response at interview to a question on the relevance of the notion of socialism to the 
operation and programming of the station provided what I believe to be a good 
illustration of how his views reflect more conservative positions within the 
movement.  After an extended period of laughter, Togna was seriously adamant:  
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 ‘Me, I’m not a socialist; I am only a Kanak!  The station is Kanak because Kanaks 
work in it ... I don’t want to be colonised a second time’ (ibid).  His rejection of the 
relevance of socialism to the operations of the station and to the movement more 
generally suggested an alignment with more conservative elements within the 
FLNKS on this important and divisive issue.  His response contrasted sharply with 
that, for example, of a PALIKA territorial counsellor who asserted unwaveringly that 
he was a ‘Marxist-Leninist’, and with the general adherence to certain socialist 
principles within the more leftist groups within the FLNKS, in particular the PALIKA 
and the USTKE. 
 
Togna’s editorial control within Djiido was therefore highly significant in the station 
being able to negotiate the difficulties of an arm’s-length relationship with the 
FLNKS.  In addition, as Waia argues, the superior financial management of Djiido 
also ensured that the station could continue while Bwenando was forced to close.     
 
A Kanak radio 
 
Djiido’s claim to constitute a Kanak presence in ‘Nouméa la blanche’ and to be the 
voice of the Kanak people implied that the station would be the conduit for the 
assertion of Kanak identity.  Within much pro-independence discourse, Kanak 
identity was expressed, as I argue in the next chapter, through the assertion of 
difference.  Djiido, on the other hand, through its concerted engagement with 
notions of professionalism, appeared at times more concerned to emulate the 
broadcasting style of its competitors than to chart a more culturally distinct course. 
Togna’s assertion that Djiido is Kanak because only Kanaks work at the station 
does not resolve the issue of the extent to which this Kanak presence was 
expressed through Djiido’s programming.  Within the broadcast media in particular, 
we might assume that the exigencies of complying with professional practices would 
limit the scope for difference.  For example, in the presentation of news, such 
factors as the punctuality of news bulletins, the scope of coverage of issues, the 
structure of the news bulletins, and their mode of verbal delivery are governed by 
professional codes which journalists at Djiido mostly appeared adept at emulating.  
Were there expressions of difference in Djiido’s news and information 
programming? 
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 The primary difference was, of course, the incorporation of news on pro-
independence movement demands and activities, which was far from insignificant in 
a context where pro-independence discourses were largely excluded from the mass 
audience media.  However, in addition, some more general differences were 
apparent.  Djiido placed greater emphasis on regional news, which was congruent 
with the pro-independence argument that New Caledonia should be seen as part of 
the Pacific, not France.17  In addition, Djiido’s news stories tended to be longer than 
those broadcast on other media.  For example, lengthy extracts of interviews 
sometimes featured prominently in news bulletins, and Djiido developed a 
reputation for reading extensively from AFP wire service stories.18  In part, these 
differences resulted from resource constraints.  Journalists frequently did not have 
time to edit interviews and the choice of a 15 to 20-minute news bulletin, three times 
daily, often necessitated heavy reliance on AFP news.   While some listeners 
viewed the lengthy reading of AFP news stories as an unfortunate lapse in 
professionalism, others considered it a significant contribution to broadening out the 
informational sphere.  For Barbançon, the filtering of information by the other radio 
services in the territory, particularly RRB, meant that: 
 
 ...you have to listen to the indépendantiste radio to know a bit more.  This is 
the only radio station to take account of AFP stories, in an almost exhaustive 
manner.  It is one of the few areas of liberty that still exists’ (1992:56-7).   
 
These practices, while influenced by organisational imperatives, may also reflect a 
different appreciation of the role which radio can play in advancing independence.  
The broadcasting of lengthy interviews with Kanaks might be seen to valorise the 
contribution of people who were not particularly adept at the ‘30-second grab’.  As 
Tjibaou once commented:  ‘As a result of speaking through the media one’s 
language becomes more sophisticated and one even loses contact with one’s own 
rank and file  (Canberra Kanaky, September-December 1985).  Giving voice to this 
Kanak ‘rank and file’, or speaking in its voice, could reduce the risk of alienation 
among Kanak listeners and valorise their voice.  It might therefore constitute not 
only a cultural expression but also an astute tactic in the political struggle.  In 
addition, the more lengthy coverage of individual stories reflects a more pedagogic 
view of the medium and a presumption that a fuller understanding of local and 
                                                          
17 In 1991, Djiido had agreements with Pacnews, Radio Australia, Radio Vanuatu and Radio Tefana in 
Tahiti for the exchange of information and programs (Waia, 1991).  By 1994, a French regional news 
broadcast from Radio Australia was being transmitted each lunch-time (Waia interview, 10/5/94). 
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 international events would enhance Kanak self-awareness and the political struggle 
for independence.19  These differences might be seen to be expressive of cultural 
difference but, as we have seen, this was not the primary objective of Djiido. 
 
The image of Kanak identity articulated through Djiido’s programming de-
emphasised difference, promoting instead a vision of Kanaks as assimilable and, 
indeed, assimilated into an area of endeavour which could be seen to exemplify 
modernity - the media.  This articulation of Kanak identity contrasted significantly 
with other notions of Kanakness which saw this identity as best expressed through 
culturally authentic practices and institutions.  Djiido’s choice reflected, as I have 
argued, the more politically moderate influence of the UC leadership through Togna 
and Deteix, resulting in the station facing less opposition from the FLNKS 
leadership, even if some more radical FLNKS members believed that more political 
programming was warranted.  However, this relative lack of opposition seldom 
translated into enthusiastic support for Djiido from the FLNKS leadership, with the 
result that the station received little financial assistance from the Front.  According 
to Deteix, the FLNKS wanted a radio station but has rarely helped out.  He argues 
that FLNKS politicians are anti-media:  they are opposed to the idea that issues 
pertinent to the pro-independence movement should be discussed on radio resulting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
18 Djiido began taking the AFP wire service at the beginning of 1987. 
19 My short period of time working in the news room at Djiido also gave me the opportunity to observe 
some organisational differences which distinguished Djiido’s mode of operation from that of public 
radio stations in Australia where I have also worked.  Public radio provides the closest point of 
comparison in the sense that a significant amount of the programming is overtly politically oriented 
and stations frequently operate under severe financial constraints.  Indeed, public radio in Australia 
mostly uses volunteer labour.  As in public radio in Australia, working conditions at Djiido were very 
poor.  Workers were often required to work a 16-hour day, six days per week, and received for it only a 
small amount of pocket money.  Working for Djiido entailed virtually living for Djiido.  Workers ate 
together throughout the day in a small shed at the side of the house.  Some, in 1989, still slept on the 
premises.  The station’s only car belonged to Nicole Waia; it was not working very well when I was 
there and required to be push started.  When journalists went out to cover stories they would leave 
together in the car and be dropped off at various places by the driver (most frequently Nicole), which 
often meant they arrived at their destinations late.  Back in the cramped news room, journalists sat 
around a very large table (made from several tables pushed together) and each engaged in their 
various listening, editing or writing tasks.  Nicole, who clearly presided in the news room, was busy 
with her own tasks, but occasionally an issue would be raised through, for example, a journalist asking 
a question about an AFP wire story, and Nicole would begin to extemporise on the issue, getting 
deeper and deeper into commenting in a most eloquent fashion on its origins and implications.  She 
commented to me that she saw her role in relation to the other, at that time young, journalists as 
pedagogic.  For me, Nicole was the grand matriarch of the news room, commanding authority but 
bestowing her political analysis and benevolence on her team.  Togna’s authority in the station was 
palpable.  His arrival in the evening generated a degree of apprehension among the workers.  He 
would give directives, tell people off about their work and shout out of his room to tell people to shut 
up if they were making too much noise.  But he also seemed to have a great deal of affection for his 
workers, most evident after the evening news bulletin when most journalists would get in his van to be 
driven home.  This mixture of authority and benevolence struck me as very distinct and certainly very 
different to the more individualistic environments in which I had worked in Australia. 
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 in there being between these politicians and Djiido ‘a permanent brawl’ (interview, 
12/5/94).   
 
There is clearly a paradox here between the FLNKS’s public pronouncements on 
the media and its more private practices.  The public condemnation of the control of 
discourse within those media institutions which the FLNKS described as ‘colonial’ 
did not translate into strategies of greater discursive openness in its own media.  It 
appears, as Barbançon has argued, that the ‘unspoken’ could emerge in Kanak 
society as readily as it could in European. 
 
Issues and discursive emphases in the pro-independence press 
 
The politically affiliated pro-independence press provided the forum for the 
propagation of party information and analyses of political events.  L’Avenir 
published speeches and articles written by UC leaders, as well as precis of UC 
congresses and meetings of its central committee.  Prior to the 1980s, Lenormand 
was the major contributor to the publication, but other party members were required 
to ensure publication during the lengthy periods when Lenormand was in Paris for 
parliamentary sittings.  In 1980 and 1981, L’Avenir published speeches delivered in 
the French parliament and the Territorial Assembly by UC Deputy Roch Pidjot, in 
the face of FR 3’s policy of not giving exposure to Kanak politicians (see for 
example, L’Avenir, 15/6/80; 31/12/80; 4/8/81).  Throughout the decade, most senior 
party members - Pierre Declercq, Eloi Machoro, Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yéiwéné 
Yéiwéné (all of whom were dead by the end of the decade) - wrote for L’Avenir or 
had speeches which they had delivered in the Territorial Assembly or elsewhere 
published.  François Burck took over as L’Avenir’s editor in the early 1980s, and 
most with whom I spoke considered that he was the primary catalyst for the 
publication’s appearance during the decade, assisted by Régis Lethezer, an 
administrator within the UC.  Bwenando also contained considerable party news.  
The FLNKS published a regular section ‘News from the Front’, contributed by its 
Political Bureau, as well as letters and articles from representatives of its 
constituent groups, precis of FLNKS, UC, UPM and FULK (Front Uni de Libération 
Kanake - United Kanak Liberation Front) congresses and decisions of their 
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 leadership committees.20   In addition, articles on PALIKA congresses and decisions 
were published in Le Kanak.21 
 
However, the ambit of issues discussed in the pro-independence press went well 
beyond party politics.  The publications addressed broader social and economic 
issues, such as health, nutrition, education, the development of economic 
resources, and Kanak culture. The emphasis which each publication placed on 
these issues differed.  For example, Kanak culture was addressed more frequently 
in L’Avenir, particularly in the early 1980s, than in Bwenando.  This difference 
reflects in part the evolution of the pro-independence struggle.  In the early 1980s a 
great deal of organisational work went into the establishment of regional and local 
struggle committees.  The issue of the role of customary authorities in these 
committees was at the forefront during this period and was discussed in several 
articles in L’Avenir (see, for example, 15/5/80).  Later in the decade, the intensity of 
the political struggle resulted in articles in Bwenando being more focused on 
articulating central pro-independence discourses than on discussing the detail of 
political organisation. The differences between the publications also pointed to 
tensions within the FLNKS over key policy issues which at a later time could emerge 
as significant areas of dissent.  However, there was also considerable discursive 
commonality and continuity across the publications, which strengthened during 
periods of heightened insurrectionary activity when the objective of unity against 
political opponents was foremost.   
  
The pro-independence media as counter-discourse 
 
We have seen that the interpretive repertoires developed by anti-independence 
politicians and their client media privileged hostile readings of the Kanak struggle. 
The pro-independence media sought to counter these readings by developing an 
alternative discursive terrain from which readings which affirmed the Kanak struggle 
would emerge.  This alternative terrain was developed through engagement with 
anti-independence discourse.  Indeed, the dialogue between these media was 
                                                          
20 Precis of congresses did not contain summaries of the debates.  They merely pointed to the topics 
which had been discussed and the resulting motion.  
21 Most articles appearing in L’Avenir were published without attribution, although articles appearing in 
the early 1980s were attributed to Pidjot and Lenormand and the authors of published speeches were 
identified.  Similarly, most Bwenando articles appeared without attribution, although there were some 
exceptions.  In 1985, Hnalaïne Uregei published en editorial which argued for the significance of the 
gains made by the FLNKS since 18 November 1984 (26/9/85). 
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 unrelenting for, as L’Avenir argued, it was the anti-independence ‘press that defines 
colonial “legality” and which justifies the illegality of the indépendantistes that have 
to be destroyed’ (L’Avenir, 30/9/81).  The pro-independence media responded not 
only to anti-independence taunts and accusations, but also to their silences, for 
these silences sometimes pointed to the perceived strength of pro-independence 
interpretive resources.  For example, Bwenando sought to respond forcefully to the 
accusation that FLNKS members were terrorists, resolving ‘issue after issue to lead 
with RPCR terrorism’ (Bwenando, 12/11/85).  But Bwenando also responded 
actively to the near silence in the anti-independence media over the FLNKS’s 
strategy to seek reinscription on the UN list of countries to be decolonised, making 
repeated references to the UN Charter and the rights it conferred on indigenous 
peoples (see, for example, 14/7/86).  The influence of anti-independence discourse 
on the discourses developed in the pro-independence media is perhaps nowhere 
better demonstrated than in Bwenando’s discussion of the existence of two theses 
around which the independence struggle was being waged.  In response to the 
RPCR’s thesis of ‘terrorism, petty crime, corruption, hatred, intolerance, dishonour, 
stupidity, obscurantism, subservience’, Bwenando posited the ‘confidence, Honour, 
mutual Respect, dignity, sincerity, Justice, liberty, intelligence’ of the FLNKS 
(Bwenando, 16/10/85, capitalisation in the original).  This autoethnographic 
depiction leaves little doubt over the influence of dominant modes of representation 
in the anti-independence press on pro-independence discourse.22 
 
A mark of the pro-independence media’s engagement with the anti-independence 
media is the prevalence of media criticism in the pro-independence press.  In 
reading Bwenando, L’Avenir and Le Kanak we are left with the distinct impression 
that those who contributed to these publications were persistent consumers of most 
local media, despite an FLNKS directive that the anti-independence media be 
boycotted by activists.  Bwenando illustrated on several occasions that it was 
attentive to the output of its competitors.  Responding to Lafleur’s denial that he had 
made certain comments at a press conference, Bwenando retorted: 
 
 You said those things during a press conference and they were broadcast on 
RRB which is listened to by thousands of people including FLNKS comrades.  
And we managed even to listen and RECORD your remarks without 
                                                          
22 Jara and Magana argue that bipolar functionalism is central to colonial discourse.  This example 
suggests that it might also be central to anti-colonial discourse (Jara & Magana, 1982:117). 
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 vomiting...We prefer to leave the embellishments and lies to candidate 
Lafleur and his media:  Affreux Jojo, RRB and Combat Calédonien (12/3/86). 
 
Bwenando’s disgust with Les Nouvelles’ coverage precipitated a call to FLNKS 
activists to adhere to the boycott directive: 
 
 Les Nouvelles, fascist disinformation rag, uniquely designed to intoxicate and 
manipulate opinion.  Les Nouvelles ‘handles’ the news without any objectivity 
or honesty.  It deforms or hides the facts and really takes its readers for 
idiots, which they end up being through their daily reading of this dirty and 
demoralising paper.  Right now, there are no more excuses to not apply 
strictly the FLNKS directive to boycott Les Nouvelles, a directive that has 
never been lifted (12/2/86). 
       
The frequency of Bwenando’s subsequent reference to and criticism of Les 
Nouvelles brings into question the extent to which its journalists were prepared to 
relinquish their daily reference to what was, after all, their main press opponent.23 
 
Colonialism as meta-discourse 
 
Central to the many discourses and their permutations which were developed 
across the pro-independence media was a discourse on colonialism.  This discourse 
not only informed but rendered coherent all others, and might therefore be 
considered a type of meta-discourse:  it enabled the subsuming of almost all 
aspects of public existence into an expression or product of it.  Thus, the 
introduction of violence into the territory, the European-influenced diet of Kanaks, 
syphilis, and AIDS were presented as colonial products and agents of colonial 
repression (see for example, L’Avenir, 16/7/87; Bwenando, 5/6/86 & 12/8/87; Le 
Kanak, January & March 1990). Drawing on the psycho-political theories of Fanon 
and Nemmi, the pro-independence press argued that colonialism structured the 
mind and imprinted itself on the bodies of the colonised.  It also formed the 
interpretive schema, described on one occasion by L’Avenir as ‘the colonial logic’ 
(L’Avenir, 9/9/87), within which political events could be understood.  The large 
1982 demonstration organised after the FI-FNSC’s formation of government by the 
Committee for the Defence of the Institutions was described in L’Avenir as an 
‘outbreak of colonialism and racism’ (29/6/82).  The situation of the Koindé tribe was 
                                                          
23 The pro-independence media’s interest in the anti-independence media appears to have been 
reciprocated.  Bwenando noted on a couple of occasions that the local media used information 
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 described as ‘typical of colonialism:  tribes dismissed but also exploited and 
diminished in their dignity’ (L’Avenir, 28/5/86), while Tjibaou argued that the 
violence on Ouvéa in 1988 ‘is in keeping with the context of 130 years of 
colonisation ... Those who want to walk on the head of Kanaks are acting like their 
colonial grandfathers’ (Les Nouvelles, 23/4/88).  In the face of anti-independence 
claims that colonialism had long since demised in New Caledonia, the pro-
independence movement continued to assert that colonialism remained the defining 
feature of society responsible for the full range of inequities and injustices which it 
claimed.  The influence of Marxist discourse meant that the pro-independence 
movement linked this discourse on colonialism with a discourse on capitalism as a 
system of inherent inequity, although this link was strongest in the early 1980s and 
argued for more strongly in Le Kanak than in Bwenando or L’Avenir.24 
                                                                                                                                                                          
broadcast on Radio Djiido, and argued that the number of defamation charges brought against it 
demonstrated that ‘our adversaries read us’  (8/1/88). 
24 For example, the strong Marxist influence in PALIKA privileges a class analysis of political events 
which often subsumes the Kanak political struggle into a broader discourse on class struggle.  This 
privileging of a class analysis is well illustrated in an article responding to the loyalist accusation that 
the Kanak independence struggle was racist.  The title of the article, ‘Racial conflict or class conflict’ is 
suggestive of its conclusion.  Following a systematic Marxist analysis of the class structure of the 
territory, Le Kanak concludes that ‘it is class interests, which have become explosive, which are 
clashing today, not, like some believe or like to make believe, a racial clash’ (Le Kanak, 9/3/85). This 
penchant for analysing political events as congruent with the grand Marxist narrative on class society 
is a distinguishing feature of Le Kanak, although the publication also engaged in less theoretically 
grounded analysis and discussion.  L’Avenir, particularly under the influence of Lenormand, similarly 
engaged with discourses which linked the Kanak political struggle with the struggle to undermine 
economic exploitation, but did so in a more populist manner in keeping with the UC’s more reformist 
agenda.  In articles in 1980 and 1981, Lenormand argued that multinational capital was behind the 
propaganda campaign to make the Caldoches believe that they would be thrown out of the country 
after Kanak independence.  The aim of these multinationals was, according to Lenormand, to ensure 
that the ‘petit blanc’ in the territory resist Kanak and Socialist independence, thereby securing the 
multinational grip on the territory’s economy (L’Avenir, 15/7/80; January 1981).  Lenormand’s leftist 
political economy informed much of L’Avenir’s analysis up until the early 1980s.  Its influence waned, 
however, as Lenormand progressively withdrew from involvement in L’Avenir and as political views 
polarised.  After the 1981 presidential elections, it appeared increasingly futile to call on worker 
solidarity with Kanak political claims.  In the lead-up to the 1981 presidential election, UC Deputy Roch 
Pidjot had urged the ‘exploited’ to vote for Mitterrand, arguing that, under Giscard:  ‘The despoilings, 
unemployment, pollution, increasingly degrading working conditions, high cost of living’ had worsened.  
These conditions were symptomatic, he argued, of the ‘colonial situation in which the territory finds 
itself’, a situation which ‘will only come to an end through the combat engaged in by the Kanak people 
for Kanak and Socialist Independence with the will and necessity to join with the mass of all exploited 
workers’ (L’Avenir, 15/4/81).  The size of the ‘worker’ vote for Giscard indicated that this discourse on 
worker solidarity with Kanak political demands had not convinced.  L’Avenir expressed its 
disappointment in this workers’ vote, describing it as ‘anti-Kanak’.  From this time onwards, the 
emphasis in L’Avenir shifted from political-economic analyses to an emphasis on Kanak political 
demands (L’Avenir, 30/4/81).  This emphasis on Kanak political demands was also favoured in 
Bwenando.  Although the leftist politics of those working for the publication were evident in its 
engagement with Marxist tropes and its open trumpeting, at times, of Marxism, the immediacy of the 
paper’s involvement in the acute political struggles occurring until mid-1988 resulted in a greater 
emphasis on rhetorical strategies grounded in the dominant discourses articulated within the FLNKS 
at that time, in particular, the internationalist discourses on the right to self-determination of 
indigenous peoples. Perhaps the ultimate example of the mobilisation of Marxist tropes in the analysis 
of economic, political and social life in New Caledonia was the booklet, published in 1982 by EDIPOP, 
Capitalism and Colonialism in New Caledonia, which sought to ‘explain capitalism and colonialism in 
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This refutation of the demise of colonialism also took other forms.  For example, 
Pidjot described the Dijoud plan for land redistribution as substituting ‘new 
colonisation for the old’.  He continued:   
 
 We don’t accept that our land be stolen once again...the canaque people, the 
victim of massacres before being reduced to slavery, won’t accept being 
mishandled one more time (Les Nouvelles, 22/12/80). 
 
This depiction of colonial relations in the 1980s as constituting a ‘new colonialism’ 
or ‘neo-colonialism’ was prevalent across the pro-independence media.  L’Avenir 
described the Lemoine statute as ‘neo-colonial’; Bwenando used the same term to 
describe the Fabius statute (L’Avenir, 11/5/84; Bwenando, 17/2/87).  But the precise 
difference between the old and this ‘new colonialism’ was the source of competing 
articulations in the pro-independence press.  For Pidjot, ‘between yesterday’s 
colonisation and today’s, nothing has changed’ (L’Avenir, 31/12/80).  Nor, he 
argued, had the Kanak response:  ‘My people survived a different colonial policy, it 
will once again resist the new colonisation’ (L’Avenir, 31/12/80).  Lenormand, on the 
other hand, articulated a notion of neo-colonialism as expressed through the 
imposition of new forms of economic domination - what he described as a ‘super-
capitalist system’.  This articulation implied that neo-colonialism was not directly 
linked to the question of independence, as New Caledonia could not be an 
independent territory unless the ‘super-capitalist system’ was destroyed (L’Avenir, 
15/7/80 & 26/12/85).  A third articulation of ‘neo-colonialism’ related it to the 
imposition of a new form of political domination presided over by Melanesians.  As 
one activist writing to Bwenando commented:  ‘Neo-colonialism means putting a 
black mask of domination in the place of White domination.  It changes the cards 
but not the rules of the game’ (Bwenando, 19/9/85).  This articulation referred to a 
situation in which New Caledonia became ‘independent’ but was governed by 
conservative Melanesian politicians such as Ukeiwé and RPCR Deputy Maurice 
Nénou.  The suggestion was that only the FLNKS would change the ‘rules of the 
game’.   
 
This articulation, like that of Lenormand, in divorcing the notion of neo-colonialism 
from that of independence, left open the possibility that the taunt of ‘neo-colonialism’ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
general’ and ‘analyse the situation in New Caledonia’ by linking economic exploitation with Kanak 
demands for self-determination. 
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 could be directed at the more conservative elements within the FLNKS:  those who 
would acquire political power without moving to reconstitute New Caledonian 
society on a more equitable political or economic basis.  Indeed, by 1989 this 
articulation had emerged.  PALIKA argued in Bwenando that:  ‘The neo-colonial 
tendency proves itself very present in the liberation movement’ (Bwenando, 
27/4/89).   
 
These articulations of ‘neo-colonialism’ coexisted with a broader discourse on 
colonialism which was far more homogeneous and totalising, and it was this latter 
discourse that constituted the greatest point of unification for the movement.  It was 
always there to be mobilised when unity and mobilisation were the objectives.  But 
the moment the discussion extended beyond the ‘fait colonial’, even, as we have 
seen, to a discussion of contemporary colonialism, competing articulations 
emerged, many of which were dilemmatic.  These dilemmas reflected divergences 
in political orientation within the FLNKS and, consequently, different appreciations 
of what constituted optimal discursive strategies.  In addition, the simultaneous 
mobilisation of these dilemmatic discourses within publications (such as Pidjot’s and 
Lenormand’s articulations of neo-colonialism described above) pointed to 
differences within parties over understandings of key notions.  These different 
understandings suggest the complexity of political relationships within the FLNKS.  
But they also provided a rich armoury of interpretive resources which could be 
mobilised strategically in the discursive struggle. 
 
 
Kanak independence 
 
In the early 1980s, L’Avenir argued that the ‘time of colonisation’ could be erased 
only through recognition of ‘the right of the Kanak people to accede to 
independence’ (L’Avenir, 27/10/81).  The claim here went beyond seeking the 
proclamation of New Caledonia as an independent country.  What the ‘Kanak 
people’ demanded was a ‘Kanak independence’ in which ‘only the kanak people 
determines its future in its country, in KANAKY’: 
 
 That is to say, in actual fact, that only the kanak people, with their status as 
colonised people, should be called upon to vote in a self-determination ballot 
(Bwenando, 26/9/85).   
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This articulation of ‘Kanak independence’ drew its justification from the 
internationalist discourse on the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, 
articulated formally in the UN Charter.  That this internationalist discourse should 
resonate so strongly among Kanaks in New Caledonia attests to the centrality of the 
struggle over identity in the territory.  ‘Kanak independence’ suggested a type of 
independence through which Kanak identity would be expressed.  While such an 
articulation of ‘Kanak independence’ was prominent in the early 1980s, the 
discourse subsequently permutated as anti-independence groups mobilised 
increasingly forcefully against it.  Their primary retort was that ‘Kanak 
independence’ was racist in privileging the rights of one ethnic community in the 
territory over those of another.  The competition between discourses on ‘Kanak 
independence’ in the pro-independence movement rendered difficult the 
mobilisation of a sustained counter-response.   
 
The anti-independence argument that Kanak independence was racist had 
precipitated a counter-response by the late 1970s.  In its 1979 platform, the FI had 
addressed the issue of the place of non-Kanaks in a future independent country, 
arguing that ‘The legitimation of non-Kanaks begins with the effective recognition of 
Kanaks as first occupants of the Territory, and the fight for Independence will allow 
them to be recognised in independence’ (L’Avenir, 15/5/80).  Recognition of Kanaks 
as ‘first occupants’ would therefore result in non-Kanaks being recognised in a 
future Kanak nation.  Within this interpretive repertoire, recognition of Kanaks as 
‘first occupants’ implied a recognition of their ‘ownership’ of the land.  As the 
platform argued:  ‘Colonisation stole the Kanak land; the FI demands that all the 
land stolen from Kanaks be returned unconditionally’ (L’Avenir, 15/5/80). 
 
This restoration of Kanak land ownership would, it was argued, allow Kanaks to 
exercise their traditional ‘right of welcome’ to the land.25  This notion of the ‘right of 
welcome’ was incorporated from traditional discourse into pro-independence 
discourse and therefore constituted an important instance of discursive hybridity.  
What could be understood as the ‘right of welcome’ and its relevance to the place of 
non-Kanaks in a future independent nation was explained in L’Avenir.  According to 
one Kanak leader: ‘we want to find ourselves at home and rediscover our power of 
                                                          
25 For a detailed discussion of Kanak land claims see L’Avenir, 15/5/80. 
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 organisation - our power of welcome - like the Kanaks from the Loyalty Islands who 
were able to welcome the clans of the Grand Terre’ (L’Avenir, 30/6/81).  This 
articulation suggested that the ‘right of welcome’ was the power to be able to 
welcome others; a power which could be possessed by Kanaks only if they had their 
land and re-established forms of Kanak organisation. 
 
The statement in the minimal platform suggested, however, that this ‘right of 
welcome’ would be extended only to those who had participated in the ‘struggle for 
independence’, a position which appeared to lend credence to the view that those 
non-Kanaks who had not supported independence would be ostracised.  However, 
by 1981, the FI appears to have shifted significantly from this position.  In an 
important statement on Indépendance Kanak et Socialist (Kanak Socialist 
Independence - IKS), three Kanak politicians articulated a far more inclusive 
discourse on ‘Kanak independence’, rejecting the proposition that the FI had 
suggested that other ethnic groups ‘pack their bags’: 
 
 No party program or Independence Front leader ever talked about making 
other ethnic groups ‘pack their bags’.  That’s an expression used to create a 
psychosis of fear and electoral leverage...We can’t see the need for artisans 
or workers, from any ethnic group, to pack an ‘empty bag’ while they have a 
place in the businesses, the work sites etc...of this country’ (L’Avenir, 
27/10/81). 
 
In the statement it was argued that the restoration of Kanak mastery over the land 
was a necessary precursor to the opening of negotiations over the future shape of 
the nation:  ‘The clans, having been recognised as the real masters of the land, will 
have recovered the right “of welcome” indispensable for negotiations’ (L’Avenir, 
27/10/81).  The restoration of the ‘right of welcome’ in this statement has shifted 
from a right to welcome those who have participated in the struggle to a necessary 
precursor to the opening of negotiations over the future of the nation as ‘partners’:  
‘recognition of the right to Kanaque Independence opens the possibility of 
negotiations between partners’ (L’Avenir, 27/10/81).  Within this more inclusive 
conceptualisation, ‘Kanak independence’ becomes not so much a polity determined 
by Kanaks as a negotiated settlement between Kanak and non-Kanak ‘partners’.   
 
This more inclusive discourse on ‘Kanak independence’ engendered a further 
discursive permutation.  ‘Kanak independence’ shifts from being a Kanak political 
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 claim to a descriptive term for the independent nation.  This articulation is 
expressed in Tjibaou’s 1987 retort to accusations that ‘Kanak independence’ was a 
racist concept: 
 
 We said Kanak independence!  Yes!  Why say that it is racist?  It’s not racist 
to speak of French independence!  Why is it racist to demand Kanak 
independence - Kanak nationality - and not racist to speak of French 
independence? (Bwenando, 29/9/87). 
 
The equating of ‘French independence’ with Kanak independence attests to the 
significance of the shift which had occurred in articulations of ‘Kanak independence’ 
by the latter part of 1987, the year in which the discourses of the territory’s 
mainstream media, Les Nouvelles and RFO, were at their most vituperative.  
‘French independence’ is not in itself a call for the supremacy of a particular ethnic 
group, although the overwhelming dominance of ethnic French in that nation’s 
political institutions means that the claim of ‘French independence’ will 
disproportionately favour this socio-ethnic grouping.   Presumably, ‘French 
independence’ has something to do with sustaining the sovereignty of French 
political institutions.  If so, it is an institutional claim, which has as its referent the 
encroachment of other nations on that sovereignty, not a primafacie a racial one.26  
‘Kanak independence’ thereby becomes a claim for political sovereignty against 
encroachments from outside.  The Other in this discourse has shifted from within - 
that is, non-Kanaks - to without; that is, the encroachment on Kanak sovereignty 
from other nations, presumably the most significant being France. 
 
This shift from an exclusive discourse on ‘Kanak independence’ to an inclusive one 
was not total; parallel discourses remained.  The choice as to which discourse to 
mobilise was at times strongly influenced by the particular political context.  Thus, 
the FLNKS Charter, ratified at the FLNKS constitutive congress in 1984, called for 
the Kanak people to ‘be recognised as the only legitimate people in the pays Kanak 
and to have its patrie there’ (check translation), an exclusionist statement par 
excellence, but one which left a counter-discursive opening in speaking of ‘pays 
kanak’ (literally translated as ‘kanak country’) rather than referring to ‘Kanak 
independence’ (Bwenando, 26/9/85).  One reading of ‘pays kanak’  referred to not 
                                                          
26 This reading of ‘French independence’ would probably not be concurred with by the extreme-right in 
France who saw the encroachment upon the French national as emerging from immigrants within 
France. 
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 the total territory of New Caledonia but rather to those areas in the territory where 
Kanaks predominate; in particular, the north of the main island and the Loyalty 
Islands.  The reading tended to suggest that a policy of regionalisation, which gave 
Kanaks considerable political autonomy over the ‘pays kanak’ would go a 
considerable way towards satisfying FLNKS demands.   
 
Like the FLNKS charter, Bwenando also contained articulations of ‘Kanak 
independence’ which could be read as exclusionist.  Anticipating that the Chirac 
government would call a general referendum on the question of independence 
sometime during 1987, Bwenando argued: 
 
 It is absurd to ask the French whether they want to be independent; they are 
already independent.  Nor do we want to ask the French if they want to 
become Kanak.  Anyway, we don’t want some of them to become KANAK, to 
accede to Kanak citizenship.  The question is elsewhere.  The real question 
to ask of every Kanak and uniquely of Kanaks is:  do you want to become 
French or independent?  And this is the only manner of proceeding in 
keeping with the logic of UN texts and even the constitutional logic if we want 
to interpret the texts honestly (Bwenando, 14/1/87). 
 
This position was not tantamount to arguing that some ‘French’ in New Caledonia 
would have to ‘pack their bags’ after independence, for the FLNKS had argued that 
non-Kanaks could maintain their French nationality in the independent nation and 
would not therefore need to become Kanak citizens.  But, within its immediate 
contextual reading, those unaware of this not too frequently publicised aspect of 
FLNKS policy could read this statement as exclusionary.   
 
In the face of such a reading, L’Avenir was keen to assert that ‘the demand for 
independence is the demand for a right and not some sort of revenge, a demand for 
justice, dignity and democracy’ (L’Avenir, 26/3/87).  L’Avenir’s resort to the term 
‘democracy’ was probably aimed at refuting the argument that ‘Kanak 
independence’ would be racist because only Kanaks would be allowed to decide it 
through a referendum in which only Kanaks could vote.  Indeed, within anti-
independence discourse, the terms ‘Kanak independence’ and ‘democracy’ were 
considered antonyms.  Perhaps what was meant by democracy here was the 
establishment of a political system after independence in which each member would 
have equal voting rights, an argument advanced in the pro-independence press 
(see, for example, L’Avenir, 27/10/81).  But within pro-independence media 
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 discourse there were dissenting articulations even over the issue of the future of 
democracy in ‘Kanak independence’.  As L’Avenir commented: 
 
 Democracy, with its system of one man=one vote, comes to us from the 
West.  If 99 imbeciles are unanimous against a single sage, they are right 
and they decide.  It is the least worst of all the systems, and that’s all!  In our 
Kanaky, this system came with the immigrants, who were brought in by the 
French Government to drown the ‘Kanak Problem’. After having pursued a 
policy of immigration and fabricated a democracy manipulated by the system 
in place, it is easy to play the democrat and deny the fundamental Kanak 
problem in our country (L’Avenir, 27/5/88). 
 
The fate of democracy in a ‘Kanak independence’ is ambiguous in this discourse.  It 
suggests that competing articulations on structures of governance within a ‘Kanak 
independence’ existed within the movement, a point attested to in the discussion of 
‘Kanak independence’ and socialism below. 
 
The more inclusionary discourse on ‘Kanak independence’ also sat uneasily with 
the meta-discourse on colonialism.  Of all the discourses articulated within the pro-
independence media, the discourse on colonialism was, as I have argued,  the most 
immutable.  The ‘fait colonial’ was the central precept conferring authority on pro-
independence demands; it straddled all other discourses but was not necessarily 
congruent with them.27  As a discourse on structured inequality, colonialism, with its 
bi-polar taxonomy of ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’, lent itself to exclusionary discourses 
on ‘Kanak independence’ in its stress on the rights of the ‘colonised’ over those of 
the ‘coloniser’.  The notions of greater rights and historical redress seemed more 
appropriate to a meta-discourse on colonialism than references to democracy 
(particularly in a context where Kanaks were an electoral minority) and inclusionary 
articulations of ‘Kanak independence’. 
 
The central place afforded the ‘right of welcome’ in the discourse on ‘Kanak 
independence’ also appeared to contradict the more inclusionary discourse.  The 
                                                          
27 Certain shifts did occur within this discourse, largely related to the issue of  who did or did not 
constitute the ‘colonised’ in the territory.  In the early 1980s, L’Avenir argued that ‘a referendum on the 
Caledonian Statute can be based only on the consultation of the kanak people, the only people 
concerned because the only people finding itself in the situation of being a colonised people in its own 
country’ (L’Avenir, 18/8/82).  A major concession from the UC representatives to the discussions held 
at Nainville-les-Roches in 1983 was to broaden this notion of the ‘colonised’ to include those ‘victims 
of history’, Europeans of Caledonian descent, with at least one parent born in the territory.  
Henceforth, the pro-independence movement conceded that these people could participate in a vote 
on self-determination.  The broader discourse on colonialism, however, remained fixed, even in the 
face of repeated denials of the ‘fait colonial’ by many of those who opposed independence. 
 219
 difficulty in Western thought of reconciling seeming inequity with equity - the notion 
in other words that Kanaks have superior claims which, once recognised, can 
precipitate negotiations among ‘partners’ - was probably at the root of the anti-
independence conviction that ‘Kanak independence’ was racist.  However, the 
importing of this traditional notion of mediation in Kanak society appears to have 
been less problematic for Kanaks.  As Machoro argued in the Territorial Assembly in 
1984:  ‘The idea that sustains this political will is that of a PEOPLE who wants the 
restitution of its Patrie in order to live in peace, free and master of its destiny, a 
Patrie in which it will have every opportunity to exercise freely its capacity for 
welcome and hospitality which everyone recognises’ (L’Avenir, 2/2/84).  The 
conviction with which anti-independence groups argued that ‘Kanak independence’ 
was racist indicated that they were unwilling to attempt to come to terms with this 
Kanak ‘logic’. Instead, this hybrid discourse provided the anti-independence 
movement with a major discursive opening which was exploited relentlessly in the 
anti-independence media and which precipitated in pro-independence discourse a 
range of reactive permutations.  In other instances, the pro-independence reaction 
to dilemmas in their own discourses was manifest in silences, as the development 
of discourses on ‘socialism’ illustrates.    
 
Kanak independence and socialism 
 
The dilemmatic aspects of discourses on ‘Kanak independence’ were accentuated 
by competing discourses on ‘socialism’.  In 1980, L’Avenir proclaimed that 
‘independence, it’s an inescapable fact, it’s tomorrow’s reality’, but cautioned that 
two types of independence were possible, ‘native independence or neo-colonial 
independence’, by which was meant ‘that of a capitalist imperialism granted by a 
neo-colonial metropole which has decided to change its tactic’ (15/7/80).  The 
independence of the ‘natives’ was therefore seen as linked to an alternative 
economic future for the country.  As L’Avenir stated two years later:  ‘If we speak of 
kanak and socialist Independence, it is because this Independence cannot be 
realised by maintaining the capitalist system in place’ (L’Avenir, 11/7/83).  What 
would replace the ‘capitalist system’ and what therefore ‘socialism’ denoted was, as 
we have seen, a contentious issue within the movement and gave rise to divergent 
responses. 
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 One response was a conception of ‘Kanak independence’ as structured around 
‘kanak institutions’ - the clans, the land and the ‘regional reality’ - and not 
constructed out of institutions ‘put in place by the colonial system’ (L’Avenir, 
10/3/81).  This response was linked in L’Avenir to an articulation of socialism as 
expressive of ‘kanak institutions’, and particularly traditional land ownership.  As 
L’Avenir commented:  ‘Through clan ownership, a purely Kanak socialism can 
begin; that is to say, modelled on the reality of the country - at least that which 
concerns ownership’ (L’Avenir, 15/5/80).  L’Avenir pointed out, however, that its 
engagement in the ‘construction of socialism in New Caledonia’ did not imply that it 
was ‘wedded to Marxism’s ideological foundations’ (15/5/80).  In a television 
address prior to the second round of voting in the presidential elections of 1981, 
Pidjot declared that:  ‘For we Kanaks, socialism is the case.  Every clan has its 
place, its function.  Everyone finds themselves there’, while his colleague Gabrielle 
Paita added:  ‘At the return of our land, we could build Socialism there’ (L’Avenir, 
30/6/81).  The use of ‘case’ as metaphor points to the integrality of this 
understanding of socialism to Kanak culture, the ‘case’ being the location of 
communal exchange and therefore a metaphor for Kanak culture.   
 
This fusing of ‘Kanak institutions’ with ‘socialism’ found expression in the term 
‘Kanak socialism’ which featured prominently in the precis of the 1981 UC Congress 
in Noumea.  L’Avenir reported that: 
 
 What we want is a Kanak socialism  
 We are against a socialism which denies custom and religion 
 We are against bureaucratic socialism 
 We are for a self-managing, decentralised socialism which would allow the 
exploitation of the patrimoine for the profit of the people (L’Avenir, 14/10/81). 
 
Here we can see the extent to which the UC’s discourse on socialism is structured 
by competing discourse on socialism emanating from both outside and within the 
movement.  The concern to articulate its support for custom and religion and its 
opposition to bureaucratic socialism was a response to the anti-independence 
argument that the movement was being manipulated by the Soviet Union.  But it 
was also a message to those in the movement whose advocacy of Marxism resulted 
in a more ambivalent attitude towards the place of custom and religion in the future 
independent nation.  As I have argued, the relative paucity of discussion of issues of 
custom in Bwenando, compared with L’Avenir, illustrates this difference. 
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The difficulty of achieving some fixity in the discourse on socialism, particularly in 
the face of an intensifying anti-independence counter-discourse which held that the 
movement was being inspired by ‘Marxist extremists’, appears to have resulted in 
an avoidance of more detailed discussions on socialism in the pro-independence 
press, reflected in Bwenando’s deflective comments in 1986: 
 
 The goal is announced:  to attain IKS (Kanak Socialist Independence).  But 
the debate to define what is meant by SOCIALISM IN PAYS KANAK is still 
taking place.  One thing is clear: to attain IKS, we have to liberate ourselves, 
to free ourselves from the colonial state, by fighting on every front:  political, 
economic, cultural (Bwenando, 31/7/86).28 
 
After this period, the tensions in the discourses on socialism could be measured by 
their silences.  These silences were enabled by a renewal of intense political 
contestation and conflict under the Pons ministry, which privileged more assertive 
rather than reflective discourses, and by the subsequent shift in political strategy 
under the Matignon accords which gave rise to an ascendancy within the FLNKS of 
notions of managerial competence and economic development over discourses on 
Kanak independence and socialism. 
                                                          
28 Tjibaou’s comment at the UC Comité Directeur meeting at Waho similarly suggests that little 
progress had been made on developing a more consensual understanding on socialism:  
‘Independence hasn’t got feet; it’s a marching head.  But we’re starting to put feet on it’ (L’Avenir, 
18/7/85). 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN - IDENTITY IN THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE MEDIA 
 
In 1972, French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer wrote in a letter to his Secretary of 
State responsible for France’s overseas departments and territories that the 
government should implement a policy of massive migration to New Caledonia to 
secure France’s presence in the territory and, more broadly, in the Pacific.  
Messmer argued that the only threat to this presence, aside from world war, was the 
emergence of nationalist demands from the ‘autochthones’.  Massive immigration of 
French citizens would work, he continued, only if it brought about a situation where 
‘the demographic mass of the non-Oceanian population is in the majority’.  In 
quoting from Messmer’s letter, L’Avenir noted that it was written around the same 
time as the declaration from the then conservative Mayor of Noumea Roger Laroque 
that:  ‘Il faut faire du blanc pour noyer le kanak’ (literally translated:  ‘more white has 
to be made to drown the kanak’ (L’Avenir, 8/6/84). The repeated references to 
Messmer’s letter and Laroque’s declaration in the pro-independence press during 
the 1980s suggested that these statements were considered particularly significant.1   
 
The context of these references indicated that, for Kanaks, these statements were 
interpreted not so much as astute statements of policy aimed at shifting the 
electoral balance but as visceral assaults on Kanak existence.  The ‘drowning’ to 
which Laroque referred was seen not as an electoral dousing but rather a 
submerging of ‘the Kanak people’ to the point of their disappearance.  The pro-
independence movement’s preoccupation with this notion of disappearance is 
expressed in the first clause of the FLNKS Charter.  The French government, it 
declared, ‘is directly threatening the disappearance of the Kanak people by 
definitively rendering it a minority in its country’ (Bwenando, 26/9/85).  Successive 
French government policies were seen as confirmation that the strategy of ensuring 
the disappearance of the ‘Kanak people’ was under way.  The Lemoine statute 
ensured ‘the DISAPPEARANCE of the kanak People as a PEOPLE’ (L’Avenir, 
14/9/84) and necessitated active opposition, ‘or else the DROWNING of the kanak 
people will become more accentuated’ (L’Avenir, 2/8/84), while the Pons statute 
was viewed as an act of ‘ethnocide’ in its abrogation of legislation which ensured 
certain customary rights (le statute particulier) (Bwenando, 12/4/88).  According to 
                                                          
1 See for example, L’Avenir, 25/5/84 & 8/6/84; Le Kanak, 24/8/85; L’Avenir of 29/6/82 describes 
Laroque as ‘LAROQUE (..faut faire du blanc)’. 
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 L’Avenir, under Pons ‘you could ascertain that the French government proposed, as 
the alternative to the kanak people’s demand for independence, “the kanak 
people’s extermination” (L’Avenir, 5/8/88). 
 
This emphasis on a discourse of disappearance can be read as a response to 
discourses on Kanak identity developed in the anti-independence media.  As I 
argued earlier, Kanak identity was articulated as a type of non-existence; Kanaks 
were neither Caledonian nor Melanesian and certainly could never constitute a 
People.  The clearest articulation of this view - Pons’ 1987 declaration that the 
‘Kanak people don’t exist’ (L’Avenir, 9/9/87) - was a product of this lengthy 
discursive lineage.  Perhaps the most extreme consequence of this discourse of 
non-existence was to enable a metaphysical constitution of Kanaks as animals (see 
JanMohamed, 1995:21).  The written and pictorial depiction in Les Nouvelles of 
Tjibaou as a monkey (the Hienghène macaque) (22/11/86) was perhaps the ultimate 
expression of this consequence.  It was a depiction of Kanaks which L’Avenir and 
Bwenando readily parodied: 
 
 A good Kanak is a docile kanak, perfectly trained to bark and be quiet when 
necessary and at the order of its master?  Nice little monkey that is made to 
‘dance and sing’ to amuse the gallery but, above all, to not go further than 
that, and especially not to think that his kanak dignity occurs through the 
valuing of his own culture.  No, his dignity as a kanak Man doesn’t exist, and 
moreover has never existed.  It is an illusion invented by Red 
Anthropologists to disturb the good conscience of the ‘Master’.  It is an 
attempt at the destabilisation of the Christian West (L’Avenir, 25/3/88 & 
reprinted in Bwenando, 12/4/88).         
 
JanMohamed (1995) has written of the process of collapsing the Other into a 
metaphysical alterity, describing it as the ‘economy of the Manichean allegory’.  The 
economy is achieved, he argues, by descriptions of the native which ignore ‘issues 
such as intention, causality, extenuating circumstances, and so forth’ and tend 
instead to ‘fetishise a nondialectical, fixed opposition between the self and the 
native’ (ibid:19).  JanMohamed argues that an ideological function of the Manichean 
allegory is ‘to dehistoricise and desocialise the conquered world, to present it as a 
metaphysical “fact of life”, before which those who have fashioned the colonial world 
are themselves reduced to the role of passive spectators in a mystery not of their 
making’ (ibid:22).   
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 This denial of history and the social also enabled the brutality of some acts of 
violence towards Kanaks, such as occurred in the Hienghène massacre.  L’Avenir 
was not reticent in affirming the existence of such articulations of Kanak identity.  In 
early 1981, L’Avenir republished an article from the French weekly Le Nouvel 
Observateur which ostensibly illustrated the attitudes of some Caldoches towards 
Kanaks.  After meeting with a Caldoche called Dolbeau, the journalist wrote: 
 
 Must I type the monstrous remarks?  Yes.  Because ten other broussards, 
who don’t know each other, spoke them to me almost word for word...’I 
always taught my kids never to retreat before a charging cow.  The indigène 
is like cattle.  You have to tame them in a ring.  Could you see those 
savages manage the territory?’ (January 1981). 
 
This articulation of Kanaks as animals was, of course, among the more extreme 
anti-independence expressions of Kanak identity.  But this extreme expression was 
among the range of articulations of Kanak identity with which the pro-independence 
movement had to contend.  In the face of the denial of human existence, the 
response in New Caledonia, as elsewhere, was for the colonised to foreground the 
assertion of their existence in their political struggle.  The objective was to assert an 
identity and reclaim a history.  It was also to claim a place in the face of the physical 
displacement which many Melanesians on the main island experienced as a result 
of colonisation.   Thus, the assertion of Kanak identity and history, and a nation 
named ‘Kanaky’, became central to the pro-independence struggle.  The quest for 
identity led Kanaks to the internationalist discourse of ‘the people’, which gave them 
not only a human identity but a privileged one.  The discourse of the ‘disappearance 
of the Kanak People’ therefore connoted not necessarily a physical disappearance 
but a disappearance of this identity.  
 
Kanakitude? 
 
The foregrounding of identity began in the early 1970s with the return to New 
Caledonia of Melanesians who had been involved in tertiary studies in France 
around the time of the May 1968 protests.  Naisseline’s political group, the Foulards 
Rouges, was particularly concerned with reasserting indigenous cultural values and 
defiantly appropriated the then term of denigration ‘Kanak’ to affirm Melanesian 
identity (Chesneaux, 1988:61-4; Henningham, 1992:47-8).   While in France, these 
students became familiar with the writing of Fanon and, through Fanon, Aimé 
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 Césaire, who along with fellow poets Léopold Senghor and Léon Damas were key 
contributors to the Négritude movement which became influential in France in the 
1930s.2  In appropriating a term of denigration, the indigenous movement followed 
the strategy pursued by African liberation movements in their reclaiming of the term 
‘négre’.  Cesaire’s description of the rationale behind the reclaiming of the term 
‘négre’ gives an insight into the strategy pursued by these young Kanak students: 
 
 We adopted the word nègre as a term of defiance...We found a violent 
affirmation in the words nègre and nègritude...it is a concrete rather than an 
abstract coming to consciousness...We lived in an atmosphere of rejection, 
and we developed an inferiority complex...I have always thought that the 
black man was searching for his identity.  And...if what we want is to 
establish this identity, then we must have a concrete consciousness of what 
we are - that is of the first fact of our lives:  that we are black; that we were 
black and have a history...[that] there have been beautiful and important 
black civilisations...that its values were values that could still make an 
important contribution to the world (Césaire, quoted in Parry, 1994:184). 
 
Senghor sought to identify the nature of these ‘values that could still make an 
important contribution’, citing a black emotivity as a central defining characteristic.  
Senghor, and the Négritude movement more generally, has been criticised for this 
quest to discover and advocate essentialist features of Otherness on the grounds 
that it perpetuates the very process by which the Other came into being as a 
product of colonial discourse.  As Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin write: 
 
 Imperial narratives such as that of anthropology in their project of naming 
and thus knowing indigenous groups have imported a notion of aboriginality, 
of cultural authenticity which proves difficult to displace.  The result is the 
positioning of the indigenous people as the ultimately marginalised, a 
concept which reinscribes the binarism of centre/margin and prevents their 
engagement with the subtle process of imperialism by locking them into a 
locally strategic but ultimately self-defeating essentialism...As post-colonial 
discourse demonstrates, the appeal to ‘authenticity’ is not merely an 
ontological contradiction, but a political trap (Ashcroft et al., 1995:214).3 
 
                                                          
2 For a discussion of Cesaire’s influence on Fanon see Caute, 1970, pp. 21-31. 
3 Ashcroft et al. make similar claims in their summation of Satre’s critique of négritude:  
‘Satre...classified this colonial movement as springing from the intellectual conditioning of the mother 
culture.  He rightly assumed that any movement founded on an antithesis which responded to the 
Cartesian ‘I think, therefore I am’ with ‘I feel, therefore I am’ must be subject to a dialectical 
determinism which made all those who ‘are’ obedient to laws formulated on the European historical 
experience.  How was he to know, if the proponents of the universal vision of Négritude did not, that 
the African world did not and need not share the history of civilisations trapped in political 
Manicheanisms’ (1989:135-6). 
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 Against this critique of essentialism, there are those who argue that the resort to 
some form of nativist essentialism is indispensable as a political strategy.  To the 
criticism that nativism is merely an attempt to ‘revive pristine pre-colonial cultures’ 
which have themselves been constructed through colonial discourse, Parry argues 
that the task is rather ‘to address the empowering effects of constructing a coherent 
identity or of cherishing and defending against calumniation altered and mutable 
indigenous forms’ (Parry, 1994:179).4  In a similar vein, Griffiths writes of the 
Australian Aboriginal author Narogin Nyoongah that ‘he asserts in both his critical 
writing and practice as a novelist the importance of asserting his identity in 
essentialist difference as a political strategy’.  To do otherwise is, according to 
Hutcheon, ‘in many ways the luxury of the dominant order which can afford to 
challenge that which it securely possesses (Hutcheon cited in Mishra & Hodge, 
1994:277).   
 
The Kanak intellectuals’ engagement with Fanon and other black liberation writers, 
such as Albert Memmi, provided one avenue for their involvement in debates 
surrounding négritude.  Fanon’s work is sometimes read as making a transition from 
an initial act of embracing an essentialised notion of négritude to a subsequent 
rejection of it in favour of a transnational project of solidarity among the oppressed 
who, in the process of struggle, construct their collective identity.  Parry disputes 
this reading, arguing instead that Fanon’s work is characterised by ‘instabilities’ in 
its sometimes embrace and sometimes rejection of nativist notions of black culture 
and consciousness (Parry, 1994:186).  Parry reads Fanon’s seminal work, Black 
Skins/White Masks, as a text where ‘both an intellectual apprehension of blackness 
as a construct ... and a visceral attachment to the powerful fiction of black identity 
are always evident’ (ibid:187), and argues that:  ‘To the end there are signs of 
Fanon’s links with the Négritude movement’ (ibid:192). 
 
These tensions are also evident in the discourses on Kanak identity in the pro-
independence media.  These discourses range from those which construct Kanak 
identity as located in essentialist notions of culture to those which articulate a Kanak 
identity which is indeed transcultural and in the process of construction.  While in 
some instances there is a relationship between the bearers of these discourses and 
                                                          
4 Said appears also to acknowledge this empowerment in his claim that:  ‘To become aware of one’s 
self as belonging to a subject people is the founding insight of anti-imperialist nationalism...We must 
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 the political grouping to which they belong, in others the discourses appear to shift 
without such markers, suggesting, as Parry does of Fanon’s work, an inherent 
instability in their articulations.   
 
Kanak identity 
 
In the pro-independence media, articulations of Kanak identity occur across a range 
of discourses.  Central to these is the discourse of the ‘Kanak people’.  However, in 
addition, notions of Kanakness were articulated through the imaginative 
geographies of the ‘Kanak nation’ and ‘Kanaky’.  The dispersed nature of these 
articulations reflects both the ambitious claims of Kanak identity and its 
permutations.  Certain articulations appear more frequently in certain discourses.  
Those which ground ‘Kanak’ identity in a past cultural authenticity tend to appear 
most frequently in discourses on the ‘Kanak people’ and the ‘Kanak nation’, while 
other discourses, particularly that of ‘Kanaky’ and to a lesser extent ‘Kanak’, lend 
themselves more readily to articulations which posit identity as an active endeavour, 
in the process of creation through human agency.   
 
In the early 1980s, the FI sought to establish district and regional political structures 
which would act as the organisational locus for political action and, in particular, 
land claims.  The promotion of regional and district structures was considered 
congruent with the structure of Melanesian society prior to colonisation, the regions 
being divided linguistically and the districts along clan lines.  The ultimate aim was 
for each clan to identify the land over which it could claim traditional ‘mastery’.  The 
FI argued that the claiming of this ‘terre d’origine’ (‘land of origin’) was a ‘duty’ 
(L’Avenir, 15/5/80).  This strategy constituted what the FI described as a ‘retour aux 
sources’ (‘back to nature’) (ibid).  It was a political strategy which was grounded in 
an idea of a ‘Kanak’ past which the movement sought to rediscover, evident in the 
UC’s demands that the regions ‘rediscover the structure of kanak society at the 
district level’ (L’Avenir, 10/3/81).  Two years later, L’Avenir was still describing the 
‘Kanak region’ as ‘a reality to discover’, pointing, of course, to the difficulty of a 
‘retour aux source’ after the geographical and cultural dislocation of more than 130 
years of colonisation (L’Avenir, 21/4/83).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not minimise the shattering importance of that initial insight - peoples being conscious of themselves 
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 The basing of political strategy on an attempted rediscovery of pre-colonial 
structures drew its legitimation from the internationalist discourse of ‘the people’ 
which articulated this entity as geographically constituted, even if it was 
subsequently dislocated through the experiences of colonialism or other forms of 
domination.  The notion of land was therefore integral to this discourse of ‘the 
people’, which is one reason why it resonated so strongly within Melanesian society.  
The significance of land in Melanesian tradition rendered very pertinent the concept 
of a land of origin within the internationalist discourse of ‘the people’.    
 
The quest to rediscover pre-colonial structures was inspired by an understanding 
that these were expressive of an essentialist notion of ‘Kanak’ culture, which was 
considered the source of Kanak strength in the political struggle.  As Bwenando 
asserted, ‘if the Kanak people knows how to organise itself and fight for its survival, 
it is thanks to its original culture, alive and strong’ (Bwenando, 18/3/88).5  This 
original culture was presented as the essence of the ‘Kanak people’ and their unity, 
which derived from the unity of the ‘Kanak people’ in their pre-colonial state.  
L’Avenir’s response to Pons’ denial of the existence of the ‘Kanak people’ illustrates 
the linkages which are made between essentialist notions of culture and ‘the Kanak 
people’, past and present: 
 
 There is a reality, the cultural reality that can’t be abandoned.  Over and 
above the political differences resulting from the geographical configuration 
of the country, there is a way of being kanak which is identical in all the 
Territory of Kanaky.  It is at this level that the unity of the ‘kanak People’ 
must be situated.  In addition, for 150 years, the struggle to resist colonial 
exploitation, which has taken every form, has soldered this cultural unity 
(L’Avenir, 25/7/86). 
 
Pons’ claim that métissage had effectively destroyed the possibility of the 
constitution of a ‘Kanak people’ elicited a response from Bwenando which further 
highlighted the centrality of this notion of cultural unity to Kanak identity: 
 
 In fact, it is not the form of hair and skin colour that distinguishes a people 
from another, for there are many peoples throughout the world with black 
skin and curly hair - but there is only one Kanak people.  And the genetic 
characteristics are effectively modified by métissage.  But what makes a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
as prisoners in their own land’ (Said, 1994:258). 
5 This quote concludes with a more inclusive statement on ‘Kanak’ culture - ‘But its untameable 
nationalism, born of this culture, doesn’t stop it from remaining open to exterior cultural contributions’ - 
illustrating the ‘instabilities’ in this discourse (Bwenando, 18/3/88). 
 229
 people is all those of the same culture.  It is not about hereditary 
characteristics, but characteristics which are acquired, lived in common, and 
transmitted, by education, language, artistic expression, social organisation - 
that is to say, custom, etc... (Bwenando, 12/4/88). 
 
What these ‘acquired characteristics’ are is not developed in any sustained fashion 
in L’Avenir or Bwenando, although some features are occasionally referred to, such 
as in the following claim in Bwenando:   
 
 Ancient and recent history proves it, the Kanak people is pacifist, its culture 
makes it repulsed by violence.  Kanaks use dialogue, discussions in which 
wisdom and reason dominate - concessions - in order to regulate problems 
or conflicts and to arrive at consensual compromises (Bwenando, 18/3/88).   
 
The juxtaposition of this depiction with that of pro-independence Kanaks in the anti-
independence media as violent, irrational and totalitarian suggests that this 
articulation of the ‘Kanak’ essence, far from being a pristine remembering of ‘Kanak’ 
culture in pre-colonial times, is instead a selective appropriation of various cultural 
memories and practices, gathered together as counter-discourse.  The danger of 
this resort to essentialising is evident in the readiness with which such depictions 
could be countered by anti-independence groups.  To the claim that Kanaks were 
‘pacifists’, anti-independence groups could cite a plethora of instances which 
ostensibly refuted this claim.  In the project of essentialising, colonial discourse 
could demonstrate again and again its superior abilities, born of its lengthy 
experience and its domination of the means of discursive production in colonial 
societies.   
 
One implication of this notion of Kanak identity as grounded in a pre-colonial culture 
was the identification of all people born within this culture as ‘Kanak’, no matter 
what their stance on independence.  Thus, the pro-independence movement 
categorised pro- but also anti-independence Melanesians as ‘Kanaks’, probably to 
the abhorrence of many anti-independence Melanesians who viewed the term 
‘Kanak’ as a political term to describe those Melanesians who supported 
independence.  This use of ‘Kanak’ to refer to anti-independence as well as pro-
independence Melanesians led to the following type of somewhat confusing 
statements.  Referring to the 1984 territorial elections boycotted by the FLNKS, 
L’Avenir commented:  ‘The French government knows that KANAKS are ready to go 
to the Territorial elections.  But THOSE KANAKS, are they fighting for the 
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 independence of the kanak People or rather looking to SAVE THEIR BACON?’ 
(L’Avenir, 5/7/84). 
 
The pro-independence movement’s unwillingness to equate the term with a position 
on the question of independence was a logical outcome of its articulation of ‘Kanak’ 
identity as culturally located. The pro-independence media occasionally 
distinguished between pro- and anti-independence ‘Kanaks’ by describing the latter 
as ‘Kanak de service’ (‘token Kanak’),6 but nonetheless incorporated this group into 
the ‘Kanak people’, as the following quote on the 1987 referendum results 
illustrates: 
 
 83 % of the Kanak People boycotted these elections whether the UKEIWES, 
WAMOS, NENOUS etc. like it or not...The Kanak People demands precisely 
its independence.  Their discourses are too stereotyped and colonialist to 
convince.  The representativeness of such individuals among our people is 
obvious (Le Kanak, 12/10/87). 
 
This inclusive definition of the ‘Kanak people’ enabled the categorisation of anti-
independence politicians, such as Ukeiwé, as ‘traitors’ because of their violation of 
the majority will of the ‘Kanak people’ for independence.  But there were fault lines 
along this inclusiveness which became most noticeable following Ukeiwé’s 
participation in the French UN delegation which opposed New Caledonia’s 
reinscription on the list of countries to be decolonised.  Bwenando denounced 
Ukeiwé’s participation and then announced his disaffiliation from the ‘Kanak’ 
identity, declaring that his participation proved that he was no more than ‘a 
Frenchman of Melanesian origin, that is to say a harki’ (13/12/86).  L’Avenir was 
more copious in its condemnation of Ukeiwé, similarly signalling this incident as 
rupturing his identification as a ‘Kanak’: 
 
 Dicky (Ukeiwé), you are not a kanak because you didn’t see - you couldn’t 
realise -...! that at the UN it was ATAI’s rebellion that the Nations were 
legitimating and not the colonial repression that we condemn with all the UN 
countries...Poor Dicky, you the Westerner born in exile, you will never 
understand the kanak people’s struggle...It is incomprehensible for a 
Westerner.  If you don’t understand it, it is useless to explain it to Jacquot or 
Chirac (L’Avenir, 18/12/86).7 
 
                                                          
6 UC politician, Léopold Jorédié defined a ‘Kanak de service’ as ‘Kanaks used to enact a policy and 
then rejected’ (Bwenando, 27/4/89). 
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 Ukeiwé’s disaffiliation from identification as a ‘Kanak’ implies that the notion of the 
‘Kanak people’ developed here has taken on a political connotation in relation to the 
question of independence.  Being ‘Kanak’ here is a way of viewing and 
understanding the world; a way which is as much politically inspired as it is culturally 
grounded.   
 
This fault line in the holism of the ‘Kanak people’ enabled, perhaps paradoxically, 
the articulation of a new notion of the ‘Kanak people’ which was more inclusive than 
that which held that the ‘Kanak people’ encompassed all Melanesians.  This 
alternative articulation, although implied in the comments about Ukeiwé following his 
UN visit in 1985, had in effect existed previously in parallel and in tension with 
essentialist notions of the ‘Kanak people’.  As early as 1980, L’Avenir was 
advancing a notion of the ‘Kanak people’ as a transcultural entity.  An article entitled 
‘Culture, Nation and the Kanak People’ first suggested this alternative articulation: 
 
 The unity of the pays kanak demands of us the constitution of a people, of a 
single people...the unity of our people is constructed from the indigenous 
people of this country - the fundamental principle for the building of the 
Kanak people...Our cultural unity, and of course our specificity, can come 
only from the fait kanak...It is in this sense that we affirm that the unity of our 
people is constructed from the ‘indigenous people’ of this country.  This 
recognition remains fundamental for the constitution of a ‘new kanak’ people 
because, although the exterior contingencies require union, the principles of 
unity of a people are always secreted from within.  Again, it is in this sense 
that we say that the roots of our cultural unity can grow only in pays kanak, 
by taking account of the fait kanak inscribed in the country.  The grafts don’t 
happen at the roots but at the branches and buds (L’Avenir, 15/7/80). 
 
This is a complex passage which interweaves notions of the ‘Kanak people’, the 
‘new Kanak people’ and the ‘indigenous people’ with those of ‘pays kanak’ and the 
‘fait kanak’.  It seems, from my reading, to advance the need for the creation of a 
transcultural unity described as ‘the people’ or the ‘new Kanak people’.  This ‘new 
Kanak people’ is distinguishable from the ‘indigenous people’ but yet takes its 
legitimation from these people.  The passage suggests that it is only through 
recognition of the existence of these ‘indigenous people’ and their claims over the 
‘pays kanak’ that a new cultural unity can be forged.  The ‘pays kanak’ comprises 
not only a territorial expanse but also a cultural and institutional space.  The 
articulation of the ‘new Kanak people’ is not therefore devoid of reference to Kanak 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Following the UN vote, Bwenando described Melanesian RPCR politicians as ‘French of Melanesian 
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 culture, but in it traditional culture is displaced from being the essence of the ‘Kanak 
identity’ to being that which has to be recognised for a new ‘Kanak’ identity to 
emerge which would be shared by people of all ethnic and racial origins in the 
territory.  The strength of this ‘new Kanak people’ would reside precisely in its 
diversity.  It would be ‘proud to be of different origins, to be part of the Pacific 
Peoples, and to contribute to the enrichment of the peoples of the Pacific, deeply 
rooted in Oceania’ (ibid).  All those residing in a future ‘Kanak nation’ who would 
choose to take ‘Kanak’ citizenship would constitute this ‘new Kanak people’.   
 
In many respects, this is a hybridised notion of the ‘Kanak people’, not only in its 
transculturality but also in the manner in which it dilutes references to an 
essentialising discourse, encoded in the metaphors of the ‘fait kanak’ and the ‘pays 
kanak’, with a transcultural articulation.8  Its development in L’Avenir is probably not 
surprising, for UC politicians appear to have been most concerned to stress publicly 
an inclusive notion of ‘Kanak independence’.  The fact that this more inclusive 
discourse on ‘Kanak’ identity should appear in such a hybridised form should also 
be of little surprise, for it reflected the tensions within the pro-independence 
movement around the issue of what constituted Kanakness between the ‘visceral 
attachment’ which Parry identifies in Fanon’s work towards the notion of an 
essentialised identity and a reticence in broaching the issue based on the 
questionable political wisdom of providing the anti-independence movement with the 
opening to argue that ‘Kanak independence’ was racist.  The maintenance of some 
notion of an essentialised identity in this more transcultural articulation is also 
tactically comprehensible as a counter-discourse to the discourses of absence in 
the anti-independence media.  A discourse which posited ‘Kanak’ identity as in the 
process of creation risked affirming this discourse of non-existence in the present.  
It is therefore not surprising that the articulation of a transcultural notion of Kanak 
identity tended to occur away from the thick of the political struggle in the territory.  
Tjibaou’s comments on Kanak identity, for example, which were in keeping with the 
critique of essentialism in the Négritude movement - ‘We can’t return to our 
tradition, that’s just a myth.  No people have ever actually done that.  For me, the 
search for one’s identity, one’s model, that’s ahead of me, never behind’ -  were not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
origin’ (29/9/87). 
8 It evokes the discourse on the ‘right of welcome’ but seems to transcend this in its egalitarian 
connotations; for the ‘right of welcome’ implies that those who are welcomed remain guests subject to 
the beneficence of their hosts, whereas the notion of the ‘new Kanak people’ is more ambiguous. 
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 published in New Caledonia but rather in the prestigious French journal Les Temps 
Modernes (quoted in Chesneaux, 1988:65).9 
 
The straddling of identity as a past essentialism and a future creation in the pro-
independence discourse of place was facilitated by the mobilisation of more than 
one category.  While the ‘pays kanak’ was very much conceived of as a concrete 
historical given, firmly rooted, as the quotation on page 243 suggests, in the ground, 
‘Kanaky’ lent itself more readily to the metaphor of the ‘branches’, growing and 
changing in response to political exigencies, although articulations of ‘Kanaky’ 
which were close to those of the ‘pays kanak’ also existed.  In an interview on Radio 
Djiido, partly published in L’Avenir, in which Tjibaou attempted to explain why he 
was going to Paris for negotiations after the Ouvéa crisis, this articulation of 
‘Kanaky’ came to the fore: 
 
 Either you continue and we ruin the country, to the detriment of everyone, 
with significant handicaps for the construction of Kanaky, or we try to discuss 
it to see how far the actual government is capable, in concrete terms, of 
decolonising and therefore safeguarding Kanaky’s interests - of getting the 
construction of Kanaky going in a concrete fashion with Kanaks, to see to it 
that non-kanaks accept the prospect of living in an independent country 
while being French, unless they accept kanak nationality (L’Avenir, 24/6/88). 
 
This is a curious passage in that it suggests a certain admonition of the insurgency 
which had, after all, been sanctioned by the FLNKS if not personally by Tjibaou.  In 
it, ‘Kanaky’ is both a future and a legacy, expressed through ‘Kanaky’s interests’ 
which are no longer those exclusively associated with Kanak culture but which now 
are capable of including, the passage suggests, other resources.  This ‘Kanaky’ is 
the future decolonised nation.  It contrasts markedly with a more politically engaged 
construction of ‘Kanaky’ expressed in Bwenando’s proclamation that:   
 
 it’s Kanaky, Kanaky fighting, Kanaky marching for its liberation.  It’s the 
earthquake, it’s the thunder that rumbles, it’s the water that floods, it’s the 
fire that purifies, it’s - the parole (word) that leaves the case (hut) 
(Bwenando, 5/9/89).   
 
Here, ‘Kanaky’ is the embodiment of the political struggle itself, expressed in the 
potentially calamitous physical occurrences of earthquake, thunder, flood and fire, 
and also the exemplification of Kanak culture, expressed in the metaphors of the 
                                                          
9 Originally published in Les Temps Modernes, 464 (March 1985):1601. 
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 ‘parole’ and the ‘case’.  This ‘Kanaky’ is a very hybridised articulation, blending 
traditional metaphors and the traditional concept of the inseparability of the physical 
and human environment with liberation discourse and its attendant metaphors 
(Kanaky fighting, Kanaky marching for its liberation).   This articulation pointed to 
another which presented ‘Kanaky’ as the product of successful political struggle as 
in L’Avenir’s comment on Eloi Machoro’s campaign in late 1984 and early 1985:  ‘It 
was a big event.  Eloi played Caledonia.  He passed and Kanaky became law.  He 
failed and repression would resume the ground that was won’ (L’Avenir, 10/1/86).  
Tjibaou’s choice of a more politically neutral and inclusionary articulation of ‘Kanaky’ 
was tactically comprehensible in the context of a broadcast in which he was aiming 
to gain consent for a shift in tactics from insurrection to negotiation.  It signalled the 
ascendancy of a new post-Matignon, reformist construction of ‘Kanaky’, in 
considerable tension with ‘Kanaky’ as the personification of Kanak political 
engagement.  While the latter grounded ‘Kanak’ identity in a geographical and 
therefore cultural imagining, the reformist construction afforded no geographical or 
cultural  privilege to those who had engaged in the political struggle, reserving 
‘Kanaky’ instead for all political and ethnic groups.   
 
Kanak history 
 
The quest to reassert a ‘Kanak’ identity was expressed not only in the articulation of 
discourses of identity and place but also in a discourse of history.  For the pro-
independence media and the movement more generally, history was ‘colonial 
history’:  a narrative from which Kanaks were excluded or in which they were mis-
represented.  The assertion of Kanak identity implied, at the very least, the 
challenging of this history.  A major objective of the pro-independence press was to 
challenge anti-independence interpretations of current events and rememberings:  
Tjibaou said that he spoke for those who demanded ‘more truth about our present 
and our past’ (L’Avenir, January 1983).  But, beyond this objective, the pro-
independence media also advanced the outline of an alternative history - ‘a ‘Kanak 
history’ - comprising Kanak rememberings of past government policies, Kanak 
insurrectionary activities, and key dates in Kanak political mobilisation.   
 
The pro-independence movement’s concern with history is evident in the frequency 
with which articles discussing current events are contextualised in a historical 
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 chronology which refers back to the period of annexation.  In a 1980 speech to the 
Senate on the Pompidou government’s land reform policies, Roch Pidjot refuted the 
claim that the statut coutumier (customary statute) was an obstacle to economic 
development, proceeding with a chronological outline of the ‘history of colonisation’ 
declaring that it was a ‘truth that you refuse to recognise ... It is a historical truth’.  
Pidjot’s chronology began:  ‘+ 24 September 1853:  taking of possession by France’.  
It ended with an entry for 28 November 1897 which read: 
 
 the FEUILLET decree declares:  ‘the chiefs, representatives of their tribes, 
had a right of sovereignty over lands that they did not occupy.  This right of 
sovereignty passed to France when it took possession’ (L’Avenir, 31/12/80). 
 
Its ending here suggests that Pidjot viewed that aspect of ‘history’ relevant to the 
land issue to have been determined by the close of the 19th century.  But other 
topics required more extended chronologies.  In an article in Bwenando which 
sought to explain the reasons for the Ouvéa insurrection, the author provided a 
more updated chronology which covered ‘contemporary Kanak history’:    
 
 In order to explain the mechanisms that were to inevitably lead to the 1988 
insurrection, we won’t go back over the course of history to the taking of 
possession in 1853 (1862 for the Loyalties) nor even to the liberation wars 
waged by chief ATAI in 1878 and chief NOEL in 1917.  We will recall some 
facts which stand out in contemporary Kanak history. 
 From 1968, we saw the emergence of diverse nationalist movements, 
‘Foulard Rouges’, ‘mouvement 1878’, then Union Multiraciale, FULK, etc., 
that bore witness to the social and cultural demands which quickly led to the 
demand for sovereignty.  In 1975... 
 
The resume incorporated events up to 1988, chosen for their imputed relevance to 
progress towards what the article described as Kanak ‘emancipation’ (Bwenando, 
30/8/88). 
 
Kanak history and form 
 
The will of the oppressed to reclaim a history has been a topic of some 
consideration within post-colonialism.  This will is viewed as integral to the assertion 
of identity, for ‘what it means to have a history is the same as what it means to have 
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 a legitimate existence:  history and legitimation go hand in hand; history legitimates 
‘us’ and not others (Ashcroft et al., 1995:355).10  Ashcroft et al. continue: 
 
 The post-colonial task, therefore, is not simply to contest the message of 
history, which has so often relegated individual post-colonial societies to 
footnotes to the march of progress, but also to engage the medium of 
narrativity itself, to reinscribe the ‘rhetoric’, the heterogeneity of historical 
representation as [Hayden] White describes it (ibid:356). 
 
As discussed earlier, Hayden White (1987) has written of the different modes of 
historical representation - the annal, the chronology and narrative - and discussed 
their differing effects.  Within ‘Kanak history’, chronology, or a mix of chronology and 
narrative, are the most frequently adopted forms.  Perhaps this propensity to use 
chronology is practically expedient when the writer is attempting to span over one 
hundred years of colonisation.  But there may have been other motivations.  
Narrative stresses cohesion, unity and continuity (ibid:10).  Chronology, on the other 
hand, is a rendering of history which stresses disassociation and dislocation (ibid).   
 
That Kanaks viewed ‘colonial history’ as a relentless experience of subjugation is 
expressed in the references to the ‘course of colonial history’ (see, for example, 
L’Avenir, 25/7/84).  ‘Colonial history’ viewed as a ‘course’ suggests that it has an 
internal logic of domination which propels it onwards in an almost unstoppable 
fashion.  The narrative form lends authority to this notion of history as a ‘course’.  
The Kanak response in chronology attests to the continuing depth of Kanak 
experiences of dislocation which render difficult the presentation of history as a 
counter-narrative.  Caribbean writer Edouard Glissant’s comments on African-
Caribbeans’ experiences of history point to the difficulty of developing such a 
counter-narrative in a context of acute dislocation and disassociation: 
 
 For history is not only an absence for us.  It is vertigo.  The time that was 
never ours we must now possess.  We do not see it stretched into our past 
and calmly take us into tomorrow, but it explodes in us as a compact mass 
pushing through a dimension of emptiness where we must with difficulty and 
pain put it all back together (Glissant, quoted in Parry, 1994:161-2).  
 
                                                          
10 In a similar vein, Said has argued that, ‘while identity is crucial, just to assert a different identity is 
never enough.  The main thing is to be able to see that Caliban has a history capable of development 
as part of the process of work, growth, and maturity to which only Europeans had seemed entitled’ 
(Said, 1994:257). 
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 Perhaps ironically, the history which the pro-independence media assisted in putting 
back together remained ‘colonial’ in that the period that it covered was the period of 
colonisation.  In my reading of the pro-independence press, I found no evidence of 
attempts to reconstruct a pre-colonial past of the type engaged in by, say, the 
Rastafarian movement.  In this sense, there was no attempt to present ‘Kanak 
history’ as any more than a colonial construct; as a substance needed to fill an 
absence created by colonialism.11  It was therefore a strategic intervention, of 
Western creation certainly but nonetheless not without political efficacy in giving 
substance to ‘Kanak’ identity and, consequently, the Kanak political struggle.12 
 
Narrative and Kanak eyes 
 
While the dislocation of the Kanak experiences of colonialism was expressed in the 
prevalence of chronology, the assertion of Kanak identity found expression in 
narrative.  Hayden White has discussed the functioning of narrative in the fashioning 
of subjectivity.  He  draws on Barthes’ discussion of narrativity and subjectivity to 
argue that narrative creates the ‘illusion of a centred consciousness capable of 
looking out on the world, apprehending its structure and processes, and 
representing them to itself as having all the formal coherence of narrativity itself’ 
(1987:10).   
 
White’s argument provides an insight into the prevalence of narrative in the pro-
independence press.  This press, like Les Nouvelles, frequently used a relatively 
strict narrative form in its descriptions of events involving violent clashes between 
pro- and anti-independence groups.  Narrative was also prevalent in the publication 
of ‘testimonies’ from Kanaks engaged in or associated with violent incidents, such 
as those of the survivors of the Hienghène massacre and their families, and those of 
                                                          
11 Chakrabarty might well argue, as he does for Indian nationalist history, that the mimetic quality of 
‘Kanak history’ renders it ‘a sad figure of lack and failure’ and always ‘grievously incomplete’ 
(Chakrabarty, 1995:384).   
12 The anti-independence movement would argue that this lack of a pre-colonial history testified to the 
absence of a ‘Kanak people’ prior to colonisation.  Chesneaux’s comments on a ‘pan-Kanak national 
consciousness’ are instructive here:  ‘Under French rule, and indeed prior to colonisation, the twenty-
eight Melanesian linguistic groups of New Caledonia had no political term to describe their common 
identity...It would nevertheless be historically inaccurate to describe Kanak national consciousness as 
a belated or fragile development, if not actually reversible.  Kanak common identity may have found its 
proper terminological expression only recently, but it has existed for a long time.  Throughout the long 
century of French colonial control, the linguistically divided Melanesian groups of New Caledonia were 
fully aware of their common fate, namely French rule.  They knew what they had in common, which 
included custom, tribal ties, consensus, and that these were radically distinct from the French culture 
of dominance’ (Chesneaux in Spencer et al., 1988:64). 
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 Kanaks from Ouvéa speaking on their involvement in the incidents surrounding the 
Ouvéa crisis (Bwenando, 14/10/87, 30/8/88 & 18/10/88).   
 
In my discussion of narrative in Les Nouvelles, I argued that the use of an 
impersonal narrative form had the effect of structuring the reader into the text as its 
‘author’, thereby enhancing the identification of the reader with the politico-social 
order authorised in the text.  One reading of narrative in the pro-independence 
media sustains this thesis.  the use of narrative structures the reader into the text in 
a position of empathy with its Kanak subjects, as this account in L’Avenir of  the 
Koindé incident illustrates: 
 
 ...the population, warned in a panic, wants to stop the passage of the 
vehicles and the equipment.  It is at this moment that a war atmosphere is 
created:  deafening helicopter noises right above the sunken tribe, grenade 
fire carried out by several groups, the tribe is invaded by smoke, the women 
and children scream and run to the river to calm the stinging in their eyes...In 
this panic, two shots are fired in the direction of the Gardes-Mobiles who 
continue shooting while retreating (L’Avenir, 28/5/86). 
 
The structuring of the reader into the text is enhanced through the deployment of 
the present tense which situates the reader in the events as they unfold and 
consequently strengthens the reader’s identification with the motivation behind the 
counter-fire which killed the gendarmes.  But there is a certain tension in this text 
between the coherence afforded it by its narrative form and its apparent theme of 
panic.  In a sense, this tension is negotiated through the punctuation of the text, 
with the series of events listed after a colon connoting an uncontrollable conflux of 
events and therefore reinforcing the notion of panic.  Interestingly, reporting in 
L’Avenir on the Koindé events immediately after they occurred mixed chronology 
and narrative, thereby reinforcing the thesis of panic: 
 
 - At 4.30 am, arrival of the helicopter 
 - The chief of OUI POIN tries to contact La Foa and KOINDE by telephone.  
He notes that telephone communications with the exterior are cut. 
 - The deployment of troops allowing BARBOU to cross the tribe without 
mishap.  Removal of the padlocked gate that was barring the way.  Return of 
the BARBOU convoy to the saw mill protected by the Gardes Mobiles... 
(L’Avenir, 14/1/83). 
 
A major thesis of the pro-independence movement was that Kanaks were being 
subjected to a bombardment of oppressive acts over which they had little control 
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 and that the psychological legacy of these acts precipitated the engagement of 
Kanaks in violent reprisals.  Although the narrative form tended to militate against 
this reading of events, its deployment in other texts was highly effective in asserting 
a Kanak presence.  Within these texts, the master eye which authorises narrative 
was, in effect, a collective Kanak eye which observed and recorded even the most 
private actions of its opponents.  This effect of narrative is particularly evident, as 
we would suspect, in articles which discuss the purported crimes or misdemeanours 
of anti-independence activists, as the following passage from an article in 
Bwenando on the shooting of a young Kanak girl by a Caldoche loyalist, Yann 
Devilliers, illustrates:   
 
 MOU - PONERIHOUEN, 4 September 85.  Late afternoon.  Yann Devilliers, 
returning home to Ponerihouen, passes in front of the Mou tribe.  People 
from the village are in the process of collecting coconuts and cry out at his 
passage.  Yann Devilliers continues on his way towards Ponerihouen and 
then goes to the police station to alert them that he had had ‘stones thrown 
at him’ and that he was going to ‘flatten someone from Mou out of revenge’.  
The gendarmes record the information and let him leave without reacting 
further.  Devilliers goes home, takes a machine gun (of a yet indeterminate 
calibre), gets back into his car, and returns to Mou.  He passes again in front 
of the tribe (4 km from Ponerihouen) and stops at the south exit where he 
finds the people collecting coconuts.  He leaves his motor running, takes out 
his shooter, and proceeds to fire into the crowd (Bwenando, 5/9/85). 
 
As with the Les Nouvelles account of the events at Koindé, Bwenando’s account of 
this incident is temporally and spatially ambitious.  Devilliers’ actions are described 
across and between several locations (at Mou, at the police station, at his home, in 
front of the tribe and at Mou’s southern exit).  While we can infer from the narrative 
the source of some of the information it contains (for example, that the comments in 
quotation marks were comments made to the gendarmes, and the description of the 
shooting derived from one or more of those being shot at), other aspects of the 
narrative are unaccounted for (such as the collecting of the gun and Devilliers’ 
journey between his home and the southern part of the village).  As in the case of 
the Les Nouvelles account of the Koindé shooting, the absence of voices in this 
account creates a space into which the reader is drawn, and from which the 
politicosocial order of the text is authorised.   
 
However, it is my contention that the absence of a direct voice in the text can 
engender a different reading; one in which the reader fills the discursive space 
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 created by the absence of a narrator not necessarily with his/her own persona but 
rather with Kanak eyes, whose silent presence throughout the territory enables the 
scrutiny of the events surrounding them.  As a further illustration, take, for example, 
the following passage from an article in Bwenando entitled ‘Loyalist Rubbish’: 
 
 The press, the radio and TV stated that ‘loyalists’ from TOUHO, unhappy 
over the strike of municipal workers over the non-lieu of the Hienghène 
assassins, went to tip their rubbish on the steps of the town hall.  The media 
hadn’t specified that the loyalists had used KOTEX and other tampons to 
stain the town hall walls.  When RFO and other media affirmed that TOUHO 
loyalists were the authors of this act of vandalism, they didn’t specify the 
number.  In reality, there were 10 of them... 
 These 10 ‘artists’ did their works in two parts - part of it was done on Friday 
afternoon and the other part on Friday evening.  ‘These artists’ are the 
following people: 
 Mme Edmonde GUILLERMET, called NOUNOU, wife of the postmaster, 
 Nicole GUILLERMET, daughter of the above, 
 Henri TOUMAINE, de facto of the above.  This ‘monsieur’, with the help of a 
trailer attached to his car, had gone to collect the rubbish of other TOUHO 
inhabitants that he then tipped on the town hall... 
 Jean-Francois GUILLERMET, son of NOUNOU and brother of Nicole, 
emptied his rubbish bins on the steps of the town hall around 21h.  The 
vocation of garbageman is truly in the family...(Bwenando, 30/10/86). 
 
The story continues with an account of the removal of the sewage and rubbish, 
interspersed with commentary on the various participants, alleging the involvement 
of some in arms trafficking and the secreting away of arms after the Hienghène 
massacre.  The article raises the question of how its author was able to gather 
together the information which it contains.  In this text, the deviations from a strict 
chronological narrative render it difficult for the reader to assume the position of 
narrator.  Instead, the story seems to connote the presence of Kanak witnesses, not 
only to the range of events which it describes but also to the ‘private’ lives of those 
whom it identifies as the ‘10 “artists”’.   The ideological effect of this reading is 
potentially quite potent.  In the context of the interior of the territory where 
Europeans were in the minority, it asserts the power of the Kanak presence in a 
colonial context where Europeans claimed domination.  In demonstrating this 
presence, the pro-independence media was not only asserting Kanak identity; it was 
also challenging the identity of those who opposed them, for the identity of their 
opponents was premised on the non-existence of Kanaks.   
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 The pro-independence media demonstrated that Kanaks were not only there but 
were also observing, noting and narrating anti-indépendantiste lives.  As L’Avenir 
commented somewhat menacingly, those engaging in clandestine activity may have 
believed that their actions were going unnoted, ‘But the kanak eye was there to 
observe the gesture of the coloniser’ (L’Avenir, 9/9/87).13 
 
Kanak othering 
 
The notion that selfhood is impelled by those characteristics and attributes projected 
onto others implies that the types of identifications forged in the pro-independence 
press of these others tells us something of the pro-independence media’s 
construction of Kanak identity.  We might expect that the pro-independence press 
would reserve its most acute ‘othering’ to those who opposed ‘Kanak independence’ 
and did so most actively.  Certainly, these people were the object of considerable 
denigration in pro-independence publications where they were described variously 
as fascists, nazis, terrorists, extremists and almost any combination of these and 
other related terms.14  Within these categorisations a distinction was sometimes 
made between extremists from metropolitan France and its former colonies and 
‘Caldoche’ extremists, as when L’Avenir commented on the belligerence of ‘the 
Caldoche extreme-right and the PATHOLOGICAL cases of the Vietnam and Algeria 
veterans who pursue the fight for the CHRISTIAN WEST against COMMUNISM’ 
(L’Avenir, 31/1/86).   
 
Here, anti-independence extremism is presented as a type of psychological 
disorder, but it is also presented at times as the emotional state of those who fear 
the loss of privilege, as in L’Avenir’s reference to ‘the reactionary right holding on to 
its colonial privileges’ (L’Avenir, 14/10/81).  The presentation of anti-independence 
extremists as suffering from an emotional impairment certainly rendered them 
different from, and we might presume inferior to, those doing the categorising.  
                                                          
13The increasing resort to the genre of  the ‘testimony’ was a more overt expression of the presence of 
Kanak witnesses whose narratives frequently contradicted those ‘official’ versions released by the 
military or the administration. One testimony from Martial Laouniou following the Ouvéa crisis 
recounted the executions, after their capture, of Samuel Wamo, Vinceslas Lavellois and Alphonse 
Dianou by the military (Bwenando, 18/10/88). 
14 For example, L’Avenir referred to ‘The fascists, the nazis, all the New Caledonian extreme-right’ 
(L’Avenir, 30/9/81).  Bwenando described fascism as ‘this vile beast, omnipresent in Kanaky’ (11/7/85) 
and L’Avenir, remembering the public jubilation in the streets of Noumea following Machoro’s 
assassination, referred to the ‘Sinister spectacle when the Marseillaise resonates with fascist accents!’ 
(L’Avenir, 10/1/86). 
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 However, it is difficult to see how this difference might truly constitute an ‘otherness’ 
if the Other is meant to signify an entity which is fundamentally distinct from those 
who classify it (Thomas, 1994:71).  Rather, anti-independence extremists were 
presented, as Nicholas Thomas writes of representations of pagans in pre-modern 
European discourses, as ‘incomplete or imperfect forms, rather than ... ”peoples” of 
a comprehensively distinct kind’ (Thomas, 1994:71).   
 
While the pro-independence press referred to its political opponents by mobilising 
categorisations which might be broadly held to connote negative images (e.g. 
‘fascists’), the condemnation of these people was usually implicit in the 
condemnation of the actions in which they had been involved.  There was very little 
extended analysis of their character, of the type engaged in in more dedicated 
projects of ‘othering’.  This was not always the case.  Although the passages in 
which the Caldoche character was discussed were few and not very expansive, 
there was nonetheless some fleshing out of their character.  These passages 
suggest that the Caldoches were far more the object of the pro-independence 
media’s ‘othering’ than the most extremist of its non-Caldoche opponents.15   
 
Within the pro-independence media, a differentiation was sometimes made between 
the wealthy Caldoches, such as Lafleur and Laroque, and the poorer Caldoches, 
referred to variously as ‘Caldoche de base’ (eg. Bwenando, 3/10/85), ‘petit blanc’ 
(L’Avenir, 21/5/83), ‘colon’, or, simply, the ‘poor people’ which, as the following 
passage suggests, signified more than a comparative state of financial 
deprivation:16 
 
 The Caldoche big wigs (literally, big heads:  grosses têtes) have already 
exported their billions, invested abroad, and don’t give a damn about what 
they leave behind.  Once departed for other financial blue skies, the poor 
people will be forced to come to terms with the Kanak people or to instead 
settle abroad.  It’s for them to decide! (Bwenando, 31/10/85).    
 
                                                          
15 Some of the Caldoches were, of course, among the most extremist in their actions against Kanaks 
and European pro-independence supporters.  Bwenando writes that a young Kanak shot in the violent 
confrontation between Kanaks and Europeans which took place on 8 May 1985 was killed by a ‘bloody 
stupid fascist Caldoche who still hasn’t understood that, on that day, he dug the tomb of French 
Caledonia a little deeper.  Go on then and talk to young Kanaks about “Fraternity” and ‘Peace”.  On 
that day a lot of them were made acquainted with...hatred.  The hatred of fascism, of the racist 
arrogance of the “Whites”. Pure hatred.  A build-up of hatred’ (Bwenando, 11/7/85). 
16 Bwenando here refers to the ‘Caldoche de base fed on the prose of the “SINISTER JOBARD” 
(L’Affreux Jojo)’ (Bwenando, 31/10/85). 
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 In an article commenting on the assault of Australian journalist Helen Fraser by anti-
independence demonstrators, Bwenando identified, in a photo of the alleged 
assailants published in Les Nouvelles, a Mr Arrighi, whom Bwenando considered 
typified this class of ‘petit blanc de Calédonie’: 
 
 Mr Arrighi isn’t a ‘strong arm’.  He is a ‘monsieur like everyone else’, a well 
and truly ordinary citizen such as exist in their thousands.  He wasn’t 
‘heated’, he wasn’t ‘provoked’, he is afraid, and he exercises his fear like 
others spit their venom, he eases his mind...(He) is a Caledonian ‘petit 
blanc’, typical of the numerous primary school teachers, young and 
frequently from good families, who, after the failure of their metropolitan 
studies, fall back on the territorial public service (L’Avenir, 21/5/83). 
 
The characterisation of the ‘petit blanc’ as fearful and intellectually inept coheres 
with another characterisation of Caldoches as children.  L’Avenir argued that the 
Caldoches ‘have always acted like children in care, relying on the Metropole and 
allowing it the task of managing their interests and administering their local public 
affairs’.  It concluded by calling into question the ability of the Caldoches to critically 
reflect on issues in order to find a way out of the political dilemmas in the territory 
(L’Avenir, 15/7/80). 17  Instead of seizing control of their destiny, they were ‘eternal 
sheep’ following Lafleur to the abattoirs (L’Avenir, 18/8/87).  Indeed, after their 
massive vote against independence in the 1987 referendum, L’Avenir considered 
that the Caldoches had effected their own elimination.  According to L’Avenir:  
‘Through this 98% vote, the “victims of History” have disappeared and the 
Caldoches have declared the end of their existence as such’ (L’Avenir, 30/11/87). 
 
There is a certain disjuncture between this notion of the disappearance of the 
Caldoche identity and the previous characterisation of the Caldoches as infantile 
and sub-intelligent.  This characterisation had as its primary referent French identity:  
the Caldoches were presented as inferior forms of a French national identity which 
the pro-independence movement generally left unchallenged.  In contrast, the 
notion of the self-inflicted disappearance of the Caldoche identity suggests that this 
identity was in some respects distinctive and was not just a subordinate form of 
French identity.  Such a view of Caldoche identity was seldom articulated in the pro-
independence press.  But its mobilisation here tells us something of how the pro-
independence press conceived of this distinctive Caldoche identity when it wished 
                                                          
17 Here ‘Caldoche’ is used generically, presumably to denote both the ‘grosses têtes’ and the ‘petit 
blanc’. 
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 to concede its existence.  In this instance, Caldoche identity is validated through 
Caldoche support for Kanak independence.  Through this support, the Caldoches 
demonstrate their acceptance of the Kanak presence and its cultural and political 
claims.  This acceptance confers on the Caldoches a distinctiveness.  They are no 
longer merely European immigrants but rather have come to an accommodation 
with the distinctiveness of their circumstances - a distinctiveness conferred by the 
Kanak presence - and therefore have effected their own distinctiveness.  Without 
this distinctiveness afforded the Caldoches by virtue of their recognition of the ‘fait 
kanak’, they remain ‘sub-Europeans’.  In a comment on the implications for Kanaks 
of the Pons statute, Bwenando described this lack of acceptance of the ‘fait kanak’ 
as a Caldoche ‘uprootedness’.  According to Bwenando, through the Pons statute 
the French government had: 
 
 ...chosen to eliminate, in the medium term, the Kanak ethnic group by 
depriving it of its culture, therefore practising Kanak ETHNOCIDE.  And it will 
happen very quickly, in one or two generations, Kanaks will have become 
black ‘sub-Europeans’, the uprooted in their own country - a type of 
Caldoche (Bwenando, 12/4/88). 
 
Such passages suggest that the pro-independence press reserved its most 
concerted othering for the Caldoches:  those with whom it would inevitably have to 
contend.   This depiction of the Caldoches as ‘sub-European’ implicitly valorised 
European identity.  The pro-independence press may have presented Europeans as 
politically malevolent, but their claim to identity, and therefore legitimacy, was never 
in dispute.  In contrast, the Caldoches were the object of denigration, their physical 
and cultural uprootedness being presented as the core of their abjectness.  One 
effect of this discourse on Caldoche identity was to delegitimate Caldoche claims to 
rightful participation in determining the future of the territory, reflected in the 
FLNKS’s repeated claim that it would only negotiate with the French government 
and not local anti-independence politicians.  Another likely effect was the escalation 
of Caldoche militancy which, in a sense, mirrored the escalation of Kanak militancy 
in the face of the denial of legitimate Kanak existence.   
 
However, the Kanak discourse on Caldoche identity was hardly a discourse of the 
non-existence of the Caldoche in the way that the anti-independence discourse was 
of the non-existence of Kanaks.  The pro-independence media appeared unable or 
unwilling to construct an Other as a fundamentally distinct and unrelentingly 
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 negative imagining.  The absence of such an imagining may reflect the extent to 
which the Kanak Other remained prisoner to negative imaginings conferred on it.  It 
could also be seen as a disavowal of the argument that counter-discourse always 
falls into the traps of colonial discourse.  Although the Caldoche were the primary 
target of Kanak derision, they remained derivative of an identity which the pro-
independence movement never seriously contested.  As such, their discursive 
exclusion from rightful participation in determining political outcomes in the territory 
was never fully effected in the pro-independence press. 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT - STATE BROADCASTING AND POLITICS 
 
State broadcasting in the territory attracted particular scrutiny in the pro- and anti-
independence press in the period from the early 1980s to the signing of the 
Matignon and Oudinot accords.  This scrutiny far outweighed that directed towards 
any other national or local government agency, in part because state broadcasting 
was one of the more visible agents of state power in political circumstances which 
rendered pre-eminent the struggle over representation.  The centrality afforded 
criticism of state broadcasting suggests that it was considered almost emblematic of 
the French state.  As such, the press’s critique of state broadcasting drew on certain 
discourses on state power, and in particular both pluralist and instrumentalist 
discourse.  Most criticism of state broadcasting programs was delivered by the 
mobilisation of instrumentalist discourse which advanced the position that programs 
were vehicles for propaganda from the state and its agents, evident, for example, in 
Combat Calédonien’s description of an RFO news bulletin as:  ‘A real publicity 
program doubled with a blinding socialist aspect’ (Combat, 5/7/85).  This critique 
drew its force, however, from the prevalence of an alternative pluralist discourse on 
state power which had as its broadcasting corollary the notion that the state 
broadcaster should represent the views of all interest groups within the community 
in an impartial manner.  RFO programs were frequently criticised for the extent to 
which they fell short of this objective. 
 
While both pro- and anti-independence groups condemned state broadcasting, they 
were nonetheless highly interested in it.  For example, Combat Calédonien 
published a regular column criticising RFO programming but accompanied this with 
a two-page program guide.  A similarly ambivalent relationship was evident in the 
comments on state broadcasting of one Kanak, published in the pro-independence 
publication La Tribune.  While the Kanak mobilised an instrumentalist critique of 
FR3’s programming, he avowed that he nonetheless watched FR3 because ‘we 
always hope that they will give us good news about Caledonia - that they will talk 
about it like we want them to - but they always say it their way’ (La Tribune, May 
1981).  In the Kanak’s comments we see a pluralist imagining of what television 
might be like and an instrumentalist critique of what television was like.  These 
discourses provided both a framework for critique and a benchmark for 
improvement in state broadcasting.  Either could be mobilised in different contexts 
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 to pursue desired rhetorical ends.  Implicit in the criticism of RFO for instrumentalist 
‘censorship’, bias’ or ‘disinformation’ was the presumption that pluralist ‘access’, 
‘balance’ and ‘truth’ were the alternative even if they were considered undesirable 
or ultimately unattainable by those initiating the criticism.  But these alternatives 
were themselves highly contested terms which were closely related to the 
contestation over identity.  The question of who should have access to the media 
and which voices constituted ‘balance’ was ultimately linked to the question of who 
could rightfully participate in the political process - and this was a question over 
which the media had, as we have seen, significant influence.  The delegitimation of 
the Kanak identity in the anti-independence press gave force to the argument that 
Kanaks had no right of representation on state broadcasting.   The weight of this 
argument was evident in RFO’s cancellation of an interview with Tjibaou following 
criticism from anti-independence groups that RFO should not broadcast a ‘terrorist’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 29/5/86).   
 
This relationship between identity and professional discourses on objectivity and 
balance is also evident in Combat’s praise for an obituary for Roger Laroque, 
broadcast on RFO and written and presented by journalist Michel Quemener. 
Combat’s comment on Quemener’s work - ‘Nothing more could be asked of a public 
service journalist than that he be the witness and echo of the men of his time’ - 
could be read, out of context, as an indication that the obituary gave voice to a 
range of views on Laroque and his work in politics.  In context however, Combat’s 
praise for Quemener, a journalist renowned for his strident right-wing views, 
suggests that his was a highly sympathetic remembering and that those referred to 
in the statement as the ‘people of his time’ were a politically select group.  This 
claiming of relevance for one group was, of course, an expression of the irrelevance 
of another.  Irrelevance implied no rightful claim to inclusion on the spectrum of 
discourses from which ‘balance’ is constituted.  Access was therefore integrally 
linked to the question of legitimacy and identity.   
 
This relationship might appear self-evident to many New Caledonians who 
remember the long period up until the late 1970s when local politicians were denied 
access to broadcasting time on state radio and television on the grounds that they 
were not members of French national political parties.  Such overt discrimination 
was expressive of state broadcasting’s imperial mandate.  The territory’s monopoly 
 249
 radio and television services were to act as ‘the voice of France in the Pacific’1 
which signified a national French voice, not a territorial one.  During the 1970s, 
however, state broadcasting was required to become more responsive to local 
exigencies as a result of political pressures in both France and New Caledonia, 
which I discuss below.  State broadcasters now had to engage with professional 
discourses on objectivity and balance in a hitherto unprecedented fashion.  Despite 
this new imperative, state broadcasting in New Caledonia remained highly partisan 
well into the 1980s.  It appeared that journalists at FR3 and RFO were able to 
negotiate their engagement with these professional discourses in a manner which 
enabled a continuing political alignment.   
 
The historical legacy of conservatism in broadcasting in New Caledonia goes a 
significant way towards explaining this political alignment.  The political culture in 
the organisation privileged particular readings of these professional discourses 
which enabled the continuing exclusion of pro-independence voices, particularly 
during the period of conservative government in France from 1986 to 1988.  To the 
extent that journalists concurred with the identification of Kanaks as ‘terrorists’, the 
exclusion of Kanaks from the realm of legitimate debate could be seen as the 
exemplification of professionalism, not a serious lapse in it. 
 
Political shifts in reporting on RFO 
 
Criticism of the political reporting of state broadcasters in certain pro- and anti-
independence media gives some insight into the shifts in editorial orientation during 
the 1980s.  One indicator of the direction of these shifts was the changing 
vociferousness of their criticism.  Prior to Mitterrand’s election as president in 1981, 
Corail was uncritical of FR3’s political reporting while L’Avenir persistently criticised 
what it described as the censoring or under-reporting of interventions in the National 
Assembly by the Kanak Deputy, Roch Pidjot (15/6/80; 5/11/80; 11/12/80).  In the 
period between Mitterrand’s election and Chirac’s victory in 1986, Corail and 
Combat criticised state broadcasting relentlessly, with Corail reserving for RFO its 
most acerbic description as a ‘Marxist station’ (Corail, 18/3/83).  Combat included 
two weekly columns on RFO, ‘RF Faux’ (RF Wrong) and ADG’s ‘In My Opinion’. 
 
                                                          
1 This is how those involved in the first radio service in the colony described their radio station. 
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 The criticism of state broadcasting in the pro-independence press was less prone to 
the vicissitudes of changing political influence in France, although there were some 
shifts.  Criticism in L’Avenir of the lack of access afforded to pro-independence 
politicians on state broadcasting ceased shortly after the Socialist electoral victory 
in 1981.  However, the pro-independence press never relinquished its 
instrumentalist critique.  Following the killing of a young Kanak in May 1983, 
L’Avenir advised its readers that an activist had been sent to the scene to gather 
together the facts because the local press, aided by the gendarmerie, usually gave 
only a ‘a version which justified the colonial Regime’, which, L’Avenir argued, ‘we 
didn’t have to wait long for, for as early as Thursday, RFO, through its announcer 
Claude TISSANDIER, gave the gendarmerie and the colonial government’s official 
version (announcer chosen on these occasions)’ (L’Avenir, 21/5/83).  During this 
period, Bwenando also criticised the reporting and radio and television commentary 
of some state broadcasters, most notably Michel Quemener who, ‘while he did 
sports commentary was still drinkable, but who, now that he does the TV news, 
antagonises us as much by his latent racism as by his infantile jokes’, but also 
Hubert Chavelet who succeeded ADG as editor of Combat (Bwenando, 6/12/85).  
However, Bwenando’s criticism of RFO escalated substantially after the formation of 
conservative government in 1986.  A few months after the election, Bwenando 
declared that RFO’s reporting ‘has never been so low’, likening it to ‘something like 
Radio-Paris under German occupation’ (Bwenando, 30/10/86).  L’Avenir began 
describing RFO as ‘Radio-Fascist-Overseas’ (29/11/86) and advanced the 
somewhat surprising view that:  ‘The present journalists’ commentaries are so 
sickening, because of their lack of objectivity, that even people in the RPCR no 
longer hide the fact that they only listen to Radio Djiido news’ (L’Avenir, 18/8/87). 
 
The shifts in editorial orientation during the 1980s, although criticised by different 
media in the territory, nonetheless had the effect of demonstrating that programming 
changes were possible.  Moreover, the transparency of political intervention in state 
broadcasting in France had been sufficiently commonplace to engender the 
expectation that political influence could have an effect.  Criticism of state 
broadcasting in New Caledonia was therefore not merely a negative reflex, but was 
also aimed at influencing changes in editorial orientation, evident in the frequency 
with which pluralist discourse was mobilised alongside instrumentalist critique.  
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 However, this view of the political malleability of state broadcasting in the territory 
probably over-stated the extent to which change was possible within the 
broadcasting organisation.  Although the structure of the organisation was finely 
tuned towards political influence, the bureaucracy which sustained FR3, and later 
RFO, was nonetheless one with its own culture and institutional imperatives which 
could not change as readily as political will.  It was a state employer and as such 
engendered certain expectations of job security and career advancement which 
rendered difficult, for example, the replacement of staff with political views 
antithetical to new political currents.  It was required to negotiate with unions and to 
produce programming within budget constraints, and its staff - particularly its 
journalists - were required to negotiate through pressures which were at once 
political, professional and personal.  For example, journalists who were stridently 
opposed to independence (as it appears many were during the 1980s) were 
nonetheless required to respond in some manner to the new political exigencies of 
the Socialist government while at the same time paying some service to the notions 
of ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’.  Moreover, their engagement with these professional 
discourses also had to contend with competing notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ 
articulated in the pro- and anti-independence media.  For example, I found no 
reference in Corail to the notion of ‘balance’ prior to Mitterrand’s victory.  But, Corail 
repeatedly decried its alleged absence afterwards, arguing that pro-independence 
sentiment was over-represented on the state broadcasting service.2   Of FR3’s 
move to include pro-independence voices after Mitterrand’s victory, Corail merely 
commented:  ‘well, it happened today.  Messrs Tjibaou and Pidjot spoke to us about 
their racist project of Canaque independence’, indicating its intolerance for the 
                                                          
2 We could imagine that this labyrinth of pressures and constraints would render management of the 
state broadcasting service difficult, particularly in the post-Matignon context when management was 
required to provide better access for the pro-independence movement immediately after the period in 
which anti-independence virulence in the station had been at its peak.  The volatility created by 
balancing these pressures in the post-Matignon period had a bearing on my fieldwork.  In 1994 I was 
requested by management not to attempt to speak to journalists working at RFO lest I rekindle old 
passions and animosities which had been contained through various management strategies - 
provisionally contained, one must assume, judging by the restraint requested on my part.  As a result, 
I was unable to speak to journalists about certain issues, the exploration of which would have assisted 
me to understand how media discourses emerged through the range of practical and professional 
constraints discussed in relation to media discourses surrounding independence in Les Nouvelles. In 
addition, my access to television archival material was relatively scant, which meant that my analysis 
of RFO discourses surrounding independence is limited to Michel Quemener’s television commentary 
on the trial of those accused of the Hienghène massacre, discussed in the following chapter (I am very 
grateful to the management of RFO and the RFO archivist for my access to this material).  Most of my 
knowledge of RFO is therefore based on secondary sources, primarily, of course, those critiques of 
the station engaged in by the loyalist and pro-independence media.  The manager of RFO in 1989, 
Alain Le Garrec, and the manager in 1994, Maxime Briand, did, however, allow me to interview them, 
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 interpretation of ‘balance’ which emerged under Socialist government influence 
(Corail, 5/11/81).  That such concepts as ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ became 
significant in the struggle over media representation in New Caledonia attests to the 
pressures which the emergence of pro-independence political demands placed on 
hitherto colonial bastions, such as FR3 Noumea.  It also attests to the extent to 
which the pro-independence movement was influenced in its demands for media 
reform by discourses developed and mobilised in political struggles over media 
access and control in France.   
 
Politics and state broadcasting in France 
 
The extensive political influence in state broadcasting in France meant that state 
media organisations were readily implicated in political struggles such as that of 
May 1968 when journalists at the monopoly state broadcasting organisation L’Office 
de Radiodiffusion-Télévision de France (ORTF) initiated a series of strikes over 
political interference in broadcasting (Smith, 1973).  Out of this industrial action and 
the more general political pressures resulting from the May protests, the new 
government of Georges Pompidou, under Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, initiated 
a range of broadcasting reforms which Kuhn argues were intended to wrest editorial 
control of broadcasting away from the Ministry of Information, which was abolished 
(Kuhn, 1985:52).  Following Chaban-Delmas’s dismissal in 1972, the Ministry of 
Information was reconstituted and ORTF reorganised, a restructuring which Sorbet 
and Palmer argue resulted in ORTF’s editorial control of its programming being 
‘more theoretical than real’ (Sorbet & Palmer, 1986:91-2).  Giscard d’Estaing came 
to power in 1974 with the promise to end political interference in broadcasting and 
initiated a break-up of ORTF into seven separate companies, each involved in 
providing different aspects of the broadcasting service and each organisationally 
independent (Kuhn, 1985:54).  FR3 was established as the provider of radio and 
television services to regional France and an overseas section was established 
within FR3 to provide radio and television services to France’s overseas 
departments and territories.  D’Estaing abolished the Ministry of Information; 
however, Kuhn argues that political involvement continued under a new structural 
guise:  ‘The Gaullist emphasis on direct control of political output via the Ministry of 
Information was replaced by a system of control through presidential appointments’ 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and I had discussed RFO with journalists and others prior to 1994.  Some of this material is reflected 
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 (Kuhn, 1985:56).  Opposition politicians were now able to get access to 
broadcasting time, but editorial content and commentaries ‘remained predominantly 
one-sided’ (ibid).  As Kuhn argues: 
 
 While the crude, external interventionism of the de Gaulle presidency had 
given way to a slightly subtler internal manipulation during Giscard’s septate, 
by the time of Giscard’s electoral defeat in 1981, the government-controlled 
state monopoly was in its essential aspects still alive and well (ibid). 
 
The Paris crowds celebrating Mitterrand’s victory reportedly chanted the names of 
broadcasting journalists targeted for their prior political complicity.  The expectation 
among the crowd was that their days in state radio and television were numbered.  
In Noumea, the mood among the sizeable majority who opposed Mitterrand was, of 
course, subdued, but there was cautious optimism among those mostly pro-
independence voters who had supported Mitterrand, and demands for change in 
state broadcasting were, as for the crowds in Paris, among the earliest demands 
made by the pro-independence movement.   
 
 
 
 
 
The politics of imperialism and broadcasting in New Caledonia 
 
Following Mitterrand’s election, La Tribune commented that the pro-independence 
movement could now ‘expect much greater access to the media (radio, television 
and newspapers)’ (La Tribune, June 1981).  The priority given to media reform was 
reflected in its inclusion in a three-point list of claims which La Tribune published 
shortly after the election.  The publication argued that the new government should 
take the following measures quickly: 
 
 1. immediate withdrawl of the gardes mobiles, the pre-eminent  
  colonial forces  
 2. replacement of the High Commissioner 
 3. replacement of the director of FR3 and greater access to radio  
 information broadcast by local political forces (La Tribune,   
 June 1981) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in my subsequent comments and analysis. 
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Dissatisfaction with state broadcasting was not the sole preserve of the pro-
independence movement.  Conservative political groups had long decried the 
absence of Caledonian voices on radio and television.  This absence was read as 
affirmation that state broadcasting’s mandate in the territory was clearly imperial. 
 
The relationship between French imperialism and New Caledonian broadcasting 
began with the introduction of radio in the colony.  Brou writes that radio was first 
heard in New Caledonia in 1931 during the opening of the colonial exposition at 
Vincennes in France.  The transmitter built at Pontoise for the occasion was 
intended for broadcasting to the colonies and Brou writes that the signal was clearly 
received in Noumea (Brou, 1975:54).  This was not the case for subsequent 
broadcasts despite the construction in 1938 of a short-wave transmitter at Essarts-
le-Roi (Brou, 1976:65).  The disappointing reception was one factor in encouraging 
the development of a local radio service.  Radio Noumea was originally established 
as a private concern by local entrepreneur M. Gaveau, and began broadcasting on 
28 May 1937 (Brou, 1976:58).  Although emanating from Noumea, Radio Noumea’s 
designs were unwaveringly imperial.  Only months after the service began, Mr 
Gaveau doubled his transmitter strength so that his programs could be better heard 
in America, Australia, New Zealand and throughout the Pacific, dubbing his station 
‘The voice of France in the Pacific’ (Bulletin du Commerce, 8/2/38; Brou, 1975:66).  
During the war, control of the station was transferred to the local administration’s 
information service which retained significant control into the post-war period. 
 
By the 1950s there was considerable dissatisfaction over official control of Radio 
Noumea, relating primarily to the refusal of the administration to allow local 
politicians access to radio broadcasts on the grounds that they were not members 
of metropolitan French national parties (PIM, April 1970:103).  This dissatisfaction 
precipitated an incident in 1958, described by Brou as the ‘radio coup’, in which a 
group of eight to ten men, including four or five local senior politicians, who were 
frustrated over official media control, seized control of the station in order to make 
an on-air declaration (Brou:86-7).3  Thompson and Adloff write that in the absence 
of local political voices, news broadcasts consisted mostly of official communiques 
                                                          
3 Thompson and Adloff write that the administration assumed full control of the station in 1958 
(Thompson & Adloff, 1971:505).  I was unable to find any reference to the ‘radio coup’ in La France 
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 and information.  They added that the station’s ‘failure to report fully the general 
council debates annoyed the conservative members of that body, and its alleged 
slanting of local political news to the detriment of the UC angered Lenormand 
(Thompson & Adloff, 1971:505).  Dissatisfaction over the national government’s 
broadcasting policy in the territory was therefore expressed across the political 
spectrum. 
 
Television, which began on a regular basis in 1967, was similarly under tight 
government control.  Some of the flavour of radio and television programming from 
this period can be gleaned from the columns in PIM of Australian journalist Helen 
Rousseau, who was married to a Caledonian pro-autonomy politician and resided in 
the territory.  Rousseau described state-controlled radio and television in this period 
as ‘very powerful tools in moulding local public opinion, drawing closer identification 
with metropolitan France’.  The programs consisted, she wrote, largely of ‘news, 
interviews and films, prepared in France and covering events in Europe’, providing 
little ‘to suggest that New Caledonia forms part of the Pacific region or that it could 
have its own Pacific identity’ (PIM, April 1973:7).  In advancing this view, Rousseau 
was echoing the sentiments of Caledonian autonomists who viewed self-
government as, amongst other things, a means to nurture a local identity.  The use 
of radio and television to propagate discourses highly favourable to the French 
government and local administration was therefore viewed with particular distain.  
Rousseau writes, for example, that radio and TV carried radio-telephone speeches 
urging a ‘yes’ vote in Pompidou’s 1972 referendum on the enlargement of the 
European Common Market, assuming mistakenly that the autonomists would vote 
‘no’ (PIM, May 1972). 
 
Some changes in state broadcasting in the territory began to occur from the early 
1970s, precipitated by the structural changes in state broadcasting taking place in 
France and the emergence of new political pressures in New Caledonia linked to 
nascent Kanak demands for self-determination.  These reforms appeared aimed at 
staving off the push for autonomy by attempting to demonstrate that the French 
government was attuned to local needs.  It was only in February 1970 that the first 
Caledonian politician, Roch Pidjot, who had held his position as deputy to the 
French parliament for over five years, was allowed to speak on television.  This was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Australe of 1958.  The increase in the administration’s control of the station may have been 
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 more a concession than a policy shift and occurred because Pidjot appeared on 
television with a delegation of three visiting French parliamentarians (PIM, April 
1970).  In 1973 Rousseau was still writing that Caledonian politicians ‘are never 
allowed on local radio or TV to discuss political questions’ (PIM, March 1973).  In 
addition, there was a new focus on local politics.  Two months prior to the territorial 
elections of September 1972, Radio Noumea extended its broadcast time to 16 
hours per day and began including more local news.  Journalists were flown in from 
Paris to assist with the additional broadcasts and some people were recruited 
locally to work as journalists.  Rousseau writes that from this time onwards local 
news featured prominently, although the issue of autonomy was still taboo: 
 
 While Caledonians were kept up to the minute almost on murder trials and 
soccer matches some 20,000 kilometres away, local speculation over the 
Administration or private persons often hit high tension relays on radio 
cocotier (coconut radio).  Now all this has changed (at least within certain 
officially acceptable limits)...a whole battery of metropolitan French public 
servants and scientists are being coaxed out of their bureaux to assure the 
Caledonians that they are there to ‘serve the public’ and to actually give their 
telephone numbers and invite further inquiries (PIM, September 1972). 
 
Local politicians were allowed on radio and television as a matter of general policy 
for the first time during the 1977 territorial election campaign, but the UC was the 
only pro-independence group allowed representation (La France Australe, 27/8/77).  
FR3’s then manager, Roger Le Leizour, made much of the decision to allow local 
political groups broadcast time, acknowledging that: 
 
 For a long time, politicians from Overseas Departments and Territories have 
demanded greater media access in order to get their ideas and programs 
known, as much on radio as on television.  And, it is in response to this 
demand that the administrative council of FR3 has decided to have, not a 
real electoral campaign, but to do interviews with the different candidates 
during the campaign (La France Australe, 30/8/77). 
 
The denial of access to other pro-independence groups elicited threats of judicial 
action from those excluded and the following condemnation from the UC: 
 
 The Union Calédonien protests against FR3’s refusal to allow democratic 
access to radio and television for the principal political formations during the 
electoral campaign.  Brief interviews apportioned in a manner which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
subsequent to, or may have precipitated, the ‘radio coup’. 
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 privileges the parties supported by the administration constitutes an abuse 
which brings into question FR3’s objectivity (La France Australe, 27/8/77).4 
 
From this time onwards, conservative Caledonian politicians began to appear on 
radio and television but the pro-independence movement argued that coverage was 
generally not afforded their representatives.  In an article entitled ‘The TV news 
scandal’ published in La Tribune just prior to Mitterrand’s election, the author 
acknowledged that FR3 news now included local stories but deplored the scantness 
of this local coverage when compared with the time allocated to news from France 
and overseas: 
 
 ...instead of repeating every week the number of unemployed in France, let’s 
begin by giving the number of Caledonian unemployed. 
 It is like that for every event.  It is talked about but succinctly, in a hurry, 
almost apologising when announcing the local segment.  Local, that’s FR3’s 
name for Caledonia. 
 It is spoken about, but through the complacent recital of official 
communiques.  It is spoken about, but always by inviting anti-independence 
personalities.  Have you already seen Pidjot on the TV?  Have you already 
heard interviews with elected indépendantistes?  Have you already seen 
impromptu or otherwise interviews with opposition personalities? (La 
Tribune, May 1981) 
 
One FR3 journalist working in Noumea during the early 1980s commented that this 
skewing of coverage was not only the consequence of the political preferences of 
some individual journalists but was also station policy.  Journalists were told that 
they were not to speak to indépendantistes, a constraint which appears to have 
been readily accepted by most staff.  This censorship fuelled the instrumentalist 
critique.  As one Kanak commented in La Tribune:    
 
 TV: it is the arm of the current government.  They accuse us of being against 
democracy, but it is us who haven’t the right to newspapers, TV, radio - 
that’s their democracy!! (La Tribune, May 1981). 
 
Shortly after Mitterrand’s 1981 election victory, the new Minister for Overseas 
Territories, Henri Emmanuelli, visited the territory and severely rebuked FR3 for its 
censorship of oppositional political groups in a speech to the Territorial Assembly.  
Emmanuelli stated that all political opinions had right of expression on FR3, noting 
                                                          
4 Le Leizour argued that access had been determined on the basis of past election results, but some 
new political groups had been granted access on the grounds that they had been formed by elected 
politicians (PIM, November 1977:37).  
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 that this had not always been the case (L’Avenir, 31/8/81).  This position was 
reaffirmed by the head of FR3 Paris, Guy Thomas, in a visit to the territory two 
months later.  A new manager, Fred Jouhaud, and a new chief editor, André 
Blondet, took up their positions in early 1982, and staffing changes took place.  
Corail commented that all journalists had been told to ‘pack their bags’, but this 
appears to have been an exaggeration, as several journalists remained (Corail, 
16/10/81). 
 
The demands for media reform from the pro-independence movement went beyond 
greater access for its politicians.  In a speech to the Territorial Assembly during a 
debate on a report on broadcasting in the territory, Roch Pidjot argued that the new 
government should find the means to ensure that all the territory’s inhabitants were 
able to receive TV and radio.  He also demanded that programs be broadcast in 
vernacular languages and that local technicians be trained.  L’Avenir commented of 
the broadcasting report that it ‘only gave one opinion, because everyone knows that 
Paris has the power and, no matter what one says, Paris always decides’ (L’Avenir, 
25/5/82).  The Parti Socialist - Nouvelle-Calédonie (PS-NC) argued that the only 
way to circumvent the use of local broadcasting for governmental ends was to 
‘RETURN ... to the country its competence over audio-visual communication’ in 
order to allow the creation of ‘“A CALEDONIAN OFFICE” for radio-television which 
will be the instrument of a Caledonian communication policy’ (Corail, 26/2/82), a 
suggestion which Corail described as ‘crazy’ (ibid). 
 
Shortly after pro-independence politicians gained access to FR3’s programs, Corail 
erupted with claims that ‘the majority are “fed up” with being assaulted each evening 
over the airwaves or on the screen’ (Corail, 5/11/81).  Corail accused the head of 
FR3 Paris, Guy Thomas, of partiality in favouring coverage of pro-independence 
events, citing the air-time given to a pro-independence demonstration.  FR3 was 
prepared, according to Corail, to ‘send out a group of cameramen-sound 
technicians and journalists for 50 demonstrators in the Place des Cocotiers, but to 
totally ignore the pro-French reactions of the majority, expressed by the Melanesian 
population itself’ (Corail, 5/11/81).  The argument advanced by Corail that FR3’s 
coverage of pro-independence events was disproportionately advantageous 
appears to have resonated strongly among anti-independence activists.  At a large 
anti-independence rally in June 1982, members of the crowd were reported to have 
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 shouted out to the FR3 team covering the demonstration to film the grand chief 
Poadja who was being presented to the crowd by one of the organisers.  Les 
Nouvelles reported that people in the crowd shouted:  ‘FR3, film the Melanesian 
who is in front of you!  You film enough of the Palika boys, so film him’, after which 
‘the crowd spontaneously chanted:  Film - Film’ (Les Nouvelles, 28/6/82).5   
 
Combat gave significant coverage to a report on state broadcasting in New 
Caledonia written by the French RPR Senator Charles Pasqua following a visit to 
the territory. According to Combat, the report proved that:  
 
 RFO New Caledonia privileges the REBEL FLNKS TO THE DETRIMENT OF 
THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF Dick Ukeiwé...RFO disinforms, in Noumea 
like in Paris.  Only tough thugs, drug addicts, slobberers, mates and anti-
French racists count on RFFaux (Combat, 12/4/85) 
 
Pasqua’s report went beyond criticism of RFO political coverage to argue that 
coverage of the New Caledonian crisis across all TV stations in France favoured the 
FLNKS.  He cited television coverage in the volatile period from 11 November 1984 
to 10 February 1985 and found that Ukeiwé appeared for 21 minutes in this period 
compared with 53 minutes for the FLNKS (Combat, 12/4/85).  The report went on to 
say that in New Caledonia, on the day prior to the November territorial elections, the 
‘indépendantistes granted themselves 1 minute 22 seconds whereas the RPCR had 
a bare allowance of 49 seconds’.  The report also mocked the manner in which air-
time was divided between the differing political groups in the territory according to 
the rule of partition employed by metropolitan broadcasters known as the ‘three 
thirds’ rule.  This rule specified that news time should be divided in three:  one third 
to government institutions, one third to the political majority, and one third to the 
opposition.  As the report pointed out, this schema became complicated when 
applied to the New Caledonian context, for the first third comprised governing 
institutions in France and New Caledonia and the third, the metropolitan and local 
oppositions.  This resulted in political antagonists being classified as belonging to 
the same group.  Thus, Pisani and Ukeiwé were together in the ‘governing 
                                                          
5 Les Nouvelles appears to have agreed that FR3 reporting did not do justice to the demonstration, 
commenting that FR3 had not mentioned that one demonstrator had been hit by a tear gas canister 
even though two Australian radio stations had mentioned it.  Les Nouvelles continued:  ‘During this 
same television news, the High Commissioner’s tasty communique was read out, but at no point were 
the four points of the motion handed to the High Commissioner cited, and these were, after all, the 
principal objectives of this mass demonstration.  As for the news bulletins broadcast Sunday lunchtime 
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 institutions’ group and Chirac and the FLNKS in the ‘oppositions’ group.  The report 
also criticised RFO’s employment policies, and in particular its alleged side-lining of 
‘undesirables’, presumably designated as such for their political views, and the 
resort instead to contract employment which Combat argued promoted self-
censorship in that journalists wishing to have their contract renewed would see the 
necessity of conforming to predetermined political positions.  Combat accompanied 
its article with a list of RFO staff considered the most politically compromised.6 
 
The Pasqua report illustrated how fraught with difficulty was the notion of balance in 
a volatile political context.  The resort to an analysis of ‘balance’ based on the time 
allocated to different political groupings is a common way of attempting to determine 
equity, but does little to address the different representations of political groups in 
the media.  For example, a short, sympathetic news story is likely to produce a far 
more positive outcome than a lengthy story which imputes negative connotations.  
Moreover, in pointing to the difficulties of group delineation and categorisation, the 
Pasqua report also highlighted a further problem associated with this type of simple 
content analysis; that is, its necessary reliance on notions of groups as relatively 
fixed entities.  Both media representation and group affiliation were, as we have 
seen, highly contested in the New Caledonian context rendering any comparison of 
the time allocated to different groups itself highly contestable.   
 
The pro-independence media did not contest these figures suggesting that the 
movement believed that access during the period covered in Pasqua’s report and, 
more generally, during the period of Socialist government was adequate.  But the 
pro-independence press nonetheless remained critical, as we have seen, of aspects 
of RFO’s programming, decrying, for example, journalists’ presentation of 
information from the military or administration as fact and the prevalence of 
conservative political commentary on radio.  By late 1985 Bwenando commented 
that RFO’s ‘extreme-right orientations are more transparent than ever’, referring to 
commentary from the ‘trio that doesn’t make us laugh, ZAJAC - CHAVELET - 
QUEMENER’ (Bwenando, 6/12/85 & 20/12/85).  The decision to allow commentary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
on Radio Noumea, the demonstration and march of the day before weren’t even mentioned’ (Les 
Nouvelles, 28/6/82). 
6 Combat pointed in the photo to Dominique Gonod, chief television editor Jean-Francois Luciani, Fred 
Jouhaud, and assistant television editor Armand Petit, and added the names of Dupart and Murraciole 
whom Combat argued had worked in Corsican television where he had supported the independence 
movement (Combat, 12/4/85).   
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 from journalists who were renowned for their political conservatism may have been 
an attempt to win support within the anti-independence community in the lead-up to 
a national election in which it was expected that the Socialists would fare poorly.  
RFO could demonstrate that the Socialist government was concerned to give voice 
to antithetical political views.  But there were probably other reasons why RFO’s 
programming under Socialist government influence was less than editorially 
homogeneous, which relate more to the legacy of conservatism within the state 
broadcasting organisation and the types of work practices employed in the news 
room which rendered difficult centralised control of all news product.   
 
Journalism and news production at RFO 
 
Until the broadcasting changes brought about by the Socialist government in late 
1981 and early 1982, broadcasting in New Caledonia had been carried out by a 
deeply conservative institution structured around an ethos of imperial servitude and 
a contemptuous disregard for local experience.  While significant changes occurred 
after 1981, a legacy of conservative influence remained.  Certainly, some journalists 
left, but others stayed for an array of personal and professional reasons.7  The 
support staff, however, most of whom were hired from within the local European 
community, did not change significantly, and their contribution to the creation of a 
conservative political culture in ORTF/FR3/RFO-NC should not be underestimated.  
After 1981 there remained journalists and others who held conservative political 
convictions alongside newly recruited and, according to Corail and Combat, socialist 
management and journalists.  A further change which took place was the hiring of 
two Melanesians, Joseph Cahié and Wallès Kotra, to work as journalists.8  Kotra in 
particular was known within the anti-independence community for his pro-
independence views, which earned him the description in Combat as a ‘precious 
collaborator’ (Combat, 31/10/85) and in Corail as a ‘token indépendantiste agent’ 
(Corail, 18/1/83).   
                                                          
7 We might assume that locally hired staff would be less mobile than staff transferred from RFO Paris.  
Claude Tissandier was one locally hired journalist who remained after 1981.  Others, although not 
locally born, refused offers of relocation.  This appears to have been the case with Michel Quemener.  
One management strategy in situations where journalists did not take up offers elsewhere was to give 
these journalists new tasks within the station.  Thus, following the re-election of a Socialist 
government in France in 1988, Quemener was shifted away from political news reporting back to 
sports reporting whence he had come in the early 1980s.  Corail commented that another strategy was 
to send old journalists back to France for training (Corail, 30/4/82). 
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This heady political mix of journalists and other workers at RFO probably gave rise 
to significant management difficulties.  In May 1982 Les Nouvelles reported that all 
was not well at FR3 and workers went on strike in late 1983 complaining about ‘the 
jobs for the boys’ in relation to hiring and ‘the creation of non-budgeted positions’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 6/5/82 & 29/12/83), suggesting that new staff may have been hired 
to circumvent the staffing rigidities resulting from some staff choosing not to take up 
offers of employment elsewhere.  Another consequence of this journalistic mix was 
a difficulty in controlling the media product.  Journalists who readily accepted the 
idea that pro-independence groups should be excluded from media access were 
likely to have difficulty making the transition to the new editorial exigencies.  The 
legacy of their personal convictions was no doubt at times evident in their media 
product.  In addition, journalistic work practices produced openings for the 
articulation of political preference.   
 
A convention within French broadcasting is that journalists in radio and television 
not only produce radio and television news stories but also present the news 
bulletins.  Within RFO, different journalists were assigned presentation on certain 
days.  These journalists had considerable influence over the content and structure 
of the news bulletins.  Not only did they produce some stories themselves, but they 
also wrote linking passages between stories.  The level of intervention of the chief 
editor probably varied.  Individual stories may have been vetted, but this may not 
have always occurred given the severe time pressures associated with the 
compilation of bulletins. Constant vetting may also have been deleterious to staff 
morale.  Its undermining of professional autonomy may have increased tensions 
among journalists, resulting in pressures on chief editors to intervene less frequently 
in the interests of staff morale.  These tensions allowed for some variation in tone 
and emphasis and the emergence of comments considered by some commentators 
to be decidedly aberrant.  L’Affreux Jojo, for example, was scandalised at Kotra’s 
introduction to a press release -  ‘And now, a communique from the government of 
Kanaky’ - and another journalist’s comment, during Mitterrand’s visit to the territory, 
that there were now ‘Three presidents in Kanaky’, referring to Mitterrand, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Corail was severely critical of the reporting of these two Melanesian journalists.  In typical fashion, 
their names were both misspelt in Corail  (as ‘Chayet’ and ‘Cotra’) (Corail, 12/3/82).  Elsewhere, Corail 
spelt Kotra’s name ‘Kodja’ (Corail, 10/6/84). 
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 President of the Territorial Assembly, and the President of the government of 
Kanaky, Jean-Marie Tjibaou (Les Nouvelles, 15/1/85 & 18/1/85).9 
 
RFO and the return of conservative government 
 
The re-emergence of conservative partisanship within RFO after the conservative 
victory in the French national elections in 1986 was greatly facilitated by both the 
continuing presence of journalists who had worked at the station prior to 1981, and 
an institutional ethos which had been shaken but not shifted during the five years of 
Socialist government.  Staffing changes once again took place and a new manager 
was appointed.  By late 1986 Bwenando was questioning where all the talented 
journalists had gone, lamenting that in their absence:  ‘We lapse into the 
QUEMENER, GIROLD defectives and, to finish it off, Mémé BEAUCHAMPS...’ 
(Bwenando, 30/10/86).  Bwenando’s description of Beauchamps was both cutting 
and revealing of the patriarchal views of its author and, we might suspect, those of 
many men within the pro-independence movement:10 
 
 You had to see this grimacing bag in ecstasy, jiggling in her seat while 
‘covering’ CHIRAC’s arrival.  She had half-a-dozen orgasms during the 48-
hour passage of her dear prime minister.  In France, she was put out to 
retirement, but for Noumea she is still good (Bwenando, 30/10/86). 
 
L’Avenir suggested that Beauchamps and other new staff were National Front 
members (L’Avenir, 18/8/87) and questioned the fate of Joseph Caihé who, they 
claimed, was heard on radio but no longer seen on television.  Was he too tanned, 
they queried (L’Avenir, 18/8/87).11   
 
The pro-independence press accused RFO once again of censoring oppositional 
views, claiming that the station ‘has given instructions to boycott everything that is 
indépendantiste’ (L’Avenir, 26/3/87) and was ‘filtering’ information to the point that, 
                                                          
9 The trade-off between external political pressures and organisational imperatives was rendered 
increasingly problematic in a context of acute political turmoil, such as existed in early 1985.  RFO 
was at this time reportedly under pressure from Pisani to minimise perceptions of the extent of the 
FLNKS insurrection by not reporting on certain events, and L’Affreux Jojo described RFO as 
‘remarkably obedient’ to the Socialists, alleging that the station refused to broadcast a communique 
from an RPCR politician on the grounds that it was a personal attack on Pisani (Les Nouvelles, 
21/1/85). 
10 Parry writes of the use of patriarchal positions in anti-colonial discourses, commenting that their 
retention ‘points up the inadvisability of using the sources to write an optimistic narrative of liberation 
struggles as “ideologically correct”’ (Parry, 1993:179). 
11 L’Avenir named Simonin and Desplage as National Front members (L’Avenir, 18/8/87). 
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 ‘at some time, the Caldoches themselves will know less about Caledonia than the 
French’ (L’Avenir, 10/4/87).  Bwenando’s claim that RFO ‘has never been so low’ 
was supported in the pro-independence press by figures which ostensibly 
demonstrated that the RPCR received four times the amount of air-time given to all 
pro-independence groups, and that the RPCR and the government received more 
than 90 per cent of broadcasting time (L’Avenir, 15/5/87).12   This assessment of 
broadcasting time formed the basis of a formal complaint to the national regulatory 
body, the National Commission of Communications and Liberties, established by the 
Chirac government to oversee issues of media concentration and broadcasting 
access.  In its submission, the FLNKS took issue with RFO’s figures for the period 1 
April - 31 July 1987, arguing that certain interventions were counted as part of the 
opposition when they should have been included with the local majority and 
concluding that the RFO figures were ‘a curious way to establish a balance!’ 
(Yéiwéné Yéiwéné submission, 21/8/87).13  It was also argued that three 
documentaries on the independent south Pacific states of Papua New Guinea, Fiji 
and Vanuatu, commissioned by RFO and written and presented by Tierry 
Desjardins, should be included in the time allocated to the majority.  L’Avenir 
described the themes of Desjardins’14 documentaries as: 
 
 NEW GUINEA:  a barbaric and wild anthropophagic people   
 FIJI - xenophobic and racist people  
 VANUATU - independent, but at the pay of Cuba and the Soviets (L’Avenir, 
18/8/87). 
 
                                                          
12 Bwenando claimed that on RFO news of 29/11/86, during which violent events at Thio were reported 
on, Pons, Lafleur and Lèques received 9 minutes 12 seconds broadcast time while Tjibaou received 
35 seconds:  ‘Only the local right’s thesis was presented, because the facts broadcast by the FLNKS 
were never mentioned (procession of armed RPCR, the first and numerous shots fired by RPCR 
fascists against kanaks and the Mouledons family)’ (L’Avenir, 29/11/86). 
13 The pro-independence movement’s resort to an analysis of content based on the time allocated to 
different political groups was clearly a strategic response which sought to tap into the dominant modes 
of assessing balance within broadcasting organisations and the broadcasting regulatory authority.  
However, at an epistemological level it was somewhat incongruent.  The notion of a quantitative 
assessment of merit had been the source of considerable critique within the movement.  The claim to 
a ‘Kanak independence’, for example, was based on the claim of the superior rights of the indigenous 
people even though they constituted a numerical minority in the territory.  Similarly, the frequent resort 
to numerical comparisons of numbers of pro- and anti-independence demonstrators was criticised by 
Tjibaou on the basis that there was no equation between numerical strength and moral rights. 
14 Barbançon describes Desjardins as the ‘master thinker’ of the pieds-noirs in New Caledonia and 
writes that he was ‘a metropolitan Le Figaro journalist...one of whose first claims to fame was the 
publication in this daily of an article entitled “Kanak culture doesn’t exist”.  This article was followed by 
a book where sentences like this can be read:  “What is distinctive about Kanak culture is its 
anthropophage tradition’, or ‘Kanaks use languages made up of a series of onomatopoeias and animal 
cries”.  This bit of anthology earned him a television series on the independent South Pacific states, in 
which the mostly Melanesian citizens are presented like sub-men’ (Barbançon, 1992:60). 
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 Desjardins’ documentaries formed part of what Barbançon called a ‘televised 
bludgeoning’ during the six months leading up to the September 1987 referendum 
on independence (Barbançon, 1992:61).   Bwenando commented that this included 
saturation publicity urging participation under the slogan ‘votez dur, votez mou, mais 
votez dans le trou’ (vote hard, vote soft, but vote in the hole) which was authorised 
by what Bwenando described as an obscure Centre for Civic Information 
(Bwenando, 11/9/87).  Bwenando pointed to RFO’s coverage of the referendum 
results, and in particular the results for the small island of Belep, as an illustration of 
the extremes of farcical sycophantism reached by RFO in the post-referendum 
loyalist euphoria.  Bwenando reported that one journalist had announced that:  ‘At 
Belep, the largest electoral victory...100% of voters said ‘yes to France”’.  This 
resounding victory had not, Bwenando argued, been difficult to attain as only two 
people on the island had voted (albeit ‘for France’), the remaining 98 voters having 
abstained (Bwenando, 29/9/87).15 
 
RFO and the Matignon accords 
 
Prior to the referendum a new manager, Alain Le Garrec, was appointed to RFO-
NC.  The period of Le Garrec’s appointment is somewhat perplexing from a strictly 
instrumentalist view of the political functioning of RFO.  Prior to Le Garrec, periods 
of appointment as manager had corresponded with the tenure of national political 
parties.  New directors had been appointed in 1981 and 1986 corresponding with 
the change in government which occurred at each of these times.  Le Garrec, 
however, was appointed during a period of conservative government, yet continued 
throughout the period of Socialist government until his transfer to RFO Tahiti in 
1991, which meant that he presided over the station prior to and following the 
Matignon accords.  This was a period in which RFO’s editorial policies shifted 
significantly away from the anti-independence triumphalism of the pre-referendum 
period towards a new engagement with notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘balance’ in 
keeping with what came to be described as the ‘spirit of the Matignon accords’.  
One reading of Le Garrec’s appointment in August 1987 was that RFO management 
in Paris itself believed that the editorial orientation pursued within RFO-NC had 
become excessively transparent and that, in the longer term interests of maintaining 
                                                          
15 L’Avenir argued that a similar interpretive strategy had been used by RFO following the legislative 
elections.  RFO had announced that 100 per cent of the community of Pouebo had voted for the 
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 some vestige of credibility regarding state broadcasting’s ability to represent 
divergent views, changes needed to be made.  Such reasoning is in keeping with a 
more structuralist view of the state which conceives of the state’s service to political 
and economic interests as premised on the maintenance of some popular belief in 
the state’s neutrality and its will to serve a plurality of interests (Mosco, 1982).  
Editorial extremism on RFO did nothing to advance the thesis that the French state, 
through its agencies, acted in the long-term interests of all in New Caledonia or to 
refute the instrumentalist thesis advanced by Yann Céléné Uregei at the United 
Nations in May 1987, that RFO was one of the pillars of French colonialism.    
 
In interview, Le Garrec spoke of the difficulties he experienced in his attempts to 
broaden access on radio and television from late 1987.  According to Le Garrec:16 
 
 We had to fight, to suffer pressures and even things which could appear as 
threats, with attempts to intervene through ministers or superior powers in 
order to get rid of this or that person in charge deemed a little too 
independent...The battle was difficult, but I have to say, it also benefited from 
the Matignon accords since, from that moment, political relations in the 
territory changed so much that, finally, what RFO had been doing for several 
months before the Matignon accords, provoking more and less nervous 
reactions, finished by being accepted (Le Garrec interview, 22/11/89). 
 
Changes to broadcasting in the territory were foreshadowed in the Matignon 
accords.  The general issues of principle outlined in the accord documents were 
heavily grounded in pluralist discourse.  The government committed its regulator, 
the CNCL (Commission Nationale de la Communication et des Libertés), to ensure 
that ‘the means of public communication respect pluralism in news and program 
diversity with regard to the different communities of the Territory’ (De la mission du 
dialogue aux accords de Matignon, 1988:7).  In a speech at Hienghène, Prime 
Minister Rocard added that ‘objective and quality news is a political and cultural 
necessity for New Caledonia’ and foreshadowed the hiring and expeditious training 
of Melanesians as journalists and technicians ‘so that news is the reflection of all 
communities’ (Du temps du pardon au temps du partage, 1988:23).  In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
RPCR candidate Maurice Nénou, omitting to inform its listeners that  98 per cent of the community 
had abstained (24/6/88). 
16 At this time, he argued, the RPCR had an expressed desire to control the station and the FLNKS 
was refusing RFO access to their press conferences on the grounds that they felt boycotted by the 
station.  Le Garrec said that it took several months for the FLNKS to observe that RFO’s mentality had 
evolved, ‘that changes in their interest had occurred and that there was no longer reason to boycott 
RFO’. 
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 Rocard declared that all programs ‘should be adapted to take into account the 
cultural and social realities of the territory, which isn’t the case at present’ (ibid). 
 
While Rocard’s comments may have seemed reassuring to many who felt politically 
and culturally marginalised by their lack of representation on RFO programs, they 
masked, of course, a range of complex contestations.  While pluralist discourse had 
been one of the primary resources drawn on by most political groups in their critique 
of state broadcasting, there was, as we have seen, no consensual position on what 
pluralism meant.  Even Rocard’s notion of New Caledonia as a multi-community 
entity which RFO was required to ‘reflect’ was a highly political utterance in its 
categorisation of the ‘Kanak people’ as a ‘community’, a categorisation which 
Kanaks had long rejected on the basis that it did not recognise their status as ‘first 
occupants’.  Moreover, Rocard’s suggestion that these ‘communities’ were self-
evident apparitions which could be mirrored off the camera’s neutral gaze, rather 
than discursively constructed and contested entities - not the least through the 
media itself - seemed to constitute a wilful disregard for the centrality of the struggle 
over identity in the broader political struggle which had been taking place.   
 
But Rocard’s comments fell short of a classic pluralist discourse on media diversity 
and objectivity in suggesting that the hiring of Melanesians would allow RFO to 
better reflect all communities, by which we might assume he meant the ‘Melanesian’ 
community.  This was an important shift by virtue of its conceding that journalists 
were not neutral arbiters and that ‘Melanesians’ might therefore be better able to 
reflect the ‘Melanesian’ community.  But in a ‘community’ which was politically 
divided, the essentialist presumption that a Melanesian, no matter what her/his 
political views, could better represent this community because of, perhaps, some 
shared cultural essence showed a naivety which was not lost on the pro-
independence movement.  The question of who would be hired for training by RFO 
was watched closely by the FLNKS.  While the choice of Melanesians was 
ultimately not contested because it included FLNKS activists, the inclusion among 
those hired of non-Melanesians generated considerable opposition.  The statement 
on the need to hire more ‘Melanesians’ in the official Matignon documents had been 
translated into a directive to RFO that it hire 10 ‘Caledonians’.  According to Le 
Garrec, specifying employment for Melanesians was racist and therefore anti-
constitutional.  Of the 10, RFO hired what Le Garrec described as ‘7 Melanesians 
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 and 1 métis’, suggesting that the remaining two were European. The FLNKS 
expressed its anger at what it argued was a wilful subversion of understandings 
reached in the accord negotiations that those hired would be ‘Melanesian’.   
 
This example once again highlights the significance of the struggle over identity to 
media practice.  The media were not only affected by the manner in which group 
identity was constructed; they were also major sites of its construction.  This 
interrelationship suggests one mechanism through which journalists at RFO may 
have been able to reconcile their engagement with notions of professional practice 
and their exclusion of Kanak and other voices in the pro-independence movement.  
The discursive marginalisation of these others enabled their exclusion from the 
realm of legitimate discourse and therefore from professional media practice.  One 
could be professional and not speak to Kanaks if one viewed Kanaks as illegitimate 
participants in the territory’s political processes.   
 269
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 CHAPTER NINE - THE POLITICS OF METISSAGE 
 
Colonialism might be conceived of as a bipolar society of coloniser and colonised, 
but the experiences of colonialism produced a far more complex set of relationships 
of power which rendered problematic the definitive placement of some individuals or 
groups in such a bipolar schema.  In New Caledonia, as elsewhere, the settler 
population personified much of this complexity.  While there existed settlers whose 
wealth and political influence exhibited many characteristics of a comprador class 
engaged in facilitating the maintenance of colonial relations and, in the process, 
benefiting personally from such engagement, the majority of settlers could claim no 
such political or economic position.  Many were people of very modest means while 
others might be said to constitute an urban or rural underclass.  Many in the interior 
lived a near subsistence lifestyle and their physical proximity to Melanesian 
communities and the similar, although far from identical, experiences of material 
deprivation resulted in the adoption of aspects of Melanesian agricultural and 
cultural practice.   
 
This hybridity was facilitated by the relatively frequent practice of métissage 
(interracial union) between settlers and Melanesian women.  The identity of the 
children of such unions was particularly ambiguous.  The father bestowed upon 
these children the identity of ‘European’ when they were brought up in the settler’s 
household, despite the frequently dark tones of their skin and the very significant 
cultural influence of their mother.  But this claim to being ‘European’ was open to 
contestation by those who considered themselves less touched by such genetic or 
cultural influence.  In informal discussions during my 1989 fieldwork in Noumea with 
business and tradespeople who had migrated to New Caledonia from France, I was 
particularly struck by the derogatory manner in which the Caldoches were 
described, exemplified in the description of the Caldoches as ‘white Kanaks’.1   
                                                          
1 I recorded in my notebook the following comments made by a metropolitan French couple who 
owned a laundry in Noumea and who had been resident in the territory for about 10 years.  Their 
discourse echoed that which I had heard with some frequency prior to my discussion with them.  I tried 
to record their main statements:  ‘I am not a Caldoche’; ‘the Caldoches are stupid’; ‘they are white 
Kanaks’; ‘the Caldoches are worse than Kanaks’; ‘Caledonia would be nothing without France’; ‘the 
wealth of the country comes from France’; ‘Kanaks can’t be exploited because they don’t work; they 
have an idyllic life but they still keep complaining’; ‘show me a people in the world which is more free 
than the Kanaks’; ‘the money circulating in the Provinces is all because of the benevolence of France’; 
‘there are many métis in Caledonia and they don’t know if they are one thing or another’; ‘Kanaks will 
put all the whites out of the country and the situation will be fucked like it is in Vanuatu’ and  ‘we are 
not racists’. 
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 Such a description suggested that the assertion of ‘Europeanness’ by settlers, 
particularly those of interracial unions, was a claim rather than a statement which 
was necessarily broadly concurred with by the French immigrant population.  It was, 
in effect, a strategic intervention in a symbolic field in which the identity of these 
settlers was constantly being contested; in other words, a political assertion which 
proclaimed the lingering superiority of this domestic unit over its Melanesian 
counterpart.  But this assertion could never elide the very complex identifications of 
such settlers, who claimed to be ‘European’ but whose material and cultural 
circumstances linked them experientially to the surrounding Melanesian 
communities.   
 
At one level, the notion of hybridity might well be apt in explaining the cultural 
blending which resulted from métissage, particularly when discussing the types of 
domestic practices which resulted from the different cultural influences.  But it 
seems to me that the notion of hybridity is not fruitful when discussing the type of 
complex identity constructions produced by settler métissage in New Caledonia; for 
hybridity suggests a certain accommodation between different cultural influences 
which, over a process of time, become reconciled in a new type of blended, yet 
discrete, identity.  Certainly, more stable identity formations can occur in more 
hegemonic political contexts, but the political volatility in New Caledonia during the 
1980s allowed for no such reconciliation.  Indeed, this context rendered the 
fragmented nature of the settler métis identification more transparent and politically 
contentious as the territory divided between the primarily European population who 
opposed independence and the primarily Kanak population who supported it.   
 
Métissage in New Caledonia 
 
Ann Stoler has described métissage as the ‘fault line’ of colonial authority in its 
linking of ‘domestic arrangements to the public order, family to the state, sex to 
subversion, and national essence to racial type’, arguing that métissage ‘might be 
read as a metonynm for the biopolitics of empire at large’ (Stoler, 1995:13).  Stoler’s 
discussion of colonial policy on métissage in French Indochina and the Netherlands 
Indies in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century points to the 
manner in which colonial authority attempted to contain this ‘fault line’ through an 
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 inclusionary rhetoric which nonetheless masked a range of exclusionary practices.2  
In the Netherlands Indies, the inclusionary rhetoric came to link nationality with 
cultural competence, not genetic racial characteristics, thereby opening up 
nationality to new sections of the métis population.  In New Caledonia, a similar link 
was forged.  ‘European’ identity was linked with culture as opposed to racial 
characteristics, but, rather than a requirement of cultural competence, a 
demonstration of cultural allegiance was what was required to secure the status of 
‘European’.  This less proscriptive attitude to the cultural attributes of the métis 
population may have emerged from the difficulties faced by the settler population in 
acquiring extensive cultural competency in situations of geographic isolation and 
material deprivation.   
 
Officially, métis, as a hybrid identity in New Caledonia, did not, and does not, exist.  
Métis either had chosen for them, by virtue of the choice of their parents or parent) 
or themselves chose to be either ‘Melanesian’ or ‘European’, depending on their 
cultural circumstance or allegiance.  We could imagine that this lack of official 
recognition of métissage would serve to heighten the fragmentation of the settler 
métis’ identity.  One had to be either ‘Melanesian’ or ‘European’, officially one could 
not be a bit of both, meaning that there was no official validation for the complexity 
of colonial life which the settler métis experienced.  This official discourse 
contrasted, as we have seen, with more exclusionary categorisations, such as that 
of ‘white Kanak’, which differentiated between ‘Europeans’ on the basis of degrees 
of perceived cultural and racial purity.       
 
The fragmented identity of the settler métis allowed for considerable rhetorical 
flexibility.  The settler métis claim to be ‘European’ was a claim to cultural 
superiority and to the economic and political benefits which being ‘European’ gave 
rise to in colonial society.  But, equally, claiming ‘Melanesian’ affiliation could also 
be rhetorically effective in allowing settler métis to augment their symbolic capital by 
presenting themselves as privileged commentators on Melanesian society and 
politics and, as will be seen, privileged claimants of the land.  This flexibility was 
                                                          
2 Faced with the prevalence of métissage, particularly in the Netherlands Indies, Stoler analyses how 
the imperial state responded to this ‘métis problem’ by determining a range of cultural markers which 
could distinguish those métis who could rightfully claim citizenship from those who could not.  While 
this opened up the possibility of citizenship to many métis, there existed nonetheless a range of 
‘exclusionary practices that restricted access and use of that knowledge by gender, race and class’ 
(Stoler, 1995:144). 
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 also apparent in anti-independence media discourse.  The anti-independence media 
generally mobilised an inclusionary discourse of settler métis as ‘European’, 
avoiding reference to the cultural complexity of their circumstances.  But the anti-
independence media could also switch to a discourse on the settler as métis when 
such an identification was deemed ideologically propitious.   Polysemous identity 
was therefore as rhetorically advantageous as it was ontologically inevitable. 
 
The involvement in late 1984 of a group of at least seven settler métis in the 
massacre of ten Kanaks near Hienghène foregrounded the issue of polysemous 
identity and its relationship to the political struggle around independence during the 
1980s in what I believe to be an unprecedented manner.  In the pro- and anti-
independence media reporting on the massacre and the subsequent trial, those who 
defended and those who indicted the settlers sought an understanding and 
explanation of their gruesome act in the complexities of their identity.  The anti-
independence media gave considerable prominence to the defence’s argument that 
the affinity of the perpetrators with Melanesian culture, and indeed their Melanesian 
‘blood’, absolved them of any intention of killing the Kanaks, thereby invalidating the 
charge of premeditated murder.  The pro-independence media, on the other hand, 
gave prominence to the defence’s argument that the massacre was, in effect, a 
desperate effort by the settler métis to proclaim their ‘Europeanness’ in the face of 
their demonstrable Melanesian affiliations.  Perhaps the strongest statement of this 
thesis came from French anthropologist, Alban Bensa, who, in an article in the 
French pro-independence publication Kanaky, reprinted in Bwenando, argued that 
the massacre had been plotted by a group of ‘pro-French’ ultras in Noumea who: 
 
 ...operated a simple psycho-political mechanism:  land-owning petits colons, 
métis, of limited outlook, decultured and in search of identity, were invited to 
show themselves more European than ever by spilling Kanak blood.  Incited 
to ‘whiten’ themselves by perpetrating the murderous exclusion of blacks, the 
métis could also, after the event, be pushed back into the Kanak camp in 
order that the white roots of the plot disappear.  Elementary deception.  With 
their backs against the wall, the ‘loyalists’ hoist the colours! (Bwenando, 
8/1/88). 
 
Although both the pro- and anti-independence media emphasised the identity of 
these settlers as métis, there was considerable difference in how their métissage 
was conceived of and described.  In the process of conceiving and describing, the 
media was, of course, constructing, and in their constructions of the settlers’ identity 
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 we see the currency of particular discourses on identity and can speculate on their 
possible ideological effects.    
 
The Hienghène massacre 
 
On the evening of 5 December 1984, a group of 17 Kanaks, most of whom were 
returning from an FLNKS meeting in the town of Hienghène to their tribe at 
Tiendanite, were ambushed and gunned down by a group of settlers.  Most of them 
were shot as most attempted to flee the two trucks in which they were travelling, 
which had been forced to stop by a tree trunk placed across the route.  Ten Kanaks 
were killed and four wounded.  The massacre occurred outside the house of a 
settler, Maurice Mitride, who became a suspect along with a group which Les 
Nouvelles described as a ‘clan of métis’ (Les Nouvelles, 10/12/84).  Mitride was 
arrested on 10 December, charged with premeditated murder and imprisoned.   
Contact was made with the remaining six settlers, who had fled Hienghène, by 
judge François Semur who was flown to an agreed meeting place near the west 
coast town of Voh.  The six - Raoul Lapetite and four of his sons, Jess, José, 
Jacques and Jean-Claude, along with adopted Melanesian son Robert Sineimène - 
surrendered to the judge and were flown to Noumea where they too were charged 
with premeditated murder and imprisoned. 
 
On 29 September 1986, Semur, as the examining magistrate, dismissed the 
charges against all seven on the grounds of self-defence and they were released 
from prison.3  Semur’s ruling was appealed by the prosecution, and on 20 
November 1986 the court of appeal reversed Semur’s finding and determined that 
the seven would go to trial.  In justifying this decision, the court of appeal argued 
that the self-defence provision of the penal code was relevant in situations where a 
response was being made to a real and concrete aggression, and noted that in this 
case the evidence suggested that the Kanaks had engaged in no such aggression 
towards the settlers.  Despite the overturning of the dismissal, the seven accused 
were not re-imprisoned.  The case went to trail on 19 October 1987 and the 
proceedings lasted for 10 days.  At the close of the trial, the jury deliberated for only 
a couple of hours (including the time to have a meal) and returned with a finding of 
not guilty on the grounds of self-defence. 
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Media reporting on the massacre 
 
This outline of some of the major events associated with the massacre and the trial 
masks, of course, the existence of many interpretations of these events.  The 
interpretive repertoires which were to be developed by the defence, and which 
ultimately secured the release of the seven accused, began to be articulated in Les 
Nouvelles and on RFO almost immediately following the massacre.  The 
development of the pro-independence movement’s interpretive repertoires was 
more tardy:  Bwenando and Djiido did not then exist and the movement’s active 
political engagement had resulted in L’Avenir and Le Kanak not appearing for a 
significant period.  It was only following the dismissal of charges in late 1986 that a 
special edition of Bwenando on the Hienghène massacre and the dismissal was 
published (November 1986).  This was followed by a second special edition 
published just prior to the trial (14 October 1987).  In addition, editions of L’Avenir 
and Bwenando were published following the verdict and these contained a 
significant volume of analysis of the trial outcome (L’Avenir, 6/11/87; Bwenando, 
17/11/87).  The anti-independence media therefore had a considerable head-start in 
developing and propagating its interpretive repertoires. 
 
What is striking about these repertoires is the congruence between the 
interpretations advanced by Les Nouvelles shortly after the massacre and the 
argument subsequently followed by the defence during the trial.  This congruence 
was marred by only one article in Les Nouvelles, published the day after news of the 
massacre became public in Noumea.4  This was a highly uncharacteristic piece of 
journalism in its pointing to the existence of different interpretations of the 
massacre.  The article began:  
 
 The circumstances of this clash remain hazy for the moment because the 
accounts diverge depending on the political tendency of the witnesses.  It is 
still possible, by bringing together the versions, to try to reconstruct the facts 
as follows (Les Nouvelles, 7/12/84). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
3 Les Nouvelles cites article 329, 2 of the penal code as the article relevant to their dismissal (Les 
Nouvelles, 20/10/87). 
4 L’Avenir pointed to evidence during the trial from Noumea Mayor Jean Lèques that he had been 
informed by telephone of the massacre at 8 pm on 5 December (i.e., only half an hour after it finished) 
as evidence that the massacre had been organised in Noumea (L’Avenir, 6/11/87).  
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 The synthesis which followed was certainly far from beyond contention, but the 
author did proceed to note that the argument advanced by the ‘anti-independence 
side’ that the house of a settler, Henri Garnier, had been set alight by the Kanaks as 
they passed in their trucks had been denied by the doctor who had travelled to the 
scene in an ambulance shortly after the massacre and who had seen Garnier’s 
house intact (ibid).  The uncharacteristic openings in this article may attest to the 
general revulsion which even many who opposed independence felt at the news of 
the scale of the massacre.  Considerable discursive effort subsequently went into 
closing these openings in Les Nouvelles.   
 
There is some evidence to suggest that RFO’s initial coverage similarly 
foreshadowed the argument developed more fully by the defence during the trial.  
The pro-independence movement accused RFO of supporting the thesis that the 
shooting had resulted from immediate provocation from the Kanaks.  According to 
the wife of one of the victims:   
 
 Before knowing the facts, RFO had already taken a position, pretending that 
Kanaks kill whites at Hienghène and that, if there were dead and wounded, it 
was as a result of confrontation - of pitched battle.  When RFO was 
subsequently aware of the facts, it kept the same attitude - the same thesis - 
against all probability - against all evidence (Bwenando, 14/10/87).               
 
The journalist chosen to travel to Hienghène the morning after the massacre was 
Michel Quemener.  Quemener was also the journalist chosen to cover the trial, and 
he gave nightly television reports of the day’s proceedings.  These reports were 
highly partisan in the manner in which they sought to close readings of the 
proceedings around interpretations which concurred with those advanced by the 
defence.  Quemener stressed the heightened insurrectionary activities of the FLNKS 
as justification for the settlers’ resort to violence, arguing that the defence’s 
rhetorical question to the jury -  ‘Do you remember what they had lived through?’ - 
‘summarised the trial well’.  He attempted to explain away inconsistencies in the 
evidence of the accused by arguing that: 
 
 ...if it appeared almost natural for them to express themselves in paramilitary 
terms at the time when, and the expression crops up often, Caledonia was in 
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 a state of war, these remarks appear outrageous these days, with peace 
reigning from the north to the south of the caillou.5 
 
Quemener made no such attempt to explain away the contradictions in the evidence 
of the survivors.  Their evidence, and that of other prosecution witnesses, was 
passed over very briefly.  The scant summary of Tjibaou’s evidence, for example, 
made no reference to most of his major points.6  In his summary of the prosecution’s 
final submission to the jury, Quemener sought to parody the prosecution’s argument 
with comments such as:  ‘He (one of the prosecution lawyers) criticised the French 
presence, that of the gendarmes, of the press, of the preliminary investigation, of 
the public prosecutor and, undoubtedly, others that I’ve forgotten’, suggesting that 
the prosecution’s argument was merely a litany of accusations not worthy of 
retention.  These asides gave a highly partisan reading to Quemener’s nightly 
commentary which is well remembered by many within the pro-independence 
movement.  But, perhaps because his brief was to summarise the day’s 
proceedings, only small sections of his commentary are devoted to developing a 
discourse on the identity of the accused, and his reports are therefore referred to 
only occasionally in this chapter.7   
      
The congruence between the seemingly spontaneous arguments developed in Les 
Nouvelles and RFO and those of the defence point to the efficacy of prior discursive 
work by the anti-independence media and other institutions in allowing for relatively 
consensual readings of events within the anti-independence community.  The 
arguments mounted by the media and the defence - that the accused were acting in 
self-defence and were themselves victims of the laxity of the French Socialist 
government which had not protected settlers - may appear laboured to some, but to 
many within the anti-independence community these were commonsense readings 
                                                          
5 I was allowed to record a sound tape from Quemener’s commentaries and subsequently transcribed 
the material.  The commentaries were undated.  Quotes from them are therefore included without any 
date reference. 
6 No reference was made, for example, to his comments on the massacre forming part of the ‘logic’ of 
colonialism and his criticism of ‘colonial justice’ in the territory. 
7 There were some inconsistencies between Quemener’s report and the report in Les Nouvelles on 
evidence given by Colonel Marchasson, commander of the gendarmes in New Caledonia during 1984.  
Les Nouvelles’ report indicated that Marchasson’s evidence had contradicted that given by other 
gendarmes stationed at Hienghène during the trial who had argued that they had been ordered to 
remain in their barracks and not to use force.  Les Nouvelles’ heading read, ‘Colonel Marchasson 
didn’t convince...’ (Les Nouvelles, 26/10/87).  Quemener, on the other hand, commented:  ‘Colonel 
Marchasson only confirmed what his men said.  On the ground, the gendarmes, whose competence, 
fidelity and humour are not at all in doubt, lived an untenable situation’.  Marchasson was one of the 
‘star’ witnesses and this divergence in reporting is therefore very interesting, and may attest to the 
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 of the massacre and enabled, as we shall see, the ultimate portrayal of the accused 
as heroic identities - the ultimate personification of la Calédonie profonde - and the 
massacre as an act of civic duty.  The weight of this common sense gave little 
chance that the alternative interpretation advanced by the FLNKS media and the 
prosecution during the trial would be found persuasive by the nine jurors, none of 
whom was Melanesian.  While arguing that the massacre was the result of a 
premeditated and calculated plot to murder Jean-Marie Tjibaou, who was expected 
to be returning to Tiendanite with the other Kanaks after addressing the FLNKS 
meeting in Hienghène, the prosecution also engaged in what was described as ‘the 
trial of the trial’ by highlighting irregularities in the gathering of evidence and the 
refusal to charge other loyalist settlers named by the survivors  as having 
participated in the massacre (Les Nouvelles, 29/10/87).8   The prosecution argued 
that these irregularities assisted in justifying the initial dismissal and the ultimate 
acquittal (Bwenando, 17/11/87).  
 
In his address to the court, Jean-Marie Tjibaou foreshadowed the acquittal, arguing 
that it was a logical outcome of the functioning of ‘colonial justice’ in New 
Caledonia, just as the murder of the Kanaks was a logical outcome of colonialism.  
As he commented:  ‘It is logical that you kill us and we await our turn’ (Bwenando, 
8/1/88).9  Tjibaou’s references to the gruesome ‘logic’ of colonialism were seized 
upon by Les Nouvelles as vindication of the massacre and the acquittal.  Les 
Nouvelles decontextualised Tjibaou’s comments, referring only to his ‘unexpected 
assertions’ such as ‘It is logical that you kill us’ (Les Nouvelles, 28/10/87), while 
Henri Perron in his weekly editorial published following the acquittal wrote: 
 
 This acquittal verdict is, without a doubt, a victory for French Caledonia.  But, 
as a matter of fact - and this is the question that everyone was asking 
                                                                                                                                                                          
extent to which Quemener may have sought to tailor the evidence to fit the development of his own 
argument. 
8 Bwenando pointed to the deficiencies in the gathering of evidence which included:  the gendarmes 
arrived at the scene of the massacre over 12 hours after it had occurred; the instructing magistrate, 
Semur, refused the seizure of certain pieces of evidence at the houses of the accused;  Semur 
refused to charge Henri Garnier and his wife despite considerable evidence pointing to their having 
participated in the massacre; he also refused to charge other settlers who survivors claim participated 
in the massacre; during the autopsies, not all bodies were X-rayed and there was therefore no record 
of the number of bullet wounds in all but two of the corpses (one of which had 26 bullets); there was 
still considerable mystery over the arms used; the judge refused a reconstruction of the event at its 
location (Bwenando, 17/11/87). 
9 He continued:  ‘If you want to go that far, we have no place in this session.  We are sadly not on the 
side of the law.  We are already condemned.  Because the verdict that will be given will follow a long 
series of verdicts which have always been situated logically against what we represent’ (Bwenendo, 
8/1/88). 
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 Thursday night - was it necessary to bring the accused in front of the judges?  
Was it necessary to revive the wounds; necessary to hand to France’s 
adversaries such a political platform?  In other words, couldn’t we have 
saved a trial?  That is what, in substance, Jean-Marie Tjibaou - for whom the 
first verdict was logical in relation to French justice - didn’t cease repeating 
(Les Nouvelles, 31/10/87).10 
 
These interpretations of Tjibaou’s comments seem highly disingenuous.  While it is 
tempting to assume that they derive from considerable malice and point to the 
extent of the political engagement of Les Nouvelles, the possibility also existed that 
such interpretations were widely held by many in the audience listening to Tjibaou’s 
comments - people whose ‘logic’ was the common sense which resulted from years 
of discursive effort aimed at legitimating colonial relations in the territory and which 
was supported by colonial institutions such as the territory’s legal system.  The 
reporting in Les Nouvelles was expressive of this ‘logic’ which the paper had itself 
played such a large part in propagating. 
 
The pro-independence press reporting on the massacre drew on the interpretive 
resources which had formed the inventory of pro-independence analysis and 
argument.  Bwenando’s two special editions on the massacre included chronologies 
of ‘the tragedy of the past in the valley of Hienghène’ dating back, in one instance, 
to the ‘taking of possession’ in 1853 and in the other to the exile for seven years of 
the grand chief of the Hienghène valley, Bouarate, in 1857, thereby demonstrating 
that ‘barbaric massacres are a long tradition of the French people’ (Bwenando, 
November 1986 & 14/10/87).  Tjibaou is reported to have read from one of these 
chronologies during his address to the court (Les Nouvelles, 28/10/87).  Most of the 
two special editions was devoted to ‘testimonies’ from the survivors and their 
families to ‘let the Kanak victims speak, as French justice and the right-wing media 
let only the assassins speak’ (Bwenando, November 1986).  Moreover, Bwenando 
sought to ‘situate the affair in its historical and political context ... leaving a large 
place to the resolutions of the UN, to modern international law which takes 
precedence over national law, in order to show that it is the Kanak people that has 
been in a state of self-defence for more than 130 years’ (November 1986).  
                                                          
10 Les Nouvelles reported that Jean-Marie Tjibaou was asked during the trial about comments he is 
reported to have made that the killing of two gendarmes by Kanaks had been ‘logical’.  The paper 
wrote:  ‘Reminding him that he has recently used this frightful word ‘its logical’ when evoking the death 
of two gendarmes, Maître Lergenmuller asked him if, according to him, the shooting in front of 
Mitride’s place was also logical.  And J. M. Tjibaou had this astounding reply:  “Since we are in a state 
of rebellion since 1853, it is logical that you kill us.  I hope that this trial will be the last, but it won’t be.  
There will be others”’ (Les Nouvelles, 28/10/87). 
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The confrontation between these two ‘logics’ during the trial took place within a legal 
setting which, judging by the acquittal, seemed to afford no credence to the 
interpretive schema of the pro-independence movement.  Pro-independence 
discourse, however, was given considerable credence, not only by the prosecution 
and the pro-independence media, but also by the defence and the anti-
independence media.  The presentation of the settlers as métis enabled the defence 
to appropriate key aspects of pro-independence discourse.  In doing so, the 
rhetorical efficacy of the prosecution’s mobilisation of these discourses appears to 
have been significantly undermined. 
 
The ‘clan of metis’ and la Calédonie profonde 
 
Two days after the magistrate’s dismissal of charges against the seven settlers, Les 
Nouvelles published a front-page photo of the seven posing in a line with the 
caption ‘FREE .... but it isn’t finished’.  The placing of the seven in the photo, most 
with arm around arm, suggested the type of solidarity and bonhomie of a football 
team, not a group who had admitted to participating in a massacre and who 
purportedly regretted their actions (Figure 9.1).  Another photo of the ‘line-up’, this 
time less posed, appeared alongside a full-page story on page three along with
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Figure 9.1:  Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86 
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Figure 9.2:  Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86 
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 two smaller photos, one of Maurice Mitride and Raoul Lapetite, and the second of 
Lapetite and one of his sons holding their dog ‘Mustang’ (Figure 9.2).  The page 
three report was headed, ‘With freedom, the Midtide-Lapetites have rediscovered 
nature.  Raoul, the patriarch, will continue writing his memoirs’ (Les Nouvelles, 
2/10/86).  The group photos reinforced this heading, set as they were in a garden 
setting with the group standing on a section of cropped grass flanked by forest.  
Until this point, there had been little discussion in the anti-independence media of 
the accused, except in the brief references to them as ‘métis’.  Most articles had 
concentrated on placing the blame for the massacre on the French Socialist 
government and its representatives in New Caledonia at the time, in particular High 
Commissioner Jacques Roynette.  These photos and the page three article 
therefore largely introduced the settlers to the readership of Les Nouvelles, and the 
paper’s characterisation of the settlers was carried forward into the defence’s 
depiction of them during the trial.   
 
The settlers, and ‘patriarch’ Raoul Lapetite in particular, were presented in Les 
Nouvelles as men of ‘nature’ enamoured with the beauty of the forest and a lifestyle 
living in harmony with their natural surroundings.  Thus, Les Nouvelles commented 
that the proximity of the forest, evident in the photos, was ‘propitious for a serene 
transition from incarceration to a life of freedom, for Raoul Lapetite above all, 
because he is a man of the earth, close to nature, trees, animals, which he has 
happily rediscovered’ (Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86). According to Lapetite, his first act as 
a free man was to ‘look at the trees.  And then the flowers and the nature.  But most 
of all the trees; the same kind that we have at our place, in the mountains...’ (ibid).  
The contrast between the depiction of the serenity of these men and the violence of 
the massacre in which they acknowledged that they participated is striking.  
Presumably, this contrast is instructive in seeking to demonstrate the out-of-
character nature of their violent act and therefore to validate the thesis advanced by 
the defence that the settlers engaged in the massacre only because they were 
pushed beyond the limit of their (the image suggests) considerable tolerance by the 
insurrectionary activity being waged by Kanaks.  The defence’s question to the jury 
in its final address - ‘In their place, what would you have done?’ - suggested that 
nothing distinguished these men from those in the jury who themselves were 
supposed to be the personification of reasonable citizenry.  However, the 
presentation of the settlers was not merely that of common people but rather of 
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 exemplars of a particular vision of Caledonia, la Calédonie profonde, for which 
Caledonian defence lawyer and former conservative politician Georges Chatenay 
said that he spoke during the trial.11   
 
The harmony, peacefulness and affinity with nature expressed in the discourse of la 
Calédonie profonde is clearly evident in the discourse on the identity of these 
settlers.  Indeed, the similarities between the photos and their accompanying texts 
referred to above and the photo and text of la Calédonie profonde discussed in 
chapter four are striking.  The settlers were posing on a domesticated space with a 
luxuriant natural backdrop, just as the farmer was glimpsed by the camera on a 
stretch of domestic space with a majestic backdrop of mountains in the distance.  
Both are colonial scenes in the representation of domesticated space - the cut lawn 
and the cleared land - and there are no barriers between this domesticated space 
and nature.  The natural is, in fact, a progression of the colonial; there is no tension 
between the two, only harmony.  Colonialism has not only created domestic space; 
it has domesticated nature. The settler métis are in effect the personification of this 
harmony:  colonial citizens who nominate themselves as ‘European’ but for whom, 
‘all their life was the bush, deer, hunting, the mountains, dogs’ (Les Nouvelles, 
2/10/86). 
 
This harmony was possible only in a world in which Kanaks were themselves 
domesticated and rendered tame and in the process denied human will and agency 
- a world, in other words, which was effectively gutted of Kanaks as human agents.  
This vision was well expressed in Les Nouvelles’ description of the area in which 
Mitride and the Lapetites lived as ‘the gentle Hienghène valley’ (2/10/86).  This 
imaginative geography was possible only through a denial of the human existence 
of Kanaks whose articulations of their own history and struggle bespoke a far more 
brutal engagement with settlers. 
 
The challenge to this utopian vision, brought about by the increased militancy 
among the valley’s Kanak population, was, in effect, a challenge to the identification 
of these self-proclaimed ‘European’ settlers as the presiders over this colonial order.  
In the anti-independence media’s reporting on the trial, much was made of the 
‘climate of fraternity’ which existed between the settlers and the surrounding Kanak 
                                                          
11 Chatenay:  ‘I am here to talk about my country, this Calédonie profonde that I know well’ (Les 
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 communities, particularly Tiendanite (Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86).  During his television 
report on the first day of the trial, Quemener commented that the major question 
which needed to be answered was:  ‘How people, all of whom are more or less 
métissé and who had lived up until then on good terms with the tribes of the region, 
could have come to such an extreme?’ (RFO).  Mitride told Les Nouvelles that the 
victims had been ‘our best friends’ while Raoul Lapetite had described them as 
‘brothers’ (Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86).  The seeming inexplicability of their act in 
massacring these ‘brothers’ could be understood, according to the defence, only by 
appreciating the transformation which had occurred within the Kanak communities, 
transforming former friends into ‘enemies’.  The situation in the valley was, 
according to one of the defence lawyers, Lergenmüller, worse than war: 
 
 ...because, in war, the enemy is known, while in the situation at the time, no-
one acted in broad daylight.  The worst was that one didn’t know if friends, 
worked on by propaganda, were still friends or if, at night, they transformed 
into enemies (Les Nouvelles, 30/10/87).12 
 
This depiction of the Kanaks as duplicitous characters capable of evil 
metamorphosis ultimately underscored a thesis of the monstrousness of those 
Kanaks who engaged in the political struggle around independence and thereby 
served to validate the treatment afforded them.  The psychiatric report on Maurice 
Mitride, commissioned by the defence, reinforced this Manichean juxtaposition 
between good and evil presented in this depiction.  The psychiatrists described 
Mitride as: 
 
 ...good son, good father, good husband, good worker, good citizen, good 
friend, attached to traditional values, to the land, to honour.  He is moved, 
not by egotism nor by any low sentiment, and when he defends his own (son 
bien), he defends, above all else, the Good (le Bien) (Les Nouvelles, 
20/10/87).   
 
This description equates the massacre with ‘the Good’, and the repeated references 
to Mitride as ‘this citizen’ serve to present the massacre as an act of civic duty by 
ridding ‘the gentle Hienghène valley’ of the evil wreaked upon it by the unexpected 
political metamorphosis of the Kanak.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Nouvelles, 30/10/87). 
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 For the pro-independence press and the prosecution, the seeming incongruence of 
the transformation effected among the settlers who turned upon their ‘brothers’ 
could rather be explained by reference to the psychic disruption which resulted from 
the upsurge of Kanak militancy among the settlers.  As the prosecution argued:  
‘The first reaction of Europeans - the people who chose to be European - was 
amazement.  They weren’t expecting a revolt.  Those who chose this camp forgot 
history.  The others, they haven’t forgotten’ (Les Nouvelles, 29/10/87).  A similar 
thesis was advanced by Bwenando: 
 
 As long as the Tiendanite Kanaks allowed themselves to be had, everything 
went well between them and the colons.  Jean-Marie TJIBAOU said to us 
that his brother LOULOU, the chief of the tribe, had decided that that has to 
stop, because the time of the colons was finished.  It is what the MITRIDE-
LAPETITES and others never swallowed, never forgave (Bwenando, 
14/10/87).   
 
Within this thesis, ‘fraternity’ existed within a structured relationship of dominance 
between ‘Europeans’ and ‘Kanaks’.  This ‘fraternity’ was itself an expression of the 
paternalistic benevolence of la Calédonie profonde exemplified in Raoul Lapetite’s 
comment that he had stayed in the UC for 23 years to help Melanesians (Les 
Nouvelles, 2/10/86).  Such ‘fraternity’ could not, of course, withstand the challenge 
to the relationship of dominance heralded by Kanak militancy.   
 
Métissage and la Calédonie profonde 
 
When Chatenay evoked la Calédonie profonde during the trial he linked this 
imagining directly to the phenomenon of métissage.  It was easy, he argued, to 
‘present Caledonia as two communities in confrontation’.  Turning to the accused, 
he continued:  ‘Look at these white colonialists and you will understand the 
amplitude of the problem’ (Les Nouvelles, 30/10/87).  His fellow defence lawyer, 
Garaud, reinforced this argument, exhorting the court room to:  ‘Look at these white 
settlers!  We haven’t seen them on the front page of the Parisian intelligensia’s 
weeklies.  Sineimène is almost blacker than Jean-Marie Tjibaou’ (Les Nouvelles, 
30/10/87).  The defence’s references to the physical characteristics of the accused 
as métis was presumably intended to sustain the argument which underpinned 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 José Lapetite was reported to have said:  ‘All the Tiendanite lads, even those dead, were my 
friends.  Since 18 November, they had changed one hundred per cent.  Before, we went hunting 
together and I slept at their place.  It’s strange how they had changed’ (Les Nouvelles, 22/10/87). 
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 much anti-independence discourse that the confrontation over independence was 
not racially based.  Garaud’s reference to the Parisian weeklies related to the anti-
independence argument that the overseas press was seeking to present European 
settlers as racists by depicting the struggle as racially based.  For the defence, the 
prevalence of métissage within the European community belied this argument.  
Within this view, métissage attested to the intimacy of relationships forged between 
races, and the acceptance of métis as European demonstrated the depth of racial 
tolerance in the territory.    The defence’s comment about the accused that,  ‘You 
know, they are rich, white colonialists, white, rich and oppressors’, parodied the 
view which the defence considered was advanced by most overseas media by 
invoking the modest material circumstances of these settlers and their manifest 
métissage (cited in Quemener, RFO).  
 
Chatenay’s evoking of métissage when referring to la Calédonie profonde gave 
sociological substance to a geographical imaginary grounded in notions of harmony 
and order.  La Calédonie profonde was as much a place of interracial harmony as it 
was natural harmony, personified in the settler métis and expressed in their bonds 
of ‘fraternity’ with Melanesian communities. The emphasis placed in the anti-
independence media and by the defence on the identity of the accused as métis 
attests to the believed efficacy of the argument that métissage proved that there 
was no racism in the territory and therefore no legitimate grounds for Kanak protest 
and militancy.  While the anti-independence media had long denied the argument 
that its opposition to independence was racist, mostly by articulating a discourse on 
‘Kanak independence’ as racist, the privileging of the issue of métissage as 
exemplifying this argument was a new rhetorical twist.  During the 1970s and 1980s, 
at least in the period up until the initial dismissal and trial, the phenomenon of 
métissage had been relatively absent in public discourse.  The emergence of a 
public discourse on métissage at this time proved, as I argue below, particularly 
efficacious in enabling the anti-independence movement to appropriate key aspects 
of pro-independence discourse as its own, thereby challenging the very basis on 
which the pro-independence movement grounded its claims to legitimacy and 
difference. 
 
Appropriating discourse 
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 Raoul Lapetite said of his ancestors that:  ‘You know, they weren’t racist because 
my father took an indigenous wife, daughter of a grand chief, and me, I’m a métis’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86).  Lapetite’s self-identification here as métis contrasted with 
his more frequent claim at other times to be European.  In discussing Lapetite’s 
ancestry, Les Nouvelles noted that the children of Raoul Lapetite’s father and 
Melanesian mother were métissé, but added the qualification:  ‘However, Raoul 
doesn’t consider himself a métis today.  He is European.  For him, only the father 
counts - descent is only paternal and excludes wives’  (Les Nouvelles, 20/10/87).  
Despite Lapetite’s assertion of ‘European’ identity, little was made of his 
‘Europeanness’ in Les Nouvelles, while considerable effort was vested in 
constructing his identity as métis.  Indeed, much of this construction occurred 
through purported quotes from Lapetite himself, who sought to emphasise his 
Melanesian heritage as proof that the massacre had not been a racist act but was 
rather driven by Kanak political extremism.  Indeed, over the period of media 
reporting on the initial dismissal of charges and the subsequent trial, he increasingly 
de-emphasised his claim to be ‘European’, asserting instead his identity as a métis.  
Following the trial he even appeared to recede from his claim to be ‘European’, 
presenting his ‘Europeanness’ as more a matter of circumstance than will, ‘because, 
with the French, you are acknowledged by your father because of the registry office, 
but there wasn’t any Canaque registry office at the time’ (Les Nouvelles, 31/10/87).     
 
Lapetite’s claims to a Melanesian heritage were sweeping.  He claimed that he and 
his five brothers were the only legitimate customary owners of the land of the 
Windjick tribe in the Hienghène valley and that he was therefore the only legitimate 
owner of this land, not the ‘Tiendanite’ who he described as ‘newcomers’.  He spoke 
fluently the ‘language of Hienghène’ and knew ‘the legends better than certain 
Melanesians’ (Les Nouvelles, 21/10/86).  These claims to a demonstrable 
‘Melanesianness’ were reinforced by the discourse mobilised by Lapetite in his 
discussion of his affiliation with the land which he claimed as his own.  What he 
wanted, he argued, was his land because:  ‘It’s sacred.  We are part of the land’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 2/10/86).  This mobilisation of a discourse on the land which had 
become associated with demands for Kanak independence was, in effect, an 
appropriation of this discourse for a very different imagining.   
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 Through the phenomenon of métissage, ‘Europeans’ were able to claim pre-colonial 
rights to the land, thereby usurping the legitimacy of Kanak claims to prior 
ownership.  By extending ‘European’ ancestry to pre-colonial times, métissage 
dissolved any disjuncture between the pre-colonial and the colonial, thereby 
enabling the type of harmonious continuum implicit in the notion of la Calédonie 
profonde.  Métissage enabled, in other words, much of pro-independence discourse 
to be appropriated to this imagining.  This appropriation was particularly evident in 
the privileging, as we have seen, of the trope of nature in discussions of the 
character of the Lapetites.   
 
Writing of nineteenth century landscape painting, Bernard Smith has commented 
that:  ‘European control of the world required a landscape practice that could first 
survey and describe, then evoke in new settlers an emotional engagement with the 
land that they had alienated from its aboriginal inhabitants’ (cited in Thomas, 
1994:148).  Through the appropriation of Kanak discourse, a type of discursive 
alienation was effected.  This was a means, yet again, of articulating the non-
existence of Kanaks as human.  Within la Calédonie profonde, Kanaks occupied a 
subordinate place in a domesticated space presided over by ‘Europeans’.  Harmony 
resulted from acceptance of this order, which was the natural response as there 
existed no legitimate basis for contestation.  To contest this order would presuppose 
the existence of racial inequity which, the argument went, was disproved by 
métissage.  It would also presuppose that Kanaks had special rights which derived 
from some inherent difference.  But métissage colonised these rights, as indeed it 
colonised Kanak history, by enabling these rights to be appropriated by the 
‘European’ population which, through métissage, could claim Melanesian ancestry 
and traditional rights to the land.  If the basis of claims to ‘Kanak’ identity was the 
notion of difference, then the discourse of la Calédonie profonde, by appropriating 
these differences, denied this identity. 
 
The Other in the discourse of la Calédonie profonde 
 
The massacre demonstrated how abjectly Kanaks were considered by those who 
actively opposed ‘Kanak independence’.  Having no recognition as rightfully human, 
the Kanaks returning in their trucks to their community could be ambushed and 
mowed down with bullets.  The descriptions of the survivors of the brutality and 
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 relentlessness of the massacre is chilling and illustrated, as Bwenando argued, ‘the 
horror of the events and their unfolding’ (Bwenando, 14/10/87).  The pro-
independence movement argued that the acquittal demonstrated that the ‘Kanak 
hunt was now open’.  As Bwenando argued: 
 
 France is putting into place the legal tool which will allow, with impunity, the 
killing of Kanaks - the perpetration of genocide against the Kanak people.  
The Kanak hunt is therefore open, but this hunt is not even regulated (the 
chasing of deer at night with lamps is prohibited) (Bwenando, November 
1986). 
 
Here, Bwenando was referring to evidence from survivors, which was denied by the 
accused, that the settlers used lamps to light up the fleeing Kanaks (ibid).   
 
In the pro-independence press there is repeated reference to this notion that the 
acquittal demonstrated that Kanaks were thought of not as animals but just as some 
form of animal sub-species. Bwenando referred to the recollection of one survivor 
that during the massacre ‘no head of cattle was wounded in the shooting’, 
concluding that this demonstrated that ‘the life of a Kanak is worth less than that of 
a cow’ (Bwenando, 17/11/87).  Following the acquittal, one of the prosecution 
lawyers commented on the dignity of the families of the victims during the trial, 
particularly in the face of highly racist taunts from some Europeans in the gallery, 
and referred to the comment from Celine Tjibaou during her evidence that:  ‘Mister 
President, you didn’t see the bodies.  Even when a deer is killed, it isn’t massacred 
like that’ (Bwenando, 17/11/87).  A commentator writing in L’Avenir, who described 
himself as ‘a convict descendant’, drew a similar parallel between Kanaks and 
hunted animals: 
 
 If poachers had organised a fraudulent night hunt on someone else’s 
property and had killed 10 head of cattle, they would have been condemned.  
For 10 Kanaks, they are acquitted.  It has to be stated:  in New Caledonia, 
shortly after the referendum, a head of cattle is worth more than a Kanak 
skin (L’Avenir, 6/11/87). 
 
The racist taunts from some in the public gallery reinforced the perception among 
Kanaks that anti-independence extremists characterised them as a lower form of 
animal life.  One of the prosecution lawyers referred to a comment from the gallery, 
heard when a survivor was showing the wounds on his stomach, that ‘next time we’ll 
shoot you in the head, fucking monkey’ (Bwenando, 17/11/87).  Under the heading, 
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 ‘The fascist ambience’, L’Avenir gave other examples, including the comment from 
one Caledonian Front member at the opening of the trial that:  ‘when I think that 
during the next 10 days I am going to have to breathe the odour of monkeys’ 
(L’Avenir, 6/11/87).   
 
This mobilisation of the trope of the monkey underscores the notion of Kanaks as a 
failed form of humanity.  This species coexisted through colonialism with Europeans 
and other races which had succeeded in making the evolutionary leap into full 
humanhood.  Within this view, Kanaks were failed humans, and it was this failure 
which rendered them inferior to other animals, such as cattle, who were never in 
contention for an identification as human.  In this regard, Les Nouvelles’ photo of 
Raoul Lapetite and one of his sons posing with their dog Mustang is telling.  The 
signs of affection displayed in this photo towards this loyal, domesticated creature, 
which, we are informed, left Hienghène with the settlers after the massacre, evoke a 
strong contrast with the depth of antagonism which must have engendered the 
massacre of Kanaks.  Perhaps the loyal Melanesian who embraced the colonial 
imagining which found expression in la Calédonie profonde might have evoked 
similar affection.  But Kanaks who wilfully sullied this imagining had reserved for 
them, at the hands of these settler métis, a level of brutality which shocked even 
many who opposed independence for the territory.  As the prosecution argued:  ‘The 
motive of the crime wasn’t fear but hatred towards the Kanak people who dared 
revolt’ (Bwenando, 17/11/87). 
 
 
Polysemous identity and ideological effect 
 
Bensa’s argument that the extreme nature of the settler métis’ barbaric act might be 
explained by the heightened fragility of their identity is persuasive.  This argument is 
lent force by theoretical insights into identity as polysemous and discursively 
constructed.  In media reporting on the massacre we have evidence of the 
engagement of Raoul Lapetite with Melanesian and European discourses as well as 
a discourse on métissage.  Although strategic considerations appear to have been 
primary in his mobilisation of Melanesian and métis discourse, his facility with these 
discourses suggested an experiential engagement with them.  Raoul Lapetite was, 
indeed, European, métis and Melanesian.  The heightened contradiction between 
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 these fragmented selfhoods may well have engendered the brutality of the violence.  
As the prosecution argued, in trying to ‘kill the Kanak in them’ the settlers pledged 
allegiance to the European world ‘by giving it these gruesome guarantees’ 
(Bwenando, 17/11/87). 
 
The massacre demonstrated the potential ideological effect of the discourse of la 
Calédonie profonde.  By denying the human existence of Kanaks, this discourse 
acted as a powerful prop for the maintenance of colonial relations of power.  The 
massacre was, of course, an extreme response to the types of political engagement 
enabled and indeed authorised by this discourse.  But even in less violent 
responses, as indeed in everyday practices and imaginings, a play of domination 
was authorised by the identification of Kanaks as less than human.   
 
I have concentrated on the discourse of la Calédonie profonde because of its 
prominence in the territory’s anti-independence media during the 1980s.  I do not 
wish to suggest that this was the sole discourse enabling relations between 
Europeans and Kanaks, remembering that there were Europeans who supported 
‘Kanak independence’.  Even among those less wedded to this objective, there were 
discursive permutations.  However, the anti-independence media gave almost no 
expression to these alternative discourses on Kanak identity, an omission which 
attests to the degree of their political engagement and therefore their complicity in 
encouraging political violence in the territory during the 1980s. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis I have attempted to demonstrate the central role which the discursive 
struggle played in the political struggle around independence.  In an important 
sense, the media debate was only minimally grounded in a discussion of political 
issues which might normally be considered central to the question of independence.  
Instead, discourses on identity became the battleground on which the discursive 
struggle primarily took place.  For example, in my discussion of the discourse of la 
Calédonie profonde I argued that it was integrally linked to notions of identity; in 
particular, the non-existence of Kanaks and the emergence of a discourse on 
métissage.  This discourse which elided Kanak identity had many discursive 
precedents in New Caledonian colonial discourse.  In response to the denial of their 
existence, pro-independence Melanesians articulated notions of Kanak identity 
which privileged their identity in relation to other identities in the territory.  Central to 
this articulation of identity was the emergence of an internationalist discourse of ‘the 
Kanak People’ - a discourse which conferred on Kanaks not only a privileged 
identity but also special rights.  I have argued that these discourses on identity were 
not merely superstructural phenomena, devoid of relevance to the actual political 
struggle, but were rather discourses which had concrete consequences to the 
extent that they authorised particular forms and strategies of political engagement.    
 
Pointing to the relationship between discourse and engagement is, of course, an 
argument on the material effects of discourse.  But this thesis has also sought to 
elucidate the materiality of discourse in another respect.  In my analysis of pro- and 
anti-independence media institutions - primarily Les Nouvelles, Bwenando and 
Radio Djiido - I sought to consider the institutional mechanisms through which 
media discourses were produced, stressing the discursive pressures which 
operated in these institutions which had a significant bearing on the types of 
discourses which they produced.  My aim was to view these mechanisms as 
pressures, in the spirit of Giddens’ ‘theorem of knowledgability’1 which views us as 
intelligent and purposive agents whose strategic actions nonetheless take place 
within important political, economic and discursive constraints. 
 
                                                          
1 See chapter 2, page 67 of this thesis for the initial reference to Giddens’ theorem. 
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 In analysing these media institutions it was clear to me that the most significant - 
and indeed determining - constraint was that of the experiences of colonialism in 
New Caledonia, which continued to structure the political, economic and discursive 
spheres and which had brought into existence notions of identity which were 
centrally contested in the political struggle.  The differing fates of the main anti- and 
pro-independence publications - the enduring Les Nouvelles and the defunct 
Bwenando - pointed to the differential opportunities available to those media 
organisations which seek to perpetuate colonial relationships compared with those 
which seek to bring about their demise.  The respective fates of these publications 
illustrate the colonial interrelationships between the economic, political and 
discursive spheres - interrelationships which ensured the relentless propagation of 
colonial discourses and which seriously hampered the propagation of anti-colonial 
discourses in many practical ways.   
 
But, as an overarching concern, I have attempted in the thesis to work through and 
apply different theoretical approaches relevant to the analysis of media reporting in 
situations of heightened political contestation.  Essentially, I sought to negotiate 
between two approaches.  The first approach, informed by neo-Marxist 
perspectives, claimed a lingering, if somewhat residual, relevance for the notion of 
ideology and viewed the power of ideological discourse as deriving from the power 
of those groups and interests involved in its propagation.  The second approach 
was more concertedly post-structuralist in its view that discourse has an efficacy of 
its own which transcends its origins.  At the outset of the thesis I outlined what I saw 
to be the major limitations of both perspectives, particularly in the context of their 
relevance to the material I was working on.   
 
The major problem with the first approach was its view of ideology as the discourse 
of dominant groups in society and its near silence on the status of oppositional 
discourse.  Attempting to circumvent this absence in response to post-structuralist 
critiques led to a tendency to conflate the notions of ideology and discourse, 
rendering the notion of ideology, some theorists argued, useless for analytical 
purposes.  A prevalent response to this critique was to shift ideology so that it was 
understood not as a form of discourse but rather as an effect.  However, as I have 
argued, the residual role left for it as an effect meant that it was difficult to apply in a 
work of media textual analysis because it presupposed detailed audience analysis 
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 in order to determine the effects of discourse - a task well beyond the scope of this 
thesis.    
 
I found that the major limitation of the second, post-structuralist approach was its 
lack of attention to the different effects of power of different discourses.  In my 
analysis I found that some discourses appeared particularly efficacious, judging by 
the responses they elicited, while others failed to resonate so strongly with their 
audience.  In a sense, my desire to be able to differentiate between the power of 
different discourses suggested that some notion akin to that of ideological effect 
would be analytically useful.   
 
I believe that my focus on discourses of identity provided a means through which 
these two approaches could be negotiated.  In analysing the creation of identities it 
was possible to assess the effects of these discourses by relating them to the 
tangible forms of political engagement that they authorised.  This enabled me to 
employ the notion of ideological effect while remaining cognisant of the post-
structuralist view that discourse has an efficacy of its own which need not be traced 
back to those groups and interests from which it derives.  While acknowledging the 
post-structuralist critique of the neo-Marxist insistence that the power of discourse 
derives from the power of those enunciating it, at the conclusion of my thesis I have 
formed the view that the differential effects of power between different discourses 
do relate in many instances to differences in the extra-discursive power of particular 
groups.  In the context of New Caledonia, this is tantamount to saying that material 
and other inequities brought about by the experiences of colonialism resulted in the 
discourse of the powerful being frequently more effective than that of subordinate 
groups.  For example, the force of la Calédonie profonde was premised on decades 
of discursive effort aimed at legitimating the marginalisation of Kanaks.  This 
discursive effort was made possible through the imposition in the colony of 
structures of political and economic governance - amongst them the media - which 
subordinated the indigenous peoples.  However, the efficacy of certain pro-
independence discourses, despite the subordination of the Kanak people and the 
pro-independence media’s lack of resources and its organisational problems, 
demonstrates that the relative power of those originating the discourse is not the 
only determinant of its effects.  
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 I have found, therefore, that there is indeed merit in viewing discourse, as Stuart 
Hall2 does, as both constituted and constituting - the product of groups and interests 
but also constituting those groups and interests.  However, in producing effects of 
power, the discourse of the ‘powerful’ is always significantly advantaged by virtue of 
their control, to quote Marx, over the ‘means of mental production’3, achieved 
through their economic and political dominance - a relationship which the pro-
independence movement was always at pains to point out.  
                                                          
2 See introduction, page 28 for the initial reference to Hall’s view of discourse. 
3 Cited in Barrett, 1991:9. 
 298
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES  
 
 
Bulletin du Commerce 
Bwenando 
Canberra Kanaky Bulletin 
Combat Calédonien 
Combat Ouvrier 
Construire 
Corail 
Kanaky 
La France Australe 
La Presse Calédonienne 
La Tribune du Pacifique 
L’Avenir Calédonien 
Le Bulletin du Commerce 
Le Journal de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 
Le Kanak 
Le Reveil Kanak 
Les Calédoniens 
Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes 
Les Nouvelles Hebdo 
L’Evenement 
Pacific Islands Monthly 
Presence:  Information bulletin of the French embassy  
 
 
 299
 BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
 
 
Althusser, Louis (1971) Lenin and Philosophy, New Left Books, London 
Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (1989) The Empire Writes Back:  
 Theory and practice in post-colonial literatures, Routledge, London and New 
York 
Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth and Tiffin, Helen (eds) (1995) The Post-colonial 
 Studies Reader, Routledge, London and New York 
Association pour la Fondation d’un Institut Kanak d’Histoire Moderne, Contribution 
 à l’Histoire du Pays Kanak, Edition IKS 
Balibar, Etienne (1991) ‘The Nation Form:  History and ideology’, Etienne Balibar 
 and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class:  Ambiguous identities, 
 Verso, London New York 
Barbançon, Louis-José (1992)  Le Pays du Non-dit:  Regards sur la Nouvelle-  
 Calédonie, Offset Cinq Edition 
Barker, Francis, Hulme, Peter and Iversen, Margaret (1994) Colonial 
 Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
 and New York 
Barrett, Michèle (1991) The Politics of Truth:  from Marx to Foucualt, Polity Press 
Bensa, Alban (1988) ‘Colonialisme, racisme et ethnologie en Nouvelle-Calédonie, 
 Ethnologie française, XVIII, 2, pp.188-197 
Bobin, Frédéric (1991) ‘Caldoches, Metropolitans and the Mother Country’, paper 
 presented at the France in the Pacific:  Past-Present-Future conference, 
 Australian National University 
Bordier, André (1987) ‘1945:  Chronologie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie’, Bulletin de 
 la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, no. 72, pp. 81-
 86 
Bordier, André (1989) ‘1946-1947:  Chronologie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie’, 
 Bulletin de la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, no. 
 78, pp. 55-67 
Bordier, André (1989b) ‘1947:  Chronologie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie’, Bulletin de 
 la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, no. 79, pp. 59-
 67 
Bordier, André (1990) ‘Chronologie:  Année 1948’, Bulletin de la Société d’Etudes 
 Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, no. 84, pp. 40-48 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) Language and Symbolic Power, Polity Press 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge University 
 Press, Cambridge 
Bourdieu, Pierre and Eagelton, Terry (1994) ‘Doxa and Common Life:  An 
 interview’, Slavoj Zizek, Mapping Ideology, Verso, pp. 265-277 
Brou, Bernard (1975) ‘Chronologie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie de 1925 à 1945 
 inclus’, Bulletin de la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle- 
 Calédonie, no. 25, pp. 33-68 
Brou, Bernard (1976) ‘Chronologie de la Nouvelle-Calédonie:  De 1925 à 1945 
 inclus - suite’, Bulletin de la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-
 Calédonie, no. 27, pp. 59-74 
Brou, Bernard, 30 Ans d’Histoire:  Politique et sociale de la Nouvelle-Calédonie de 
 1945 à 1977, Publications de la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la 
 Nouvelle-Calédonie, no. 31 
Buci-Glucksmann, Christine (1982) ‘Hegemony and Consent’, Anne Showstack 
 Sassoon (ed) Approaches to Gramsci, Writers and Readers, London 
Caute, David (1970) Fanon, Fontana/Collins 
 300
 Campbell, David (1995) ‘The Necessary Impossibility of Democracy:  An 
 articulation of the political possibilities of “Postmodernism”’, Peace 
 Research Centre, Australian National University 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (1995) ‘Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History’, Bill 
 Ashcroft et al. (eds), The Post-colonial Studies Reader, Routledge, London 
 and New York, pp. 383-390 
Chatterjee, Partha (1986) Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World:  A 
 derivative discourse, Zed Books for the United Nations University 
Chesneaux, Jean (1988) ‘Kanak Political Culture and French Political Practice’, 
 Michael Spencer et al. (eds) New Caledonia:  Essays in nationalism and 
 dependency, University of Queensland Press, pp. 56-80 
Connell, John (1987), New Caledonia or Kanaky?:  The political history of a 
 French colony, Pacific Research Monograph no. 16, National Centre for 
 Development Studies, Australian National University 
Coquilhat, Georges (1987) La Presse en Nouvelle-Calédonie au X1Xème siecle, 
 Publications de la Société d’Etudes Historiques de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, 
 No. 38 
Curran, James (1983) ‘Capitalism and Control of the Press, 1800-1975, James 
 Curran et al. (eds) Mass Communication and Society, Edward Arnold, 
 London 
D’Appollonia, Ariane Chebe (1988) L’Extreme-droite en France:  De Maurras à Le 
 Pen, Editions Complexe 
Dornoy, Miriam (1984) Politics in New Caledonia, Sydney University Press 
Eldridge, John (ed) (1993) Getting the Message:  News, truth and power, 
 Routledge, London  
Fabian, Johannes (1986) Language and Colonial Power:  The appropriation of 
 Swahili in the former Belgian Congo, 1880 - 1938, Cambridge University 
 Press, Cambridge, New York 
Fanon, Franz (1968) , Black Skin, White Masks, Grove Press, New York 
Femia, Joseph (1981) Gramsci’s Political Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
FLNKS, La Charte Du FLNKS.  Les Motions de Tous les Contres.  Les Decisions 
 du Gouvernment Provisoire de Kanaky, EDIPOP 
Foucault, Michel (1972) ‘The Discourse on Language’, Michel Foucault, The 
 Archaeology of Knowledge, Pantheon Books, New York, pp. 215-237 
Foucault, Michel (1980) Power/Knowledge, Harvester Press, Brighton 
Foucault, Michel (1982) ‘The Subject and Power’, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul 
 Rabinow, Michele Foucault:  Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, 
 Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, pp. 208-226 
Foucault, Michel (1991) ‘Truth and Power’, Paul Rabinow (ed) The Foucault 
 Reader:  An introduction to Foucault’s thought, Penguin Books 
Foucault, Michel (1991b) ‘What is an Author?’, Paul Rabinow (ed) The Foucault 
 Reader:  An introduction to Foucault’s thought, Penguin Books 
Fraser, Helen (1990) Your Flag’s Blocking Our Sun, ABC Books 
Freiberg, J.W. (1981) The French Press:  Class, State, and Ideology, Praeger, 
 New York 
Freire, Paulo (1982) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Books 
Giddens, Anthony (1981) A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 
 1, Power, Property and the State, University of California Press, Berkley 
 and Los Angeles 
Godard, Philippe, Le Mémorial Calédonien, Volume 7, Pacifique Press 
 Comunication 
 301
 Goldie, Terry (1995) ‘The Representation of the Indigene’, Bill Ashcroft et al., The 
 Post-colonial Studies Reader, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 232-
 236 
Guiart, Jean (1985) La Terre est le Sang des Morts:  Nouvelle Calédonie du 
 passé au présent, Editions anthropos, Paris 
Hage, Ghassan (1989) The Fetishism of Identity:  Class, politics and processes of 
 identification in Lebanon, PhD Thesis, Macquarie University 
Hall, Stuart and Jefferson, Tony (eds) (1982) Resistance through Rituals:  Youth 
 subcultures in post-war Britain, Hutchinson 
Hall, Stuart (1985) ‘The Rediscovery of “Ideology”:  Return of the repressed in 
 media studies’, V. Beechey and J. Donald (eds) Subjectivity and Social 
 Relations, Milton Keynes, Open University Press 
Henningham, Stephen (1992) France and the South Pacific:  Contemporary 
 history, Allen & Unwin 
Higgins, John (1986) ‘Raymond Williams and the Problem of Ideology’, Jonathan 
 Arac (ed), Postmodernism and Politics, Theory and History of Literature, 
 vol. 28, University of Minnesota Press 
INSEE - Institut Naitonal de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (1989)  Insée 
Première, no. 41, September 
JanMohamed, Abdul R. (1985) ‘The Economy of the Manichean Allegory:  The 
 function of racial difference in colonialist literature’, Critical Inquiry 12 (1), 
 pp. 59-87 
Jara, Fabiola and Magana, Edmundo (1982) ‘Rules of Imperialist Method’, 
 Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 7(2), pp. 115-136 
Johnson, Richard (1986) ‘The Story So Far:  And further transformations?’, David 
 Punter (ed), Introduction to Contemporary Cultural Studies, Longman, 
 London, New York 
Kuhn, Raymond (1985) ‘France:  The end of the government monopoly’, Raymond 
 Kuhn (ed) The Politics of Broadcasting, Croom Helm, London and Sydney 
Kurtovich, Ismet (1980) L’Affaire N’Goye dans Les Nouvelles Calédoniennes, 
 Mémoire de D.E.A., Institut Français de Presse et des sciences de 
 l’information, Université de Paris II 
Kurtovich, Ismet (1991) ‘Le “What” de Lasswell, exemples calédoniens’, 
 Connaissance et Communication, Actes du troisième colloque CORAIL, 
 Noumea, pp. 189-196 
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy:  
 Towards a radical democratic politics, Verso, London 
Larrain, Jorge (1979) The Concept of Ideology, Hutchinson, London 
Loomba, Ania (1994) ‘Overworlding the “Third World”’, Patrick Williams and Laura 
 Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory:  A reader, 
 Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp.305-323  
Mansfield, Alan (1984) Communications Honours seminars, lecture notes 
Marcus, Jonathan (1995) The National Front and French Politics:  The resistible 
 rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen, New York University Press, New York 
Marcuse, Herbert, Moore Barrington and Wolff, Robert Paul (1968) A Critique of 
 Pure Tolerance, Beacon Press, Boston 
Mathieu, Jean-Luc (1989) La Nouvelle-Calédonie, Que Sais-Je?, Universitaires de 
 France 
McCallum, W. S. (1989) ‘“Caldochie” - A state of mind?, Masters Thesis, 
 University of Canterbury, New Zealand 
McCallum, W. S. (1992) ‘European Loyalist and Polynesian Political Dissent in 
 New Caledonia:  The other challenge to RPCR orthodoxy’, Pacific Studies, 
 vol. 15 (3), pp. 25-58 
 302
 McClintoch, Anne (1994) ‘The Angel of Progress:  Pitfalls of the Term “Post-
 colonialism”’, Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, Colonial Discourse and 
 Post-colonial Theory:  A reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 291-304 
Mills, Sara (1991) Discourses of Difference:  An analysis of women’s travel writing 
 and colonialism, Routledge, London and New York 
Milner, Andrew (199) Cultural Materialism,  
Milner, Andrew (1991) Contemporary Cultural Theory:  An introduction, Allen & 
 Unwin,  
Mishra, Vijay and Hodge, Bob (1994) ‘What is Post(-)colonialism?’, Patrick 
 Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial 
 Theory:  A reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Morley, David (1980) The ‘Nationwide’ Audience, BFI, London 
Mosco, Vincent (1982) Pushbutton Fantasies:  Critical perspectives on videotex 
 and information technology, Ablex Publishing Corp, Norwood, New Jersey 
O’Reilly, Patrick (1955) Bibliographie methodique, analytique, et critique de la 
 Nouvelle-Calédonie, Société des Océanistes, Paris 
O’Reilly, Patrick (1980) Calédoniens:  repertoire bio-bibliographique de la 
 Nouvelle-Calédonie, Musée de l’Hommes, Paris 
Ovington, Michael (1988) ‘The Impact of the Dijoud Plan’, Michael Spencer, Alan 
 Ward and John Connell (eds), New Caledonia:  Essays in nationalism and 
 dependency, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, London, New York,  
Parry, Benita (1993) ‘Resistance Theory/Theorising Resistance or Two Cheers for 
 Nativism’, Peter Hulme et al. (eds) Post Colonial Theory and Colonial 
 Discourse, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
Patton, Paul (1987) ‘Michel Foucault’, Diane J. Austin-Broos (ed) Creating 
 Culture:  Profiles in the study of culture, Allen & Unwin 
Pratt, Mary-Louise (1994) ‘Transculturation and Autoethnography:  Peru 
 1615/1980’, Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen, Colonial 
 Discourse/Postcolonial Theory, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
 and New York 
Purvis, Trevor and Hunt, Alan (1993) ‘Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, 
 discourse, ideology...’, British Journal of Sociology  44(3), pp. 473-499 
Rabinow, Paul (ed) (1991) The Foucault Reader, Penguin 
Ross, Kristin (1995) Fast Cars, Clean Bodies:  decolonisation and the reordering 
 of French culture, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massacussetts 
Said, Edward (1978) Orientalism, Routledge, London 
Said, Edward (1981) Covering Islam, Routledge, London 
Said, Edward (1984) The World, the Text, and the Critic, Faber & Faber, London, 
   Boston 
Said, Edward (1994) Culture and Imperialism, Vintage   
Sénès, Jacqueline (1985) ‘La Vie Quotidienne en Nouvelle-Calèdonie’, Hérodote 
 revue de géographie et de géopolitique, 37/38, April-September 
Simon, Roger (1982) Gramsci’s Political Thought:  An introduction, Lawrence and 
 Wishart, London 
Smith, Anthony (1973) The Shadow in the Cave:  A study of the relationship 
 between broadcaster, his audience and the state, George Allen & Unwin, 
 London 
Société d’Etudes Historiques de Nouvelle-Calédonie (1992) Histoire:  Nouvelle-
 Calédonie-France:  Le manuel scolaire d’histoire, Graphoprint 
Sorbets, Claude and Palmer, Michael (1986) ‘France’, Hans J. Kleinsteuber, Denis 
 McQuail, Karen Siune (eds) Electronic Media and Politics in Western 
 Europe, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York 
 303
 Spencer, Michael (1988) ‘Its Not All Black and White:  The reporting of the 1984-
 1985 crisis in New Caledonia by the French Press, Michael Spencer, Alan 
 Ward and John Connell (eds), New Caledonia:  Essays in nationalism and 
 dependency, University of Queensland Press 
Spencer, Michael, Ward, Alan and Connell, John (eds) (1988) New Caledonia:  
 Essays in nationalism and dependency, University of Queensland Press 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1995) ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ Bill Ashcroft et 
 al.The Post-colonial Studies Reader, Routledge, London and New York 
Stoler, Ann (1995) ‘“Mixed-bloods” and the Cultural Politics of European Identity in 
 Colonial Southeast Asia’, Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, The 
 Decolonization of Imagination:  Culture, knowledge and power, Zed Book, 
 London and New Jersey 
Thomas, Nicholas (1994) Colonialism’s Culture:  Anthropology, travel and 
 government, Polity Press, Oxford 
Thompson, John B. (1984) Studies in the Theory of Ideology, Polity Press, 
 Cambridge 
Thompson, John B. (1988) ‘Mass Communication and Modern Culture:  
 Contribution to a critical theory of ideology’, Sociology, 22(3), pp. 359-383 
Thompson, John B. (1990) Ideology and Modern Culture:  critical social theory in 
 the era of mass communications, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard (1971) The French Pacific Islands:  
 French Polynesia and New Caledonia, University of California Press, 
 Berkeley 
Waia, Nicole (1991) ‘Histoire de Radio Djiido’, paper presented at the France in 
 the Pacific:  Past-Present-Future conference, Australian National University 
 Ward, Alan (1982) Land and Politics in New Caledonia, Political and Social 
 Change Monograph no. 2, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
 National University, Canberra 
Wetherell, Margaret and Potter, Jonathan (1992) Mapping the Language of 
 Racism:  discourse and the legitimation of exploitation, Harvester 
 Wheatsheaf 
White, Hayden (1978) Tropics of Discourse:  Essays in cultural criticism, The 
 Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London 
White, Hayden (1987) The Content of the Form:  Narrative discourse and 
 historical representation, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
 and London 
Williams, Patrick and Chrisman, Laura (eds) Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial 
 Theory:  A reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Williams, Raymond (1977) Marxism and Literature, Oxford University Press 
Zizek, Slavoj (ed) (1994) Mapping Ideology, Verso, London, New York 
 
 
 304
